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authordartraiden <wowemuh@gmail.com>2022-12-22 16:31:20 +0300
committerdartraiden <wowemuh@gmail.com>2022-12-22 16:31:20 +0300
commit47b6881fe726c904f87aa4be059b730ef77954d0 (patch)
treeaa72b213043d3b514c883bc59a0fa0c434106156 /libs/libcurl/src/vtls/openssl.c
parent8fbc9220b7f3d3a04bbe45d32489ef882821558e (diff)
libcurl: update to 7.87.0
Diffstat (limited to 'libs/libcurl/src/vtls/openssl.c')
-rw-r--r--libs/libcurl/src/vtls/openssl.c9601
1 files changed, 4984 insertions, 4617 deletions
diff --git a/libs/libcurl/src/vtls/openssl.c b/libs/libcurl/src/vtls/openssl.c
index ad2efa5586..2142ff5ccd 100644
--- a/libs/libcurl/src/vtls/openssl.c
+++ b/libs/libcurl/src/vtls/openssl.c
@@ -1,4617 +1,4984 @@
-/***************************************************************************
- * _ _ ____ _
- * Project ___| | | | _ \| |
- * / __| | | | |_) | |
- * | (__| |_| | _ <| |___
- * \___|\___/|_| \_\_____|
- *
- * Copyright (C) 1998 - 2022, Daniel Stenberg, <daniel@haxx.se>, et al.
- *
- * This software is licensed as described in the file COPYING, which
- * you should have received as part of this distribution. The terms
- * are also available at https://curl.se/docs/copyright.html.
- *
- * You may opt to use, copy, modify, merge, publish, distribute and/or sell
- * copies of the Software, and permit persons to whom the Software is
- * furnished to do so, under the terms of the COPYING file.
- *
- * This software is distributed on an "AS IS" basis, WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY
- * KIND, either express or implied.
- *
- * SPDX-License-Identifier: curl
- *
- ***************************************************************************/
-
-/*
- * Source file for all OpenSSL-specific code for the TLS/SSL layer. No code
- * but vtls.c should ever call or use these functions.
- */
-
-#include "curl_setup.h"
-
-#if defined(USE_QUICHE) || defined(USE_OPENSSL)
-
-#include <limits.h>
-
-/* Wincrypt must be included before anything that could include OpenSSL. */
-#if defined(USE_WIN32_CRYPTO)
-#include <wincrypt.h>
-/* Undefine wincrypt conflicting symbols for BoringSSL. */
-#undef X509_NAME
-#undef X509_EXTENSIONS
-#undef PKCS7_ISSUER_AND_SERIAL
-#undef PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO
-#undef OCSP_REQUEST
-#undef OCSP_RESPONSE
-#endif
-
-#include "urldata.h"
-#include "sendf.h"
-#include "formdata.h" /* for the boundary function */
-#include "url.h" /* for the ssl config check function */
-#include "inet_pton.h"
-#include "openssl.h"
-#include "connect.h"
-#include "slist.h"
-#include "select.h"
-#include "vtls.h"
-#include "vauth/vauth.h"
-#include "keylog.h"
-#include "strcase.h"
-#include "hostcheck.h"
-#include "multiif.h"
-#include "strerror.h"
-#include "curl_printf.h"
-
-#include <openssl/ssl.h>
-#include <openssl/rand.h>
-#include <openssl/x509v3.h>
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
-#include <openssl/dsa.h>
-#endif
-#include <openssl/dh.h>
-#include <openssl/err.h>
-#include <openssl/md5.h>
-#include <openssl/conf.h>
-#include <openssl/bn.h>
-#include <openssl/rsa.h>
-#include <openssl/bio.h>
-#include <openssl/buffer.h>
-#include <openssl/pkcs12.h>
-
-#if (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x0090808fL) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_OCSP)
-#include <openssl/ocsp.h>
-#endif
-
-#if (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x0090700fL) && /* 0.9.7 or later */ \
- !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_UI_CONSOLE)
-#define USE_OPENSSL_ENGINE
-#include <openssl/engine.h>
-#endif
-
-#include "warnless.h"
-
-/* The last #include files should be: */
-#include "curl_memory.h"
-#include "memdebug.h"
-
-/* Uncomment the ALLOW_RENEG line to a real #define if you want to allow TLS
- renegotiations when built with BoringSSL. Renegotiating is non-compliant
- with HTTP/2 and "an extremely dangerous protocol feature". Beware.
-
-#define ALLOW_RENEG 1
- */
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER
-#error "OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER not defined"
-#endif
-
-#ifdef USE_OPENSSL_ENGINE
-#include <openssl/ui.h>
-#endif
-
-#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x00909000L
-#define SSL_METHOD_QUAL const
-#else
-#define SSL_METHOD_QUAL
-#endif
-
-#if (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10000000L)
-#define HAVE_ERR_REMOVE_THREAD_STATE 1
-#endif
-
-#if (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10100000L) && /* OpenSSL 1.1.0+ */ \
- !(defined(LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER) && \
- LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x20700000L)
-#define SSLEAY_VERSION_NUMBER OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER
-#define HAVE_X509_GET0_EXTENSIONS 1 /* added in 1.1.0 -pre1 */
-#define HAVE_OPAQUE_EVP_PKEY 1 /* since 1.1.0 -pre3 */
-#define HAVE_OPAQUE_RSA_DSA_DH 1 /* since 1.1.0 -pre5 */
-#define CONST_EXTS const
-#define HAVE_ERR_REMOVE_THREAD_STATE_DEPRECATED 1
-
-/* funny typecast define due to difference in API */
-#ifdef LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER
-#define ARG2_X509_signature_print (X509_ALGOR *)
-#else
-#define ARG2_X509_signature_print
-#endif
-
-#else
-/* For OpenSSL before 1.1.0 */
-#define ASN1_STRING_get0_data(x) ASN1_STRING_data(x)
-#define X509_get0_notBefore(x) X509_get_notBefore(x)
-#define X509_get0_notAfter(x) X509_get_notAfter(x)
-#define CONST_EXTS /* nope */
-#ifndef LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER
-#define OpenSSL_version_num() SSLeay()
-#endif
-#endif
-
-#if (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x1000200fL) && /* 1.0.2 or later */ \
- !(defined(LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER) && \
- LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x20700000L)
-#define HAVE_X509_GET0_SIGNATURE 1
-#endif
-
-#if (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x1000200fL) /* 1.0.2 or later */
-#define HAVE_SSL_GET_SHUTDOWN 1
-#endif
-
-#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10002003L && \
- OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER <= 0x10002FFFL && \
- !defined(OPENSSL_NO_COMP)
-#define HAVE_SSL_COMP_FREE_COMPRESSION_METHODS 1
-#endif
-
-#if (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x0090808fL)
-/* not present in older OpenSSL */
-#define OPENSSL_load_builtin_modules(x)
-#endif
-
-#if (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x30000000L)
-#define HAVE_EVP_PKEY_GET_PARAMS 1
-#else
-#define SSL_get1_peer_certificate SSL_get_peer_certificate
-#endif
-
-#ifdef HAVE_EVP_PKEY_GET_PARAMS
-#include <openssl/core_names.h>
-#define DECLARE_PKEY_PARAM_BIGNUM(name) BIGNUM *name = NULL
-#define FREE_PKEY_PARAM_BIGNUM(name) BN_clear_free(name)
-#else
-#define DECLARE_PKEY_PARAM_BIGNUM(name) const BIGNUM *name
-#define FREE_PKEY_PARAM_BIGNUM(name)
-#endif
-
-/*
- * Whether SSL_CTX_set_keylog_callback is available.
- * OpenSSL: supported since 1.1.1 https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/2287
- * BoringSSL: supported since d28f59c27bac (committed 2015-11-19)
- * LibreSSL: unsupported in at least 2.7.2 (explicitly check for it since it
- * lies and pretends to be OpenSSL 2.0.0).
- */
-#if (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10101000L && \
- !defined(LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER)) || \
- defined(OPENSSL_IS_BORINGSSL)
-#define HAVE_KEYLOG_CALLBACK
-#endif
-
-/* Whether SSL_CTX_set_ciphersuites is available.
- * OpenSSL: supported since 1.1.1 (commit a53b5be6a05)
- * BoringSSL: no
- * LibreSSL: no
- */
-#if ((OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10101000L) && \
- !defined(LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER) && \
- !defined(OPENSSL_IS_BORINGSSL))
-#define HAVE_SSL_CTX_SET_CIPHERSUITES
-#define HAVE_SSL_CTX_SET_POST_HANDSHAKE_AUTH
-#endif
-
-/*
- * Whether SSL_CTX_set1_curves_list is available.
- * OpenSSL: supported since 1.0.2, see
- * https://www.openssl.org/docs/manmaster/man3/SSL_CTX_set1_groups.html
- * BoringSSL: supported since 5fd1807d95f7 (committed 2016-09-30)
- * LibreSSL: since 2.5.3 (April 12, 2017)
- */
-#if (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10002000L) || \
- defined(OPENSSL_IS_BORINGSSL)
-#define HAVE_SSL_CTX_SET_EC_CURVES
-#endif
-
-#if defined(LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER)
-#define OSSL_PACKAGE "LibreSSL"
-#elif defined(OPENSSL_IS_BORINGSSL)
-#define OSSL_PACKAGE "BoringSSL"
-#else
-#define OSSL_PACKAGE "OpenSSL"
-#endif
-
-#if (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10100000L)
-/* up2date versions of OpenSSL maintain reasonably secure defaults without
- * breaking compatibility, so it is better not to override the defaults in curl
- */
-#define DEFAULT_CIPHER_SELECTION NULL
-#else
-/* ... but it is not the case with old versions of OpenSSL */
-#define DEFAULT_CIPHER_SELECTION \
- "ALL:!EXPORT:!EXPORT40:!EXPORT56:!aNULL:!LOW:!RC4:@STRENGTH"
-#endif
-
-#ifdef HAVE_OPENSSL_SRP
-/* the function exists */
-#ifdef USE_TLS_SRP
-/* the functionality is not disabled */
-#define USE_OPENSSL_SRP
-#endif
-#endif
-
-#if (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10100000L)
-#define HAVE_RANDOM_INIT_BY_DEFAULT 1
-#endif
-
-#if (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10100000L) && \
- !(defined(LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER) && \
- LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x2070100fL) && \
- !defined(OPENSSL_IS_BORINGSSL)
-#define HAVE_OPENSSL_VERSION
-#endif
-
-struct ssl_backend_data {
- struct Curl_easy *logger; /* transfer handle to pass trace logs to, only
- using sockindex 0 */
- /* these ones requires specific SSL-types */
- SSL_CTX* ctx;
- SSL* handle;
- X509* server_cert;
-#ifndef HAVE_KEYLOG_CALLBACK
- /* Set to true once a valid keylog entry has been created to avoid dupes. */
- bool keylog_done;
-#endif
-};
-
-#define push_certinfo(_label, _num) \
-do { \
- long info_len = BIO_get_mem_data(mem, &ptr); \
- Curl_ssl_push_certinfo_len(data, _num, _label, ptr, info_len); \
- if(1 != BIO_reset(mem)) \
- break; \
-} while(0)
-
-static void pubkey_show(struct Curl_easy *data,
- BIO *mem,
- int num,
- const char *type,
- const char *name,
- const BIGNUM *bn)
-{
- char *ptr;
- char namebuf[32];
-
- msnprintf(namebuf, sizeof(namebuf), "%s(%s)", type, name);
-
- if(bn)
- BN_print(mem, bn);
- push_certinfo(namebuf, num);
-}
-
-#ifdef HAVE_OPAQUE_RSA_DSA_DH
-#define print_pubkey_BN(_type, _name, _num) \
- pubkey_show(data, mem, _num, #_type, #_name, _name)
-
-#else
-#define print_pubkey_BN(_type, _name, _num) \
-do { \
- if(_type->_name) { \
- pubkey_show(data, mem, _num, #_type, #_name, _type->_name); \
- } \
-} while(0)
-#endif
-
-static int asn1_object_dump(ASN1_OBJECT *a, char *buf, size_t len)
-{
- int i, ilen;
-
- ilen = (int)len;
- if(ilen < 0)
- return 1; /* buffer too big */
-
- i = i2t_ASN1_OBJECT(buf, ilen, a);
-
- if(i >= ilen)
- return 1; /* buffer too small */
-
- return 0;
-}
-
-static void X509V3_ext(struct Curl_easy *data,
- int certnum,
- CONST_EXTS STACK_OF(X509_EXTENSION) *exts)
-{
- int i;
-
- if((int)sk_X509_EXTENSION_num(exts) <= 0)
- /* no extensions, bail out */
- return;
-
- for(i = 0; i < (int)sk_X509_EXTENSION_num(exts); i++) {
- ASN1_OBJECT *obj;
- X509_EXTENSION *ext = sk_X509_EXTENSION_value(exts, i);
- BUF_MEM *biomem;
- char namebuf[128];
- BIO *bio_out = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem());
-
- if(!bio_out)
- return;
-
- obj = X509_EXTENSION_get_object(ext);
-
- asn1_object_dump(obj, namebuf, sizeof(namebuf));
-
- if(!X509V3_EXT_print(bio_out, ext, 0, 0))
- ASN1_STRING_print(bio_out, (ASN1_STRING *)X509_EXTENSION_get_data(ext));
-
- BIO_get_mem_ptr(bio_out, &biomem);
- Curl_ssl_push_certinfo_len(data, certnum, namebuf, biomem->data,
- biomem->length);
- BIO_free(bio_out);
- }
-}
-
-#ifdef OPENSSL_IS_BORINGSSL
-typedef size_t numcert_t;
-#else
-typedef int numcert_t;
-#endif
-
-CURLcode Curl_ossl_certchain(struct Curl_easy *data, SSL *ssl)
-{
- CURLcode result;
- STACK_OF(X509) *sk;
- int i;
- numcert_t numcerts;
- BIO *mem;
-
- DEBUGASSERT(ssl);
-
- sk = SSL_get_peer_cert_chain(ssl);
- if(!sk) {
- return CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY;
- }
-
- numcerts = sk_X509_num(sk);
-
- result = Curl_ssl_init_certinfo(data, (int)numcerts);
- if(result) {
- return result;
- }
-
- mem = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem());
- if(!mem) {
- return CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY;
- }
-
- for(i = 0; i < (int)numcerts; i++) {
- ASN1_INTEGER *num;
- X509 *x = sk_X509_value(sk, i);
- EVP_PKEY *pubkey = NULL;
- int j;
- char *ptr;
- const ASN1_BIT_STRING *psig = NULL;
-
- X509_NAME_print_ex(mem, X509_get_subject_name(x), 0, XN_FLAG_ONELINE);
- push_certinfo("Subject", i);
-
- X509_NAME_print_ex(mem, X509_get_issuer_name(x), 0, XN_FLAG_ONELINE);
- push_certinfo("Issuer", i);
-
- BIO_printf(mem, "%lx", X509_get_version(x));
- push_certinfo("Version", i);
-
- num = X509_get_serialNumber(x);
- if(num->type == V_ASN1_NEG_INTEGER)
- BIO_puts(mem, "-");
- for(j = 0; j < num->length; j++)
- BIO_printf(mem, "%02x", num->data[j]);
- push_certinfo("Serial Number", i);
-
-#if defined(HAVE_X509_GET0_SIGNATURE) && defined(HAVE_X509_GET0_EXTENSIONS)
- {
- const X509_ALGOR *sigalg = NULL;
- X509_PUBKEY *xpubkey = NULL;
- ASN1_OBJECT *pubkeyoid = NULL;
-
- X509_get0_signature(&psig, &sigalg, x);
- if(sigalg) {
- i2a_ASN1_OBJECT(mem, sigalg->algorithm);
- push_certinfo("Signature Algorithm", i);
- }
-
- xpubkey = X509_get_X509_PUBKEY(x);
- if(xpubkey) {
- X509_PUBKEY_get0_param(&pubkeyoid, NULL, NULL, NULL, xpubkey);
- if(pubkeyoid) {
- i2a_ASN1_OBJECT(mem, pubkeyoid);
- push_certinfo("Public Key Algorithm", i);
- }
- }
-
- X509V3_ext(data, i, X509_get0_extensions(x));
- }
-#else
- {
- /* before OpenSSL 1.0.2 */
- X509_CINF *cinf = x->cert_info;
-
- i2a_ASN1_OBJECT(mem, cinf->signature->algorithm);
- push_certinfo("Signature Algorithm", i);
-
- i2a_ASN1_OBJECT(mem, cinf->key->algor->algorithm);
- push_certinfo("Public Key Algorithm", i);
-
- X509V3_ext(data, i, cinf->extensions);
-
- psig = x->signature;
- }
-#endif
-
- ASN1_TIME_print(mem, X509_get0_notBefore(x));
- push_certinfo("Start date", i);
-
- ASN1_TIME_print(mem, X509_get0_notAfter(x));
- push_certinfo("Expire date", i);
-
- pubkey = X509_get_pubkey(x);
- if(!pubkey)
- infof(data, " Unable to load public key");
- else {
- int pktype;
-#ifdef HAVE_OPAQUE_EVP_PKEY
- pktype = EVP_PKEY_id(pubkey);
-#else
- pktype = pubkey->type;
-#endif
- switch(pktype) {
- case EVP_PKEY_RSA:
- {
-#ifndef HAVE_EVP_PKEY_GET_PARAMS
- RSA *rsa;
-#ifdef HAVE_OPAQUE_EVP_PKEY
- rsa = EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(pubkey);
-#else
- rsa = pubkey->pkey.rsa;
-#endif /* HAVE_OPAQUE_EVP_PKEY */
-#endif /* !HAVE_EVP_PKEY_GET_PARAMS */
-
- {
-#ifdef HAVE_OPAQUE_RSA_DSA_DH
- DECLARE_PKEY_PARAM_BIGNUM(n);
- DECLARE_PKEY_PARAM_BIGNUM(e);
-#ifdef HAVE_EVP_PKEY_GET_PARAMS
- EVP_PKEY_get_bn_param(pubkey, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_RSA_N, &n);
- EVP_PKEY_get_bn_param(pubkey, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_RSA_E, &e);
-#else
- RSA_get0_key(rsa, &n, &e, NULL);
-#endif /* HAVE_EVP_PKEY_GET_PARAMS */
- BIO_printf(mem, "%d", BN_num_bits(n));
-#else
- BIO_printf(mem, "%d", BN_num_bits(rsa->n));
-#endif /* HAVE_OPAQUE_RSA_DSA_DH */
- push_certinfo("RSA Public Key", i);
- print_pubkey_BN(rsa, n, i);
- print_pubkey_BN(rsa, e, i);
- FREE_PKEY_PARAM_BIGNUM(n);
- FREE_PKEY_PARAM_BIGNUM(e);
- }
-
- break;
- }
- case EVP_PKEY_DSA:
- {
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
-#ifndef HAVE_EVP_PKEY_GET_PARAMS
- DSA *dsa;
-#ifdef HAVE_OPAQUE_EVP_PKEY
- dsa = EVP_PKEY_get0_DSA(pubkey);
-#else
- dsa = pubkey->pkey.dsa;
-#endif /* HAVE_OPAQUE_EVP_PKEY */
-#endif /* !HAVE_EVP_PKEY_GET_PARAMS */
- {
-#ifdef HAVE_OPAQUE_RSA_DSA_DH
- DECLARE_PKEY_PARAM_BIGNUM(p);
- DECLARE_PKEY_PARAM_BIGNUM(q);
- DECLARE_PKEY_PARAM_BIGNUM(g);
- DECLARE_PKEY_PARAM_BIGNUM(pub_key);
-#ifdef HAVE_EVP_PKEY_GET_PARAMS
- EVP_PKEY_get_bn_param(pubkey, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_FFC_P, &p);
- EVP_PKEY_get_bn_param(pubkey, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_FFC_Q, &q);
- EVP_PKEY_get_bn_param(pubkey, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_FFC_G, &g);
- EVP_PKEY_get_bn_param(pubkey, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_PUB_KEY, &pub_key);
-#else
- DSA_get0_pqg(dsa, &p, &q, &g);
- DSA_get0_key(dsa, &pub_key, NULL);
-#endif /* HAVE_EVP_PKEY_GET_PARAMS */
-#endif /* HAVE_OPAQUE_RSA_DSA_DH */
- print_pubkey_BN(dsa, p, i);
- print_pubkey_BN(dsa, q, i);
- print_pubkey_BN(dsa, g, i);
- print_pubkey_BN(dsa, pub_key, i);
- FREE_PKEY_PARAM_BIGNUM(p);
- FREE_PKEY_PARAM_BIGNUM(q);
- FREE_PKEY_PARAM_BIGNUM(g);
- FREE_PKEY_PARAM_BIGNUM(pub_key);
- }
-#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_DSA */
- break;
- }
- case EVP_PKEY_DH:
- {
-#ifndef HAVE_EVP_PKEY_GET_PARAMS
- DH *dh;
-#ifdef HAVE_OPAQUE_EVP_PKEY
- dh = EVP_PKEY_get0_DH(pubkey);
-#else
- dh = pubkey->pkey.dh;
-#endif /* HAVE_OPAQUE_EVP_PKEY */
-#endif /* !HAVE_EVP_PKEY_GET_PARAMS */
- {
-#ifdef HAVE_OPAQUE_RSA_DSA_DH
- DECLARE_PKEY_PARAM_BIGNUM(p);
- DECLARE_PKEY_PARAM_BIGNUM(q);
- DECLARE_PKEY_PARAM_BIGNUM(g);
- DECLARE_PKEY_PARAM_BIGNUM(pub_key);
-#ifdef HAVE_EVP_PKEY_GET_PARAMS
- EVP_PKEY_get_bn_param(pubkey, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_FFC_P, &p);
- EVP_PKEY_get_bn_param(pubkey, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_FFC_Q, &q);
- EVP_PKEY_get_bn_param(pubkey, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_FFC_G, &g);
- EVP_PKEY_get_bn_param(pubkey, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_PUB_KEY, &pub_key);
-#else
- DH_get0_pqg(dh, &p, &q, &g);
- DH_get0_key(dh, &pub_key, NULL);
-#endif /* HAVE_EVP_PKEY_GET_PARAMS */
- print_pubkey_BN(dh, p, i);
- print_pubkey_BN(dh, q, i);
- print_pubkey_BN(dh, g, i);
-#else
- print_pubkey_BN(dh, p, i);
- print_pubkey_BN(dh, g, i);
-#endif /* HAVE_OPAQUE_RSA_DSA_DH */
- print_pubkey_BN(dh, pub_key, i);
- FREE_PKEY_PARAM_BIGNUM(p);
- FREE_PKEY_PARAM_BIGNUM(q);
- FREE_PKEY_PARAM_BIGNUM(g);
- FREE_PKEY_PARAM_BIGNUM(pub_key);
- }
- break;
- }
- }
- EVP_PKEY_free(pubkey);
- }
-
- if(psig) {
- for(j = 0; j < psig->length; j++)
- BIO_printf(mem, "%02x:", psig->data[j]);
- push_certinfo("Signature", i);
- }
-
- PEM_write_bio_X509(mem, x);
- push_certinfo("Cert", i);
- }
-
- BIO_free(mem);
-
- return CURLE_OK;
-}
-
-#endif /* quiche or OpenSSL */
-
-#ifdef USE_OPENSSL
-
-static bool ossl_associate_connection(struct Curl_easy *data,
- struct connectdata *conn,
- int sockindex);
-
-/*
- * Number of bytes to read from the random number seed file. This must be
- * a finite value (because some entropy "files" like /dev/urandom have
- * an infinite length), but must be large enough to provide enough
- * entropy to properly seed OpenSSL's PRNG.
- */
-#define RAND_LOAD_LENGTH 1024
-
-#ifdef HAVE_KEYLOG_CALLBACK
-static void ossl_keylog_callback(const SSL *ssl, const char *line)
-{
- (void)ssl;
-
- Curl_tls_keylog_write_line(line);
-}
-#else
-/*
- * ossl_log_tls12_secret is called by libcurl to make the CLIENT_RANDOMs if the
- * OpenSSL being used doesn't have native support for doing that.
- */
-static void
-ossl_log_tls12_secret(const SSL *ssl, bool *keylog_done)
-{
- const SSL_SESSION *session = SSL_get_session(ssl);
- unsigned char client_random[SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE];
- unsigned char master_key[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH];
- int master_key_length = 0;
-
- if(!session || *keylog_done)
- return;
-
-#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10100000L && \
- !(defined(LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER) && \
- LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x20700000L)
- /* ssl->s3 is not checked in openssl 1.1.0-pre6, but let's assume that
- * we have a valid SSL context if we have a non-NULL session. */
- SSL_get_client_random(ssl, client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
- master_key_length = (int)
- SSL_SESSION_get_master_key(session, master_key, SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH);
-#else
- if(ssl->s3 && session->master_key_length > 0) {
- master_key_length = session->master_key_length;
- memcpy(master_key, session->master_key, session->master_key_length);
- memcpy(client_random, ssl->s3->client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
- }
-#endif
-
- /* The handshake has not progressed sufficiently yet, or this is a TLS 1.3
- * session (when curl was built with older OpenSSL headers and running with
- * newer OpenSSL runtime libraries). */
- if(master_key_length <= 0)
- return;
-
- *keylog_done = true;
- Curl_tls_keylog_write("CLIENT_RANDOM", client_random,
- master_key, master_key_length);
-}
-#endif /* !HAVE_KEYLOG_CALLBACK */
-
-static const char *SSL_ERROR_to_str(int err)
-{
- switch(err) {
- case SSL_ERROR_NONE:
- return "SSL_ERROR_NONE";
- case SSL_ERROR_SSL:
- return "SSL_ERROR_SSL";
- case SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ:
- return "SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ";
- case SSL_ERROR_WANT_WRITE:
- return "SSL_ERROR_WANT_WRITE";
- case SSL_ERROR_WANT_X509_LOOKUP:
- return "SSL_ERROR_WANT_X509_LOOKUP";
- case SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL:
- return "SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL";
- case SSL_ERROR_ZERO_RETURN:
- return "SSL_ERROR_ZERO_RETURN";
- case SSL_ERROR_WANT_CONNECT:
- return "SSL_ERROR_WANT_CONNECT";
- case SSL_ERROR_WANT_ACCEPT:
- return "SSL_ERROR_WANT_ACCEPT";
-#if defined(SSL_ERROR_WANT_ASYNC)
- case SSL_ERROR_WANT_ASYNC:
- return "SSL_ERROR_WANT_ASYNC";
-#endif
-#if defined(SSL_ERROR_WANT_ASYNC_JOB)
- case SSL_ERROR_WANT_ASYNC_JOB:
- return "SSL_ERROR_WANT_ASYNC_JOB";
-#endif
-#if defined(SSL_ERROR_WANT_EARLY)
- case SSL_ERROR_WANT_EARLY:
- return "SSL_ERROR_WANT_EARLY";
-#endif
- default:
- return "SSL_ERROR unknown";
- }
-}
-
-/* Return error string for last OpenSSL error
- */
-static char *ossl_strerror(unsigned long error, char *buf, size_t size)
-{
- if(size)
- *buf = '\0';
-
-#ifdef OPENSSL_IS_BORINGSSL
- ERR_error_string_n((uint32_t)error, buf, size);
-#else
- ERR_error_string_n(error, buf, size);
-#endif
-
- if(size > 1 && !*buf) {
- strncpy(buf, (error ? "Unknown error" : "No error"), size);
- buf[size - 1] = '\0';
- }
-
- return buf;
-}
-
-/* Return an extra data index for the transfer data.
- * This index can be used with SSL_get_ex_data() and SSL_set_ex_data().
- */
-static int ossl_get_ssl_data_index(void)
-{
- static int ssl_ex_data_data_index = -1;
- if(ssl_ex_data_data_index < 0) {
- ssl_ex_data_data_index = SSL_get_ex_new_index(0, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL);
- }
- return ssl_ex_data_data_index;
-}
-
-/* Return an extra data index for the connection data.
- * This index can be used with SSL_get_ex_data() and SSL_set_ex_data().
- */
-static int ossl_get_ssl_conn_index(void)
-{
- static int ssl_ex_data_conn_index = -1;
- if(ssl_ex_data_conn_index < 0) {
- ssl_ex_data_conn_index = SSL_get_ex_new_index(0, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL);
- }
- return ssl_ex_data_conn_index;
-}
-
-/* Return an extra data index for the sockindex.
- * This index can be used with SSL_get_ex_data() and SSL_set_ex_data().
- */
-static int ossl_get_ssl_sockindex_index(void)
-{
- static int sockindex_index = -1;
- if(sockindex_index < 0) {
- sockindex_index = SSL_get_ex_new_index(0, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL);
- }
- return sockindex_index;
-}
-
-/* Return an extra data index for proxy boolean.
- * This index can be used with SSL_get_ex_data() and SSL_set_ex_data().
- */
-static int ossl_get_proxy_index(void)
-{
- static int proxy_index = -1;
- if(proxy_index < 0) {
- proxy_index = SSL_get_ex_new_index(0, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL);
- }
- return proxy_index;
-}
-
-static int passwd_callback(char *buf, int num, int encrypting,
- void *global_passwd)
-{
- DEBUGASSERT(0 == encrypting);
-
- if(!encrypting) {
- int klen = curlx_uztosi(strlen((char *)global_passwd));
- if(num > klen) {
- memcpy(buf, global_passwd, klen + 1);
- return klen;
- }
- }
- return 0;
-}
-
-/*
- * rand_enough() returns TRUE if we have seeded the random engine properly.
- */
-static bool rand_enough(void)
-{
- return (0 != RAND_status()) ? TRUE : FALSE;
-}
-
-static CURLcode ossl_seed(struct Curl_easy *data)
-{
- /* This might get called before it has been added to a multi handle */
- if(data->multi && data->multi->ssl_seeded)
- return CURLE_OK;
-
- if(rand_enough()) {
- /* OpenSSL 1.1.0+ should return here */
- if(data->multi)
- data->multi->ssl_seeded = TRUE;
- return CURLE_OK;
- }
-#ifdef HAVE_RANDOM_INIT_BY_DEFAULT
- /* with OpenSSL 1.1.0+, a failed RAND_status is a showstopper */
- failf(data, "Insufficient randomness");
- return CURLE_SSL_CONNECT_ERROR;
-#else
-
-#ifdef RANDOM_FILE
- RAND_load_file(RANDOM_FILE, RAND_LOAD_LENGTH);
- if(rand_enough())
- return CURLE_OK;
-#endif
-
-#if defined(HAVE_RAND_EGD) && defined(EGD_SOCKET)
- /* available in OpenSSL 0.9.5 and later */
- /* EGD_SOCKET is set at configure time or not at all */
- {
- /* If there's an option and a define, the option overrides the
- define */
- int ret = RAND_egd(EGD_SOCKET);
- if(-1 != ret) {
- if(rand_enough())
- return CURLE_OK;
- }
- }
-#endif
-
- /* fallback to a custom seeding of the PRNG using a hash based on a current
- time */
- do {
- unsigned char randb[64];
- size_t len = sizeof(randb);
- size_t i, i_max;
- for(i = 0, i_max = len / sizeof(struct curltime); i < i_max; ++i) {
- struct curltime tv = Curl_now();
- Curl_wait_ms(1);
- tv.tv_sec *= i + 1;
- tv.tv_usec *= (unsigned int)i + 2;
- tv.tv_sec ^= ((Curl_now().tv_sec + Curl_now().tv_usec) *
- (i + 3)) << 8;
- tv.tv_usec ^= (unsigned int) ((Curl_now().tv_sec +
- Curl_now().tv_usec) *
- (i + 4)) << 16;
- memcpy(&randb[i * sizeof(struct curltime)], &tv,
- sizeof(struct curltime));
- }
- RAND_add(randb, (int)len, (double)len/2);
- } while(!rand_enough());
-
- {
- /* generates a default path for the random seed file */
- char fname[256];
- fname[0] = 0; /* blank it first */
- RAND_file_name(fname, sizeof(fname));
- if(fname[0]) {
- /* we got a file name to try */
- RAND_load_file(fname, RAND_LOAD_LENGTH);
- if(rand_enough())
- return CURLE_OK;
- }
- }
-
- infof(data, "libcurl is now using a weak random seed");
- return (rand_enough() ? CURLE_OK :
- CURLE_SSL_CONNECT_ERROR /* confusing error code */);
-#endif
-}
-
-#ifndef SSL_FILETYPE_ENGINE
-#define SSL_FILETYPE_ENGINE 42
-#endif
-#ifndef SSL_FILETYPE_PKCS12
-#define SSL_FILETYPE_PKCS12 43
-#endif
-static int do_file_type(const char *type)
-{
- if(!type || !type[0])
- return SSL_FILETYPE_PEM;
- if(strcasecompare(type, "PEM"))
- return SSL_FILETYPE_PEM;
- if(strcasecompare(type, "DER"))
- return SSL_FILETYPE_ASN1;
- if(strcasecompare(type, "ENG"))
- return SSL_FILETYPE_ENGINE;
- if(strcasecompare(type, "P12"))
- return SSL_FILETYPE_PKCS12;
- return -1;
-}
-
-#ifdef USE_OPENSSL_ENGINE
-/*
- * Supply default password to the engine user interface conversation.
- * The password is passed by OpenSSL engine from ENGINE_load_private_key()
- * last argument to the ui and can be obtained by UI_get0_user_data(ui) here.
- */
-static int ssl_ui_reader(UI *ui, UI_STRING *uis)
-{
- const char *password;
- switch(UI_get_string_type(uis)) {
- case UIT_PROMPT:
- case UIT_VERIFY:
- password = (const char *)UI_get0_user_data(ui);
- if(password && (UI_get_input_flags(uis) & UI_INPUT_FLAG_DEFAULT_PWD)) {
- UI_set_result(ui, uis, password);
- return 1;
- }
- default:
- break;
- }
- return (UI_method_get_reader(UI_OpenSSL()))(ui, uis);
-}
-
-/*
- * Suppress interactive request for a default password if available.
- */
-static int ssl_ui_writer(UI *ui, UI_STRING *uis)
-{
- switch(UI_get_string_type(uis)) {
- case UIT_PROMPT:
- case UIT_VERIFY:
- if(UI_get0_user_data(ui) &&
- (UI_get_input_flags(uis) & UI_INPUT_FLAG_DEFAULT_PWD)) {
- return 1;
- }
- default:
- break;
- }
- return (UI_method_get_writer(UI_OpenSSL()))(ui, uis);
-}
-
-/*
- * Check if a given string is a PKCS#11 URI
- */
-static bool is_pkcs11_uri(const char *string)
-{
- return (string && strncasecompare(string, "pkcs11:", 7));
-}
-
-#endif
-
-static CURLcode ossl_set_engine(struct Curl_easy *data, const char *engine);
-
-static int
-SSL_CTX_use_certificate_blob(SSL_CTX *ctx, const struct curl_blob *blob,
- int type, const char *key_passwd)
-{
- int ret = 0;
- X509 *x = NULL;
- /* the typecast of blob->len is fine since it is guaranteed to never be
- larger than CURL_MAX_INPUT_LENGTH */
- BIO *in = BIO_new_mem_buf(blob->data, (int)(blob->len));
- if(!in)
- return CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY;
-
- if(type == SSL_FILETYPE_ASN1) {
- /* j = ERR_R_ASN1_LIB; */
- x = d2i_X509_bio(in, NULL);
- }
- else if(type == SSL_FILETYPE_PEM) {
- /* ERR_R_PEM_LIB; */
- x = PEM_read_bio_X509(in, NULL,
- passwd_callback, (void *)key_passwd);
- }
- else {
- ret = 0;
- goto end;
- }
-
- if(!x) {
- ret = 0;
- goto end;
- }
-
- ret = SSL_CTX_use_certificate(ctx, x);
- end:
- X509_free(x);
- BIO_free(in);
- return ret;
-}
-
-static int
-SSL_CTX_use_PrivateKey_blob(SSL_CTX *ctx, const struct curl_blob *blob,
- int type, const char *key_passwd)
-{
- int ret = 0;
- EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
- BIO *in = BIO_new_mem_buf(blob->data, (int)(blob->len));
- if(!in)
- return CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY;
-
- if(type == SSL_FILETYPE_PEM)
- pkey = PEM_read_bio_PrivateKey(in, NULL, passwd_callback,
- (void *)key_passwd);
- else if(type == SSL_FILETYPE_ASN1)
- pkey = d2i_PrivateKey_bio(in, NULL);
- else {
- ret = 0;
- goto end;
- }
- if(!pkey) {
- ret = 0;
- goto end;
- }
- ret = SSL_CTX_use_PrivateKey(ctx, pkey);
- EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
- end:
- BIO_free(in);
- return ret;
-}
-
-static int
-SSL_CTX_use_certificate_chain_blob(SSL_CTX *ctx, const struct curl_blob *blob,
- const char *key_passwd)
-{
-/* SSL_CTX_add1_chain_cert introduced in OpenSSL 1.0.2 */
-#if (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x1000200fL) && /* OpenSSL 1.0.2 or later */ \
- !(defined(LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER) && \
- (LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x2090100fL)) /* LibreSSL 2.9.1 or later */
- int ret = 0;
- X509 *x = NULL;
- void *passwd_callback_userdata = (void *)key_passwd;
- BIO *in = BIO_new_mem_buf(blob->data, (int)(blob->len));
- if(!in)
- return CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY;
-
- ERR_clear_error();
-
- x = PEM_read_bio_X509_AUX(in, NULL,
- passwd_callback, (void *)key_passwd);
-
- if(!x) {
- ret = 0;
- goto end;
- }
-
- ret = SSL_CTX_use_certificate(ctx, x);
-
- if(ERR_peek_error() != 0)
- ret = 0;
-
- if(ret) {
- X509 *ca;
- unsigned long err;
-
- if(!SSL_CTX_clear_chain_certs(ctx)) {
- ret = 0;
- goto end;
- }
-
- while((ca = PEM_read_bio_X509(in, NULL, passwd_callback,
- passwd_callback_userdata))
- != NULL) {
-
- if(!SSL_CTX_add0_chain_cert(ctx, ca)) {
- X509_free(ca);
- ret = 0;
- goto end;
- }
- }
-
- err = ERR_peek_last_error();
- if((ERR_GET_LIB(err) == ERR_LIB_PEM) &&
- (ERR_GET_REASON(err) == PEM_R_NO_START_LINE))
- ERR_clear_error();
- else
- ret = 0;
- }
-
- end:
- X509_free(x);
- BIO_free(in);
- return ret;
-#else
- (void)ctx; /* unused */
- (void)blob; /* unused */
- (void)key_passwd; /* unused */
- return 0;
-#endif
-}
-
-static
-int cert_stuff(struct Curl_easy *data,
- SSL_CTX* ctx,
- char *cert_file,
- const struct curl_blob *cert_blob,
- const char *cert_type,
- char *key_file,
- const struct curl_blob *key_blob,
- const char *key_type,
- char *key_passwd)
-{
- char error_buffer[256];
- bool check_privkey = TRUE;
-
- int file_type = do_file_type(cert_type);
-
- if(cert_file || cert_blob || (file_type == SSL_FILETYPE_ENGINE)) {
- SSL *ssl;
- X509 *x509;
- int cert_done = 0;
- int cert_use_result;
-
- if(key_passwd) {
- /* set the password in the callback userdata */
- SSL_CTX_set_default_passwd_cb_userdata(ctx, key_passwd);
- /* Set passwd callback: */
- SSL_CTX_set_default_passwd_cb(ctx, passwd_callback);
- }
-
-
- switch(file_type) {
- case SSL_FILETYPE_PEM:
- /* SSL_CTX_use_certificate_chain_file() only works on PEM files */
- cert_use_result = cert_blob ?
- SSL_CTX_use_certificate_chain_blob(ctx, cert_blob, key_passwd) :
- SSL_CTX_use_certificate_chain_file(ctx, cert_file);
- if(cert_use_result != 1) {
- failf(data,
- "could not load PEM client certificate from %s, " OSSL_PACKAGE
- " error %s, "
- "(no key found, wrong pass phrase, or wrong file format?)",
- (cert_blob ? "CURLOPT_SSLCERT_BLOB" : cert_file),
- ossl_strerror(ERR_get_error(), error_buffer,
- sizeof(error_buffer)) );
- return 0;
- }
- break;
-
- case SSL_FILETYPE_ASN1:
- /* SSL_CTX_use_certificate_file() works with either PEM or ASN1, but
- we use the case above for PEM so this can only be performed with
- ASN1 files. */
-
- cert_use_result = cert_blob ?
- SSL_CTX_use_certificate_blob(ctx, cert_blob,
- file_type, key_passwd) :
- SSL_CTX_use_certificate_file(ctx, cert_file, file_type);
- if(cert_use_result != 1) {
- failf(data,
- "could not load ASN1 client certificate from %s, " OSSL_PACKAGE
- " error %s, "
- "(no key found, wrong pass phrase, or wrong file format?)",
- (cert_blob ? "CURLOPT_SSLCERT_BLOB" : cert_file),
- ossl_strerror(ERR_get_error(), error_buffer,
- sizeof(error_buffer)) );
- return 0;
- }
- break;
- case SSL_FILETYPE_ENGINE:
-#if defined(USE_OPENSSL_ENGINE) && defined(ENGINE_CTRL_GET_CMD_FROM_NAME)
- {
- /* Implicitly use pkcs11 engine if none was provided and the
- * cert_file is a PKCS#11 URI */
- if(!data->state.engine) {
- if(is_pkcs11_uri(cert_file)) {
- if(ossl_set_engine(data, "pkcs11") != CURLE_OK) {
- return 0;
- }
- }
- }
-
- if(data->state.engine) {
- const char *cmd_name = "LOAD_CERT_CTRL";
- struct {
- const char *cert_id;
- X509 *cert;
- } params;
-
- params.cert_id = cert_file;
- params.cert = NULL;
-
- /* Does the engine supports LOAD_CERT_CTRL ? */
- if(!ENGINE_ctrl(data->state.engine, ENGINE_CTRL_GET_CMD_FROM_NAME,
- 0, (void *)cmd_name, NULL)) {
- failf(data, "ssl engine does not support loading certificates");
- return 0;
- }
-
- /* Load the certificate from the engine */
- if(!ENGINE_ctrl_cmd(data->state.engine, cmd_name,
- 0, &params, NULL, 1)) {
- failf(data, "ssl engine cannot load client cert with id"
- " '%s' [%s]", cert_file,
- ossl_strerror(ERR_get_error(), error_buffer,
- sizeof(error_buffer)));
- return 0;
- }
-
- if(!params.cert) {
- failf(data, "ssl engine didn't initialized the certificate "
- "properly.");
- return 0;
- }
-
- if(SSL_CTX_use_certificate(ctx, params.cert) != 1) {
- failf(data, "unable to set client certificate [%s]",
- ossl_strerror(ERR_get_error(), error_buffer,
- sizeof(error_buffer)));
- return 0;
- }
- X509_free(params.cert); /* we don't need the handle any more... */
- }
- else {
- failf(data, "crypto engine not set, can't load certificate");
- return 0;
- }
- }
- break;
-#else
- failf(data, "file type ENG for certificate not implemented");
- return 0;
-#endif
-
- case SSL_FILETYPE_PKCS12:
- {
- BIO *cert_bio = NULL;
- PKCS12 *p12 = NULL;
- EVP_PKEY *pri;
- STACK_OF(X509) *ca = NULL;
- if(cert_blob) {
- cert_bio = BIO_new_mem_buf(cert_blob->data, (int)(cert_blob->len));
- if(!cert_bio) {
- failf(data,
- "BIO_new_mem_buf NULL, " OSSL_PACKAGE
- " error %s",
- ossl_strerror(ERR_get_error(), error_buffer,
- sizeof(error_buffer)) );
- return 0;
- }
- }
- else {
- cert_bio = BIO_new(BIO_s_file());
- if(!cert_bio) {
- failf(data,
- "BIO_new return NULL, " OSSL_PACKAGE
- " error %s",
- ossl_strerror(ERR_get_error(), error_buffer,
- sizeof(error_buffer)) );
- return 0;
- }
-
- if(BIO_read_filename(cert_bio, cert_file) <= 0) {
- failf(data, "could not open PKCS12 file '%s'", cert_file);
- BIO_free(cert_bio);
- return 0;
- }
- }
-
- p12 = d2i_PKCS12_bio(cert_bio, NULL);
- BIO_free(cert_bio);
-
- if(!p12) {
- failf(data, "error reading PKCS12 file '%s'",
- cert_blob ? "(memory blob)" : cert_file);
- return 0;
- }
-
- PKCS12_PBE_add();
-
- if(!PKCS12_parse(p12, key_passwd, &pri, &x509,
- &ca)) {
- failf(data,
- "could not parse PKCS12 file, check password, " OSSL_PACKAGE
- " error %s",
- ossl_strerror(ERR_get_error(), error_buffer,
- sizeof(error_buffer)) );
- PKCS12_free(p12);
- return 0;
- }
-
- PKCS12_free(p12);
-
- if(SSL_CTX_use_certificate(ctx, x509) != 1) {
- failf(data,
- "could not load PKCS12 client certificate, " OSSL_PACKAGE
- " error %s",
- ossl_strerror(ERR_get_error(), error_buffer,
- sizeof(error_buffer)) );
- goto fail;
- }
-
- if(SSL_CTX_use_PrivateKey(ctx, pri) != 1) {
- failf(data, "unable to use private key from PKCS12 file '%s'",
- cert_file);
- goto fail;
- }
-
- if(!SSL_CTX_check_private_key (ctx)) {
- failf(data, "private key from PKCS12 file '%s' "
- "does not match certificate in same file", cert_file);
- goto fail;
- }
- /* Set Certificate Verification chain */
- if(ca) {
- while(sk_X509_num(ca)) {
- /*
- * Note that sk_X509_pop() is used below to make sure the cert is
- * removed from the stack properly before getting passed to
- * SSL_CTX_add_extra_chain_cert(), which takes ownership. Previously
- * we used sk_X509_value() instead, but then we'd clean it in the
- * subsequent sk_X509_pop_free() call.
- */
- X509 *x = sk_X509_pop(ca);
- if(!SSL_CTX_add_client_CA(ctx, x)) {
- X509_free(x);
- failf(data, "cannot add certificate to client CA list");
- goto fail;
- }
- if(!SSL_CTX_add_extra_chain_cert(ctx, x)) {
- X509_free(x);
- failf(data, "cannot add certificate to certificate chain");
- goto fail;
- }
- }
- }
-
- cert_done = 1;
- fail:
- EVP_PKEY_free(pri);
- X509_free(x509);
- sk_X509_pop_free(ca, X509_free);
- if(!cert_done)
- return 0; /* failure! */
- break;
- }
- default:
- failf(data, "not supported file type '%s' for certificate", cert_type);
- return 0;
- }
-
- if((!key_file) && (!key_blob)) {
- key_file = cert_file;
- key_blob = cert_blob;
- }
- else
- file_type = do_file_type(key_type);
-
- switch(file_type) {
- case SSL_FILETYPE_PEM:
- if(cert_done)
- break;
- /* FALLTHROUGH */
- case SSL_FILETYPE_ASN1:
- cert_use_result = key_blob ?
- SSL_CTX_use_PrivateKey_blob(ctx, key_blob, file_type, key_passwd) :
- SSL_CTX_use_PrivateKey_file(ctx, key_file, file_type);
- if(cert_use_result != 1) {
- failf(data, "unable to set private key file: '%s' type %s",
- key_file?key_file:"(memory blob)", key_type?key_type:"PEM");
- return 0;
- }
- break;
- case SSL_FILETYPE_ENGINE:
-#ifdef USE_OPENSSL_ENGINE
- { /* XXXX still needs some work */
- EVP_PKEY *priv_key = NULL;
-
- /* Implicitly use pkcs11 engine if none was provided and the
- * key_file is a PKCS#11 URI */
- if(!data->state.engine) {
- if(is_pkcs11_uri(key_file)) {
- if(ossl_set_engine(data, "pkcs11") != CURLE_OK) {
- return 0;
- }
- }
- }
-
- if(data->state.engine) {
- UI_METHOD *ui_method =
- UI_create_method((char *)"curl user interface");
- if(!ui_method) {
- failf(data, "unable do create " OSSL_PACKAGE
- " user-interface method");
- return 0;
- }
- UI_method_set_opener(ui_method, UI_method_get_opener(UI_OpenSSL()));
- UI_method_set_closer(ui_method, UI_method_get_closer(UI_OpenSSL()));
- UI_method_set_reader(ui_method, ssl_ui_reader);
- UI_method_set_writer(ui_method, ssl_ui_writer);
- /* the typecast below was added to please mingw32 */
- priv_key = (EVP_PKEY *)
- ENGINE_load_private_key(data->state.engine, key_file,
- ui_method,
- key_passwd);
- UI_destroy_method(ui_method);
- if(!priv_key) {
- failf(data, "failed to load private key from crypto engine");
- return 0;
- }
- if(SSL_CTX_use_PrivateKey(ctx, priv_key) != 1) {
- failf(data, "unable to set private key");
- EVP_PKEY_free(priv_key);
- return 0;
- }
- EVP_PKEY_free(priv_key); /* we don't need the handle any more... */
- }
- else {
- failf(data, "crypto engine not set, can't load private key");
- return 0;
- }
- }
- break;
-#else
- failf(data, "file type ENG for private key not supported");
- return 0;
-#endif
- case SSL_FILETYPE_PKCS12:
- if(!cert_done) {
- failf(data, "file type P12 for private key not supported");
- return 0;
- }
- break;
- default:
- failf(data, "not supported file type for private key");
- return 0;
- }
-
- ssl = SSL_new(ctx);
- if(!ssl) {
- failf(data, "unable to create an SSL structure");
- return 0;
- }
-
- x509 = SSL_get_certificate(ssl);
-
- /* This version was provided by Evan Jordan and is supposed to not
- leak memory as the previous version: */
- if(x509) {
- EVP_PKEY *pktmp = X509_get_pubkey(x509);
- EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(pktmp, SSL_get_privatekey(ssl));
- EVP_PKEY_free(pktmp);
- }
-
-#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_RSA) && !defined(OPENSSL_IS_BORINGSSL) && \
- !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_3_0)
- {
- /* If RSA is used, don't check the private key if its flags indicate
- * it doesn't support it. */
- EVP_PKEY *priv_key = SSL_get_privatekey(ssl);
- int pktype;
-#ifdef HAVE_OPAQUE_EVP_PKEY
- pktype = EVP_PKEY_id(priv_key);
-#else
- pktype = priv_key->type;
-#endif
- if(pktype == EVP_PKEY_RSA) {
- RSA *rsa = EVP_PKEY_get1_RSA(priv_key);
- if(RSA_flags(rsa) & RSA_METHOD_FLAG_NO_CHECK)
- check_privkey = FALSE;
- RSA_free(rsa); /* Decrement reference count */
- }
- }
-#endif
-
- SSL_free(ssl);
-
- /* If we are using DSA, we can copy the parameters from
- * the private key */
-
- if(check_privkey == TRUE) {
- /* Now we know that a key and cert have been set against
- * the SSL context */
- if(!SSL_CTX_check_private_key(ctx)) {
- failf(data, "Private key does not match the certificate public key");
- return 0;
- }
- }
- }
- return 1;
-}
-
-CURLcode Curl_ossl_set_client_cert(struct Curl_easy *data, SSL_CTX *ctx,
- char *cert_file,
- const struct curl_blob *cert_blob,
- const char *cert_type, char *key_file,
- const struct curl_blob *key_blob,
- const char *key_type, char *key_passwd)
-{
- int rv = cert_stuff(data, ctx, cert_file, cert_blob, cert_type, key_file,
- key_blob, key_type, key_passwd);
- if(rv != 1) {
- return CURLE_SSL_CERTPROBLEM;
- }
-
- return CURLE_OK;
-}
-
-/* returns non-zero on failure */
-static int x509_name_oneline(X509_NAME *a, char *buf, size_t size)
-{
- BIO *bio_out = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem());
- BUF_MEM *biomem;
- int rc;
-
- if(!bio_out)
- return 1; /* alloc failed! */
-
- rc = X509_NAME_print_ex(bio_out, a, 0, XN_FLAG_SEP_SPLUS_SPC);
- BIO_get_mem_ptr(bio_out, &biomem);
-
- if((size_t)biomem->length < size)
- size = biomem->length;
- else
- size--; /* don't overwrite the buffer end */
-
- memcpy(buf, biomem->data, size);
- buf[size] = 0;
-
- BIO_free(bio_out);
-
- return !rc;
-}
-
-/**
- * Global SSL init
- *
- * @retval 0 error initializing SSL
- * @retval 1 SSL initialized successfully
- */
-static int ossl_init(void)
-{
-#if (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10100000L) && \
- !defined(LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER)
- const uint64_t flags =
-#ifdef OPENSSL_INIT_ENGINE_ALL_BUILTIN
- /* not present in BoringSSL */
- OPENSSL_INIT_ENGINE_ALL_BUILTIN |
-#endif
-#ifdef CURL_DISABLE_OPENSSL_AUTO_LOAD_CONFIG
- OPENSSL_INIT_NO_LOAD_CONFIG |
-#else
- OPENSSL_INIT_LOAD_CONFIG |
-#endif
- 0;
- OPENSSL_init_ssl(flags, NULL);
-#else
- OPENSSL_load_builtin_modules();
-
-#ifdef USE_OPENSSL_ENGINE
- ENGINE_load_builtin_engines();
-#endif
-
-/* CONF_MFLAGS_DEFAULT_SECTION was introduced some time between 0.9.8b and
- 0.9.8e */
-#ifndef CONF_MFLAGS_DEFAULT_SECTION
-#define CONF_MFLAGS_DEFAULT_SECTION 0x0
-#endif
-
-#ifndef CURL_DISABLE_OPENSSL_AUTO_LOAD_CONFIG
- CONF_modules_load_file(NULL, NULL,
- CONF_MFLAGS_DEFAULT_SECTION|
- CONF_MFLAGS_IGNORE_MISSING_FILE);
-#endif
-
- /* Let's get nice error messages */
- SSL_load_error_strings();
-
- /* Init the global ciphers and digests */
- if(!SSLeay_add_ssl_algorithms())
- return 0;
-
- OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms();
-#endif
-
- Curl_tls_keylog_open();
-
- /* Initialize the extra data indexes */
- if(ossl_get_ssl_data_index() < 0 || ossl_get_ssl_conn_index() < 0 ||
- ossl_get_ssl_sockindex_index() < 0 || ossl_get_proxy_index() < 0)
- return 0;
-
- return 1;
-}
-
-/* Global cleanup */
-static void ossl_cleanup(void)
-{
-#if (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10100000L) && \
- !defined(LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER)
- /* OpenSSL 1.1 deprecates all these cleanup functions and
- turns them into no-ops in OpenSSL 1.0 compatibility mode */
-#else
- /* Free ciphers and digests lists */
- EVP_cleanup();
-
-#ifdef USE_OPENSSL_ENGINE
- /* Free engine list */
- ENGINE_cleanup();
-#endif
-
- /* Free OpenSSL error strings */
- ERR_free_strings();
-
- /* Free thread local error state, destroying hash upon zero refcount */
-#ifdef HAVE_ERR_REMOVE_THREAD_STATE
- ERR_remove_thread_state(NULL);
-#else
- ERR_remove_state(0);
-#endif
-
- /* Free all memory allocated by all configuration modules */
- CONF_modules_free();
-
-#ifdef HAVE_SSL_COMP_FREE_COMPRESSION_METHODS
- SSL_COMP_free_compression_methods();
-#endif
-#endif
-
- Curl_tls_keylog_close();
-}
-
-/*
- * This function is used to determine connection status.
- *
- * Return codes:
- * 1 means the connection is still in place
- * 0 means the connection has been closed
- * -1 means the connection status is unknown
- */
-static int ossl_check_cxn(struct connectdata *conn)
-{
- /* SSL_peek takes data out of the raw recv buffer without peeking so we use
- recv MSG_PEEK instead. Bug #795 */
-#ifdef MSG_PEEK
- char buf;
- ssize_t nread;
- nread = recv((RECV_TYPE_ARG1)conn->sock[FIRSTSOCKET], (RECV_TYPE_ARG2)&buf,
- (RECV_TYPE_ARG3)1, (RECV_TYPE_ARG4)MSG_PEEK);
- if(nread == 0)
- return 0; /* connection has been closed */
- if(nread == 1)
- return 1; /* connection still in place */
- else if(nread == -1) {
- int err = SOCKERRNO;
- if(err == EINPROGRESS ||
-#if defined(EAGAIN) && (EAGAIN != EWOULDBLOCK)
- err == EAGAIN ||
-#endif
- err == EWOULDBLOCK)
- return 1; /* connection still in place */
- if(err == ECONNRESET ||
-#ifdef ECONNABORTED
- err == ECONNABORTED ||
-#endif
-#ifdef ENETDOWN
- err == ENETDOWN ||
-#endif
-#ifdef ENETRESET
- err == ENETRESET ||
-#endif
-#ifdef ESHUTDOWN
- err == ESHUTDOWN ||
-#endif
-#ifdef ETIMEDOUT
- err == ETIMEDOUT ||
-#endif
- err == ENOTCONN)
- return 0; /* connection has been closed */
- }
-#endif
- return -1; /* connection status unknown */
-}
-
-/* Selects an OpenSSL crypto engine
- */
-static CURLcode ossl_set_engine(struct Curl_easy *data, const char *engine)
-{
-#ifdef USE_OPENSSL_ENGINE
- ENGINE *e;
-
-#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x00909000L
- e = ENGINE_by_id(engine);
-#else
- /* avoid memory leak */
- for(e = ENGINE_get_first(); e; e = ENGINE_get_next(e)) {
- const char *e_id = ENGINE_get_id(e);
- if(!strcmp(engine, e_id))
- break;
- }
-#endif
-
- if(!e) {
- failf(data, "SSL Engine '%s' not found", engine);
- return CURLE_SSL_ENGINE_NOTFOUND;
- }
-
- if(data->state.engine) {
- ENGINE_finish(data->state.engine);
- ENGINE_free(data->state.engine);
- data->state.engine = NULL;
- }
- if(!ENGINE_init(e)) {
- char buf[256];
-
- ENGINE_free(e);
- failf(data, "Failed to initialise SSL Engine '%s': %s",
- engine, ossl_strerror(ERR_get_error(), buf, sizeof(buf)));
- return CURLE_SSL_ENGINE_INITFAILED;
- }
- data->state.engine = e;
- return CURLE_OK;
-#else
- (void)engine;
- failf(data, "SSL Engine not supported");
- return CURLE_SSL_ENGINE_NOTFOUND;
-#endif
-}
-
-/* Sets engine as default for all SSL operations
- */
-static CURLcode ossl_set_engine_default(struct Curl_easy *data)
-{
-#ifdef USE_OPENSSL_ENGINE
- if(data->state.engine) {
- if(ENGINE_set_default(data->state.engine, ENGINE_METHOD_ALL) > 0) {
- infof(data, "set default crypto engine '%s'",
- ENGINE_get_id(data->state.engine));
- }
- else {
- failf(data, "set default crypto engine '%s' failed",
- ENGINE_get_id(data->state.engine));
- return CURLE_SSL_ENGINE_SETFAILED;
- }
- }
-#else
- (void) data;
-#endif
- return CURLE_OK;
-}
-
-/* Return list of OpenSSL crypto engine names.
- */
-static struct curl_slist *ossl_engines_list(struct Curl_easy *data)
-{
- struct curl_slist *list = NULL;
-#ifdef USE_OPENSSL_ENGINE
- struct curl_slist *beg;
- ENGINE *e;
-
- for(e = ENGINE_get_first(); e; e = ENGINE_get_next(e)) {
- beg = curl_slist_append(list, ENGINE_get_id(e));
- if(!beg) {
- curl_slist_free_all(list);
- return NULL;
- }
- list = beg;
- }
-#endif
- (void) data;
- return list;
-}
-
-#define set_logger(conn, data) \
- conn->ssl[0].backend->logger = data
-
-static void ossl_closeone(struct Curl_easy *data,
- struct connectdata *conn,
- struct ssl_connect_data *connssl)
-{
- struct ssl_backend_data *backend = connssl->backend;
-
- DEBUGASSERT(backend);
-
- if(backend->handle) {
- char buf[32];
- set_logger(conn, data);
- /*
- * The conn->sock[0] socket is passed to openssl with SSL_set_fd(). Make
- * sure the socket is not closed before calling OpenSSL functions that
- * will use it.
- */
- DEBUGASSERT(conn->sock[FIRSTSOCKET] != CURL_SOCKET_BAD);
-
- /* Maybe the server has already sent a close notify alert.
- Read it to avoid an RST on the TCP connection. */
- (void)SSL_read(backend->handle, buf, (int)sizeof(buf));
-
- (void)SSL_shutdown(backend->handle);
- SSL_set_connect_state(backend->handle);
-
- SSL_free(backend->handle);
- backend->handle = NULL;
- }
- if(backend->ctx) {
- SSL_CTX_free(backend->ctx);
- backend->ctx = NULL;
- }
-}
-
-/*
- * This function is called when an SSL connection is closed.
- */
-static void ossl_close(struct Curl_easy *data, struct connectdata *conn,
- int sockindex)
-{
- ossl_closeone(data, conn, &conn->ssl[sockindex]);
-#ifndef CURL_DISABLE_PROXY
- ossl_closeone(data, conn, &conn->proxy_ssl[sockindex]);
-#endif
-}
-
-/*
- * This function is called to shut down the SSL layer but keep the
- * socket open (CCC - Clear Command Channel)
- */
-static int ossl_shutdown(struct Curl_easy *data,
- struct connectdata *conn, int sockindex)
-{
- int retval = 0;
- struct ssl_connect_data *connssl = &conn->ssl[sockindex];
- char buf[256]; /* We will use this for the OpenSSL error buffer, so it has
- to be at least 256 bytes long. */
- unsigned long sslerror;
- ssize_t nread;
- int buffsize;
- int err;
- bool done = FALSE;
- struct ssl_backend_data *backend = connssl->backend;
- int loop = 10;
-
- DEBUGASSERT(backend);
-
-#ifndef CURL_DISABLE_FTP
- /* This has only been tested on the proftpd server, and the mod_tls code
- sends a close notify alert without waiting for a close notify alert in
- response. Thus we wait for a close notify alert from the server, but
- we do not send one. Let's hope other servers do the same... */
-
- if(data->set.ftp_ccc == CURLFTPSSL_CCC_ACTIVE)
- (void)SSL_shutdown(backend->handle);
-#endif
-
- if(backend->handle) {
- buffsize = (int)sizeof(buf);
- while(!done && loop--) {
- int what = SOCKET_READABLE(conn->sock[sockindex],
- SSL_SHUTDOWN_TIMEOUT);
- if(what > 0) {
- ERR_clear_error();
-
- /* Something to read, let's do it and hope that it is the close
- notify alert from the server */
- nread = (ssize_t)SSL_read(backend->handle, buf, buffsize);
- err = SSL_get_error(backend->handle, (int)nread);
-
- switch(err) {
- case SSL_ERROR_NONE: /* this is not an error */
- case SSL_ERROR_ZERO_RETURN: /* no more data */
- /* This is the expected response. There was no data but only
- the close notify alert */
- done = TRUE;
- break;
- case SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ:
- /* there's data pending, re-invoke SSL_read() */
- infof(data, "SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ");
- break;
- case SSL_ERROR_WANT_WRITE:
- /* SSL wants a write. Really odd. Let's bail out. */
- infof(data, "SSL_ERROR_WANT_WRITE");
- done = TRUE;
- break;
- default:
- /* openssl/ssl.h says "look at error stack/return value/errno" */
- sslerror = ERR_get_error();
- failf(data, OSSL_PACKAGE " SSL_read on shutdown: %s, errno %d",
- (sslerror ?
- ossl_strerror(sslerror, buf, sizeof(buf)) :
- SSL_ERROR_to_str(err)),
- SOCKERRNO);
- done = TRUE;
- break;
- }
- }
- else if(0 == what) {
- /* timeout */
- failf(data, "SSL shutdown timeout");
- done = TRUE;
- }
- else {
- /* anything that gets here is fatally bad */
- failf(data, "select/poll on SSL socket, errno: %d", SOCKERRNO);
- retval = -1;
- done = TRUE;
- }
- } /* while()-loop for the select() */
-
- if(data->set.verbose) {
-#ifdef HAVE_SSL_GET_SHUTDOWN
- switch(SSL_get_shutdown(backend->handle)) {
- case SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN:
- infof(data, "SSL_get_shutdown() returned SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN");
- break;
- case SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN:
- infof(data, "SSL_get_shutdown() returned SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN");
- break;
- case SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN|SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN:
- infof(data, "SSL_get_shutdown() returned SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN|"
- "SSL_RECEIVED__SHUTDOWN");
- break;
- }
-#endif
- }
-
- SSL_free(backend->handle);
- backend->handle = NULL;
- }
- return retval;
-}
-
-static void ossl_session_free(void *ptr)
-{
- /* free the ID */
- SSL_SESSION_free(ptr);
-}
-
-/*
- * This function is called when the 'data' struct is going away. Close
- * down everything and free all resources!
- */
-static void ossl_close_all(struct Curl_easy *data)
-{
-#ifdef USE_OPENSSL_ENGINE
- if(data->state.engine) {
- ENGINE_finish(data->state.engine);
- ENGINE_free(data->state.engine);
- data->state.engine = NULL;
- }
-#else
- (void)data;
-#endif
-#if !defined(HAVE_ERR_REMOVE_THREAD_STATE_DEPRECATED) && \
- defined(HAVE_ERR_REMOVE_THREAD_STATE)
- /* OpenSSL 1.0.1 and 1.0.2 build an error queue that is stored per-thread
- so we need to clean it here in case the thread will be killed. All OpenSSL
- code should extract the error in association with the error so clearing
- this queue here should be harmless at worst. */
- ERR_remove_thread_state(NULL);
-#endif
-}
-
-/* ====================================================== */
-
-/*
- * Match subjectAltName against the host name.
- */
-static bool subj_alt_hostcheck(struct Curl_easy *data,
- const char *match_pattern,
- size_t matchlen,
- const char *hostname,
- size_t hostlen,
- const char *dispname)
-{
-#ifdef CURL_DISABLE_VERBOSE_STRINGS
- (void)dispname;
- (void)data;
-#endif
- if(Curl_cert_hostcheck(match_pattern, matchlen, hostname, hostlen)) {
- infof(data, " subjectAltName: host \"%s\" matched cert's \"%s\"",
- dispname, match_pattern);
- return TRUE;
- }
- return FALSE;
-}
-
-/* Quote from RFC2818 section 3.1 "Server Identity"
-
- If a subjectAltName extension of type dNSName is present, that MUST
- be used as the identity. Otherwise, the (most specific) Common Name
- field in the Subject field of the certificate MUST be used. Although
- the use of the Common Name is existing practice, it is deprecated and
- Certification Authorities are encouraged to use the dNSName instead.
-
- Matching is performed using the matching rules specified by
- [RFC2459]. If more than one identity of a given type is present in
- the certificate (e.g., more than one dNSName name, a match in any one
- of the set is considered acceptable.) Names may contain the wildcard
- character * which is considered to match any single domain name
- component or component fragment. E.g., *.a.com matches foo.a.com but
- not bar.foo.a.com. f*.com matches foo.com but not bar.com.
-
- In some cases, the URI is specified as an IP address rather than a
- hostname. In this case, the iPAddress subjectAltName must be present
- in the certificate and must exactly match the IP in the URI.
-
- This function is now used from ngtcp2 (QUIC) as well.
-*/
-CURLcode Curl_ossl_verifyhost(struct Curl_easy *data, struct connectdata *conn,
- X509 *server_cert)
-{
- bool matched = FALSE;
- int target = GEN_DNS; /* target type, GEN_DNS or GEN_IPADD */
- size_t addrlen = 0;
- STACK_OF(GENERAL_NAME) *altnames;
-#ifdef ENABLE_IPV6
- struct in6_addr addr;
-#else
- struct in_addr addr;
-#endif
- CURLcode result = CURLE_OK;
- bool dNSName = FALSE; /* if a dNSName field exists in the cert */
- bool iPAddress = FALSE; /* if a iPAddress field exists in the cert */
- const char * const hostname = SSL_HOST_NAME();
- const char * const dispname = SSL_HOST_DISPNAME();
- size_t hostlen = strlen(hostname);
-
-#ifdef ENABLE_IPV6
- if(conn->bits.ipv6_ip &&
- Curl_inet_pton(AF_INET6, hostname, &addr)) {
- target = GEN_IPADD;
- addrlen = sizeof(struct in6_addr);
- }
- else
-#endif
- if(Curl_inet_pton(AF_INET, hostname, &addr)) {
- target = GEN_IPADD;
- addrlen = sizeof(struct in_addr);
- }
-
- /* get a "list" of alternative names */
- altnames = X509_get_ext_d2i(server_cert, NID_subject_alt_name, NULL, NULL);
-
- if(altnames) {
-#ifdef OPENSSL_IS_BORINGSSL
- size_t numalts;
- size_t i;
-#else
- int numalts;
- int i;
-#endif
- bool dnsmatched = FALSE;
- bool ipmatched = FALSE;
-
- /* get amount of alternatives, RFC2459 claims there MUST be at least
- one, but we don't depend on it... */
- numalts = sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(altnames);
-
- /* loop through all alternatives - until a dnsmatch */
- for(i = 0; (i < numalts) && !dnsmatched; i++) {
- /* get a handle to alternative name number i */
- const GENERAL_NAME *check = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(altnames, i);
-
- if(check->type == GEN_DNS)
- dNSName = TRUE;
- else if(check->type == GEN_IPADD)
- iPAddress = TRUE;
-
- /* only check alternatives of the same type the target is */
- if(check->type == target) {
- /* get data and length */
- const char *altptr = (char *)ASN1_STRING_get0_data(check->d.ia5);
- size_t altlen = (size_t) ASN1_STRING_length(check->d.ia5);
-
- switch(target) {
- case GEN_DNS: /* name/pattern comparison */
- /* The OpenSSL man page explicitly says: "In general it cannot be
- assumed that the data returned by ASN1_STRING_data() is null
- terminated or does not contain embedded nulls." But also that
- "The actual format of the data will depend on the actual string
- type itself: for example for an IA5String the data will be ASCII"
-
- It has been however verified that in 0.9.6 and 0.9.7, IA5String
- is always null-terminated.
- */
- if((altlen == strlen(altptr)) &&
- /* if this isn't true, there was an embedded zero in the name
- string and we cannot match it. */
- subj_alt_hostcheck(data,
- altptr,
- altlen, hostname, hostlen, dispname)) {
- dnsmatched = TRUE;
- }
- break;
-
- case GEN_IPADD: /* IP address comparison */
- /* compare alternative IP address if the data chunk is the same size
- our server IP address is */
- if((altlen == addrlen) && !memcmp(altptr, &addr, altlen)) {
- ipmatched = TRUE;
- infof(data,
- " subjectAltName: host \"%s\" matched cert's IP address!",
- dispname);
- }
- break;
- }
- }
- }
- GENERAL_NAMES_free(altnames);
-
- if(dnsmatched || ipmatched)
- matched = TRUE;
- }
-
- if(matched)
- /* an alternative name matched */
- ;
- else if(dNSName || iPAddress) {
- infof(data, " subjectAltName does not match %s", dispname);
- failf(data, "SSL: no alternative certificate subject name matches "
- "target host name '%s'", dispname);
- result = CURLE_PEER_FAILED_VERIFICATION;
- }
- else {
- /* we have to look to the last occurrence of a commonName in the
- distinguished one to get the most significant one. */
- int i = -1;
- unsigned char *peer_CN = NULL;
- int peerlen = 0;
-
- /* The following is done because of a bug in 0.9.6b */
- X509_NAME *name = X509_get_subject_name(server_cert);
- if(name) {
- int j;
- while((j = X509_NAME_get_index_by_NID(name, NID_commonName, i)) >= 0)
- i = j;
- }
-
- /* we have the name entry and we will now convert this to a string
- that we can use for comparison. Doing this we support BMPstring,
- UTF8, etc. */
-
- if(i >= 0) {
- ASN1_STRING *tmp =
- X509_NAME_ENTRY_get_data(X509_NAME_get_entry(name, i));
-
- /* In OpenSSL 0.9.7d and earlier, ASN1_STRING_to_UTF8 fails if the input
- is already UTF-8 encoded. We check for this case and copy the raw
- string manually to avoid the problem. This code can be made
- conditional in the future when OpenSSL has been fixed. */
- if(tmp) {
- if(ASN1_STRING_type(tmp) == V_ASN1_UTF8STRING) {
- peerlen = ASN1_STRING_length(tmp);
- if(peerlen >= 0) {
- peer_CN = OPENSSL_malloc(peerlen + 1);
- if(peer_CN) {
- memcpy(peer_CN, ASN1_STRING_get0_data(tmp), peerlen);
- peer_CN[peerlen] = '\0';
- }
- else
- result = CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY;
- }
- }
- else /* not a UTF8 name */
- peerlen = ASN1_STRING_to_UTF8(&peer_CN, tmp);
-
- if(peer_CN && (curlx_uztosi(strlen((char *)peer_CN)) != peerlen)) {
- /* there was a terminating zero before the end of string, this
- cannot match and we return failure! */
- failf(data, "SSL: illegal cert name field");
- result = CURLE_PEER_FAILED_VERIFICATION;
- }
- }
- }
-
- if(result)
- /* error already detected, pass through */
- ;
- else if(!peer_CN) {
- failf(data,
- "SSL: unable to obtain common name from peer certificate");
- result = CURLE_PEER_FAILED_VERIFICATION;
- }
- else if(!Curl_cert_hostcheck((const char *)peer_CN,
- peerlen, hostname, hostlen)) {
- failf(data, "SSL: certificate subject name '%s' does not match "
- "target host name '%s'", peer_CN, dispname);
- result = CURLE_PEER_FAILED_VERIFICATION;
- }
- else {
- infof(data, " common name: %s (matched)", peer_CN);
- }
- if(peer_CN)
- OPENSSL_free(peer_CN);
- }
-
- return result;
-}
-
-#if (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x0090808fL) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) && \
- !defined(OPENSSL_NO_OCSP)
-static CURLcode verifystatus(struct Curl_easy *data,
- struct ssl_connect_data *connssl)
-{
- int i, ocsp_status;
- unsigned char *status;
- const unsigned char *p;
- CURLcode result = CURLE_OK;
- OCSP_RESPONSE *rsp = NULL;
- OCSP_BASICRESP *br = NULL;
- X509_STORE *st = NULL;
- STACK_OF(X509) *ch = NULL;
- struct ssl_backend_data *backend = connssl->backend;
- X509 *cert;
- OCSP_CERTID *id = NULL;
- int cert_status, crl_reason;
- ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME *rev, *thisupd, *nextupd;
- int ret;
- long len;
-
- DEBUGASSERT(backend);
-
- len = SSL_get_tlsext_status_ocsp_resp(backend->handle, &status);
-
- if(!status) {
- failf(data, "No OCSP response received");
- result = CURLE_SSL_INVALIDCERTSTATUS;
- goto end;
- }
- p = status;
- rsp = d2i_OCSP_RESPONSE(NULL, &p, len);
- if(!rsp) {
- failf(data, "Invalid OCSP response");
- result = CURLE_SSL_INVALIDCERTSTATUS;
- goto end;
- }
-
- ocsp_status = OCSP_response_status(rsp);
- if(ocsp_status != OCSP_RESPONSE_STATUS_SUCCESSFUL) {
- failf(data, "Invalid OCSP response status: %s (%d)",
- OCSP_response_status_str(ocsp_status), ocsp_status);
- result = CURLE_SSL_INVALIDCERTSTATUS;
- goto end;
- }
-
- br = OCSP_response_get1_basic(rsp);
- if(!br) {
- failf(data, "Invalid OCSP response");
- result = CURLE_SSL_INVALIDCERTSTATUS;
- goto end;
- }
-
- ch = SSL_get_peer_cert_chain(backend->handle);
- if(!ch) {
- failf(data, "Could not get peer certificate chain");
- result = CURLE_SSL_INVALIDCERTSTATUS;
- goto end;
- }
- st = SSL_CTX_get_cert_store(backend->ctx);
-
-#if ((OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER <= 0x1000201fL) /* Fixed after 1.0.2a */ || \
- (defined(LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER) && \
- LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER <= 0x2040200fL))
- /* The authorized responder cert in the OCSP response MUST be signed by the
- peer cert's issuer (see RFC6960 section 4.2.2.2). If that's a root cert,
- no problem, but if it's an intermediate cert OpenSSL has a bug where it
- expects this issuer to be present in the chain embedded in the OCSP
- response. So we add it if necessary. */
-
- /* First make sure the peer cert chain includes both a peer and an issuer,
- and the OCSP response contains a responder cert. */
- if(sk_X509_num(ch) >= 2 && sk_X509_num(br->certs) >= 1) {
- X509 *responder = sk_X509_value(br->certs, sk_X509_num(br->certs) - 1);
-
- /* Find issuer of responder cert and add it to the OCSP response chain */
- for(i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(ch); i++) {
- X509 *issuer = sk_X509_value(ch, i);
- if(X509_check_issued(issuer, responder) == X509_V_OK) {
- if(!OCSP_basic_add1_cert(br, issuer)) {
- failf(data, "Could not add issuer cert to OCSP response");
- result = CURLE_SSL_INVALIDCERTSTATUS;
- goto end;
- }
- }
- }
- }
-#endif
-
- if(OCSP_basic_verify(br, ch, st, 0) <= 0) {
- failf(data, "OCSP response verification failed");
- result = CURLE_SSL_INVALIDCERTSTATUS;
- goto end;
- }
-
- /* Compute the certificate's ID */
- cert = SSL_get1_peer_certificate(backend->handle);
- if(!cert) {
- failf(data, "Error getting peer certificate");
- result = CURLE_SSL_INVALIDCERTSTATUS;
- goto end;
- }
-
- for(i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(ch); i++) {
- X509 *issuer = sk_X509_value(ch, i);
- if(X509_check_issued(issuer, cert) == X509_V_OK) {
- id = OCSP_cert_to_id(EVP_sha1(), cert, issuer);
- break;
- }
- }
- X509_free(cert);
-
- if(!id) {
- failf(data, "Error computing OCSP ID");
- result = CURLE_SSL_INVALIDCERTSTATUS;
- goto end;
- }
-
- /* Find the single OCSP response corresponding to the certificate ID */
- ret = OCSP_resp_find_status(br, id, &cert_status, &crl_reason, &rev,
- &thisupd, &nextupd);
- OCSP_CERTID_free(id);
- if(ret != 1) {
- failf(data, "Could not find certificate ID in OCSP response");
- result = CURLE_SSL_INVALIDCERTSTATUS;
- goto end;
- }
-
- /* Validate the corresponding single OCSP response */
- if(!OCSP_check_validity(thisupd, nextupd, 300L, -1L)) {
- failf(data, "OCSP response has expired");
- result = CURLE_SSL_INVALIDCERTSTATUS;
- goto end;
- }
-
- infof(data, "SSL certificate status: %s (%d)",
- OCSP_cert_status_str(cert_status), cert_status);
-
- switch(cert_status) {
- case V_OCSP_CERTSTATUS_GOOD:
- break;
-
- case V_OCSP_CERTSTATUS_REVOKED:
- result = CURLE_SSL_INVALIDCERTSTATUS;
- failf(data, "SSL certificate revocation reason: %s (%d)",
- OCSP_crl_reason_str(crl_reason), crl_reason);
- goto end;
-
- case V_OCSP_CERTSTATUS_UNKNOWN:
- default:
- result = CURLE_SSL_INVALIDCERTSTATUS;
- goto end;
- }
-
-end:
- if(br)
- OCSP_BASICRESP_free(br);
- OCSP_RESPONSE_free(rsp);
-
- return result;
-}
-#endif
-
-#endif /* USE_OPENSSL */
-
-/* The SSL_CTRL_SET_MSG_CALLBACK doesn't exist in ancient OpenSSL versions
- and thus this cannot be done there. */
-#ifdef SSL_CTRL_SET_MSG_CALLBACK
-
-static const char *ssl_msg_type(int ssl_ver, int msg)
-{
-#ifdef SSL2_VERSION_MAJOR
- if(ssl_ver == SSL2_VERSION_MAJOR) {
- switch(msg) {
- case SSL2_MT_ERROR:
- return "Error";
- case SSL2_MT_CLIENT_HELLO:
- return "Client hello";
- case SSL2_MT_CLIENT_MASTER_KEY:
- return "Client key";
- case SSL2_MT_CLIENT_FINISHED:
- return "Client finished";
- case SSL2_MT_SERVER_HELLO:
- return "Server hello";
- case SSL2_MT_SERVER_VERIFY:
- return "Server verify";
- case SSL2_MT_SERVER_FINISHED:
- return "Server finished";
- case SSL2_MT_REQUEST_CERTIFICATE:
- return "Request CERT";
- case SSL2_MT_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE:
- return "Client CERT";
- }
- }
- else
-#endif
- if(ssl_ver == SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR) {
- switch(msg) {
- case SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST:
- return "Hello request";
- case SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO:
- return "Client hello";
- case SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO:
- return "Server hello";
-#ifdef SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET
- case SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET:
- return "Newsession Ticket";
-#endif
- case SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE:
- return "Certificate";
- case SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE:
- return "Server key exchange";
- case SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE:
- return "Client key exchange";
- case SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST:
- return "Request CERT";
- case SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE:
- return "Server finished";
- case SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY:
- return "CERT verify";
- case SSL3_MT_FINISHED:
- return "Finished";
-#ifdef SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS
- case SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS:
- return "Certificate Status";
-#endif
-#ifdef SSL3_MT_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS
- case SSL3_MT_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS:
- return "Encrypted Extensions";
-#endif
-#ifdef SSL3_MT_SUPPLEMENTAL_DATA
- case SSL3_MT_SUPPLEMENTAL_DATA:
- return "Supplemental data";
-#endif
-#ifdef SSL3_MT_END_OF_EARLY_DATA
- case SSL3_MT_END_OF_EARLY_DATA:
- return "End of early data";
-#endif
-#ifdef SSL3_MT_KEY_UPDATE
- case SSL3_MT_KEY_UPDATE:
- return "Key update";
-#endif
-#ifdef SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO
- case SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO:
- return "Next protocol";
-#endif
-#ifdef SSL3_MT_MESSAGE_HASH
- case SSL3_MT_MESSAGE_HASH:
- return "Message hash";
-#endif
- }
- }
- return "Unknown";
-}
-
-static const char *tls_rt_type(int type)
-{
- switch(type) {
-#ifdef SSL3_RT_HEADER
- case SSL3_RT_HEADER:
- return "TLS header";
-#endif
- case SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC:
- return "TLS change cipher";
- case SSL3_RT_ALERT:
- return "TLS alert";
- case SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE:
- return "TLS handshake";
- case SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA:
- return "TLS app data";
- default:
- return "TLS Unknown";
- }
-}
-
-/*
- * Our callback from the SSL/TLS layers.
- */
-static void ossl_trace(int direction, int ssl_ver, int content_type,
- const void *buf, size_t len, SSL *ssl,
- void *userp)
-{
- char unknown[32];
- const char *verstr = NULL;
- struct connectdata *conn = userp;
- struct ssl_connect_data *connssl = &conn->ssl[0];
- struct ssl_backend_data *backend = connssl->backend;
- struct Curl_easy *data = NULL;
-
- DEBUGASSERT(backend);
- data = backend->logger;
-
- if(!conn || !data || !data->set.fdebug ||
- (direction != 0 && direction != 1))
- return;
-
- switch(ssl_ver) {
-#ifdef SSL2_VERSION /* removed in recent versions */
- case SSL2_VERSION:
- verstr = "SSLv2";
- break;
-#endif
-#ifdef SSL3_VERSION
- case SSL3_VERSION:
- verstr = "SSLv3";
- break;
-#endif
- case TLS1_VERSION:
- verstr = "TLSv1.0";
- break;
-#ifdef TLS1_1_VERSION
- case TLS1_1_VERSION:
- verstr = "TLSv1.1";
- break;
-#endif
-#ifdef TLS1_2_VERSION
- case TLS1_2_VERSION:
- verstr = "TLSv1.2";
- break;
-#endif
-#ifdef TLS1_3_VERSION
- case TLS1_3_VERSION:
- verstr = "TLSv1.3";
- break;
-#endif
- case 0:
- break;
- default:
- msnprintf(unknown, sizeof(unknown), "(%x)", ssl_ver);
- verstr = unknown;
- break;
- }
-
- /* Log progress for interesting records only (like Handshake or Alert), skip
- * all raw record headers (content_type == SSL3_RT_HEADER or ssl_ver == 0).
- * For TLS 1.3, skip notification of the decrypted inner Content-Type.
- */
- if(ssl_ver
-#ifdef SSL3_RT_INNER_CONTENT_TYPE
- && content_type != SSL3_RT_INNER_CONTENT_TYPE
-#endif
- ) {
- const char *msg_name, *tls_rt_name;
- char ssl_buf[1024];
- int msg_type, txt_len;
-
- /* the info given when the version is zero is not that useful for us */
-
- ssl_ver >>= 8; /* check the upper 8 bits only below */
-
- /* SSLv2 doesn't seem to have TLS record-type headers, so OpenSSL
- * always pass-up content-type as 0. But the interesting message-type
- * is at 'buf[0]'.
- */
- if(ssl_ver == SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR && content_type)
- tls_rt_name = tls_rt_type(content_type);
- else
- tls_rt_name = "";
-
- if(content_type == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
- msg_type = *(char *)buf;
- msg_name = "Change cipher spec";
- }
- else if(content_type == SSL3_RT_ALERT) {
- msg_type = (((char *)buf)[0] << 8) + ((char *)buf)[1];
- msg_name = SSL_alert_desc_string_long(msg_type);
- }
- else {
- msg_type = *(char *)buf;
- msg_name = ssl_msg_type(ssl_ver, msg_type);
- }
-
- txt_len = msnprintf(ssl_buf, sizeof(ssl_buf), "%s (%s), %s, %s (%d):\n",
- verstr, direction?"OUT":"IN",
- tls_rt_name, msg_name, msg_type);
- if(0 <= txt_len && (unsigned)txt_len < sizeof(ssl_buf)) {
- Curl_debug(data, CURLINFO_TEXT, ssl_buf, (size_t)txt_len);
- }
- }
-
- Curl_debug(data, (direction == 1) ? CURLINFO_SSL_DATA_OUT :
- CURLINFO_SSL_DATA_IN, (char *)buf, len);
- (void) ssl;
-}
-#endif
-
-#ifdef USE_OPENSSL
-/* ====================================================== */
-
-#ifdef SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_HOSTNAME
-# define use_sni(x) sni = (x)
-#else
-# define use_sni(x) Curl_nop_stmt
-#endif
-
-/* Check for OpenSSL 1.0.2 which has ALPN support. */
-#undef HAS_ALPN
-#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10002000L \
- && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT)
-# define HAS_ALPN 1
-#endif
-
-#if (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10100000L) /* 1.1.0 */
-static CURLcode
-set_ssl_version_min_max(SSL_CTX *ctx, struct connectdata *conn)
-{
- /* first, TLS min version... */
- long curl_ssl_version_min = SSL_CONN_CONFIG(version);
- long curl_ssl_version_max;
-
- /* convert curl min SSL version option to OpenSSL constant */
-#if defined(OPENSSL_IS_BORINGSSL) || defined(LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER)
- uint16_t ossl_ssl_version_min = 0;
- uint16_t ossl_ssl_version_max = 0;
-#else
- long ossl_ssl_version_min = 0;
- long ossl_ssl_version_max = 0;
-#endif
- switch(curl_ssl_version_min) {
- case CURL_SSLVERSION_TLSv1: /* TLS 1.x */
- case CURL_SSLVERSION_TLSv1_0:
- ossl_ssl_version_min = TLS1_VERSION;
- break;
- case CURL_SSLVERSION_TLSv1_1:
- ossl_ssl_version_min = TLS1_1_VERSION;
- break;
- case CURL_SSLVERSION_TLSv1_2:
- ossl_ssl_version_min = TLS1_2_VERSION;
- break;
- case CURL_SSLVERSION_TLSv1_3:
-#ifdef TLS1_3_VERSION
- ossl_ssl_version_min = TLS1_3_VERSION;
- break;
-#else
- return CURLE_NOT_BUILT_IN;
-#endif
- }
-
- /* CURL_SSLVERSION_DEFAULT means that no option was selected.
- We don't want to pass 0 to SSL_CTX_set_min_proto_version as
- it would enable all versions down to the lowest supported by
- the library.
- So we skip this, and stay with the library default
- */
- if(curl_ssl_version_min != CURL_SSLVERSION_DEFAULT) {
- if(!SSL_CTX_set_min_proto_version(ctx, ossl_ssl_version_min)) {
- return CURLE_SSL_CONNECT_ERROR;
- }
- }
-
- /* ... then, TLS max version */
- curl_ssl_version_max = SSL_CONN_CONFIG(version_max);
-
- /* convert curl max SSL version option to OpenSSL constant */
- switch(curl_ssl_version_max) {
- case CURL_SSLVERSION_MAX_TLSv1_0:
- ossl_ssl_version_max = TLS1_VERSION;
- break;
- case CURL_SSLVERSION_MAX_TLSv1_1:
- ossl_ssl_version_max = TLS1_1_VERSION;
- break;
- case CURL_SSLVERSION_MAX_TLSv1_2:
- ossl_ssl_version_max = TLS1_2_VERSION;
- break;
-#ifdef TLS1_3_VERSION
- case CURL_SSLVERSION_MAX_TLSv1_3:
- ossl_ssl_version_max = TLS1_3_VERSION;
- break;
-#endif
- case CURL_SSLVERSION_MAX_NONE: /* none selected */
- case CURL_SSLVERSION_MAX_DEFAULT: /* max selected */
- default:
- /* SSL_CTX_set_max_proto_version states that:
- setting the maximum to 0 will enable
- protocol versions up to the highest version
- supported by the library */
- ossl_ssl_version_max = 0;
- break;
- }
-
- if(!SSL_CTX_set_max_proto_version(ctx, ossl_ssl_version_max)) {
- return CURLE_SSL_CONNECT_ERROR;
- }
-
- return CURLE_OK;
-}
-#endif
-
-#ifdef OPENSSL_IS_BORINGSSL
-typedef uint32_t ctx_option_t;
-#elif OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x30000000L
-typedef uint64_t ctx_option_t;
-#else
-typedef long ctx_option_t;
-#endif
-
-#if (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10100000L) /* 1.1.0 */
-static CURLcode
-set_ssl_version_min_max_legacy(ctx_option_t *ctx_options,
- struct Curl_easy *data,
- struct connectdata *conn, int sockindex)
-{
- long ssl_version = SSL_CONN_CONFIG(version);
- long ssl_version_max = SSL_CONN_CONFIG(version_max);
-
- (void) data; /* In case it's unused. */
-
- switch(ssl_version) {
- case CURL_SSLVERSION_TLSv1_3:
-#ifdef TLS1_3_VERSION
- {
- struct ssl_connect_data *connssl = &conn->ssl[sockindex];
- struct ssl_backend_data *backend = connssl->backend;
- DEBUGASSERT(backend);
- SSL_CTX_set_max_proto_version(backend->ctx, TLS1_3_VERSION);
- *ctx_options |= SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_2;
- }
-#else
- (void)sockindex;
- (void)ctx_options;
- failf(data, OSSL_PACKAGE " was built without TLS 1.3 support");
- return CURLE_NOT_BUILT_IN;
-#endif
- /* FALLTHROUGH */
- case CURL_SSLVERSION_TLSv1_2:
-#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x1000100FL
- *ctx_options |= SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1;
-#else
- failf(data, OSSL_PACKAGE " was built without TLS 1.2 support");
- return CURLE_NOT_BUILT_IN;
-#endif
- /* FALLTHROUGH */
- case CURL_SSLVERSION_TLSv1_1:
-#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x1000100FL
- *ctx_options |= SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1;
-#else
- failf(data, OSSL_PACKAGE " was built without TLS 1.1 support");
- return CURLE_NOT_BUILT_IN;
-#endif
- /* FALLTHROUGH */
- case CURL_SSLVERSION_TLSv1_0:
- case CURL_SSLVERSION_TLSv1:
- break;
- }
-
- switch(ssl_version_max) {
- case CURL_SSLVERSION_MAX_TLSv1_0:
-#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x1000100FL
- *ctx_options |= SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1;
-#endif
- /* FALLTHROUGH */
- case CURL_SSLVERSION_MAX_TLSv1_1:
-#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x1000100FL
- *ctx_options |= SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_2;
-#endif
- /* FALLTHROUGH */
- case CURL_SSLVERSION_MAX_TLSv1_2:
-#ifdef TLS1_3_VERSION
- *ctx_options |= SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_3;
-#endif
- break;
- case CURL_SSLVERSION_MAX_TLSv1_3:
-#ifdef TLS1_3_VERSION
- break;
-#else
- failf(data, OSSL_PACKAGE " was built without TLS 1.3 support");
- return CURLE_NOT_BUILT_IN;
-#endif
- }
- return CURLE_OK;
-}
-#endif
-
-/* The "new session" callback must return zero if the session can be removed
- * or non-zero if the session has been put into the session cache.
- */
-static int ossl_new_session_cb(SSL *ssl, SSL_SESSION *ssl_sessionid)
-{
- int res = 0;
- struct connectdata *conn;
- struct Curl_easy *data;
- int sockindex;
- curl_socket_t *sockindex_ptr;
- int data_idx = ossl_get_ssl_data_index();
- int connectdata_idx = ossl_get_ssl_conn_index();
- int sockindex_idx = ossl_get_ssl_sockindex_index();
- int proxy_idx = ossl_get_proxy_index();
- bool isproxy;
-
- if(data_idx < 0 || connectdata_idx < 0 || sockindex_idx < 0 || proxy_idx < 0)
- return 0;
-
- conn = (struct connectdata*) SSL_get_ex_data(ssl, connectdata_idx);
- data = (struct Curl_easy *) SSL_get_ex_data(ssl, data_idx);
- /* The sockindex has been stored as a pointer to an array element */
- sockindex_ptr = (curl_socket_t*) SSL_get_ex_data(ssl, sockindex_idx);
- if(!conn || !data || !sockindex_ptr)
- return 0;
-
- sockindex = (int)(sockindex_ptr - conn->sock);
-
- isproxy = SSL_get_ex_data(ssl, proxy_idx) ? TRUE : FALSE;
-
- if(SSL_SET_OPTION(primary.sessionid)) {
- bool incache;
- bool added = FALSE;
- void *old_ssl_sessionid = NULL;
-
- Curl_ssl_sessionid_lock(data);
- if(isproxy)
- incache = FALSE;
- else
- incache = !(Curl_ssl_getsessionid(data, conn, isproxy,
- &old_ssl_sessionid, NULL, sockindex));
- if(incache) {
- if(old_ssl_sessionid != ssl_sessionid) {
- infof(data, "old SSL session ID is stale, removing");
- Curl_ssl_delsessionid(data, old_ssl_sessionid);
- incache = FALSE;
- }
- }
-
- if(!incache) {
- if(!Curl_ssl_addsessionid(data, conn, isproxy, ssl_sessionid,
- 0 /* unknown size */, sockindex, &added)) {
- if(added) {
- /* the session has been put into the session cache */
- res = 1;
- }
- }
- else
- failf(data, "failed to store ssl session");
- }
- Curl_ssl_sessionid_unlock(data);
- }
-
- return res;
-}
-
-static CURLcode load_cacert_from_memory(SSL_CTX *ctx,
- const struct curl_blob *ca_info_blob)
-{
- /* these need to be freed at the end */
- BIO *cbio = NULL;
- STACK_OF(X509_INFO) *inf = NULL;
-
- /* everything else is just a reference */
- int i, count = 0;
- X509_STORE *cts = NULL;
- X509_INFO *itmp = NULL;
-
- if(ca_info_blob->len > (size_t)INT_MAX)
- return CURLE_SSL_CACERT_BADFILE;
-
- cts = SSL_CTX_get_cert_store(ctx);
- if(!cts)
- return CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY;
-
- cbio = BIO_new_mem_buf(ca_info_blob->data, (int)ca_info_blob->len);
- if(!cbio)
- return CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY;
-
- inf = PEM_X509_INFO_read_bio(cbio, NULL, NULL, NULL);
- if(!inf) {
- BIO_free(cbio);
- return CURLE_SSL_CACERT_BADFILE;
- }
-
- /* add each entry from PEM file to x509_store */
- for(i = 0; i < (int)sk_X509_INFO_num(inf); ++i) {
- itmp = sk_X509_INFO_value(inf, i);
- if(itmp->x509) {
- if(X509_STORE_add_cert(cts, itmp->x509)) {
- ++count;
- }
- else {
- /* set count to 0 to return an error */
- count = 0;
- break;
- }
- }
- if(itmp->crl) {
- if(X509_STORE_add_crl(cts, itmp->crl)) {
- ++count;
- }
- else {
- /* set count to 0 to return an error */
- count = 0;
- break;
- }
- }
- }
-
- sk_X509_INFO_pop_free(inf, X509_INFO_free);
- BIO_free(cbio);
-
- /* if we didn't end up importing anything, treat that as an error */
- return (count > 0 ? CURLE_OK : CURLE_SSL_CACERT_BADFILE);
-}
-
-static CURLcode ossl_connect_step1(struct Curl_easy *data,
- struct connectdata *conn, int sockindex)
-{
- CURLcode result = CURLE_OK;
- char *ciphers;
- SSL_METHOD_QUAL SSL_METHOD *req_method = NULL;
- X509_LOOKUP *lookup = NULL;
- curl_socket_t sockfd = conn->sock[sockindex];
- struct ssl_connect_data *connssl = &conn->ssl[sockindex];
- ctx_option_t ctx_options = 0;
- void *ssl_sessionid = NULL;
-
-#ifdef SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_HOSTNAME
- bool sni;
- const char * const hostname = SSL_HOST_NAME();
-
-#ifdef ENABLE_IPV6
- struct in6_addr addr;
-#else
- struct in_addr addr;
-#endif
-#endif
- const long int ssl_version = SSL_CONN_CONFIG(version);
-#ifdef USE_OPENSSL_SRP
- const enum CURL_TLSAUTH ssl_authtype = SSL_SET_OPTION(primary.authtype);
-#endif
- char * const ssl_cert = SSL_SET_OPTION(primary.clientcert);
- const struct curl_blob *ssl_cert_blob = SSL_SET_OPTION(primary.cert_blob);
- const struct curl_blob *ca_info_blob = SSL_CONN_CONFIG(ca_info_blob);
- const char * const ssl_cert_type = SSL_SET_OPTION(cert_type);
- const char * const ssl_cafile =
- /* CURLOPT_CAINFO_BLOB overrides CURLOPT_CAINFO */
- (ca_info_blob ? NULL : SSL_CONN_CONFIG(CAfile));
- const char * const ssl_capath = SSL_CONN_CONFIG(CApath);
- const bool verifypeer = SSL_CONN_CONFIG(verifypeer);
- const char * const ssl_crlfile = SSL_SET_OPTION(primary.CRLfile);
- char error_buffer[256];
- struct ssl_backend_data *backend = connssl->backend;
- bool imported_native_ca = false;
-
- DEBUGASSERT(ssl_connect_1 == connssl->connecting_state);
- DEBUGASSERT(backend);
-
- /* Make funny stuff to get random input */
- result = ossl_seed(data);
- if(result)
- return result;
-
- SSL_SET_OPTION_LVALUE(certverifyresult) = !X509_V_OK;
-
- /* check to see if we've been told to use an explicit SSL/TLS version */
-
- switch(ssl_version) {
- case CURL_SSLVERSION_DEFAULT:
- case CURL_SSLVERSION_TLSv1:
- case CURL_SSLVERSION_TLSv1_0:
- case CURL_SSLVERSION_TLSv1_1:
- case CURL_SSLVERSION_TLSv1_2:
- case CURL_SSLVERSION_TLSv1_3:
- /* it will be handled later with the context options */
-#if (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10100000L)
- req_method = TLS_client_method();
-#else
- req_method = SSLv23_client_method();
-#endif
- use_sni(TRUE);
- break;
- case CURL_SSLVERSION_SSLv2:
- failf(data, "No SSLv2 support");
- return CURLE_NOT_BUILT_IN;
- case CURL_SSLVERSION_SSLv3:
- failf(data, "No SSLv3 support");
- return CURLE_NOT_BUILT_IN;
- default:
- failf(data, "Unrecognized parameter passed via CURLOPT_SSLVERSION");
- return CURLE_SSL_CONNECT_ERROR;
- }
-
- DEBUGASSERT(!backend->ctx);
- backend->ctx = SSL_CTX_new(req_method);
-
- if(!backend->ctx) {
- failf(data, "SSL: couldn't create a context: %s",
- ossl_strerror(ERR_peek_error(), error_buffer, sizeof(error_buffer)));
- return CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY;
- }
-
-#ifdef SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS
- SSL_CTX_set_mode(backend->ctx, SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS);
-#endif
-
-#ifdef SSL_CTRL_SET_MSG_CALLBACK
- if(data->set.fdebug && data->set.verbose) {
- /* the SSL trace callback is only used for verbose logging */
- SSL_CTX_set_msg_callback(backend->ctx, ossl_trace);
- SSL_CTX_set_msg_callback_arg(backend->ctx, conn);
- set_logger(conn, data);
- }
-#endif
-
- /* OpenSSL contains code to work around lots of bugs and flaws in various
- SSL-implementations. SSL_CTX_set_options() is used to enabled those
- work-arounds. The man page for this option states that SSL_OP_ALL enables
- all the work-arounds and that "It is usually safe to use SSL_OP_ALL to
- enable the bug workaround options if compatibility with somewhat broken
- implementations is desired."
-
- The "-no_ticket" option was introduced in OpenSSL 0.9.8j. It's a flag to
- disable "rfc4507bis session ticket support". rfc4507bis was later turned
- into the proper RFC5077: https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc5077
-
- The enabled extension concerns the session management. I wonder how often
- libcurl stops a connection and then resumes a TLS session. Also, sending
- the session data is some overhead. I suggest that you just use your
- proposed patch (which explicitly disables TICKET).
-
- If someone writes an application with libcurl and OpenSSL who wants to
- enable the feature, one can do this in the SSL callback.
-
- SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_REUSE_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG option enabling allowed proper
- interoperability with web server Netscape Enterprise Server 2.0.1 which
- was released back in 1996.
-
- Due to CVE-2010-4180, option SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_REUSE_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG has
- become ineffective as of OpenSSL 0.9.8q and 1.0.0c. In order to mitigate
- CVE-2010-4180 when using previous OpenSSL versions we no longer enable
- this option regardless of OpenSSL version and SSL_OP_ALL definition.
-
- OpenSSL added a work-around for a SSL 3.0/TLS 1.0 CBC vulnerability
- (https://www.openssl.org/~bodo/tls-cbc.txt). In 0.9.6e they added a bit to
- SSL_OP_ALL that _disables_ that work-around despite the fact that
- SSL_OP_ALL is documented to do "rather harmless" workarounds. In order to
- keep the secure work-around, the SSL_OP_DONT_INSERT_EMPTY_FRAGMENTS bit
- must not be set.
- */
-
- ctx_options = SSL_OP_ALL;
-
-#ifdef SSL_OP_NO_TICKET
- ctx_options |= SSL_OP_NO_TICKET;
-#endif
-
-#ifdef SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION
- ctx_options |= SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION;
-#endif
-
-#ifdef SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_REUSE_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG
- /* mitigate CVE-2010-4180 */
- ctx_options &= ~SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_REUSE_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG;
-#endif
-
-#ifdef SSL_OP_DONT_INSERT_EMPTY_FRAGMENTS
- /* unless the user explicitly asks to allow the protocol vulnerability we
- use the work-around */
- if(!SSL_SET_OPTION(enable_beast))
- ctx_options &= ~SSL_OP_DONT_INSERT_EMPTY_FRAGMENTS;
-#endif
-
- switch(ssl_version) {
- case CURL_SSLVERSION_SSLv2:
- case CURL_SSLVERSION_SSLv3:
- return CURLE_NOT_BUILT_IN;
-
- /* "--tlsv<x.y>" options mean TLS >= version <x.y> */
- case CURL_SSLVERSION_DEFAULT:
- case CURL_SSLVERSION_TLSv1: /* TLS >= version 1.0 */
- case CURL_SSLVERSION_TLSv1_0: /* TLS >= version 1.0 */
- case CURL_SSLVERSION_TLSv1_1: /* TLS >= version 1.1 */
- case CURL_SSLVERSION_TLSv1_2: /* TLS >= version 1.2 */
- case CURL_SSLVERSION_TLSv1_3: /* TLS >= version 1.3 */
- /* asking for any TLS version as the minimum, means no SSL versions
- allowed */
- ctx_options |= SSL_OP_NO_SSLv2;
- ctx_options |= SSL_OP_NO_SSLv3;
-
-#if (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10100000L) /* 1.1.0 */
- result = set_ssl_version_min_max(backend->ctx, conn);
-#else
- result = set_ssl_version_min_max_legacy(&ctx_options, data, conn,
- sockindex);
-#endif
- if(result != CURLE_OK)
- return result;
- break;
-
- default:
- failf(data, "Unrecognized parameter passed via CURLOPT_SSLVERSION");
- return CURLE_SSL_CONNECT_ERROR;
- }
-
- SSL_CTX_set_options(backend->ctx, ctx_options);
-
-#ifdef HAS_ALPN
- if(conn->bits.tls_enable_alpn) {
- int cur = 0;
- unsigned char protocols[128];
-
-#ifdef USE_HTTP2
- if(data->state.httpwant >= CURL_HTTP_VERSION_2
-#ifndef CURL_DISABLE_PROXY
- && (!SSL_IS_PROXY() || !conn->bits.tunnel_proxy)
-#endif
- ) {
- protocols[cur++] = ALPN_H2_LENGTH;
-
- memcpy(&protocols[cur], ALPN_H2, ALPN_H2_LENGTH);
- cur += ALPN_H2_LENGTH;
- infof(data, VTLS_INFOF_ALPN_OFFER_1STR, ALPN_H2);
- }
-#endif
-
- protocols[cur++] = ALPN_HTTP_1_1_LENGTH;
- memcpy(&protocols[cur], ALPN_HTTP_1_1, ALPN_HTTP_1_1_LENGTH);
- cur += ALPN_HTTP_1_1_LENGTH;
- infof(data, VTLS_INFOF_ALPN_OFFER_1STR, ALPN_HTTP_1_1);
-
- /* expects length prefixed preference ordered list of protocols in wire
- * format
- */
- if(SSL_CTX_set_alpn_protos(backend->ctx, protocols, cur)) {
- failf(data, "Error setting ALPN");
- return CURLE_SSL_CONNECT_ERROR;
- }
- }
-#endif
-
- if(ssl_cert || ssl_cert_blob || ssl_cert_type) {
- if(!result &&
- !cert_stuff(data, backend->ctx,
- ssl_cert, ssl_cert_blob, ssl_cert_type,
- SSL_SET_OPTION(key), SSL_SET_OPTION(key_blob),
- SSL_SET_OPTION(key_type), SSL_SET_OPTION(key_passwd)))
- result = CURLE_SSL_CERTPROBLEM;
- if(result)
- /* failf() is already done in cert_stuff() */
- return result;
- }
-
- ciphers = SSL_CONN_CONFIG(cipher_list);
- if(!ciphers)
- ciphers = (char *)DEFAULT_CIPHER_SELECTION;
- if(ciphers) {
- if(!SSL_CTX_set_cipher_list(backend->ctx, ciphers)) {
- failf(data, "failed setting cipher list: %s", ciphers);
- return CURLE_SSL_CIPHER;
- }
- infof(data, "Cipher selection: %s", ciphers);
- }
-
-#ifdef HAVE_SSL_CTX_SET_CIPHERSUITES
- {
- char *ciphers13 = SSL_CONN_CONFIG(cipher_list13);
- if(ciphers13) {
- if(!SSL_CTX_set_ciphersuites(backend->ctx, ciphers13)) {
- failf(data, "failed setting TLS 1.3 cipher suite: %s", ciphers13);
- return CURLE_SSL_CIPHER;
- }
- infof(data, "TLS 1.3 cipher selection: %s", ciphers13);
- }
- }
-#endif
-
-#ifdef HAVE_SSL_CTX_SET_POST_HANDSHAKE_AUTH
- /* OpenSSL 1.1.1 requires clients to opt-in for PHA */
- SSL_CTX_set_post_handshake_auth(backend->ctx, 1);
-#endif
-
-#ifdef HAVE_SSL_CTX_SET_EC_CURVES
- {
- char *curves = SSL_CONN_CONFIG(curves);
- if(curves) {
- if(!SSL_CTX_set1_curves_list(backend->ctx, curves)) {
- failf(data, "failed setting curves list: '%s'", curves);
- return CURLE_SSL_CIPHER;
- }
- }
- }
-#endif
-
-#ifdef USE_OPENSSL_SRP
- if((ssl_authtype == CURL_TLSAUTH_SRP) &&
- Curl_auth_allowed_to_host(data)) {
- char * const ssl_username = SSL_SET_OPTION(primary.username);
- char * const ssl_password = SSL_SET_OPTION(primary.password);
- infof(data, "Using TLS-SRP username: %s", ssl_username);
-
- if(!SSL_CTX_set_srp_username(backend->ctx, ssl_username)) {
- failf(data, "Unable to set SRP user name");
- return CURLE_BAD_FUNCTION_ARGUMENT;
- }
- if(!SSL_CTX_set_srp_password(backend->ctx, ssl_password)) {
- failf(data, "failed setting SRP password");
- return CURLE_BAD_FUNCTION_ARGUMENT;
- }
- if(!SSL_CONN_CONFIG(cipher_list)) {
- infof(data, "Setting cipher list SRP");
-
- if(!SSL_CTX_set_cipher_list(backend->ctx, "SRP")) {
- failf(data, "failed setting SRP cipher list");
- return CURLE_SSL_CIPHER;
- }
- }
- }
-#endif
-
-
-#if defined(USE_WIN32_CRYPTO)
- /* Import certificates from the Windows root certificate store if requested.
- https://stackoverflow.com/questions/9507184/
- https://github.com/d3x0r/SACK/blob/master/src/netlib/ssl_layer.c#L1037
- https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc5280 */
- if((SSL_CONN_CONFIG(verifypeer) || SSL_CONN_CONFIG(verifyhost)) &&
- (SSL_SET_OPTION(native_ca_store))) {
- X509_STORE *store = SSL_CTX_get_cert_store(backend->ctx);
- HCERTSTORE hStore = CertOpenSystemStore(0, TEXT("ROOT"));
-
- if(hStore) {
- PCCERT_CONTEXT pContext = NULL;
- /* The array of enhanced key usage OIDs will vary per certificate and is
- declared outside of the loop so that rather than malloc/free each
- iteration we can grow it with realloc, when necessary. */
- CERT_ENHKEY_USAGE *enhkey_usage = NULL;
- DWORD enhkey_usage_size = 0;
-
- /* This loop makes a best effort to import all valid certificates from
- the MS root store. If a certificate cannot be imported it is skipped.
- 'result' is used to store only hard-fail conditions (such as out of
- memory) that cause an early break. */
- result = CURLE_OK;
- for(;;) {
- X509 *x509;
- FILETIME now;
- BYTE key_usage[2];
- DWORD req_size;
- const unsigned char *encoded_cert;
-#if defined(DEBUGBUILD) && !defined(CURL_DISABLE_VERBOSE_STRINGS)
- char cert_name[256];
-#endif
-
- pContext = CertEnumCertificatesInStore(hStore, pContext);
- if(!pContext)
- break;
-
-#if defined(DEBUGBUILD) && !defined(CURL_DISABLE_VERBOSE_STRINGS)
- if(!CertGetNameStringA(pContext, CERT_NAME_SIMPLE_DISPLAY_TYPE, 0,
- NULL, cert_name, sizeof(cert_name))) {
- strcpy(cert_name, "Unknown");
- }
- infof(data, "SSL: Checking cert \"%s\"", cert_name);
-#endif
-
- encoded_cert = (const unsigned char *)pContext->pbCertEncoded;
- if(!encoded_cert)
- continue;
-
- GetSystemTimeAsFileTime(&now);
- if(CompareFileTime(&pContext->pCertInfo->NotBefore, &now) > 0 ||
- CompareFileTime(&now, &pContext->pCertInfo->NotAfter) > 0)
- continue;
-
- /* If key usage exists check for signing attribute */
- if(CertGetIntendedKeyUsage(pContext->dwCertEncodingType,
- pContext->pCertInfo,
- key_usage, sizeof(key_usage))) {
- if(!(key_usage[0] & CERT_KEY_CERT_SIGN_KEY_USAGE))
- continue;
- }
- else if(GetLastError())
- continue;
-
- /* If enhanced key usage exists check for server auth attribute.
- *
- * Note "In a Microsoft environment, a certificate might also have EKU
- * extended properties that specify valid uses for the certificate."
- * The call below checks both, and behavior varies depending on what is
- * found. For more details see CertGetEnhancedKeyUsage doc.
- */
- if(CertGetEnhancedKeyUsage(pContext, 0, NULL, &req_size)) {
- if(req_size && req_size > enhkey_usage_size) {
- void *tmp = realloc(enhkey_usage, req_size);
-
- if(!tmp) {
- failf(data, "SSL: Out of memory allocating for OID list");
- result = CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY;
- break;
- }
-
- enhkey_usage = (CERT_ENHKEY_USAGE *)tmp;
- enhkey_usage_size = req_size;
- }
-
- if(CertGetEnhancedKeyUsage(pContext, 0, enhkey_usage, &req_size)) {
- if(!enhkey_usage->cUsageIdentifier) {
- /* "If GetLastError returns CRYPT_E_NOT_FOUND, the certificate is
- good for all uses. If it returns zero, the certificate has no
- valid uses." */
- if((HRESULT)GetLastError() != CRYPT_E_NOT_FOUND)
- continue;
- }
- else {
- DWORD i;
- bool found = false;
-
- for(i = 0; i < enhkey_usage->cUsageIdentifier; ++i) {
- if(!strcmp("1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.1" /* OID server auth */,
- enhkey_usage->rgpszUsageIdentifier[i])) {
- found = true;
- break;
- }
- }
-
- if(!found)
- continue;
- }
- }
- else
- continue;
- }
- else
- continue;
-
- x509 = d2i_X509(NULL, &encoded_cert, pContext->cbCertEncoded);
- if(!x509)
- continue;
-
- /* Try to import the certificate. This may fail for legitimate reasons
- such as duplicate certificate, which is allowed by MS but not
- OpenSSL. */
- if(X509_STORE_add_cert(store, x509) == 1) {
-#if defined(DEBUGBUILD) && !defined(CURL_DISABLE_VERBOSE_STRINGS)
- infof(data, "SSL: Imported cert \"%s\"", cert_name);
-#endif
- imported_native_ca = true;
- }
- X509_free(x509);
- }
-
- free(enhkey_usage);
- CertFreeCertificateContext(pContext);
- CertCloseStore(hStore, 0);
-
- if(result)
- return result;
- }
- if(imported_native_ca)
- infof(data, "successfully imported Windows CA store");
- else
- infof(data, "error importing Windows CA store, continuing anyway");
- }
-#endif
-
- if(ca_info_blob) {
- result = load_cacert_from_memory(backend->ctx, ca_info_blob);
- if(result) {
- if(result == CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY ||
- (verifypeer && !imported_native_ca)) {
- failf(data, "error importing CA certificate blob");
- return result;
- }
- /* Only warn if no certificate verification is required. */
- infof(data, "error importing CA certificate blob, continuing anyway");
- }
- }
-
- if(verifypeer && !imported_native_ca && (ssl_cafile || ssl_capath)) {
-#if defined(OPENSSL_VERSION_MAJOR) && (OPENSSL_VERSION_MAJOR >= 3)
- /* OpenSSL 3.0.0 has deprecated SSL_CTX_load_verify_locations */
- if(ssl_cafile &&
- !SSL_CTX_load_verify_file(backend->ctx, ssl_cafile)) {
- /* Fail if we insist on successfully verifying the server. */
- failf(data, "error setting certificate file: %s", ssl_cafile);
- return CURLE_SSL_CACERT_BADFILE;
- }
- if(ssl_capath &&
- !SSL_CTX_load_verify_dir(backend->ctx, ssl_capath)) {
- /* Fail if we insist on successfully verifying the server. */
- failf(data, "error setting certificate path: %s", ssl_capath);
- return CURLE_SSL_CACERT_BADFILE;
- }
-#else
- /* tell OpenSSL where to find CA certificates that are used to verify the
- server's certificate. */
- if(!SSL_CTX_load_verify_locations(backend->ctx, ssl_cafile, ssl_capath)) {
- /* Fail if we insist on successfully verifying the server. */
- failf(data, "error setting certificate verify locations:"
- " CAfile: %s CApath: %s",
- ssl_cafile ? ssl_cafile : "none",
- ssl_capath ? ssl_capath : "none");
- return CURLE_SSL_CACERT_BADFILE;
- }
-#endif
- infof(data, " CAfile: %s", ssl_cafile ? ssl_cafile : "none");
- infof(data, " CApath: %s", ssl_capath ? ssl_capath : "none");
- }
-
-#ifdef CURL_CA_FALLBACK
- if(verifypeer &&
- !ca_info_blob && !ssl_cafile && !ssl_capath && !imported_native_ca) {
- /* verifying the peer without any CA certificates won't
- work so use openssl's built-in default as fallback */
- SSL_CTX_set_default_verify_paths(backend->ctx);
- }
-#endif
-
- if(ssl_crlfile) {
- /* tell OpenSSL where to find CRL file that is used to check certificate
- * revocation */
- lookup = X509_STORE_add_lookup(SSL_CTX_get_cert_store(backend->ctx),
- X509_LOOKUP_file());
- if(!lookup ||
- (!X509_load_crl_file(lookup, ssl_crlfile, X509_FILETYPE_PEM)) ) {
- failf(data, "error loading CRL file: %s", ssl_crlfile);
- return CURLE_SSL_CRL_BADFILE;
- }
- /* Everything is fine. */
- infof(data, "successfully loaded CRL file:");
- X509_STORE_set_flags(SSL_CTX_get_cert_store(backend->ctx),
- X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK|X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK_ALL);
-
- infof(data, " CRLfile: %s", ssl_crlfile);
- }
-
- if(verifypeer) {
- /* Try building a chain using issuers in the trusted store first to avoid
- problems with server-sent legacy intermediates. Newer versions of
- OpenSSL do alternate chain checking by default but we do not know how to
- determine that in a reliable manner.
- https://rt.openssl.org/Ticket/Display.html?id=3621&user=guest&pass=guest
- */
-#if defined(X509_V_FLAG_TRUSTED_FIRST)
- X509_STORE_set_flags(SSL_CTX_get_cert_store(backend->ctx),
- X509_V_FLAG_TRUSTED_FIRST);
-#endif
-#ifdef X509_V_FLAG_PARTIAL_CHAIN
- if(!SSL_SET_OPTION(no_partialchain) && !ssl_crlfile) {
- /* Have intermediate certificates in the trust store be treated as
- trust-anchors, in the same way as self-signed root CA certificates
- are. This allows users to verify servers using the intermediate cert
- only, instead of needing the whole chain.
-
- Due to OpenSSL bug https://github.com/openssl/openssl/issues/5081 we
- cannot do partial chains with a CRL check.
- */
- X509_STORE_set_flags(SSL_CTX_get_cert_store(backend->ctx),
- X509_V_FLAG_PARTIAL_CHAIN);
- }
-#endif
- }
-
- /* OpenSSL always tries to verify the peer, this only says whether it should
- * fail to connect if the verification fails, or if it should continue
- * anyway. In the latter case the result of the verification is checked with
- * SSL_get_verify_result() below. */
- SSL_CTX_set_verify(backend->ctx,
- verifypeer ? SSL_VERIFY_PEER : SSL_VERIFY_NONE, NULL);
-
- /* Enable logging of secrets to the file specified in env SSLKEYLOGFILE. */
-#ifdef HAVE_KEYLOG_CALLBACK
- if(Curl_tls_keylog_enabled()) {
- SSL_CTX_set_keylog_callback(backend->ctx, ossl_keylog_callback);
- }
-#endif
-
- /* Enable the session cache because it's a prerequisite for the "new session"
- * callback. Use the "external storage" mode to prevent OpenSSL from creating
- * an internal session cache.
- */
- SSL_CTX_set_session_cache_mode(backend->ctx,
- SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT | SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_INTERNAL);
- SSL_CTX_sess_set_new_cb(backend->ctx, ossl_new_session_cb);
-
- /* give application a chance to interfere with SSL set up. */
- if(data->set.ssl.fsslctx) {
- Curl_set_in_callback(data, true);
- result = (*data->set.ssl.fsslctx)(data, backend->ctx,
- data->set.ssl.fsslctxp);
- Curl_set_in_callback(data, false);
- if(result) {
- failf(data, "error signaled by ssl ctx callback");
- return result;
- }
- }
-
- /* Let's make an SSL structure */
- if(backend->handle)
- SSL_free(backend->handle);
- backend->handle = SSL_new(backend->ctx);
- if(!backend->handle) {
- failf(data, "SSL: couldn't create a context (handle)");
- return CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY;
- }
-
-#if (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x0090808fL) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) && \
- !defined(OPENSSL_NO_OCSP)
- if(SSL_CONN_CONFIG(verifystatus))
- SSL_set_tlsext_status_type(backend->handle, TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp);
-#endif
-
-#if defined(OPENSSL_IS_BORINGSSL) && defined(ALLOW_RENEG)
- SSL_set_renegotiate_mode(backend->handle, ssl_renegotiate_freely);
-#endif
-
- SSL_set_connect_state(backend->handle);
-
- backend->server_cert = 0x0;
-#ifdef SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_HOSTNAME
- if((0 == Curl_inet_pton(AF_INET, hostname, &addr)) &&
-#ifdef ENABLE_IPV6
- (0 == Curl_inet_pton(AF_INET6, hostname, &addr)) &&
-#endif
- sni) {
- char *snihost = Curl_ssl_snihost(data, hostname, NULL);
- if(!snihost || !SSL_set_tlsext_host_name(backend->handle, snihost)) {
- failf(data, "Failed set SNI");
- return CURLE_SSL_CONNECT_ERROR;
- }
- }
-#endif
-
- if(!ossl_associate_connection(data, conn, sockindex)) {
- /* Maybe the internal errors of SSL_get_ex_new_index or SSL_set_ex_data */
- failf(data, "SSL: ossl_associate_connection failed: %s",
- ossl_strerror(ERR_get_error(), error_buffer,
- sizeof(error_buffer)));
- return CURLE_SSL_CONNECT_ERROR;
- }
-
- if(SSL_SET_OPTION(primary.sessionid)) {
- Curl_ssl_sessionid_lock(data);
- if(!Curl_ssl_getsessionid(data, conn, SSL_IS_PROXY() ? TRUE : FALSE,
- &ssl_sessionid, NULL, sockindex)) {
- /* we got a session id, use it! */
- if(!SSL_set_session(backend->handle, ssl_sessionid)) {
- Curl_ssl_sessionid_unlock(data);
- failf(data, "SSL: SSL_set_session failed: %s",
- ossl_strerror(ERR_get_error(), error_buffer,
- sizeof(error_buffer)));
- return CURLE_SSL_CONNECT_ERROR;
- }
- /* Informational message */
- infof(data, "SSL re-using session ID");
- }
- Curl_ssl_sessionid_unlock(data);
- }
-
-#ifndef CURL_DISABLE_PROXY
- if(conn->proxy_ssl[sockindex].use) {
- BIO *const bio = BIO_new(BIO_f_ssl());
- struct ssl_backend_data *proxy_backend;
- SSL* handle = NULL;
- proxy_backend = conn->proxy_ssl[sockindex].backend;
- DEBUGASSERT(proxy_backend);
- handle = proxy_backend->handle;
- DEBUGASSERT(ssl_connection_complete == conn->proxy_ssl[sockindex].state);
- DEBUGASSERT(handle != NULL);
- DEBUGASSERT(bio != NULL);
- BIO_set_ssl(bio, handle, FALSE);
- SSL_set_bio(backend->handle, bio, bio);
- }
- else
-#endif
- if(!SSL_set_fd(backend->handle, (int)sockfd)) {
- /* pass the raw socket into the SSL layers */
- failf(data, "SSL: SSL_set_fd failed: %s",
- ossl_strerror(ERR_get_error(), error_buffer, sizeof(error_buffer)));
- return CURLE_SSL_CONNECT_ERROR;
- }
-
- connssl->connecting_state = ssl_connect_2;
-
- return CURLE_OK;
-}
-
-static CURLcode ossl_connect_step2(struct Curl_easy *data,
- struct connectdata *conn, int sockindex)
-{
- int err;
- struct ssl_connect_data *connssl = &conn->ssl[sockindex];
- struct ssl_backend_data *backend = connssl->backend;
- DEBUGASSERT(ssl_connect_2 == connssl->connecting_state
- || ssl_connect_2_reading == connssl->connecting_state
- || ssl_connect_2_writing == connssl->connecting_state);
- DEBUGASSERT(backend);
-
- ERR_clear_error();
-
- err = SSL_connect(backend->handle);
-#ifndef HAVE_KEYLOG_CALLBACK
- if(Curl_tls_keylog_enabled()) {
- /* If key logging is enabled, wait for the handshake to complete and then
- * proceed with logging secrets (for TLS 1.2 or older).
- */
- ossl_log_tls12_secret(backend->handle, &backend->keylog_done);
- }
-#endif
-
- /* 1 is fine
- 0 is "not successful but was shut down controlled"
- <0 is "handshake was not successful, because a fatal error occurred" */
- if(1 != err) {
- int detail = SSL_get_error(backend->handle, err);
-
- if(SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ == detail) {
- connssl->connecting_state = ssl_connect_2_reading;
- return CURLE_OK;
- }
- if(SSL_ERROR_WANT_WRITE == detail) {
- connssl->connecting_state = ssl_connect_2_writing;
- return CURLE_OK;
- }
-#ifdef SSL_ERROR_WANT_ASYNC
- if(SSL_ERROR_WANT_ASYNC == detail) {
- connssl->connecting_state = ssl_connect_2;
- return CURLE_OK;
- }
-#endif
- else {
- /* untreated error */
- unsigned long errdetail;
- char error_buffer[256]="";
- CURLcode result;
- long lerr;
- int lib;
- int reason;
-
- /* the connection failed, we're not waiting for anything else. */
- connssl->connecting_state = ssl_connect_2;
-
- /* Get the earliest error code from the thread's error queue and remove
- the entry. */
- errdetail = ERR_get_error();
-
- /* Extract which lib and reason */
- lib = ERR_GET_LIB(errdetail);
- reason = ERR_GET_REASON(errdetail);
-
- if((lib == ERR_LIB_SSL) &&
- ((reason == SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED) ||
- (reason == SSL_R_SSLV3_ALERT_CERTIFICATE_EXPIRED))) {
- result = CURLE_PEER_FAILED_VERIFICATION;
-
- lerr = SSL_get_verify_result(backend->handle);
- if(lerr != X509_V_OK) {
- SSL_SET_OPTION_LVALUE(certverifyresult) = lerr;
- msnprintf(error_buffer, sizeof(error_buffer),
- "SSL certificate problem: %s",
- X509_verify_cert_error_string(lerr));
- }
- else
- /* strcpy() is fine here as long as the string fits within
- error_buffer */
- strcpy(error_buffer, "SSL certificate verification failed");
- }
-#if (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10101000L && \
- !defined(LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER) && \
- !defined(OPENSSL_IS_BORINGSSL))
- /* SSL_R_TLSV13_ALERT_CERTIFICATE_REQUIRED is only available on
- OpenSSL version above v1.1.1, not LibreSSL nor BoringSSL */
- else if((lib == ERR_LIB_SSL) &&
- (reason == SSL_R_TLSV13_ALERT_CERTIFICATE_REQUIRED)) {
- /* If client certificate is required, communicate the
- error to client */
- result = CURLE_SSL_CLIENTCERT;
- ossl_strerror(errdetail, error_buffer, sizeof(error_buffer));
- }
-#endif
- else {
- result = CURLE_SSL_CONNECT_ERROR;
- ossl_strerror(errdetail, error_buffer, sizeof(error_buffer));
- }
-
- /* detail is already set to the SSL error above */
-
- /* If we e.g. use SSLv2 request-method and the server doesn't like us
- * (RST connection, etc.), OpenSSL gives no explanation whatsoever and
- * the SO_ERROR is also lost.
- */
- if(CURLE_SSL_CONNECT_ERROR == result && errdetail == 0) {
- const char * const hostname = SSL_HOST_NAME();
- const long int port = SSL_HOST_PORT();
- char extramsg[80]="";
- int sockerr = SOCKERRNO;
- if(sockerr && detail == SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL)
- Curl_strerror(sockerr, extramsg, sizeof(extramsg));
- failf(data, OSSL_PACKAGE " SSL_connect: %s in connection to %s:%ld ",
- extramsg[0] ? extramsg : SSL_ERROR_to_str(detail),
- hostname, port);
- return result;
- }
-
- /* Could be a CERT problem */
- failf(data, "%s", error_buffer);
-
- return result;
- }
- }
- else {
- /* we connected fine, we're not waiting for anything else. */
- connssl->connecting_state = ssl_connect_3;
-
- /* Informational message */
- infof(data, "SSL connection using %s / %s",
- SSL_get_version(backend->handle),
- SSL_get_cipher(backend->handle));
-
-#ifdef HAS_ALPN
- /* Sets data and len to negotiated protocol, len is 0 if no protocol was
- * negotiated
- */
- if(conn->bits.tls_enable_alpn) {
- const unsigned char *neg_protocol;
- unsigned int len;
- SSL_get0_alpn_selected(backend->handle, &neg_protocol, &len);
- if(len) {
- infof(data, VTLS_INFOF_ALPN_ACCEPTED_LEN_1STR, len, neg_protocol);
-
-#ifdef USE_HTTP2
- if(len == ALPN_H2_LENGTH &&
- !memcmp(ALPN_H2, neg_protocol, len)) {
- conn->alpn = CURL_HTTP_VERSION_2;
- }
- else
-#endif
- if(len == ALPN_HTTP_1_1_LENGTH &&
- !memcmp(ALPN_HTTP_1_1, neg_protocol, ALPN_HTTP_1_1_LENGTH)) {
- conn->alpn = CURL_HTTP_VERSION_1_1;
- }
- }
- else
- infof(data, VTLS_INFOF_NO_ALPN);
-
- Curl_multiuse_state(data, conn->alpn == CURL_HTTP_VERSION_2 ?
- BUNDLE_MULTIPLEX : BUNDLE_NO_MULTIUSE);
- }
-#endif
-
- return CURLE_OK;
- }
-}
-
-/*
- * Heavily modified from:
- * https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Certificate_and_Public_Key_Pinning#OpenSSL
- */
-static CURLcode pkp_pin_peer_pubkey(struct Curl_easy *data, X509* cert,
- const char *pinnedpubkey)
-{
- /* Scratch */
- int len1 = 0, len2 = 0;
- unsigned char *buff1 = NULL, *temp = NULL;
-
- /* Result is returned to caller */
- CURLcode result = CURLE_SSL_PINNEDPUBKEYNOTMATCH;
-
- /* if a path wasn't specified, don't pin */
- if(!pinnedpubkey)
- return CURLE_OK;
-
- if(!cert)
- return result;
-
- do {
- /* Begin Gyrations to get the subjectPublicKeyInfo */
- /* Thanks to Viktor Dukhovni on the OpenSSL mailing list */
-
- /* https://groups.google.com/group/mailing.openssl.users/browse_thread
- /thread/d61858dae102c6c7 */
- len1 = i2d_X509_PUBKEY(X509_get_X509_PUBKEY(cert), NULL);
- if(len1 < 1)
- break; /* failed */
-
- buff1 = temp = malloc(len1);
- if(!buff1)
- break; /* failed */
-
- /* https://www.openssl.org/docs/crypto/d2i_X509.html */
- len2 = i2d_X509_PUBKEY(X509_get_X509_PUBKEY(cert), &temp);
-
- /*
- * These checks are verifying we got back the same values as when we
- * sized the buffer. It's pretty weak since they should always be the
- * same. But it gives us something to test.
- */
- if((len1 != len2) || !temp || ((temp - buff1) != len1))
- break; /* failed */
-
- /* End Gyrations */
-
- /* The one good exit point */
- result = Curl_pin_peer_pubkey(data, pinnedpubkey, buff1, len1);
- } while(0);
-
- if(buff1)
- free(buff1);
-
- return result;
-}
-
-/*
- * Get the server cert, verify it and show it, etc., only call failf() if the
- * 'strict' argument is TRUE as otherwise all this is for informational
- * purposes only!
- *
- * We check certificates to authenticate the server; otherwise we risk
- * man-in-the-middle attack.
- */
-static CURLcode servercert(struct Curl_easy *data,
- struct connectdata *conn,
- struct ssl_connect_data *connssl,
- bool strict)
-{
- CURLcode result = CURLE_OK;
- int rc;
- long lerr;
- X509 *issuer;
- BIO *fp = NULL;
- char error_buffer[256]="";
- char buffer[2048];
- const char *ptr;
- BIO *mem = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem());
- struct ssl_backend_data *backend = connssl->backend;
-
- DEBUGASSERT(backend);
-
- if(!mem) {
- failf(data,
- "BIO_new return NULL, " OSSL_PACKAGE
- " error %s",
- ossl_strerror(ERR_get_error(), error_buffer,
- sizeof(error_buffer)) );
- return CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY;
- }
-
- if(data->set.ssl.certinfo)
- /* asked to gather certificate info */
- (void)Curl_ossl_certchain(data, connssl->backend->handle);
-
- backend->server_cert = SSL_get1_peer_certificate(backend->handle);
- if(!backend->server_cert) {
- BIO_free(mem);
- if(!strict)
- return CURLE_OK;
-
- failf(data, "SSL: couldn't get peer certificate");
- return CURLE_PEER_FAILED_VERIFICATION;
- }
-
- infof(data, "%s certificate:", SSL_IS_PROXY() ? "Proxy" : "Server");
-
- rc = x509_name_oneline(X509_get_subject_name(backend->server_cert),
- buffer, sizeof(buffer));
- infof(data, " subject: %s", rc?"[NONE]":buffer);
-
-#ifndef CURL_DISABLE_VERBOSE_STRINGS
- {
- long len;
- ASN1_TIME_print(mem, X509_get0_notBefore(backend->server_cert));
- len = BIO_get_mem_data(mem, (char **) &ptr);
- infof(data, " start date: %.*s", (int)len, ptr);
- (void)BIO_reset(mem);
-
- ASN1_TIME_print(mem, X509_get0_notAfter(backend->server_cert));
- len = BIO_get_mem_data(mem, (char **) &ptr);
- infof(data, " expire date: %.*s", (int)len, ptr);
- (void)BIO_reset(mem);
- }
-#endif
-
- BIO_free(mem);
-
- if(SSL_CONN_CONFIG(verifyhost)) {
- result = Curl_ossl_verifyhost(data, conn, backend->server_cert);
- if(result) {
- X509_free(backend->server_cert);
- backend->server_cert = NULL;
- return result;
- }
- }
-
- rc = x509_name_oneline(X509_get_issuer_name(backend->server_cert),
- buffer, sizeof(buffer));
- if(rc) {
- if(strict)
- failf(data, "SSL: couldn't get X509-issuer name");
- result = CURLE_PEER_FAILED_VERIFICATION;
- }
- else {
- infof(data, " issuer: %s", buffer);
-
- /* We could do all sorts of certificate verification stuff here before
- deallocating the certificate. */
-
- /* e.g. match issuer name with provided issuer certificate */
- if(SSL_CONN_CONFIG(issuercert) || SSL_CONN_CONFIG(issuercert_blob)) {
- if(SSL_CONN_CONFIG(issuercert_blob)) {
- fp = BIO_new_mem_buf(SSL_CONN_CONFIG(issuercert_blob)->data,
- (int)SSL_CONN_CONFIG(issuercert_blob)->len);
- if(!fp) {
- failf(data,
- "BIO_new_mem_buf NULL, " OSSL_PACKAGE
- " error %s",
- ossl_strerror(ERR_get_error(), error_buffer,
- sizeof(error_buffer)) );
- X509_free(backend->server_cert);
- backend->server_cert = NULL;
- return CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY;
- }
- }
- else {
- fp = BIO_new(BIO_s_file());
- if(!fp) {
- failf(data,
- "BIO_new return NULL, " OSSL_PACKAGE
- " error %s",
- ossl_strerror(ERR_get_error(), error_buffer,
- sizeof(error_buffer)) );
- X509_free(backend->server_cert);
- backend->server_cert = NULL;
- return CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY;
- }
-
- if(BIO_read_filename(fp, SSL_CONN_CONFIG(issuercert)) <= 0) {
- if(strict)
- failf(data, "SSL: Unable to open issuer cert (%s)",
- SSL_CONN_CONFIG(issuercert));
- BIO_free(fp);
- X509_free(backend->server_cert);
- backend->server_cert = NULL;
- return CURLE_SSL_ISSUER_ERROR;
- }
- }
-
- issuer = PEM_read_bio_X509(fp, NULL, ZERO_NULL, NULL);
- if(!issuer) {
- if(strict)
- failf(data, "SSL: Unable to read issuer cert (%s)",
- SSL_CONN_CONFIG(issuercert));
- BIO_free(fp);
- X509_free(issuer);
- X509_free(backend->server_cert);
- backend->server_cert = NULL;
- return CURLE_SSL_ISSUER_ERROR;
- }
-
- if(X509_check_issued(issuer, backend->server_cert) != X509_V_OK) {
- if(strict)
- failf(data, "SSL: Certificate issuer check failed (%s)",
- SSL_CONN_CONFIG(issuercert));
- BIO_free(fp);
- X509_free(issuer);
- X509_free(backend->server_cert);
- backend->server_cert = NULL;
- return CURLE_SSL_ISSUER_ERROR;
- }
-
- infof(data, " SSL certificate issuer check ok (%s)",
- SSL_CONN_CONFIG(issuercert));
- BIO_free(fp);
- X509_free(issuer);
- }
-
- lerr = SSL_get_verify_result(backend->handle);
- SSL_SET_OPTION_LVALUE(certverifyresult) = lerr;
- if(lerr != X509_V_OK) {
- if(SSL_CONN_CONFIG(verifypeer)) {
- /* We probably never reach this, because SSL_connect() will fail
- and we return earlier if verifypeer is set? */
- if(strict)
- failf(data, "SSL certificate verify result: %s (%ld)",
- X509_verify_cert_error_string(lerr), lerr);
- result = CURLE_PEER_FAILED_VERIFICATION;
- }
- else
- infof(data, " SSL certificate verify result: %s (%ld),"
- " continuing anyway.",
- X509_verify_cert_error_string(lerr), lerr);
- }
- else
- infof(data, " SSL certificate verify ok.");
- }
-
-#if (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x0090808fL) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) && \
- !defined(OPENSSL_NO_OCSP)
- if(SSL_CONN_CONFIG(verifystatus)) {
- result = verifystatus(data, connssl);
- if(result) {
- X509_free(backend->server_cert);
- backend->server_cert = NULL;
- return result;
- }
- }
-#endif
-
- if(!strict)
- /* when not strict, we don't bother about the verify cert problems */
- result = CURLE_OK;
-
- ptr = SSL_PINNED_PUB_KEY();
- if(!result && ptr) {
- result = pkp_pin_peer_pubkey(data, backend->server_cert, ptr);
- if(result)
- failf(data, "SSL: public key does not match pinned public key");
- }
-
- X509_free(backend->server_cert);
- backend->server_cert = NULL;
- connssl->connecting_state = ssl_connect_done;
-
- return result;
-}
-
-static CURLcode ossl_connect_step3(struct Curl_easy *data,
- struct connectdata *conn, int sockindex)
-{
- CURLcode result = CURLE_OK;
- struct ssl_connect_data *connssl = &conn->ssl[sockindex];
-
- DEBUGASSERT(ssl_connect_3 == connssl->connecting_state);
-
- /*
- * We check certificates to authenticate the server; otherwise we risk
- * man-in-the-middle attack; NEVERTHELESS, if we're told explicitly not to
- * verify the peer, ignore faults and failures from the server cert
- * operations.
- */
-
- result = servercert(data, conn, connssl, (SSL_CONN_CONFIG(verifypeer) ||
- SSL_CONN_CONFIG(verifyhost)));
-
- if(!result)
- connssl->connecting_state = ssl_connect_done;
-
- return result;
-}
-
-static Curl_recv ossl_recv;
-static Curl_send ossl_send;
-
-static CURLcode ossl_connect_common(struct Curl_easy *data,
- struct connectdata *conn,
- int sockindex,
- bool nonblocking,
- bool *done)
-{
- CURLcode result;
- struct ssl_connect_data *connssl = &conn->ssl[sockindex];
- curl_socket_t sockfd = conn->sock[sockindex];
- int what;
-
- /* check if the connection has already been established */
- if(ssl_connection_complete == connssl->state) {
- *done = TRUE;
- return CURLE_OK;
- }
-
- if(ssl_connect_1 == connssl->connecting_state) {
- /* Find out how much more time we're allowed */
- const timediff_t timeout_ms = Curl_timeleft(data, NULL, TRUE);
-
- if(timeout_ms < 0) {
- /* no need to continue if time is already up */
- failf(data, "SSL connection timeout");
- return CURLE_OPERATION_TIMEDOUT;
- }
-
- result = ossl_connect_step1(data, conn, sockindex);
- if(result)
- return result;
- }
-
- while(ssl_connect_2 == connssl->connecting_state ||
- ssl_connect_2_reading == connssl->connecting_state ||
- ssl_connect_2_writing == connssl->connecting_state) {
-
- /* check allowed time left */
- const timediff_t timeout_ms = Curl_timeleft(data, NULL, TRUE);
-
- if(timeout_ms < 0) {
- /* no need to continue if time already is up */
- failf(data, "SSL connection timeout");
- return CURLE_OPERATION_TIMEDOUT;
- }
-
- /* if ssl is expecting something, check if it's available. */
- if(connssl->connecting_state == ssl_connect_2_reading ||
- connssl->connecting_state == ssl_connect_2_writing) {
-
- curl_socket_t writefd = ssl_connect_2_writing ==
- connssl->connecting_state?sockfd:CURL_SOCKET_BAD;
- curl_socket_t readfd = ssl_connect_2_reading ==
- connssl->connecting_state?sockfd:CURL_SOCKET_BAD;
-
- what = Curl_socket_check(readfd, CURL_SOCKET_BAD, writefd,
- nonblocking?0:timeout_ms);
- if(what < 0) {
- /* fatal error */
- failf(data, "select/poll on SSL socket, errno: %d", SOCKERRNO);
- return CURLE_SSL_CONNECT_ERROR;
- }
- if(0 == what) {
- if(nonblocking) {
- *done = FALSE;
- return CURLE_OK;
- }
- /* timeout */
- failf(data, "SSL connection timeout");
- return CURLE_OPERATION_TIMEDOUT;
- }
- /* socket is readable or writable */
- }
-
- /* Run transaction, and return to the caller if it failed or if this
- * connection is done nonblocking and this loop would execute again. This
- * permits the owner of a multi handle to abort a connection attempt
- * before step2 has completed while ensuring that a client using select()
- * or epoll() will always have a valid fdset to wait on.
- */
- result = ossl_connect_step2(data, conn, sockindex);
- if(result || (nonblocking &&
- (ssl_connect_2 == connssl->connecting_state ||
- ssl_connect_2_reading == connssl->connecting_state ||
- ssl_connect_2_writing == connssl->connecting_state)))
- return result;
-
- } /* repeat step2 until all transactions are done. */
-
- if(ssl_connect_3 == connssl->connecting_state) {
- result = ossl_connect_step3(data, conn, sockindex);
- if(result)
- return result;
- }
-
- if(ssl_connect_done == connssl->connecting_state) {
- connssl->state = ssl_connection_complete;
- conn->recv[sockindex] = ossl_recv;
- conn->send[sockindex] = ossl_send;
- *done = TRUE;
- }
- else
- *done = FALSE;
-
- /* Reset our connect state machine */
- connssl->connecting_state = ssl_connect_1;
-
- return CURLE_OK;
-}
-
-static CURLcode ossl_connect_nonblocking(struct Curl_easy *data,
- struct connectdata *conn,
- int sockindex,
- bool *done)
-{
- return ossl_connect_common(data, conn, sockindex, TRUE, done);
-}
-
-static CURLcode ossl_connect(struct Curl_easy *data, struct connectdata *conn,
- int sockindex)
-{
- CURLcode result;
- bool done = FALSE;
-
- result = ossl_connect_common(data, conn, sockindex, FALSE, &done);
- if(result)
- return result;
-
- DEBUGASSERT(done);
-
- return CURLE_OK;
-}
-
-static bool ossl_data_pending(const struct connectdata *conn,
- int connindex)
-{
- const struct ssl_connect_data *connssl = &conn->ssl[connindex];
- DEBUGASSERT(connssl->backend);
- if(connssl->backend->handle && SSL_pending(connssl->backend->handle))
- return TRUE;
-#ifndef CURL_DISABLE_PROXY
- {
- const struct ssl_connect_data *proxyssl = &conn->proxy_ssl[connindex];
- DEBUGASSERT(proxyssl->backend);
- if(proxyssl->backend->handle && SSL_pending(proxyssl->backend->handle))
- return TRUE;
- }
-#endif
- return FALSE;
-}
-
-static size_t ossl_version(char *buffer, size_t size);
-
-static ssize_t ossl_send(struct Curl_easy *data,
- int sockindex,
- const void *mem,
- size_t len,
- CURLcode *curlcode)
-{
- /* SSL_write() is said to return 'int' while write() and send() returns
- 'size_t' */
- int err;
- char error_buffer[256];
- unsigned long sslerror;
- int memlen;
- int rc;
- struct connectdata *conn = data->conn;
- struct ssl_connect_data *connssl = &conn->ssl[sockindex];
- struct ssl_backend_data *backend = connssl->backend;
-
- DEBUGASSERT(backend);
-
- ERR_clear_error();
-
- memlen = (len > (size_t)INT_MAX) ? INT_MAX : (int)len;
- set_logger(conn, data);
- rc = SSL_write(backend->handle, mem, memlen);
-
- if(rc <= 0) {
- err = SSL_get_error(backend->handle, rc);
-
- switch(err) {
- case SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ:
- case SSL_ERROR_WANT_WRITE:
- /* The operation did not complete; the same TLS/SSL I/O function
- should be called again later. This is basically an EWOULDBLOCK
- equivalent. */
- *curlcode = CURLE_AGAIN;
- return -1;
- case SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL:
- {
- int sockerr = SOCKERRNO;
- sslerror = ERR_get_error();
- if(sslerror)
- ossl_strerror(sslerror, error_buffer, sizeof(error_buffer));
- else if(sockerr)
- Curl_strerror(sockerr, error_buffer, sizeof(error_buffer));
- else {
- strncpy(error_buffer, SSL_ERROR_to_str(err), sizeof(error_buffer));
- error_buffer[sizeof(error_buffer) - 1] = '\0';
- }
- failf(data, OSSL_PACKAGE " SSL_write: %s, errno %d",
- error_buffer, sockerr);
- *curlcode = CURLE_SEND_ERROR;
- return -1;
- }
- case SSL_ERROR_SSL:
- /* A failure in the SSL library occurred, usually a protocol error.
- The OpenSSL error queue contains more information on the error. */
- sslerror = ERR_get_error();
- if(ERR_GET_LIB(sslerror) == ERR_LIB_SSL &&
- ERR_GET_REASON(sslerror) == SSL_R_BIO_NOT_SET &&
- conn->ssl[sockindex].state == ssl_connection_complete
-#ifndef CURL_DISABLE_PROXY
- && conn->proxy_ssl[sockindex].state == ssl_connection_complete
-#endif
- ) {
- char ver[120];
- (void)ossl_version(ver, sizeof(ver));
- failf(data, "Error: %s does not support double SSL tunneling.", ver);
- }
- else
- failf(data, "SSL_write() error: %s",
- ossl_strerror(sslerror, error_buffer, sizeof(error_buffer)));
- *curlcode = CURLE_SEND_ERROR;
- return -1;
- }
- /* a true error */
- failf(data, OSSL_PACKAGE " SSL_write: %s, errno %d",
- SSL_ERROR_to_str(err), SOCKERRNO);
- *curlcode = CURLE_SEND_ERROR;
- return -1;
- }
- *curlcode = CURLE_OK;
- return (ssize_t)rc; /* number of bytes */
-}
-
-static ssize_t ossl_recv(struct Curl_easy *data, /* transfer */
- int num, /* socketindex */
- char *buf, /* store read data here */
- size_t buffersize, /* max amount to read */
- CURLcode *curlcode)
-{
- char error_buffer[256];
- unsigned long sslerror;
- ssize_t nread;
- int buffsize;
- struct connectdata *conn = data->conn;
- struct ssl_connect_data *connssl = &conn->ssl[num];
- struct ssl_backend_data *backend = connssl->backend;
-
- DEBUGASSERT(backend);
-
- ERR_clear_error();
-
- buffsize = (buffersize > (size_t)INT_MAX) ? INT_MAX : (int)buffersize;
- set_logger(conn, data);
- nread = (ssize_t)SSL_read(backend->handle, buf, buffsize);
- if(nread <= 0) {
- /* failed SSL_read */
- int err = SSL_get_error(backend->handle, (int)nread);
-
- switch(err) {
- case SSL_ERROR_NONE: /* this is not an error */
- break;
- case SSL_ERROR_ZERO_RETURN: /* no more data */
- /* close_notify alert */
- if(num == FIRSTSOCKET)
- /* mark the connection for close if it is indeed the control
- connection */
- connclose(conn, "TLS close_notify");
- break;
- case SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ:
- case SSL_ERROR_WANT_WRITE:
- /* there's data pending, re-invoke SSL_read() */
- *curlcode = CURLE_AGAIN;
- return -1;
- default:
- /* openssl/ssl.h for SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL says "look at error stack/return
- value/errno" */
- /* https://www.openssl.org/docs/crypto/ERR_get_error.html */
- sslerror = ERR_get_error();
- if((nread < 0) || sslerror) {
- /* If the return code was negative or there actually is an error in the
- queue */
- int sockerr = SOCKERRNO;
- if(sslerror)
- ossl_strerror(sslerror, error_buffer, sizeof(error_buffer));
- else if(sockerr && err == SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL)
- Curl_strerror(sockerr, error_buffer, sizeof(error_buffer));
- else {
- strncpy(error_buffer, SSL_ERROR_to_str(err), sizeof(error_buffer));
- error_buffer[sizeof(error_buffer) - 1] = '\0';
- }
- failf(data, OSSL_PACKAGE " SSL_read: %s, errno %d",
- error_buffer, sockerr);
- *curlcode = CURLE_RECV_ERROR;
- return -1;
- }
- /* For debug builds be a little stricter and error on any
- SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL. For example a server may have closed the connection
- abruptly without a close_notify alert. For compatibility with older
- peers we don't do this by default. #4624
-
- We can use this to gauge how many users may be affected, and
- if it goes ok eventually transition to allow in dev and release with
- the newest OpenSSL: #if (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10101000L) */
-#ifdef DEBUGBUILD
- if(err == SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL) {
- int sockerr = SOCKERRNO;
- if(sockerr)
- Curl_strerror(sockerr, error_buffer, sizeof(error_buffer));
- else {
- msnprintf(error_buffer, sizeof(error_buffer),
- "Connection closed abruptly");
- }
- failf(data, OSSL_PACKAGE " SSL_read: %s, errno %d"
- " (Fatal because this is a curl debug build)",
- error_buffer, sockerr);
- *curlcode = CURLE_RECV_ERROR;
- return -1;
- }
-#endif
- }
- }
- return nread;
-}
-
-static size_t ossl_version(char *buffer, size_t size)
-{
-#ifdef LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER
-#ifdef HAVE_OPENSSL_VERSION
- char *p;
- int count;
- const char *ver = OpenSSL_version(OPENSSL_VERSION);
- const char expected[] = OSSL_PACKAGE " "; /* ie "LibreSSL " */
- if(Curl_strncasecompare(ver, expected, sizeof(expected) - 1)) {
- ver += sizeof(expected) - 1;
- }
- count = msnprintf(buffer, size, "%s/%s", OSSL_PACKAGE, ver);
- for(p = buffer; *p; ++p) {
- if(ISBLANK(*p))
- *p = '_';
- }
- return count;
-#else
- return msnprintf(buffer, size, "%s/%lx.%lx.%lx",
- OSSL_PACKAGE,
- (LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER>>28)&0xf,
- (LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER>>20)&0xff,
- (LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER>>12)&0xff);
-#endif
-#elif defined(OPENSSL_IS_BORINGSSL)
-#ifdef CURL_BORINGSSL_VERSION
- return msnprintf(buffer, size, "%s/%s",
- OSSL_PACKAGE,
- CURL_BORINGSSL_VERSION);
-#else
- return msnprintf(buffer, size, OSSL_PACKAGE);
-#endif
-#elif defined(HAVE_OPENSSL_VERSION) && defined(OPENSSL_VERSION_STRING)
- return msnprintf(buffer, size, "%s/%s",
- OSSL_PACKAGE, OpenSSL_version(OPENSSL_VERSION_STRING));
-#else
- /* not LibreSSL, BoringSSL and not using OpenSSL_version */
-
- char sub[3];
- unsigned long ssleay_value;
- sub[2]='\0';
- sub[1]='\0';
- ssleay_value = OpenSSL_version_num();
- if(ssleay_value < 0x906000) {
- ssleay_value = SSLEAY_VERSION_NUMBER;
- sub[0]='\0';
- }
- else {
- if(ssleay_value&0xff0) {
- int minor_ver = (ssleay_value >> 4) & 0xff;
- if(minor_ver > 26) {
- /* handle extended version introduced for 0.9.8za */
- sub[1] = (char) ((minor_ver - 1) % 26 + 'a' + 1);
- sub[0] = 'z';
- }
- else {
- sub[0] = (char) (minor_ver + 'a' - 1);
- }
- }
- else
- sub[0]='\0';
- }
-
- return msnprintf(buffer, size, "%s/%lx.%lx.%lx%s"
-#ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
- "-fips"
-#endif
- ,
- OSSL_PACKAGE,
- (ssleay_value>>28)&0xf,
- (ssleay_value>>20)&0xff,
- (ssleay_value>>12)&0xff,
- sub);
-#endif /* OPENSSL_IS_BORINGSSL */
-}
-
-/* can be called with data == NULL */
-static CURLcode ossl_random(struct Curl_easy *data,
- unsigned char *entropy, size_t length)
-{
- int rc;
- if(data) {
- if(ossl_seed(data)) /* Initiate the seed if not already done */
- return CURLE_FAILED_INIT; /* couldn't seed for some reason */
- }
- else {
- if(!rand_enough())
- return CURLE_FAILED_INIT;
- }
- /* RAND_bytes() returns 1 on success, 0 otherwise. */
- rc = RAND_bytes(entropy, curlx_uztosi(length));
- return (rc == 1 ? CURLE_OK : CURLE_FAILED_INIT);
-}
-
-#if (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x0090800fL) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_SHA256)
-static CURLcode ossl_sha256sum(const unsigned char *tmp, /* input */
- size_t tmplen,
- unsigned char *sha256sum /* output */,
- size_t unused)
-{
- EVP_MD_CTX *mdctx;
- unsigned int len = 0;
- (void) unused;
-
- mdctx = EVP_MD_CTX_create();
- if(!mdctx)
- return CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY;
- EVP_DigestInit(mdctx, EVP_sha256());
- EVP_DigestUpdate(mdctx, tmp, tmplen);
- EVP_DigestFinal_ex(mdctx, sha256sum, &len);
- EVP_MD_CTX_destroy(mdctx);
- return CURLE_OK;
-}
-#endif
-
-static bool ossl_cert_status_request(void)
-{
-#if (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x0090808fL) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) && \
- !defined(OPENSSL_NO_OCSP)
- return TRUE;
-#else
- return FALSE;
-#endif
-}
-
-static void *ossl_get_internals(struct ssl_connect_data *connssl,
- CURLINFO info)
-{
- /* Legacy: CURLINFO_TLS_SESSION must return an SSL_CTX pointer. */
- struct ssl_backend_data *backend = connssl->backend;
- DEBUGASSERT(backend);
- return info == CURLINFO_TLS_SESSION ?
- (void *)backend->ctx : (void *)backend->handle;
-}
-
-static bool ossl_associate_connection(struct Curl_easy *data,
- struct connectdata *conn,
- int sockindex)
-{
- struct ssl_connect_data *connssl = &conn->ssl[sockindex];
- struct ssl_backend_data *backend = connssl->backend;
- DEBUGASSERT(backend);
-
- /* If we don't have SSL context, do nothing. */
- if(!backend->handle)
- return FALSE;
-
- if(SSL_SET_OPTION(primary.sessionid)) {
- int data_idx = ossl_get_ssl_data_index();
- int connectdata_idx = ossl_get_ssl_conn_index();
- int sockindex_idx = ossl_get_ssl_sockindex_index();
- int proxy_idx = ossl_get_proxy_index();
-
- if(data_idx >= 0 && connectdata_idx >= 0 && sockindex_idx >= 0 &&
- proxy_idx >= 0) {
- int data_status, conn_status, sockindex_status, proxy_status;
-
- /* Store the data needed for the "new session" callback.
- * The sockindex is stored as a pointer to an array element. */
- data_status = SSL_set_ex_data(backend->handle, data_idx, data);
- conn_status = SSL_set_ex_data(backend->handle, connectdata_idx, conn);
- sockindex_status = SSL_set_ex_data(backend->handle, sockindex_idx,
- conn->sock + sockindex);
-#ifndef CURL_DISABLE_PROXY
- proxy_status = SSL_set_ex_data(backend->handle, proxy_idx,
- SSL_IS_PROXY() ? (void *) 1 : NULL);
-#else
- proxy_status = SSL_set_ex_data(backend->handle, proxy_idx, NULL);
-#endif
- if(data_status && conn_status && sockindex_status && proxy_status)
- return TRUE;
- }
- return FALSE;
- }
- return TRUE;
-}
-
-/*
- * Starting with TLS 1.3, the ossl_new_session_cb callback gets called after
- * the handshake. If the transfer that sets up the callback gets killed before
- * this callback arrives, we must make sure to properly clear the data to
- * avoid UAF problems. A future optimization could be to instead store another
- * transfer that might still be using the same connection.
- */
-
-static void ossl_disassociate_connection(struct Curl_easy *data,
- int sockindex)
-{
- struct connectdata *conn = data->conn;
- struct ssl_connect_data *connssl = &conn->ssl[sockindex];
- struct ssl_backend_data *backend = connssl->backend;
- DEBUGASSERT(backend);
-
- /* If we don't have SSL context, do nothing. */
- if(!backend->handle)
- return;
-
- if(SSL_SET_OPTION(primary.sessionid)) {
- int data_idx = ossl_get_ssl_data_index();
- int connectdata_idx = ossl_get_ssl_conn_index();
- int sockindex_idx = ossl_get_ssl_sockindex_index();
- int proxy_idx = ossl_get_proxy_index();
-
- if(data_idx >= 0 && connectdata_idx >= 0 && sockindex_idx >= 0 &&
- proxy_idx >= 0) {
- /* Disable references to data in "new session" callback to avoid
- * accessing a stale pointer. */
- SSL_set_ex_data(backend->handle, data_idx, NULL);
- SSL_set_ex_data(backend->handle, connectdata_idx, NULL);
- SSL_set_ex_data(backend->handle, sockindex_idx, NULL);
- SSL_set_ex_data(backend->handle, proxy_idx, NULL);
- }
- }
-}
-
-const struct Curl_ssl Curl_ssl_openssl = {
- { CURLSSLBACKEND_OPENSSL, "openssl" }, /* info */
-
- SSLSUPP_CA_PATH |
- SSLSUPP_CAINFO_BLOB |
- SSLSUPP_CERTINFO |
- SSLSUPP_PINNEDPUBKEY |
- SSLSUPP_SSL_CTX |
-#ifdef HAVE_SSL_CTX_SET_CIPHERSUITES
- SSLSUPP_TLS13_CIPHERSUITES |
-#endif
- SSLSUPP_HTTPS_PROXY,
-
- sizeof(struct ssl_backend_data),
-
- ossl_init, /* init */
- ossl_cleanup, /* cleanup */
- ossl_version, /* version */
- ossl_check_cxn, /* check_cxn */
- ossl_shutdown, /* shutdown */
- ossl_data_pending, /* data_pending */
- ossl_random, /* random */
- ossl_cert_status_request, /* cert_status_request */
- ossl_connect, /* connect */
- ossl_connect_nonblocking, /* connect_nonblocking */
- Curl_ssl_getsock, /* getsock */
- ossl_get_internals, /* get_internals */
- ossl_close, /* close_one */
- ossl_close_all, /* close_all */
- ossl_session_free, /* session_free */
- ossl_set_engine, /* set_engine */
- ossl_set_engine_default, /* set_engine_default */
- ossl_engines_list, /* engines_list */
- Curl_none_false_start, /* false_start */
-#if (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x0090800fL) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_SHA256)
- ossl_sha256sum, /* sha256sum */
-#else
- NULL, /* sha256sum */
-#endif
- ossl_associate_connection, /* associate_connection */
- ossl_disassociate_connection /* disassociate_connection */
-};
-
-#endif /* USE_OPENSSL */
+/***************************************************************************
+ * _ _ ____ _
+ * Project ___| | | | _ \| |
+ * / __| | | | |_) | |
+ * | (__| |_| | _ <| |___
+ * \___|\___/|_| \_\_____|
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 1998 - 2022, Daniel Stenberg, <daniel@haxx.se>, et al.
+ *
+ * This software is licensed as described in the file COPYING, which
+ * you should have received as part of this distribution. The terms
+ * are also available at https://curl.se/docs/copyright.html.
+ *
+ * You may opt to use, copy, modify, merge, publish, distribute and/or sell
+ * copies of the Software, and permit persons to whom the Software is
+ * furnished to do so, under the terms of the COPYING file.
+ *
+ * This software is distributed on an "AS IS" basis, WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY
+ * KIND, either express or implied.
+ *
+ * SPDX-License-Identifier: curl
+ *
+ ***************************************************************************/
+
+/*
+ * Source file for all OpenSSL-specific code for the TLS/SSL layer. No code
+ * but vtls.c should ever call or use these functions.
+ */
+
+#include "curl_setup.h"
+
+#if defined(USE_QUICHE) || defined(USE_OPENSSL)
+
+#include <limits.h>
+
+/* Wincrypt must be included before anything that could include OpenSSL. */
+#if defined(USE_WIN32_CRYPTO)
+#include <wincrypt.h>
+/* Undefine wincrypt conflicting symbols for BoringSSL. */
+#undef X509_NAME
+#undef X509_EXTENSIONS
+#undef PKCS7_ISSUER_AND_SERIAL
+#undef PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO
+#undef OCSP_REQUEST
+#undef OCSP_RESPONSE
+#endif
+
+#include "urldata.h"
+#include "sendf.h"
+#include "formdata.h" /* for the boundary function */
+#include "url.h" /* for the ssl config check function */
+#include "inet_pton.h"
+#include "openssl.h"
+#include "connect.h"
+#include "slist.h"
+#include "select.h"
+#include "vtls.h"
+#include "vtls_int.h"
+#include "vauth/vauth.h"
+#include "keylog.h"
+#include "strcase.h"
+#include "hostcheck.h"
+#include "multiif.h"
+#include "strerror.h"
+#include "curl_printf.h"
+
+#include <openssl/ssl.h>
+#include <openssl/rand.h>
+#include <openssl/x509v3.h>
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
+#include <openssl/dsa.h>
+#endif
+#include <openssl/dh.h>
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+#include <openssl/md5.h>
+#include <openssl/conf.h>
+#include <openssl/bn.h>
+#include <openssl/rsa.h>
+#include <openssl/bio.h>
+#include <openssl/buffer.h>
+#include <openssl/pkcs12.h>
+
+#if (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x0090808fL) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_OCSP)
+#include <openssl/ocsp.h>
+#endif
+
+#if (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x0090700fL) && /* 0.9.7 or later */ \
+ !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_UI_CONSOLE)
+#define USE_OPENSSL_ENGINE
+#include <openssl/engine.h>
+#endif
+
+#include "warnless.h"
+
+/* The last #include files should be: */
+#include "curl_memory.h"
+#include "memdebug.h"
+
+/* Uncomment the ALLOW_RENEG line to a real #define if you want to allow TLS
+ renegotiations when built with BoringSSL. Renegotiating is non-compliant
+ with HTTP/2 and "an extremely dangerous protocol feature". Beware.
+
+#define ALLOW_RENEG 1
+ */
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER
+#error "OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER not defined"
+#endif
+
+#ifdef USE_OPENSSL_ENGINE
+#include <openssl/ui.h>
+#endif
+
+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x00909000L
+#define SSL_METHOD_QUAL const
+#else
+#define SSL_METHOD_QUAL
+#endif
+
+#if (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10000000L)
+#define HAVE_ERR_REMOVE_THREAD_STATE 1
+#endif
+
+#if (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10100000L) && /* OpenSSL 1.1.0+ */ \
+ !(defined(LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER) && \
+ LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x20700000L)
+#define SSLEAY_VERSION_NUMBER OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER
+#define HAVE_X509_GET0_EXTENSIONS 1 /* added in 1.1.0 -pre1 */
+#define HAVE_OPAQUE_EVP_PKEY 1 /* since 1.1.0 -pre3 */
+#define HAVE_OPAQUE_RSA_DSA_DH 1 /* since 1.1.0 -pre5 */
+#define CONST_EXTS const
+#define HAVE_ERR_REMOVE_THREAD_STATE_DEPRECATED 1
+
+/* funny typecast define due to difference in API */
+#ifdef LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER
+#define ARG2_X509_signature_print (X509_ALGOR *)
+#else
+#define ARG2_X509_signature_print
+#endif
+
+#else
+/* For OpenSSL before 1.1.0 */
+#define ASN1_STRING_get0_data(x) ASN1_STRING_data(x)
+#define X509_get0_notBefore(x) X509_get_notBefore(x)
+#define X509_get0_notAfter(x) X509_get_notAfter(x)
+#define CONST_EXTS /* nope */
+#ifndef LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER
+#define OpenSSL_version_num() SSLeay()
+#endif
+#endif
+
+#if (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x1000200fL) && /* 1.0.2 or later */ \
+ !(defined(LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER) && \
+ LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x20700000L)
+#define HAVE_X509_GET0_SIGNATURE 1
+#endif
+
+#if (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x1000200fL) /* 1.0.2 or later */
+#define HAVE_SSL_GET_SHUTDOWN 1
+#endif
+
+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10002003L && \
+ OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER <= 0x10002FFFL && \
+ !defined(OPENSSL_NO_COMP)
+#define HAVE_SSL_COMP_FREE_COMPRESSION_METHODS 1
+#endif
+
+#if (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x0090808fL)
+/* not present in older OpenSSL */
+#define OPENSSL_load_builtin_modules(x)
+#endif
+
+#if (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x30000000L)
+#define HAVE_EVP_PKEY_GET_PARAMS 1
+#else
+#define SSL_get1_peer_certificate SSL_get_peer_certificate
+#endif
+
+#ifdef HAVE_EVP_PKEY_GET_PARAMS
+#include <openssl/core_names.h>
+#define DECLARE_PKEY_PARAM_BIGNUM(name) BIGNUM *name = NULL
+#define FREE_PKEY_PARAM_BIGNUM(name) BN_clear_free(name)
+#else
+#define DECLARE_PKEY_PARAM_BIGNUM(name) const BIGNUM *name
+#define FREE_PKEY_PARAM_BIGNUM(name)
+#endif
+
+/*
+ * Whether SSL_CTX_set_keylog_callback is available.
+ * OpenSSL: supported since 1.1.1 https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/2287
+ * BoringSSL: supported since d28f59c27bac (committed 2015-11-19)
+ * LibreSSL: unsupported in at least 2.7.2 (explicitly check for it since it
+ * lies and pretends to be OpenSSL 2.0.0).
+ */
+#if (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10101000L && \
+ !defined(LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER)) || \
+ defined(OPENSSL_IS_BORINGSSL)
+#define HAVE_KEYLOG_CALLBACK
+#endif
+
+/* Whether SSL_CTX_set_ciphersuites is available.
+ * OpenSSL: supported since 1.1.1 (commit a53b5be6a05)
+ * BoringSSL: no
+ * LibreSSL: no
+ */
+#if ((OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10101000L) && \
+ !defined(LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER) && \
+ !defined(OPENSSL_IS_BORINGSSL))
+#define HAVE_SSL_CTX_SET_CIPHERSUITES
+#define HAVE_SSL_CTX_SET_POST_HANDSHAKE_AUTH
+#endif
+
+/*
+ * Whether SSL_CTX_set1_curves_list is available.
+ * OpenSSL: supported since 1.0.2, see
+ * https://www.openssl.org/docs/manmaster/man3/SSL_CTX_set1_groups.html
+ * BoringSSL: supported since 5fd1807d95f7 (committed 2016-09-30)
+ * LibreSSL: since 2.5.3 (April 12, 2017)
+ */
+#if (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10002000L) || \
+ defined(OPENSSL_IS_BORINGSSL)
+#define HAVE_SSL_CTX_SET_EC_CURVES
+#endif
+
+#if defined(LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER)
+#define OSSL_PACKAGE "LibreSSL"
+#elif defined(OPENSSL_IS_BORINGSSL)
+#define OSSL_PACKAGE "BoringSSL"
+#else
+#define OSSL_PACKAGE "OpenSSL"
+#endif
+
+#if (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10100000L)
+/* up2date versions of OpenSSL maintain reasonably secure defaults without
+ * breaking compatibility, so it is better not to override the defaults in curl
+ */
+#define DEFAULT_CIPHER_SELECTION NULL
+#else
+/* ... but it is not the case with old versions of OpenSSL */
+#define DEFAULT_CIPHER_SELECTION \
+ "ALL:!EXPORT:!EXPORT40:!EXPORT56:!aNULL:!LOW:!RC4:@STRENGTH"
+#endif
+
+#ifdef HAVE_OPENSSL_SRP
+/* the function exists */
+#ifdef USE_TLS_SRP
+/* the functionality is not disabled */
+#define USE_OPENSSL_SRP
+#endif
+#endif
+
+#if (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10100000L)
+#define HAVE_RANDOM_INIT_BY_DEFAULT 1
+#endif
+
+#if (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10100000L) && \
+ !(defined(LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER) && \
+ LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x2070100fL) && \
+ !defined(OPENSSL_IS_BORINGSSL)
+#define HAVE_OPENSSL_VERSION
+#endif
+
+/*
+ * Whether the OpenSSL version has the API needed to support sharing an
+ * X509_STORE between connections. The API is:
+ * * `X509_STORE_up_ref` -- Introduced: OpenSSL 1.1.0.
+ */
+#if (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10100000L) /* OpenSSL >= 1.1.0 */
+#define HAVE_SSL_X509_STORE_SHARE
+#endif
+
+/* What API version do we use? */
+#if defined(LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER)
+#define USE_PRE_1_1_API (LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x2070000f)
+#else /* !LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER */
+#define USE_PRE_1_1_API (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10100000L)
+#endif /* !LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER */
+
+struct ssl_backend_data {
+ struct Curl_easy *logger; /* transfer handle to pass trace logs to, only
+ using sockindex 0 */
+ /* these ones requires specific SSL-types */
+ SSL_CTX* ctx;
+ SSL* handle;
+ X509* server_cert;
+ CURLcode io_result; /* result of last BIO cfilter operation */
+#ifndef HAVE_KEYLOG_CALLBACK
+ /* Set to true once a valid keylog entry has been created to avoid dupes. */
+ bool keylog_done;
+#endif
+};
+
+#if defined(HAVE_SSL_X509_STORE_SHARE)
+struct multi_ssl_backend_data {
+ char *CAfile; /* CAfile path used to generate X509 store */
+ X509_STORE *store; /* cached X509 store or NULL if none */
+ struct curltime time; /* when the cached store was created */
+};
+#endif /* HAVE_SSL_X509_STORE_SHARE */
+
+#define push_certinfo(_label, _num) \
+do { \
+ long info_len = BIO_get_mem_data(mem, &ptr); \
+ Curl_ssl_push_certinfo_len(data, _num, _label, ptr, info_len); \
+ if(1 != BIO_reset(mem)) \
+ break; \
+} while(0)
+
+static void pubkey_show(struct Curl_easy *data,
+ BIO *mem,
+ int num,
+ const char *type,
+ const char *name,
+ const BIGNUM *bn)
+{
+ char *ptr;
+ char namebuf[32];
+
+ msnprintf(namebuf, sizeof(namebuf), "%s(%s)", type, name);
+
+ if(bn)
+ BN_print(mem, bn);
+ push_certinfo(namebuf, num);
+}
+
+#ifdef HAVE_OPAQUE_RSA_DSA_DH
+#define print_pubkey_BN(_type, _name, _num) \
+ pubkey_show(data, mem, _num, #_type, #_name, _name)
+
+#else
+#define print_pubkey_BN(_type, _name, _num) \
+do { \
+ if(_type->_name) { \
+ pubkey_show(data, mem, _num, #_type, #_name, _type->_name); \
+ } \
+} while(0)
+#endif
+
+static int asn1_object_dump(ASN1_OBJECT *a, char *buf, size_t len)
+{
+ int i, ilen;
+
+ ilen = (int)len;
+ if(ilen < 0)
+ return 1; /* buffer too big */
+
+ i = i2t_ASN1_OBJECT(buf, ilen, a);
+
+ if(i >= ilen)
+ return 1; /* buffer too small */
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static void X509V3_ext(struct Curl_easy *data,
+ int certnum,
+ CONST_EXTS STACK_OF(X509_EXTENSION) *exts)
+{
+ int i;
+
+ if((int)sk_X509_EXTENSION_num(exts) <= 0)
+ /* no extensions, bail out */
+ return;
+
+ for(i = 0; i < (int)sk_X509_EXTENSION_num(exts); i++) {
+ ASN1_OBJECT *obj;
+ X509_EXTENSION *ext = sk_X509_EXTENSION_value(exts, i);
+ BUF_MEM *biomem;
+ char namebuf[128];
+ BIO *bio_out = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem());
+
+ if(!bio_out)
+ return;
+
+ obj = X509_EXTENSION_get_object(ext);
+
+ asn1_object_dump(obj, namebuf, sizeof(namebuf));
+
+ if(!X509V3_EXT_print(bio_out, ext, 0, 0))
+ ASN1_STRING_print(bio_out, (ASN1_STRING *)X509_EXTENSION_get_data(ext));
+
+ BIO_get_mem_ptr(bio_out, &biomem);
+ Curl_ssl_push_certinfo_len(data, certnum, namebuf, biomem->data,
+ biomem->length);
+ BIO_free(bio_out);
+ }
+}
+
+#ifdef OPENSSL_IS_BORINGSSL
+typedef size_t numcert_t;
+#else
+typedef int numcert_t;
+#endif
+
+CURLcode Curl_ossl_certchain(struct Curl_easy *data, SSL *ssl)
+{
+ CURLcode result;
+ STACK_OF(X509) *sk;
+ int i;
+ numcert_t numcerts;
+ BIO *mem;
+
+ DEBUGASSERT(ssl);
+
+ sk = SSL_get_peer_cert_chain(ssl);
+ if(!sk) {
+ return CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY;
+ }
+
+ numcerts = sk_X509_num(sk);
+
+ result = Curl_ssl_init_certinfo(data, (int)numcerts);
+ if(result) {
+ return result;
+ }
+
+ mem = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem());
+ if(!mem) {
+ return CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY;
+ }
+
+ for(i = 0; i < (int)numcerts; i++) {
+ ASN1_INTEGER *num;
+ X509 *x = sk_X509_value(sk, i);
+ EVP_PKEY *pubkey = NULL;
+ int j;
+ char *ptr;
+ const ASN1_BIT_STRING *psig = NULL;
+
+ X509_NAME_print_ex(mem, X509_get_subject_name(x), 0, XN_FLAG_ONELINE);
+ push_certinfo("Subject", i);
+
+ X509_NAME_print_ex(mem, X509_get_issuer_name(x), 0, XN_FLAG_ONELINE);
+ push_certinfo("Issuer", i);
+
+ BIO_printf(mem, "%lx", X509_get_version(x));
+ push_certinfo("Version", i);
+
+ num = X509_get_serialNumber(x);
+ if(num->type == V_ASN1_NEG_INTEGER)
+ BIO_puts(mem, "-");
+ for(j = 0; j < num->length; j++)
+ BIO_printf(mem, "%02x", num->data[j]);
+ push_certinfo("Serial Number", i);
+
+#if defined(HAVE_X509_GET0_SIGNATURE) && defined(HAVE_X509_GET0_EXTENSIONS)
+ {
+ const X509_ALGOR *sigalg = NULL;
+ X509_PUBKEY *xpubkey = NULL;
+ ASN1_OBJECT *pubkeyoid = NULL;
+
+ X509_get0_signature(&psig, &sigalg, x);
+ if(sigalg) {
+ i2a_ASN1_OBJECT(mem, sigalg->algorithm);
+ push_certinfo("Signature Algorithm", i);
+ }
+
+ xpubkey = X509_get_X509_PUBKEY(x);
+ if(xpubkey) {
+ X509_PUBKEY_get0_param(&pubkeyoid, NULL, NULL, NULL, xpubkey);
+ if(pubkeyoid) {
+ i2a_ASN1_OBJECT(mem, pubkeyoid);
+ push_certinfo("Public Key Algorithm", i);
+ }
+ }
+
+ X509V3_ext(data, i, X509_get0_extensions(x));
+ }
+#else
+ {
+ /* before OpenSSL 1.0.2 */
+ X509_CINF *cinf = x->cert_info;
+
+ i2a_ASN1_OBJECT(mem, cinf->signature->algorithm);
+ push_certinfo("Signature Algorithm", i);
+
+ i2a_ASN1_OBJECT(mem, cinf->key->algor->algorithm);
+ push_certinfo("Public Key Algorithm", i);
+
+ X509V3_ext(data, i, cinf->extensions);
+
+ psig = x->signature;
+ }
+#endif
+
+ ASN1_TIME_print(mem, X509_get0_notBefore(x));
+ push_certinfo("Start date", i);
+
+ ASN1_TIME_print(mem, X509_get0_notAfter(x));
+ push_certinfo("Expire date", i);
+
+ pubkey = X509_get_pubkey(x);
+ if(!pubkey)
+ infof(data, " Unable to load public key");
+ else {
+ int pktype;
+#ifdef HAVE_OPAQUE_EVP_PKEY
+ pktype = EVP_PKEY_id(pubkey);
+#else
+ pktype = pubkey->type;
+#endif
+ switch(pktype) {
+ case EVP_PKEY_RSA:
+ {
+#ifndef HAVE_EVP_PKEY_GET_PARAMS
+ RSA *rsa;
+#ifdef HAVE_OPAQUE_EVP_PKEY
+ rsa = EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(pubkey);
+#else
+ rsa = pubkey->pkey.rsa;
+#endif /* HAVE_OPAQUE_EVP_PKEY */
+#endif /* !HAVE_EVP_PKEY_GET_PARAMS */
+
+ {
+#ifdef HAVE_OPAQUE_RSA_DSA_DH
+ DECLARE_PKEY_PARAM_BIGNUM(n);
+ DECLARE_PKEY_PARAM_BIGNUM(e);
+#ifdef HAVE_EVP_PKEY_GET_PARAMS
+ EVP_PKEY_get_bn_param(pubkey, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_RSA_N, &n);
+ EVP_PKEY_get_bn_param(pubkey, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_RSA_E, &e);
+#else
+ RSA_get0_key(rsa, &n, &e, NULL);
+#endif /* HAVE_EVP_PKEY_GET_PARAMS */
+ BIO_printf(mem, "%d", BN_num_bits(n));
+#else
+ BIO_printf(mem, "%d", BN_num_bits(rsa->n));
+#endif /* HAVE_OPAQUE_RSA_DSA_DH */
+ push_certinfo("RSA Public Key", i);
+ print_pubkey_BN(rsa, n, i);
+ print_pubkey_BN(rsa, e, i);
+ FREE_PKEY_PARAM_BIGNUM(n);
+ FREE_PKEY_PARAM_BIGNUM(e);
+ }
+
+ break;
+ }
+ case EVP_PKEY_DSA:
+ {
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
+#ifndef HAVE_EVP_PKEY_GET_PARAMS
+ DSA *dsa;
+#ifdef HAVE_OPAQUE_EVP_PKEY
+ dsa = EVP_PKEY_get0_DSA(pubkey);
+#else
+ dsa = pubkey->pkey.dsa;
+#endif /* HAVE_OPAQUE_EVP_PKEY */
+#endif /* !HAVE_EVP_PKEY_GET_PARAMS */
+ {
+#ifdef HAVE_OPAQUE_RSA_DSA_DH
+ DECLARE_PKEY_PARAM_BIGNUM(p);
+ DECLARE_PKEY_PARAM_BIGNUM(q);
+ DECLARE_PKEY_PARAM_BIGNUM(g);
+ DECLARE_PKEY_PARAM_BIGNUM(pub_key);
+#ifdef HAVE_EVP_PKEY_GET_PARAMS
+ EVP_PKEY_get_bn_param(pubkey, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_FFC_P, &p);
+ EVP_PKEY_get_bn_param(pubkey, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_FFC_Q, &q);
+ EVP_PKEY_get_bn_param(pubkey, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_FFC_G, &g);
+ EVP_PKEY_get_bn_param(pubkey, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_PUB_KEY, &pub_key);
+#else
+ DSA_get0_pqg(dsa, &p, &q, &g);
+ DSA_get0_key(dsa, &pub_key, NULL);
+#endif /* HAVE_EVP_PKEY_GET_PARAMS */
+#endif /* HAVE_OPAQUE_RSA_DSA_DH */
+ print_pubkey_BN(dsa, p, i);
+ print_pubkey_BN(dsa, q, i);
+ print_pubkey_BN(dsa, g, i);
+ print_pubkey_BN(dsa, pub_key, i);
+ FREE_PKEY_PARAM_BIGNUM(p);
+ FREE_PKEY_PARAM_BIGNUM(q);
+ FREE_PKEY_PARAM_BIGNUM(g);
+ FREE_PKEY_PARAM_BIGNUM(pub_key);
+ }
+#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_DSA */
+ break;
+ }
+ case EVP_PKEY_DH:
+ {
+#ifndef HAVE_EVP_PKEY_GET_PARAMS
+ DH *dh;
+#ifdef HAVE_OPAQUE_EVP_PKEY
+ dh = EVP_PKEY_get0_DH(pubkey);
+#else
+ dh = pubkey->pkey.dh;
+#endif /* HAVE_OPAQUE_EVP_PKEY */
+#endif /* !HAVE_EVP_PKEY_GET_PARAMS */
+ {
+#ifdef HAVE_OPAQUE_RSA_DSA_DH
+ DECLARE_PKEY_PARAM_BIGNUM(p);
+ DECLARE_PKEY_PARAM_BIGNUM(q);
+ DECLARE_PKEY_PARAM_BIGNUM(g);
+ DECLARE_PKEY_PARAM_BIGNUM(pub_key);
+#ifdef HAVE_EVP_PKEY_GET_PARAMS
+ EVP_PKEY_get_bn_param(pubkey, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_FFC_P, &p);
+ EVP_PKEY_get_bn_param(pubkey, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_FFC_Q, &q);
+ EVP_PKEY_get_bn_param(pubkey, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_FFC_G, &g);
+ EVP_PKEY_get_bn_param(pubkey, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_PUB_KEY, &pub_key);
+#else
+ DH_get0_pqg(dh, &p, &q, &g);
+ DH_get0_key(dh, &pub_key, NULL);
+#endif /* HAVE_EVP_PKEY_GET_PARAMS */
+ print_pubkey_BN(dh, p, i);
+ print_pubkey_BN(dh, q, i);
+ print_pubkey_BN(dh, g, i);
+#else
+ print_pubkey_BN(dh, p, i);
+ print_pubkey_BN(dh, g, i);
+#endif /* HAVE_OPAQUE_RSA_DSA_DH */
+ print_pubkey_BN(dh, pub_key, i);
+ FREE_PKEY_PARAM_BIGNUM(p);
+ FREE_PKEY_PARAM_BIGNUM(q);
+ FREE_PKEY_PARAM_BIGNUM(g);
+ FREE_PKEY_PARAM_BIGNUM(pub_key);
+ }
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ EVP_PKEY_free(pubkey);
+ }
+
+ if(psig) {
+ for(j = 0; j < psig->length; j++)
+ BIO_printf(mem, "%02x:", psig->data[j]);
+ push_certinfo("Signature", i);
+ }
+
+ PEM_write_bio_X509(mem, x);
+ push_certinfo("Cert", i);
+ }
+
+ BIO_free(mem);
+
+ return CURLE_OK;
+}
+
+#endif /* quiche or OpenSSL */
+
+#ifdef USE_OPENSSL
+
+#if USE_PRE_1_1_API
+#if !defined(LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER) || LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x2070000fL
+#define BIO_set_init(x,v) ((x)->init=(v))
+#define BIO_get_data(x) ((x)->ptr)
+#define BIO_set_data(x,v) ((x)->ptr=(v))
+#endif
+#define BIO_get_shutdown(x) ((x)->shutdown)
+#define BIO_set_shutdown(x,v) ((x)->shutdown=(v))
+#endif /* USE_PRE_1_1_API */
+
+static int bio_cf_create(BIO *bio)
+{
+ BIO_set_shutdown(bio, 1);
+ BIO_set_init(bio, 1);
+#if USE_PRE_1_1_API
+ bio->num = -1;
+#endif
+ BIO_set_data(bio, NULL);
+ return 1;
+}
+
+static int bio_cf_destroy(BIO *bio)
+{
+ if(!bio)
+ return 0;
+ return 1;
+}
+
+static long bio_cf_ctrl(BIO *bio, int cmd, long num, void *ptr)
+{
+ struct Curl_cfilter *cf = BIO_get_data(bio);
+ long ret = 1;
+
+ (void)cf;
+ (void)ptr;
+ switch(cmd) {
+ case BIO_CTRL_GET_CLOSE:
+ ret = (long)BIO_get_shutdown(bio);
+ break;
+ case BIO_CTRL_SET_CLOSE:
+ BIO_set_shutdown(bio, (int)num);
+ break;
+ case BIO_CTRL_FLUSH:
+ /* we do no delayed writes, but if we ever would, this
+ * needs to trigger it. */
+ ret = 1;
+ break;
+ case BIO_CTRL_DUP:
+ ret = 1;
+ break;
+#ifdef BIO_CTRL_EOF
+ case BIO_CTRL_EOF:
+ /* EOF has been reached on input? */
+ return (!cf->next || !cf->next->connected);
+#endif
+ default:
+ ret = 0;
+ break;
+ }
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static int bio_cf_out_write(BIO *bio, const char *buf, int blen)
+{
+ struct Curl_cfilter *cf = BIO_get_data(bio);
+ struct ssl_connect_data *connssl = cf->ctx;
+ struct Curl_easy *data = connssl->call_data;
+ ssize_t nwritten;
+ CURLcode result = CURLE_SEND_ERROR;
+
+ DEBUGASSERT(data);
+ nwritten = Curl_conn_cf_send(cf->next, data, buf, blen, &result);
+ /* DEBUGF(infof(data, CFMSG(cf, "bio_cf_out_write(len=%d) -> %d, err=%d"),
+ blen, (int)nwritten, result)); */
+ BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio);
+ connssl->backend->io_result = result;
+ if(nwritten < 0) {
+ if(CURLE_AGAIN == result)
+ BIO_set_retry_write(bio);
+ }
+ return (int)nwritten;
+}
+
+static int bio_cf_in_read(BIO *bio, char *buf, int blen)
+{
+ struct Curl_cfilter *cf = BIO_get_data(bio);
+ struct ssl_connect_data *connssl = cf->ctx;
+ struct Curl_easy *data = connssl->call_data;
+ ssize_t nread;
+ CURLcode result = CURLE_RECV_ERROR;
+
+ DEBUGASSERT(data);
+ /* OpenSSL catches this case, so should we. */
+ if(!buf)
+ return 0;
+
+ nread = Curl_conn_cf_recv(cf->next, data, buf, blen, &result);
+ /* DEBUGF(infof(data, CFMSG(cf, "bio_cf_in_read(len=%d) -> %d, err=%d"),
+ blen, (int)nread, result)); */
+ BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio);
+ connssl->backend->io_result = result;
+ if(nread < 0) {
+ if(CURLE_AGAIN == result)
+ BIO_set_retry_read(bio);
+ }
+ return (int)nread;
+}
+
+static BIO_METHOD *bio_cf_method = NULL;
+
+#if USE_PRE_1_1_API
+
+static BIO_METHOD bio_cf_meth_1_0 = {
+ BIO_TYPE_MEM,
+ "OpenSSL CF BIO",
+ bio_cf_out_write,
+ bio_cf_in_read,
+ NULL, /* puts is never called */
+ NULL, /* gets is never called */
+ bio_cf_ctrl,
+ bio_cf_create,
+ bio_cf_destroy,
+ NULL
+};
+
+static void bio_cf_init_methods(void)
+{
+ bio_cf_method = &bio_cf_meth_1_0;
+}
+
+#define bio_cf_free_methods() Curl_nop_stmt
+
+#else
+
+static void bio_cf_init_methods(void)
+{
+ bio_cf_method = BIO_meth_new(BIO_TYPE_MEM, "OpenSSL CF BIO");
+ BIO_meth_set_write(bio_cf_method, &bio_cf_out_write);
+ BIO_meth_set_read(bio_cf_method, &bio_cf_in_read);
+ BIO_meth_set_ctrl(bio_cf_method, &bio_cf_ctrl);
+ BIO_meth_set_create(bio_cf_method, &bio_cf_create);
+ BIO_meth_set_destroy(bio_cf_method, &bio_cf_destroy);
+}
+
+static void bio_cf_free_methods(void)
+{
+ BIO_meth_free(bio_cf_method);
+}
+
+#endif
+
+
+static bool ossl_attach_data(struct Curl_cfilter *cf,
+ struct Curl_easy *data);
+
+/*
+ * Number of bytes to read from the random number seed file. This must be
+ * a finite value (because some entropy "files" like /dev/urandom have
+ * an infinite length), but must be large enough to provide enough
+ * entropy to properly seed OpenSSL's PRNG.
+ */
+#define RAND_LOAD_LENGTH 1024
+
+#ifdef HAVE_KEYLOG_CALLBACK
+static void ossl_keylog_callback(const SSL *ssl, const char *line)
+{
+ (void)ssl;
+
+ Curl_tls_keylog_write_line(line);
+}
+#else
+/*
+ * ossl_log_tls12_secret is called by libcurl to make the CLIENT_RANDOMs if the
+ * OpenSSL being used doesn't have native support for doing that.
+ */
+static void
+ossl_log_tls12_secret(const SSL *ssl, bool *keylog_done)
+{
+ const SSL_SESSION *session = SSL_get_session(ssl);
+ unsigned char client_random[SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE];
+ unsigned char master_key[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH];
+ int master_key_length = 0;
+
+ if(!session || *keylog_done)
+ return;
+
+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10100000L && \
+ !(defined(LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER) && \
+ LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x20700000L)
+ /* ssl->s3 is not checked in openssl 1.1.0-pre6, but let's assume that
+ * we have a valid SSL context if we have a non-NULL session. */
+ SSL_get_client_random(ssl, client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
+ master_key_length = (int)
+ SSL_SESSION_get_master_key(session, master_key, SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH);
+#else
+ if(ssl->s3 && session->master_key_length > 0) {
+ master_key_length = session->master_key_length;
+ memcpy(master_key, session->master_key, session->master_key_length);
+ memcpy(client_random, ssl->s3->client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
+ }
+#endif
+
+ /* The handshake has not progressed sufficiently yet, or this is a TLS 1.3
+ * session (when curl was built with older OpenSSL headers and running with
+ * newer OpenSSL runtime libraries). */
+ if(master_key_length <= 0)
+ return;
+
+ *keylog_done = true;
+ Curl_tls_keylog_write("CLIENT_RANDOM", client_random,
+ master_key, master_key_length);
+}
+#endif /* !HAVE_KEYLOG_CALLBACK */
+
+static const char *SSL_ERROR_to_str(int err)
+{
+ switch(err) {
+ case SSL_ERROR_NONE:
+ return "SSL_ERROR_NONE";
+ case SSL_ERROR_SSL:
+ return "SSL_ERROR_SSL";
+ case SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ:
+ return "SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ";
+ case SSL_ERROR_WANT_WRITE:
+ return "SSL_ERROR_WANT_WRITE";
+ case SSL_ERROR_WANT_X509_LOOKUP:
+ return "SSL_ERROR_WANT_X509_LOOKUP";
+ case SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL:
+ return "SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL";
+ case SSL_ERROR_ZERO_RETURN:
+ return "SSL_ERROR_ZERO_RETURN";
+ case SSL_ERROR_WANT_CONNECT:
+ return "SSL_ERROR_WANT_CONNECT";
+ case SSL_ERROR_WANT_ACCEPT:
+ return "SSL_ERROR_WANT_ACCEPT";
+#if defined(SSL_ERROR_WANT_ASYNC)
+ case SSL_ERROR_WANT_ASYNC:
+ return "SSL_ERROR_WANT_ASYNC";
+#endif
+#if defined(SSL_ERROR_WANT_ASYNC_JOB)
+ case SSL_ERROR_WANT_ASYNC_JOB:
+ return "SSL_ERROR_WANT_ASYNC_JOB";
+#endif
+#if defined(SSL_ERROR_WANT_EARLY)
+ case SSL_ERROR_WANT_EARLY:
+ return "SSL_ERROR_WANT_EARLY";
+#endif
+ default:
+ return "SSL_ERROR unknown";
+ }
+}
+
+static size_t ossl_version(char *buffer, size_t size);
+
+/* Return error string for last OpenSSL error
+ */
+static char *ossl_strerror(unsigned long error, char *buf, size_t size)
+{
+ size_t len;
+ DEBUGASSERT(size);
+ *buf = '\0';
+
+ len = ossl_version(buf, size);
+ DEBUGASSERT(len < (size - 2));
+ if(len < (size - 2)) {
+ buf += len;
+ size -= (len + 2);
+ *buf++ = ':';
+ *buf++ = ' ';
+ *buf = '\0';
+ }
+
+#ifdef OPENSSL_IS_BORINGSSL
+ ERR_error_string_n((uint32_t)error, buf, size);
+#else
+ ERR_error_string_n(error, buf, size);
+#endif
+
+ if(!*buf) {
+ strncpy(buf, (error ? "Unknown error" : "No error"), size);
+ buf[size - 1] = '\0';
+ }
+
+ return buf;
+}
+
+/* Return an extra data index for the transfer data.
+ * This index can be used with SSL_get_ex_data() and SSL_set_ex_data().
+ */
+static int ossl_get_ssl_data_index(void)
+{
+ static int ssl_ex_data_data_index = -1;
+ if(ssl_ex_data_data_index < 0) {
+ ssl_ex_data_data_index = SSL_get_ex_new_index(0, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL);
+ }
+ return ssl_ex_data_data_index;
+}
+
+/* Return an extra data index for the associated Curl_cfilter instance.
+ * This index can be used with SSL_get_ex_data() and SSL_set_ex_data().
+ */
+static int ossl_get_ssl_cf_index(void)
+{
+ static int ssl_ex_data_cf_index = -1;
+ if(ssl_ex_data_cf_index < 0) {
+ ssl_ex_data_cf_index = SSL_get_ex_new_index(0, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL);
+ }
+ return ssl_ex_data_cf_index;
+}
+
+/* Return an extra data index for the sockindex.
+ * This index can be used with SSL_get_ex_data() and SSL_set_ex_data().
+ */
+static int ossl_get_ssl_sockindex_index(void)
+{
+ static int sockindex_index = -1;
+ if(sockindex_index < 0) {
+ sockindex_index = SSL_get_ex_new_index(0, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL);
+ }
+ return sockindex_index;
+}
+
+/* Return an extra data index for proxy boolean.
+ * This index can be used with SSL_get_ex_data() and SSL_set_ex_data().
+ */
+static int ossl_get_proxy_index(void)
+{
+ static int proxy_index = -1;
+ if(proxy_index < 0) {
+ proxy_index = SSL_get_ex_new_index(0, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL);
+ }
+ return proxy_index;
+}
+
+static int passwd_callback(char *buf, int num, int encrypting,
+ void *global_passwd)
+{
+ DEBUGASSERT(0 == encrypting);
+
+ if(!encrypting) {
+ int klen = curlx_uztosi(strlen((char *)global_passwd));
+ if(num > klen) {
+ memcpy(buf, global_passwd, klen + 1);
+ return klen;
+ }
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * rand_enough() returns TRUE if we have seeded the random engine properly.
+ */
+static bool rand_enough(void)
+{
+ return (0 != RAND_status()) ? TRUE : FALSE;
+}
+
+static CURLcode ossl_seed(struct Curl_easy *data)
+{
+ /* This might get called before it has been added to a multi handle */
+ if(data->multi && data->multi->ssl_seeded)
+ return CURLE_OK;
+
+ if(rand_enough()) {
+ /* OpenSSL 1.1.0+ should return here */
+ if(data->multi)
+ data->multi->ssl_seeded = TRUE;
+ return CURLE_OK;
+ }
+#ifdef HAVE_RANDOM_INIT_BY_DEFAULT
+ /* with OpenSSL 1.1.0+, a failed RAND_status is a showstopper */
+ failf(data, "Insufficient randomness");
+ return CURLE_SSL_CONNECT_ERROR;
+#else
+
+#ifdef RANDOM_FILE
+ RAND_load_file(RANDOM_FILE, RAND_LOAD_LENGTH);
+ if(rand_enough())
+ return CURLE_OK;
+#endif
+
+#if defined(HAVE_RAND_EGD) && defined(EGD_SOCKET)
+ /* available in OpenSSL 0.9.5 and later */
+ /* EGD_SOCKET is set at configure time or not at all */
+ {
+ /* If there's an option and a define, the option overrides the
+ define */
+ int ret = RAND_egd(EGD_SOCKET);
+ if(-1 != ret) {
+ if(rand_enough())
+ return CURLE_OK;
+ }
+ }
+#endif
+
+ /* fallback to a custom seeding of the PRNG using a hash based on a current
+ time */
+ do {
+ unsigned char randb[64];
+ size_t len = sizeof(randb);
+ size_t i, i_max;
+ for(i = 0, i_max = len / sizeof(struct curltime); i < i_max; ++i) {
+ struct curltime tv = Curl_now();
+ Curl_wait_ms(1);
+ tv.tv_sec *= i + 1;
+ tv.tv_usec *= (unsigned int)i + 2;
+ tv.tv_sec ^= ((Curl_now().tv_sec + Curl_now().tv_usec) *
+ (i + 3)) << 8;
+ tv.tv_usec ^= (unsigned int) ((Curl_now().tv_sec +
+ Curl_now().tv_usec) *
+ (i + 4)) << 16;
+ memcpy(&randb[i * sizeof(struct curltime)], &tv,
+ sizeof(struct curltime));
+ }
+ RAND_add(randb, (int)len, (double)len/2);
+ } while(!rand_enough());
+
+ {
+ /* generates a default path for the random seed file */
+ char fname[256];
+ fname[0] = 0; /* blank it first */
+ RAND_file_name(fname, sizeof(fname));
+ if(fname[0]) {
+ /* we got a file name to try */
+ RAND_load_file(fname, RAND_LOAD_LENGTH);
+ if(rand_enough())
+ return CURLE_OK;
+ }
+ }
+
+ infof(data, "libcurl is now using a weak random seed");
+ return (rand_enough() ? CURLE_OK :
+ CURLE_SSL_CONNECT_ERROR /* confusing error code */);
+#endif
+}
+
+#ifndef SSL_FILETYPE_ENGINE
+#define SSL_FILETYPE_ENGINE 42
+#endif
+#ifndef SSL_FILETYPE_PKCS12
+#define SSL_FILETYPE_PKCS12 43
+#endif
+static int do_file_type(const char *type)
+{
+ if(!type || !type[0])
+ return SSL_FILETYPE_PEM;
+ if(strcasecompare(type, "PEM"))
+ return SSL_FILETYPE_PEM;
+ if(strcasecompare(type, "DER"))
+ return SSL_FILETYPE_ASN1;
+ if(strcasecompare(type, "ENG"))
+ return SSL_FILETYPE_ENGINE;
+ if(strcasecompare(type, "P12"))
+ return SSL_FILETYPE_PKCS12;
+ return -1;
+}
+
+#ifdef USE_OPENSSL_ENGINE
+/*
+ * Supply default password to the engine user interface conversation.
+ * The password is passed by OpenSSL engine from ENGINE_load_private_key()
+ * last argument to the ui and can be obtained by UI_get0_user_data(ui) here.
+ */
+static int ssl_ui_reader(UI *ui, UI_STRING *uis)
+{
+ const char *password;
+ switch(UI_get_string_type(uis)) {
+ case UIT_PROMPT:
+ case UIT_VERIFY:
+ password = (const char *)UI_get0_user_data(ui);
+ if(password && (UI_get_input_flags(uis) & UI_INPUT_FLAG_DEFAULT_PWD)) {
+ UI_set_result(ui, uis, password);
+ return 1;
+ }
+ default:
+ break;
+ }
+ return (UI_method_get_reader(UI_OpenSSL()))(ui, uis);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Suppress interactive request for a default password if available.
+ */
+static int ssl_ui_writer(UI *ui, UI_STRING *uis)
+{
+ switch(UI_get_string_type(uis)) {
+ case UIT_PROMPT:
+ case UIT_VERIFY:
+ if(UI_get0_user_data(ui) &&
+ (UI_get_input_flags(uis) & UI_INPUT_FLAG_DEFAULT_PWD)) {
+ return 1;
+ }
+ default:
+ break;
+ }
+ return (UI_method_get_writer(UI_OpenSSL()))(ui, uis);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Check if a given string is a PKCS#11 URI
+ */
+static bool is_pkcs11_uri(const char *string)
+{
+ return (string && strncasecompare(string, "pkcs11:", 7));
+}
+
+#endif
+
+static CURLcode ossl_set_engine(struct Curl_easy *data, const char *engine);
+
+static int
+SSL_CTX_use_certificate_blob(SSL_CTX *ctx, const struct curl_blob *blob,
+ int type, const char *key_passwd)
+{
+ int ret = 0;
+ X509 *x = NULL;
+ /* the typecast of blob->len is fine since it is guaranteed to never be
+ larger than CURL_MAX_INPUT_LENGTH */
+ BIO *in = BIO_new_mem_buf(blob->data, (int)(blob->len));
+ if(!in)
+ return CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY;
+
+ if(type == SSL_FILETYPE_ASN1) {
+ /* j = ERR_R_ASN1_LIB; */
+ x = d2i_X509_bio(in, NULL);
+ }
+ else if(type == SSL_FILETYPE_PEM) {
+ /* ERR_R_PEM_LIB; */
+ x = PEM_read_bio_X509(in, NULL,
+ passwd_callback, (void *)key_passwd);
+ }
+ else {
+ ret = 0;
+ goto end;
+ }
+
+ if(!x) {
+ ret = 0;
+ goto end;
+ }
+
+ ret = SSL_CTX_use_certificate(ctx, x);
+ end:
+ X509_free(x);
+ BIO_free(in);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static int
+SSL_CTX_use_PrivateKey_blob(SSL_CTX *ctx, const struct curl_blob *blob,
+ int type, const char *key_passwd)
+{
+ int ret = 0;
+ EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
+ BIO *in = BIO_new_mem_buf(blob->data, (int)(blob->len));
+ if(!in)
+ return CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY;
+
+ if(type == SSL_FILETYPE_PEM)
+ pkey = PEM_read_bio_PrivateKey(in, NULL, passwd_callback,
+ (void *)key_passwd);
+ else if(type == SSL_FILETYPE_ASN1)
+ pkey = d2i_PrivateKey_bio(in, NULL);
+ else {
+ ret = 0;
+ goto end;
+ }
+ if(!pkey) {
+ ret = 0;
+ goto end;
+ }
+ ret = SSL_CTX_use_PrivateKey(ctx, pkey);
+ EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
+ end:
+ BIO_free(in);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static int
+SSL_CTX_use_certificate_chain_blob(SSL_CTX *ctx, const struct curl_blob *blob,
+ const char *key_passwd)
+{
+/* SSL_CTX_add1_chain_cert introduced in OpenSSL 1.0.2 */
+#if (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x1000200fL) && /* OpenSSL 1.0.2 or later */ \
+ !(defined(LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER) && \
+ (LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x2090100fL)) /* LibreSSL 2.9.1 or later */
+ int ret = 0;
+ X509 *x = NULL;
+ void *passwd_callback_userdata = (void *)key_passwd;
+ BIO *in = BIO_new_mem_buf(blob->data, (int)(blob->len));
+ if(!in)
+ return CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY;
+
+ ERR_clear_error();
+
+ x = PEM_read_bio_X509_AUX(in, NULL,
+ passwd_callback, (void *)key_passwd);
+
+ if(!x) {
+ ret = 0;
+ goto end;
+ }
+
+ ret = SSL_CTX_use_certificate(ctx, x);
+
+ if(ERR_peek_error() != 0)
+ ret = 0;
+
+ if(ret) {
+ X509 *ca;
+ unsigned long err;
+
+ if(!SSL_CTX_clear_chain_certs(ctx)) {
+ ret = 0;
+ goto end;
+ }
+
+ while((ca = PEM_read_bio_X509(in, NULL, passwd_callback,
+ passwd_callback_userdata))
+ != NULL) {
+
+ if(!SSL_CTX_add0_chain_cert(ctx, ca)) {
+ X509_free(ca);
+ ret = 0;
+ goto end;
+ }
+ }
+
+ err = ERR_peek_last_error();
+ if((ERR_GET_LIB(err) == ERR_LIB_PEM) &&
+ (ERR_GET_REASON(err) == PEM_R_NO_START_LINE))
+ ERR_clear_error();
+ else
+ ret = 0;
+ }
+
+ end:
+ X509_free(x);
+ BIO_free(in);
+ return ret;
+#else
+ (void)ctx; /* unused */
+ (void)blob; /* unused */
+ (void)key_passwd; /* unused */
+ return 0;
+#endif
+}
+
+static
+int cert_stuff(struct Curl_easy *data,
+ SSL_CTX* ctx,
+ char *cert_file,
+ const struct curl_blob *cert_blob,
+ const char *cert_type,
+ char *key_file,
+ const struct curl_blob *key_blob,
+ const char *key_type,
+ char *key_passwd)
+{
+ char error_buffer[256];
+ bool check_privkey = TRUE;
+
+ int file_type = do_file_type(cert_type);
+
+ if(cert_file || cert_blob || (file_type == SSL_FILETYPE_ENGINE)) {
+ SSL *ssl;
+ X509 *x509;
+ int cert_done = 0;
+ int cert_use_result;
+
+ if(key_passwd) {
+ /* set the password in the callback userdata */
+ SSL_CTX_set_default_passwd_cb_userdata(ctx, key_passwd);
+ /* Set passwd callback: */
+ SSL_CTX_set_default_passwd_cb(ctx, passwd_callback);
+ }
+
+
+ switch(file_type) {
+ case SSL_FILETYPE_PEM:
+ /* SSL_CTX_use_certificate_chain_file() only works on PEM files */
+ cert_use_result = cert_blob ?
+ SSL_CTX_use_certificate_chain_blob(ctx, cert_blob, key_passwd) :
+ SSL_CTX_use_certificate_chain_file(ctx, cert_file);
+ if(cert_use_result != 1) {
+ failf(data,
+ "could not load PEM client certificate from %s, " OSSL_PACKAGE
+ " error %s, "
+ "(no key found, wrong pass phrase, or wrong file format?)",
+ (cert_blob ? "CURLOPT_SSLCERT_BLOB" : cert_file),
+ ossl_strerror(ERR_get_error(), error_buffer,
+ sizeof(error_buffer)) );
+ return 0;
+ }
+ break;
+
+ case SSL_FILETYPE_ASN1:
+ /* SSL_CTX_use_certificate_file() works with either PEM or ASN1, but
+ we use the case above for PEM so this can only be performed with
+ ASN1 files. */
+
+ cert_use_result = cert_blob ?
+ SSL_CTX_use_certificate_blob(ctx, cert_blob,
+ file_type, key_passwd) :
+ SSL_CTX_use_certificate_file(ctx, cert_file, file_type);
+ if(cert_use_result != 1) {
+ failf(data,
+ "could not load ASN1 client certificate from %s, " OSSL_PACKAGE
+ " error %s, "
+ "(no key found, wrong pass phrase, or wrong file format?)",
+ (cert_blob ? "CURLOPT_SSLCERT_BLOB" : cert_file),
+ ossl_strerror(ERR_get_error(), error_buffer,
+ sizeof(error_buffer)) );
+ return 0;
+ }
+ break;
+ case SSL_FILETYPE_ENGINE:
+#if defined(USE_OPENSSL_ENGINE) && defined(ENGINE_CTRL_GET_CMD_FROM_NAME)
+ {
+ /* Implicitly use pkcs11 engine if none was provided and the
+ * cert_file is a PKCS#11 URI */
+ if(!data->state.engine) {
+ if(is_pkcs11_uri(cert_file)) {
+ if(ossl_set_engine(data, "pkcs11") != CURLE_OK) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ if(data->state.engine) {
+ const char *cmd_name = "LOAD_CERT_CTRL";
+ struct {
+ const char *cert_id;
+ X509 *cert;
+ } params;
+
+ params.cert_id = cert_file;
+ params.cert = NULL;
+
+ /* Does the engine supports LOAD_CERT_CTRL ? */
+ if(!ENGINE_ctrl(data->state.engine, ENGINE_CTRL_GET_CMD_FROM_NAME,
+ 0, (void *)cmd_name, NULL)) {
+ failf(data, "ssl engine does not support loading certificates");
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ /* Load the certificate from the engine */
+ if(!ENGINE_ctrl_cmd(data->state.engine, cmd_name,
+ 0, &params, NULL, 1)) {
+ failf(data, "ssl engine cannot load client cert with id"
+ " '%s' [%s]", cert_file,
+ ossl_strerror(ERR_get_error(), error_buffer,
+ sizeof(error_buffer)));
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if(!params.cert) {
+ failf(data, "ssl engine didn't initialized the certificate "
+ "properly.");
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if(SSL_CTX_use_certificate(ctx, params.cert) != 1) {
+ failf(data, "unable to set client certificate [%s]",
+ ossl_strerror(ERR_get_error(), error_buffer,
+ sizeof(error_buffer)));
+ return 0;
+ }
+ X509_free(params.cert); /* we don't need the handle any more... */
+ }
+ else {
+ failf(data, "crypto engine not set, can't load certificate");
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
+ break;
+#else
+ failf(data, "file type ENG for certificate not implemented");
+ return 0;
+#endif
+
+ case SSL_FILETYPE_PKCS12:
+ {
+ BIO *cert_bio = NULL;
+ PKCS12 *p12 = NULL;
+ EVP_PKEY *pri;
+ STACK_OF(X509) *ca = NULL;
+ if(cert_blob) {
+ cert_bio = BIO_new_mem_buf(cert_blob->data, (int)(cert_blob->len));
+ if(!cert_bio) {
+ failf(data,
+ "BIO_new_mem_buf NULL, " OSSL_PACKAGE
+ " error %s",
+ ossl_strerror(ERR_get_error(), error_buffer,
+ sizeof(error_buffer)) );
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
+ else {
+ cert_bio = BIO_new(BIO_s_file());
+ if(!cert_bio) {
+ failf(data,
+ "BIO_new return NULL, " OSSL_PACKAGE
+ " error %s",
+ ossl_strerror(ERR_get_error(), error_buffer,
+ sizeof(error_buffer)) );
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if(BIO_read_filename(cert_bio, cert_file) <= 0) {
+ failf(data, "could not open PKCS12 file '%s'", cert_file);
+ BIO_free(cert_bio);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
+
+ p12 = d2i_PKCS12_bio(cert_bio, NULL);
+ BIO_free(cert_bio);
+
+ if(!p12) {
+ failf(data, "error reading PKCS12 file '%s'",
+ cert_blob ? "(memory blob)" : cert_file);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ PKCS12_PBE_add();
+
+ if(!PKCS12_parse(p12, key_passwd, &pri, &x509,
+ &ca)) {
+ failf(data,
+ "could not parse PKCS12 file, check password, " OSSL_PACKAGE
+ " error %s",
+ ossl_strerror(ERR_get_error(), error_buffer,
+ sizeof(error_buffer)) );
+ PKCS12_free(p12);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ PKCS12_free(p12);
+
+ if(SSL_CTX_use_certificate(ctx, x509) != 1) {
+ failf(data,
+ "could not load PKCS12 client certificate, " OSSL_PACKAGE
+ " error %s",
+ ossl_strerror(ERR_get_error(), error_buffer,
+ sizeof(error_buffer)) );
+ goto fail;
+ }
+
+ if(SSL_CTX_use_PrivateKey(ctx, pri) != 1) {
+ failf(data, "unable to use private key from PKCS12 file '%s'",
+ cert_file);
+ goto fail;
+ }
+
+ if(!SSL_CTX_check_private_key (ctx)) {
+ failf(data, "private key from PKCS12 file '%s' "
+ "does not match certificate in same file", cert_file);
+ goto fail;
+ }
+ /* Set Certificate Verification chain */
+ if(ca) {
+ while(sk_X509_num(ca)) {
+ /*
+ * Note that sk_X509_pop() is used below to make sure the cert is
+ * removed from the stack properly before getting passed to
+ * SSL_CTX_add_extra_chain_cert(), which takes ownership. Previously
+ * we used sk_X509_value() instead, but then we'd clean it in the
+ * subsequent sk_X509_pop_free() call.
+ */
+ X509 *x = sk_X509_pop(ca);
+ if(!SSL_CTX_add_client_CA(ctx, x)) {
+ X509_free(x);
+ failf(data, "cannot add certificate to client CA list");
+ goto fail;
+ }
+ if(!SSL_CTX_add_extra_chain_cert(ctx, x)) {
+ X509_free(x);
+ failf(data, "cannot add certificate to certificate chain");
+ goto fail;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ cert_done = 1;
+ fail:
+ EVP_PKEY_free(pri);
+ X509_free(x509);
+ sk_X509_pop_free(ca, X509_free);
+ if(!cert_done)
+ return 0; /* failure! */
+ break;
+ }
+ default:
+ failf(data, "not supported file type '%s' for certificate", cert_type);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if((!key_file) && (!key_blob)) {
+ key_file = cert_file;
+ key_blob = cert_blob;
+ }
+ else
+ file_type = do_file_type(key_type);
+
+ switch(file_type) {
+ case SSL_FILETYPE_PEM:
+ if(cert_done)
+ break;
+ /* FALLTHROUGH */
+ case SSL_FILETYPE_ASN1:
+ cert_use_result = key_blob ?
+ SSL_CTX_use_PrivateKey_blob(ctx, key_blob, file_type, key_passwd) :
+ SSL_CTX_use_PrivateKey_file(ctx, key_file, file_type);
+ if(cert_use_result != 1) {
+ failf(data, "unable to set private key file: '%s' type %s",
+ key_file?key_file:"(memory blob)", key_type?key_type:"PEM");
+ return 0;
+ }
+ break;
+ case SSL_FILETYPE_ENGINE:
+#ifdef USE_OPENSSL_ENGINE
+ { /* XXXX still needs some work */
+ EVP_PKEY *priv_key = NULL;
+
+ /* Implicitly use pkcs11 engine if none was provided and the
+ * key_file is a PKCS#11 URI */
+ if(!data->state.engine) {
+ if(is_pkcs11_uri(key_file)) {
+ if(ossl_set_engine(data, "pkcs11") != CURLE_OK) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ if(data->state.engine) {
+ UI_METHOD *ui_method =
+ UI_create_method((char *)"curl user interface");
+ if(!ui_method) {
+ failf(data, "unable do create " OSSL_PACKAGE
+ " user-interface method");
+ return 0;
+ }
+ UI_method_set_opener(ui_method, UI_method_get_opener(UI_OpenSSL()));
+ UI_method_set_closer(ui_method, UI_method_get_closer(UI_OpenSSL()));
+ UI_method_set_reader(ui_method, ssl_ui_reader);
+ UI_method_set_writer(ui_method, ssl_ui_writer);
+ /* the typecast below was added to please mingw32 */
+ priv_key = (EVP_PKEY *)
+ ENGINE_load_private_key(data->state.engine, key_file,
+ ui_method,
+ key_passwd);
+ UI_destroy_method(ui_method);
+ if(!priv_key) {
+ failf(data, "failed to load private key from crypto engine");
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if(SSL_CTX_use_PrivateKey(ctx, priv_key) != 1) {
+ failf(data, "unable to set private key");
+ EVP_PKEY_free(priv_key);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ EVP_PKEY_free(priv_key); /* we don't need the handle any more... */
+ }
+ else {
+ failf(data, "crypto engine not set, can't load private key");
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
+ break;
+#else
+ failf(data, "file type ENG for private key not supported");
+ return 0;
+#endif
+ case SSL_FILETYPE_PKCS12:
+ if(!cert_done) {
+ failf(data, "file type P12 for private key not supported");
+ return 0;
+ }
+ break;
+ default:
+ failf(data, "not supported file type for private key");
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ ssl = SSL_new(ctx);
+ if(!ssl) {
+ failf(data, "unable to create an SSL structure");
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ x509 = SSL_get_certificate(ssl);
+
+ /* This version was provided by Evan Jordan and is supposed to not
+ leak memory as the previous version: */
+ if(x509) {
+ EVP_PKEY *pktmp = X509_get_pubkey(x509);
+ EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(pktmp, SSL_get_privatekey(ssl));
+ EVP_PKEY_free(pktmp);
+ }
+
+#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_RSA) && !defined(OPENSSL_IS_BORINGSSL) && \
+ !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_3_0)
+ {
+ /* If RSA is used, don't check the private key if its flags indicate
+ * it doesn't support it. */
+ EVP_PKEY *priv_key = SSL_get_privatekey(ssl);
+ int pktype;
+#ifdef HAVE_OPAQUE_EVP_PKEY
+ pktype = EVP_PKEY_id(priv_key);
+#else
+ pktype = priv_key->type;
+#endif
+ if(pktype == EVP_PKEY_RSA) {
+ RSA *rsa = EVP_PKEY_get1_RSA(priv_key);
+ if(RSA_flags(rsa) & RSA_METHOD_FLAG_NO_CHECK)
+ check_privkey = FALSE;
+ RSA_free(rsa); /* Decrement reference count */
+ }
+ }
+#endif
+
+ SSL_free(ssl);
+
+ /* If we are using DSA, we can copy the parameters from
+ * the private key */
+
+ if(check_privkey == TRUE) {
+ /* Now we know that a key and cert have been set against
+ * the SSL context */
+ if(!SSL_CTX_check_private_key(ctx)) {
+ failf(data, "Private key does not match the certificate public key");
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ return 1;
+}
+
+CURLcode Curl_ossl_set_client_cert(struct Curl_easy *data, SSL_CTX *ctx,
+ char *cert_file,
+ const struct curl_blob *cert_blob,
+ const char *cert_type, char *key_file,
+ const struct curl_blob *key_blob,
+ const char *key_type, char *key_passwd)
+{
+ int rv = cert_stuff(data, ctx, cert_file, cert_blob, cert_type, key_file,
+ key_blob, key_type, key_passwd);
+ if(rv != 1) {
+ return CURLE_SSL_CERTPROBLEM;
+ }
+
+ return CURLE_OK;
+}
+
+/* returns non-zero on failure */
+static int x509_name_oneline(X509_NAME *a, char *buf, size_t size)
+{
+ BIO *bio_out = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem());
+ BUF_MEM *biomem;
+ int rc;
+
+ if(!bio_out)
+ return 1; /* alloc failed! */
+
+ rc = X509_NAME_print_ex(bio_out, a, 0, XN_FLAG_SEP_SPLUS_SPC);
+ BIO_get_mem_ptr(bio_out, &biomem);
+
+ if((size_t)biomem->length < size)
+ size = biomem->length;
+ else
+ size--; /* don't overwrite the buffer end */
+
+ memcpy(buf, biomem->data, size);
+ buf[size] = 0;
+
+ BIO_free(bio_out);
+
+ return !rc;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Global SSL init
+ *
+ * @retval 0 error initializing SSL
+ * @retval 1 SSL initialized successfully
+ */
+static int ossl_init(void)
+{
+#if (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10100000L) && \
+ !defined(LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER)
+ const uint64_t flags =
+#ifdef OPENSSL_INIT_ENGINE_ALL_BUILTIN
+ /* not present in BoringSSL */
+ OPENSSL_INIT_ENGINE_ALL_BUILTIN |
+#endif
+#ifdef CURL_DISABLE_OPENSSL_AUTO_LOAD_CONFIG
+ OPENSSL_INIT_NO_LOAD_CONFIG |
+#else
+ OPENSSL_INIT_LOAD_CONFIG |
+#endif
+ 0;
+ OPENSSL_init_ssl(flags, NULL);
+#else
+ OPENSSL_load_builtin_modules();
+
+#ifdef USE_OPENSSL_ENGINE
+ ENGINE_load_builtin_engines();
+#endif
+
+/* CONF_MFLAGS_DEFAULT_SECTION was introduced some time between 0.9.8b and
+ 0.9.8e */
+#ifndef CONF_MFLAGS_DEFAULT_SECTION
+#define CONF_MFLAGS_DEFAULT_SECTION 0x0
+#endif
+
+#ifndef CURL_DISABLE_OPENSSL_AUTO_LOAD_CONFIG
+ CONF_modules_load_file(NULL, NULL,
+ CONF_MFLAGS_DEFAULT_SECTION|
+ CONF_MFLAGS_IGNORE_MISSING_FILE);
+#endif
+
+ /* Let's get nice error messages */
+ SSL_load_error_strings();
+
+ /* Init the global ciphers and digests */
+ if(!SSLeay_add_ssl_algorithms())
+ return 0;
+
+ OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms();
+#endif
+
+ bio_cf_init_methods();
+ Curl_tls_keylog_open();
+
+ /* Initialize the extra data indexes */
+ if(ossl_get_ssl_data_index() < 0 || ossl_get_ssl_cf_index() < 0 ||
+ ossl_get_ssl_sockindex_index() < 0 || ossl_get_proxy_index() < 0)
+ return 0;
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+/* Global cleanup */
+static void ossl_cleanup(void)
+{
+#if (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10100000L) && \
+ !defined(LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER)
+ /* OpenSSL 1.1 deprecates all these cleanup functions and
+ turns them into no-ops in OpenSSL 1.0 compatibility mode */
+#else
+ /* Free ciphers and digests lists */
+ EVP_cleanup();
+
+#ifdef USE_OPENSSL_ENGINE
+ /* Free engine list */
+ ENGINE_cleanup();
+#endif
+
+ /* Free OpenSSL error strings */
+ ERR_free_strings();
+
+ /* Free thread local error state, destroying hash upon zero refcount */
+#ifdef HAVE_ERR_REMOVE_THREAD_STATE
+ ERR_remove_thread_state(NULL);
+#else
+ ERR_remove_state(0);
+#endif
+
+ /* Free all memory allocated by all configuration modules */
+ CONF_modules_free();
+
+#ifdef HAVE_SSL_COMP_FREE_COMPRESSION_METHODS
+ SSL_COMP_free_compression_methods();
+#endif
+#endif
+
+ Curl_tls_keylog_close();
+ bio_cf_free_methods();
+}
+
+/*
+ * This function is used to determine connection status.
+ *
+ * Return codes:
+ * 1 means the connection is still in place
+ * 0 means the connection has been closed
+ * -1 means the connection status is unknown
+ */
+static int ossl_check_cxn(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, struct Curl_easy *data)
+{
+ /* SSL_peek takes data out of the raw recv buffer without peeking so we use
+ recv MSG_PEEK instead. Bug #795 */
+#ifdef MSG_PEEK
+ char buf;
+ ssize_t nread;
+ nread = recv((RECV_TYPE_ARG1)cf->conn->sock[cf->sockindex],
+ (RECV_TYPE_ARG2)&buf, (RECV_TYPE_ARG3)1,
+ (RECV_TYPE_ARG4)MSG_PEEK);
+ if(nread == 0)
+ return 0; /* connection has been closed */
+ if(nread == 1)
+ return 1; /* connection still in place */
+ else if(nread == -1) {
+ int err = SOCKERRNO;
+ if(err == EINPROGRESS ||
+#if defined(EAGAIN) && (EAGAIN != EWOULDBLOCK)
+ err == EAGAIN ||
+#endif
+ err == EWOULDBLOCK)
+ return 1; /* connection still in place */
+ if(err == ECONNRESET ||
+#ifdef ECONNABORTED
+ err == ECONNABORTED ||
+#endif
+#ifdef ENETDOWN
+ err == ENETDOWN ||
+#endif
+#ifdef ENETRESET
+ err == ENETRESET ||
+#endif
+#ifdef ESHUTDOWN
+ err == ESHUTDOWN ||
+#endif
+#ifdef ETIMEDOUT
+ err == ETIMEDOUT ||
+#endif
+ err == ENOTCONN)
+ return 0; /* connection has been closed */
+ }
+#endif
+ (void)data;
+ return -1; /* connection status unknown */
+}
+
+/* Selects an OpenSSL crypto engine
+ */
+static CURLcode ossl_set_engine(struct Curl_easy *data, const char *engine)
+{
+#ifdef USE_OPENSSL_ENGINE
+ ENGINE *e;
+
+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x00909000L
+ e = ENGINE_by_id(engine);
+#else
+ /* avoid memory leak */
+ for(e = ENGINE_get_first(); e; e = ENGINE_get_next(e)) {
+ const char *e_id = ENGINE_get_id(e);
+ if(!strcmp(engine, e_id))
+ break;
+ }
+#endif
+
+ if(!e) {
+ failf(data, "SSL Engine '%s' not found", engine);
+ return CURLE_SSL_ENGINE_NOTFOUND;
+ }
+
+ if(data->state.engine) {
+ ENGINE_finish(data->state.engine);
+ ENGINE_free(data->state.engine);
+ data->state.engine = NULL;
+ }
+ if(!ENGINE_init(e)) {
+ char buf[256];
+
+ ENGINE_free(e);
+ failf(data, "Failed to initialise SSL Engine '%s': %s",
+ engine, ossl_strerror(ERR_get_error(), buf, sizeof(buf)));
+ return CURLE_SSL_ENGINE_INITFAILED;
+ }
+ data->state.engine = e;
+ return CURLE_OK;
+#else
+ (void)engine;
+ failf(data, "SSL Engine not supported");
+ return CURLE_SSL_ENGINE_NOTFOUND;
+#endif
+}
+
+/* Sets engine as default for all SSL operations
+ */
+static CURLcode ossl_set_engine_default(struct Curl_easy *data)
+{
+#ifdef USE_OPENSSL_ENGINE
+ if(data->state.engine) {
+ if(ENGINE_set_default(data->state.engine, ENGINE_METHOD_ALL) > 0) {
+ infof(data, "set default crypto engine '%s'",
+ ENGINE_get_id(data->state.engine));
+ }
+ else {
+ failf(data, "set default crypto engine '%s' failed",
+ ENGINE_get_id(data->state.engine));
+ return CURLE_SSL_ENGINE_SETFAILED;
+ }
+ }
+#else
+ (void) data;
+#endif
+ return CURLE_OK;
+}
+
+/* Return list of OpenSSL crypto engine names.
+ */
+static struct curl_slist *ossl_engines_list(struct Curl_easy *data)
+{
+ struct curl_slist *list = NULL;
+#ifdef USE_OPENSSL_ENGINE
+ struct curl_slist *beg;
+ ENGINE *e;
+
+ for(e = ENGINE_get_first(); e; e = ENGINE_get_next(e)) {
+ beg = curl_slist_append(list, ENGINE_get_id(e));
+ if(!beg) {
+ curl_slist_free_all(list);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ list = beg;
+ }
+#endif
+ (void) data;
+ return list;
+}
+
+#define set_logger(connssl, data) \
+ connssl->backend->logger = data
+
+static void ossl_close(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, struct Curl_easy *data)
+{
+ struct ssl_connect_data *connssl = cf->ctx;
+ struct ssl_backend_data *backend = connssl->backend;
+
+ DEBUGASSERT(backend);
+
+ if(backend->handle) {
+ set_logger(connssl, data);
+
+ if(cf->next && cf->next->connected) {
+ char buf[32];
+ /* Maybe the server has already sent a close notify alert.
+ Read it to avoid an RST on the TCP connection. */
+ (void)SSL_read(backend->handle, buf, (int)sizeof(buf));
+
+ (void)SSL_shutdown(backend->handle);
+ SSL_set_connect_state(backend->handle);
+ }
+
+ SSL_free(backend->handle);
+ backend->handle = NULL;
+ }
+ if(backend->ctx) {
+ SSL_CTX_free(backend->ctx);
+ backend->ctx = NULL;
+ }
+}
+
+/*
+ * This function is called to shut down the SSL layer but keep the
+ * socket open (CCC - Clear Command Channel)
+ */
+static int ossl_shutdown(struct Curl_cfilter *cf,
+ struct Curl_easy *data)
+{
+ int retval = 0;
+ struct ssl_connect_data *connssl = cf->ctx;
+ char buf[256]; /* We will use this for the OpenSSL error buffer, so it has
+ to be at least 256 bytes long. */
+ unsigned long sslerror;
+ int nread;
+ int buffsize;
+ int err;
+ bool done = FALSE;
+ struct ssl_backend_data *backend = connssl->backend;
+ int loop = 10;
+
+ DEBUGASSERT(backend);
+
+#ifndef CURL_DISABLE_FTP
+ /* This has only been tested on the proftpd server, and the mod_tls code
+ sends a close notify alert without waiting for a close notify alert in
+ response. Thus we wait for a close notify alert from the server, but
+ we do not send one. Let's hope other servers do the same... */
+
+ if(data->set.ftp_ccc == CURLFTPSSL_CCC_ACTIVE)
+ (void)SSL_shutdown(backend->handle);
+#endif
+
+ if(backend->handle) {
+ buffsize = (int)sizeof(buf);
+ while(!done && loop--) {
+ int what = SOCKET_READABLE(cf->conn->sock[cf->sockindex],
+ SSL_SHUTDOWN_TIMEOUT);
+ if(what > 0) {
+ ERR_clear_error();
+
+ /* Something to read, let's do it and hope that it is the close
+ notify alert from the server */
+ nread = SSL_read(backend->handle, buf, buffsize);
+ err = SSL_get_error(backend->handle, nread);
+
+ switch(err) {
+ case SSL_ERROR_NONE: /* this is not an error */
+ case SSL_ERROR_ZERO_RETURN: /* no more data */
+ /* This is the expected response. There was no data but only
+ the close notify alert */
+ done = TRUE;
+ break;
+ case SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ:
+ /* there's data pending, re-invoke SSL_read() */
+ infof(data, "SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ");
+ break;
+ case SSL_ERROR_WANT_WRITE:
+ /* SSL wants a write. Really odd. Let's bail out. */
+ infof(data, "SSL_ERROR_WANT_WRITE");
+ done = TRUE;
+ break;
+ default:
+ /* openssl/ssl.h says "look at error stack/return value/errno" */
+ sslerror = ERR_get_error();
+ failf(data, OSSL_PACKAGE " SSL_read on shutdown: %s, errno %d",
+ (sslerror ?
+ ossl_strerror(sslerror, buf, sizeof(buf)) :
+ SSL_ERROR_to_str(err)),
+ SOCKERRNO);
+ done = TRUE;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ else if(0 == what) {
+ /* timeout */
+ failf(data, "SSL shutdown timeout");
+ done = TRUE;
+ }
+ else {
+ /* anything that gets here is fatally bad */
+ failf(data, "select/poll on SSL socket, errno: %d", SOCKERRNO);
+ retval = -1;
+ done = TRUE;
+ }
+ } /* while()-loop for the select() */
+
+ if(data->set.verbose) {
+#ifdef HAVE_SSL_GET_SHUTDOWN
+ switch(SSL_get_shutdown(backend->handle)) {
+ case SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN:
+ infof(data, "SSL_get_shutdown() returned SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN");
+ break;
+ case SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN:
+ infof(data, "SSL_get_shutdown() returned SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN");
+ break;
+ case SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN|SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN:
+ infof(data, "SSL_get_shutdown() returned SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN|"
+ "SSL_RECEIVED__SHUTDOWN");
+ break;
+ }
+#endif
+ }
+
+ SSL_free(backend->handle);
+ backend->handle = NULL;
+ }
+ return retval;
+}
+
+static void ossl_session_free(void *ptr)
+{
+ /* free the ID */
+ SSL_SESSION_free(ptr);
+}
+
+/*
+ * This function is called when the 'data' struct is going away. Close
+ * down everything and free all resources!
+ */
+static void ossl_close_all(struct Curl_easy *data)
+{
+#ifdef USE_OPENSSL_ENGINE
+ if(data->state.engine) {
+ ENGINE_finish(data->state.engine);
+ ENGINE_free(data->state.engine);
+ data->state.engine = NULL;
+ }
+#else
+ (void)data;
+#endif
+#if !defined(HAVE_ERR_REMOVE_THREAD_STATE_DEPRECATED) && \
+ defined(HAVE_ERR_REMOVE_THREAD_STATE)
+ /* OpenSSL 1.0.1 and 1.0.2 build an error queue that is stored per-thread
+ so we need to clean it here in case the thread will be killed. All OpenSSL
+ code should extract the error in association with the error so clearing
+ this queue here should be harmless at worst. */
+ ERR_remove_thread_state(NULL);
+#endif
+}
+
+/* ====================================================== */
+
+/*
+ * Match subjectAltName against the host name.
+ */
+static bool subj_alt_hostcheck(struct Curl_easy *data,
+ const char *match_pattern,
+ size_t matchlen,
+ const char *hostname,
+ size_t hostlen,
+ const char *dispname)
+{
+#ifdef CURL_DISABLE_VERBOSE_STRINGS
+ (void)dispname;
+ (void)data;
+#endif
+ if(Curl_cert_hostcheck(match_pattern, matchlen, hostname, hostlen)) {
+ infof(data, " subjectAltName: host \"%s\" matched cert's \"%s\"",
+ dispname, match_pattern);
+ return TRUE;
+ }
+ return FALSE;
+}
+
+/* Quote from RFC2818 section 3.1 "Server Identity"
+
+ If a subjectAltName extension of type dNSName is present, that MUST
+ be used as the identity. Otherwise, the (most specific) Common Name
+ field in the Subject field of the certificate MUST be used. Although
+ the use of the Common Name is existing practice, it is deprecated and
+ Certification Authorities are encouraged to use the dNSName instead.
+
+ Matching is performed using the matching rules specified by
+ [RFC2459]. If more than one identity of a given type is present in
+ the certificate (e.g., more than one dNSName name, a match in any one
+ of the set is considered acceptable.) Names may contain the wildcard
+ character * which is considered to match any single domain name
+ component or component fragment. E.g., *.a.com matches foo.a.com but
+ not bar.foo.a.com. f*.com matches foo.com but not bar.com.
+
+ In some cases, the URI is specified as an IP address rather than a
+ hostname. In this case, the iPAddress subjectAltName must be present
+ in the certificate and must exactly match the IP in the URI.
+
+ This function is now used from ngtcp2 (QUIC) as well.
+*/
+CURLcode Curl_ossl_verifyhost(struct Curl_easy *data, struct connectdata *conn,
+ X509 *server_cert)
+{
+ bool matched = FALSE;
+ int target = GEN_DNS; /* target type, GEN_DNS or GEN_IPADD */
+ size_t addrlen = 0;
+ STACK_OF(GENERAL_NAME) *altnames;
+#ifdef ENABLE_IPV6
+ struct in6_addr addr;
+#else
+ struct in_addr addr;
+#endif
+ CURLcode result = CURLE_OK;
+ bool dNSName = FALSE; /* if a dNSName field exists in the cert */
+ bool iPAddress = FALSE; /* if a iPAddress field exists in the cert */
+ const char *hostname, *dispname;
+ int port;
+ size_t hostlen;
+
+ (void)conn;
+ Curl_conn_get_host(data, FIRSTSOCKET, &hostname, &dispname, &port);
+ hostlen = strlen(hostname);
+
+#ifndef ENABLE_IPV6
+ /* Silence compiler warnings for unused params */
+ (void) conn;
+#endif
+
+#ifdef ENABLE_IPV6
+ if(conn->bits.ipv6_ip &&
+ Curl_inet_pton(AF_INET6, hostname, &addr)) {
+ target = GEN_IPADD;
+ addrlen = sizeof(struct in6_addr);
+ }
+ else
+#endif
+ if(Curl_inet_pton(AF_INET, hostname, &addr)) {
+ target = GEN_IPADD;
+ addrlen = sizeof(struct in_addr);
+ }
+
+ /* get a "list" of alternative names */
+ altnames = X509_get_ext_d2i(server_cert, NID_subject_alt_name, NULL, NULL);
+
+ if(altnames) {
+#ifdef OPENSSL_IS_BORINGSSL
+ size_t numalts;
+ size_t i;
+#else
+ int numalts;
+ int i;
+#endif
+ bool dnsmatched = FALSE;
+ bool ipmatched = FALSE;
+
+ /* get amount of alternatives, RFC2459 claims there MUST be at least
+ one, but we don't depend on it... */
+ numalts = sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(altnames);
+
+ /* loop through all alternatives - until a dnsmatch */
+ for(i = 0; (i < numalts) && !dnsmatched; i++) {
+ /* get a handle to alternative name number i */
+ const GENERAL_NAME *check = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(altnames, i);
+
+ if(check->type == GEN_DNS)
+ dNSName = TRUE;
+ else if(check->type == GEN_IPADD)
+ iPAddress = TRUE;
+
+ /* only check alternatives of the same type the target is */
+ if(check->type == target) {
+ /* get data and length */
+ const char *altptr = (char *)ASN1_STRING_get0_data(check->d.ia5);
+ size_t altlen = (size_t) ASN1_STRING_length(check->d.ia5);
+
+ switch(target) {
+ case GEN_DNS: /* name/pattern comparison */
+ /* The OpenSSL man page explicitly says: "In general it cannot be
+ assumed that the data returned by ASN1_STRING_data() is null
+ terminated or does not contain embedded nulls." But also that
+ "The actual format of the data will depend on the actual string
+ type itself: for example for an IA5String the data will be ASCII"
+
+ It has been however verified that in 0.9.6 and 0.9.7, IA5String
+ is always null-terminated.
+ */
+ if((altlen == strlen(altptr)) &&
+ /* if this isn't true, there was an embedded zero in the name
+ string and we cannot match it. */
+ subj_alt_hostcheck(data,
+ altptr,
+ altlen, hostname, hostlen, dispname)) {
+ dnsmatched = TRUE;
+ }
+ break;
+
+ case GEN_IPADD: /* IP address comparison */
+ /* compare alternative IP address if the data chunk is the same size
+ our server IP address is */
+ if((altlen == addrlen) && !memcmp(altptr, &addr, altlen)) {
+ ipmatched = TRUE;
+ infof(data,
+ " subjectAltName: host \"%s\" matched cert's IP address!",
+ dispname);
+ }
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ GENERAL_NAMES_free(altnames);
+
+ if(dnsmatched || ipmatched)
+ matched = TRUE;
+ }
+
+ if(matched)
+ /* an alternative name matched */
+ ;
+ else if(dNSName || iPAddress) {
+ infof(data, " subjectAltName does not match %s", dispname);
+ failf(data, "SSL: no alternative certificate subject name matches "
+ "target host name '%s'", dispname);
+ result = CURLE_PEER_FAILED_VERIFICATION;
+ }
+ else {
+ /* we have to look to the last occurrence of a commonName in the
+ distinguished one to get the most significant one. */
+ int i = -1;
+ unsigned char *peer_CN = NULL;
+ int peerlen = 0;
+
+ /* The following is done because of a bug in 0.9.6b */
+ X509_NAME *name = X509_get_subject_name(server_cert);
+ if(name) {
+ int j;
+ while((j = X509_NAME_get_index_by_NID(name, NID_commonName, i)) >= 0)
+ i = j;
+ }
+
+ /* we have the name entry and we will now convert this to a string
+ that we can use for comparison. Doing this we support BMPstring,
+ UTF8, etc. */
+
+ if(i >= 0) {
+ ASN1_STRING *tmp =
+ X509_NAME_ENTRY_get_data(X509_NAME_get_entry(name, i));
+
+ /* In OpenSSL 0.9.7d and earlier, ASN1_STRING_to_UTF8 fails if the input
+ is already UTF-8 encoded. We check for this case and copy the raw
+ string manually to avoid the problem. This code can be made
+ conditional in the future when OpenSSL has been fixed. */
+ if(tmp) {
+ if(ASN1_STRING_type(tmp) == V_ASN1_UTF8STRING) {
+ peerlen = ASN1_STRING_length(tmp);
+ if(peerlen >= 0) {
+ peer_CN = OPENSSL_malloc(peerlen + 1);
+ if(peer_CN) {
+ memcpy(peer_CN, ASN1_STRING_get0_data(tmp), peerlen);
+ peer_CN[peerlen] = '\0';
+ }
+ else
+ result = CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY;
+ }
+ }
+ else /* not a UTF8 name */
+ peerlen = ASN1_STRING_to_UTF8(&peer_CN, tmp);
+
+ if(peer_CN && (curlx_uztosi(strlen((char *)peer_CN)) != peerlen)) {
+ /* there was a terminating zero before the end of string, this
+ cannot match and we return failure! */
+ failf(data, "SSL: illegal cert name field");
+ result = CURLE_PEER_FAILED_VERIFICATION;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ if(result)
+ /* error already detected, pass through */
+ ;
+ else if(!peer_CN) {
+ failf(data,
+ "SSL: unable to obtain common name from peer certificate");
+ result = CURLE_PEER_FAILED_VERIFICATION;
+ }
+ else if(!Curl_cert_hostcheck((const char *)peer_CN,
+ peerlen, hostname, hostlen)) {
+ failf(data, "SSL: certificate subject name '%s' does not match "
+ "target host name '%s'", peer_CN, dispname);
+ result = CURLE_PEER_FAILED_VERIFICATION;
+ }
+ else {
+ infof(data, " common name: %s (matched)", peer_CN);
+ }
+ if(peer_CN)
+ OPENSSL_free(peer_CN);
+ }
+
+ return result;
+}
+
+#if (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x0090808fL) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) && \
+ !defined(OPENSSL_NO_OCSP)
+static CURLcode verifystatus(struct Curl_cfilter *cf,
+ struct Curl_easy *data)
+{
+ struct ssl_connect_data *connssl = cf->ctx;
+ int i, ocsp_status;
+ unsigned char *status;
+ const unsigned char *p;
+ CURLcode result = CURLE_OK;
+ OCSP_RESPONSE *rsp = NULL;
+ OCSP_BASICRESP *br = NULL;
+ X509_STORE *st = NULL;
+ STACK_OF(X509) *ch = NULL;
+ struct ssl_backend_data *backend = connssl->backend;
+ X509 *cert;
+ OCSP_CERTID *id = NULL;
+ int cert_status, crl_reason;
+ ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME *rev, *thisupd, *nextupd;
+ int ret;
+ long len;
+
+ DEBUGASSERT(backend);
+
+ len = SSL_get_tlsext_status_ocsp_resp(backend->handle, &status);
+
+ if(!status) {
+ failf(data, "No OCSP response received");
+ result = CURLE_SSL_INVALIDCERTSTATUS;
+ goto end;
+ }
+ p = status;
+ rsp = d2i_OCSP_RESPONSE(NULL, &p, len);
+ if(!rsp) {
+ failf(data, "Invalid OCSP response");
+ result = CURLE_SSL_INVALIDCERTSTATUS;
+ goto end;
+ }
+
+ ocsp_status = OCSP_response_status(rsp);
+ if(ocsp_status != OCSP_RESPONSE_STATUS_SUCCESSFUL) {
+ failf(data, "Invalid OCSP response status: %s (%d)",
+ OCSP_response_status_str(ocsp_status), ocsp_status);
+ result = CURLE_SSL_INVALIDCERTSTATUS;
+ goto end;
+ }
+
+ br = OCSP_response_get1_basic(rsp);
+ if(!br) {
+ failf(data, "Invalid OCSP response");
+ result = CURLE_SSL_INVALIDCERTSTATUS;
+ goto end;
+ }
+
+ ch = SSL_get_peer_cert_chain(backend->handle);
+ if(!ch) {
+ failf(data, "Could not get peer certificate chain");
+ result = CURLE_SSL_INVALIDCERTSTATUS;
+ goto end;
+ }
+ st = SSL_CTX_get_cert_store(backend->ctx);
+
+#if ((OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER <= 0x1000201fL) /* Fixed after 1.0.2a */ || \
+ (defined(LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER) && \
+ LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER <= 0x2040200fL))
+ /* The authorized responder cert in the OCSP response MUST be signed by the
+ peer cert's issuer (see RFC6960 section 4.2.2.2). If that's a root cert,
+ no problem, but if it's an intermediate cert OpenSSL has a bug where it
+ expects this issuer to be present in the chain embedded in the OCSP
+ response. So we add it if necessary. */
+
+ /* First make sure the peer cert chain includes both a peer and an issuer,
+ and the OCSP response contains a responder cert. */
+ if(sk_X509_num(ch) >= 2 && sk_X509_num(br->certs) >= 1) {
+ X509 *responder = sk_X509_value(br->certs, sk_X509_num(br->certs) - 1);
+
+ /* Find issuer of responder cert and add it to the OCSP response chain */
+ for(i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(ch); i++) {
+ X509 *issuer = sk_X509_value(ch, i);
+ if(X509_check_issued(issuer, responder) == X509_V_OK) {
+ if(!OCSP_basic_add1_cert(br, issuer)) {
+ failf(data, "Could not add issuer cert to OCSP response");
+ result = CURLE_SSL_INVALIDCERTSTATUS;
+ goto end;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ }
+#endif
+
+ if(OCSP_basic_verify(br, ch, st, 0) <= 0) {
+ failf(data, "OCSP response verification failed");
+ result = CURLE_SSL_INVALIDCERTSTATUS;
+ goto end;
+ }
+
+ /* Compute the certificate's ID */
+ cert = SSL_get1_peer_certificate(backend->handle);
+ if(!cert) {
+ failf(data, "Error getting peer certificate");
+ result = CURLE_SSL_INVALIDCERTSTATUS;
+ goto end;
+ }
+
+ for(i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(ch); i++) {
+ X509 *issuer = sk_X509_value(ch, i);
+ if(X509_check_issued(issuer, cert) == X509_V_OK) {
+ id = OCSP_cert_to_id(EVP_sha1(), cert, issuer);
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ X509_free(cert);
+
+ if(!id) {
+ failf(data, "Error computing OCSP ID");
+ result = CURLE_SSL_INVALIDCERTSTATUS;
+ goto end;
+ }
+
+ /* Find the single OCSP response corresponding to the certificate ID */
+ ret = OCSP_resp_find_status(br, id, &cert_status, &crl_reason, &rev,
+ &thisupd, &nextupd);
+ OCSP_CERTID_free(id);
+ if(ret != 1) {
+ failf(data, "Could not find certificate ID in OCSP response");
+ result = CURLE_SSL_INVALIDCERTSTATUS;
+ goto end;
+ }
+
+ /* Validate the corresponding single OCSP response */
+ if(!OCSP_check_validity(thisupd, nextupd, 300L, -1L)) {
+ failf(data, "OCSP response has expired");
+ result = CURLE_SSL_INVALIDCERTSTATUS;
+ goto end;
+ }
+
+ infof(data, "SSL certificate status: %s (%d)",
+ OCSP_cert_status_str(cert_status), cert_status);
+
+ switch(cert_status) {
+ case V_OCSP_CERTSTATUS_GOOD:
+ break;
+
+ case V_OCSP_CERTSTATUS_REVOKED:
+ result = CURLE_SSL_INVALIDCERTSTATUS;
+ failf(data, "SSL certificate revocation reason: %s (%d)",
+ OCSP_crl_reason_str(crl_reason), crl_reason);
+ goto end;
+
+ case V_OCSP_CERTSTATUS_UNKNOWN:
+ default:
+ result = CURLE_SSL_INVALIDCERTSTATUS;
+ goto end;
+ }
+
+end:
+ if(br)
+ OCSP_BASICRESP_free(br);
+ OCSP_RESPONSE_free(rsp);
+
+ return result;
+}
+#endif
+
+#endif /* USE_OPENSSL */
+
+/* The SSL_CTRL_SET_MSG_CALLBACK doesn't exist in ancient OpenSSL versions
+ and thus this cannot be done there. */
+#ifdef SSL_CTRL_SET_MSG_CALLBACK
+
+static const char *ssl_msg_type(int ssl_ver, int msg)
+{
+#ifdef SSL2_VERSION_MAJOR
+ if(ssl_ver == SSL2_VERSION_MAJOR) {
+ switch(msg) {
+ case SSL2_MT_ERROR:
+ return "Error";
+ case SSL2_MT_CLIENT_HELLO:
+ return "Client hello";
+ case SSL2_MT_CLIENT_MASTER_KEY:
+ return "Client key";
+ case SSL2_MT_CLIENT_FINISHED:
+ return "Client finished";
+ case SSL2_MT_SERVER_HELLO:
+ return "Server hello";
+ case SSL2_MT_SERVER_VERIFY:
+ return "Server verify";
+ case SSL2_MT_SERVER_FINISHED:
+ return "Server finished";
+ case SSL2_MT_REQUEST_CERTIFICATE:
+ return "Request CERT";
+ case SSL2_MT_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE:
+ return "Client CERT";
+ }
+ }
+ else
+#endif
+ if(ssl_ver == SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR) {
+ switch(msg) {
+ case SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST:
+ return "Hello request";
+ case SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO:
+ return "Client hello";
+ case SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO:
+ return "Server hello";
+#ifdef SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET
+ case SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET:
+ return "Newsession Ticket";
+#endif
+ case SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE:
+ return "Certificate";
+ case SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE:
+ return "Server key exchange";
+ case SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE:
+ return "Client key exchange";
+ case SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST:
+ return "Request CERT";
+ case SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE:
+ return "Server finished";
+ case SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY:
+ return "CERT verify";
+ case SSL3_MT_FINISHED:
+ return "Finished";
+#ifdef SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS
+ case SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS:
+ return "Certificate Status";
+#endif
+#ifdef SSL3_MT_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS
+ case SSL3_MT_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS:
+ return "Encrypted Extensions";
+#endif
+#ifdef SSL3_MT_SUPPLEMENTAL_DATA
+ case SSL3_MT_SUPPLEMENTAL_DATA:
+ return "Supplemental data";
+#endif
+#ifdef SSL3_MT_END_OF_EARLY_DATA
+ case SSL3_MT_END_OF_EARLY_DATA:
+ return "End of early data";
+#endif
+#ifdef SSL3_MT_KEY_UPDATE
+ case SSL3_MT_KEY_UPDATE:
+ return "Key update";
+#endif
+#ifdef SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO
+ case SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO:
+ return "Next protocol";
+#endif
+#ifdef SSL3_MT_MESSAGE_HASH
+ case SSL3_MT_MESSAGE_HASH:
+ return "Message hash";
+#endif
+ }
+ }
+ return "Unknown";
+}
+
+static const char *tls_rt_type(int type)
+{
+ switch(type) {
+#ifdef SSL3_RT_HEADER
+ case SSL3_RT_HEADER:
+ return "TLS header";
+#endif
+ case SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC:
+ return "TLS change cipher";
+ case SSL3_RT_ALERT:
+ return "TLS alert";
+ case SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE:
+ return "TLS handshake";
+ case SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA:
+ return "TLS app data";
+ default:
+ return "TLS Unknown";
+ }
+}
+
+/*
+ * Our callback from the SSL/TLS layers.
+ */
+static void ossl_trace(int direction, int ssl_ver, int content_type,
+ const void *buf, size_t len, SSL *ssl,
+ void *userp)
+{
+ char unknown[32];
+ const char *verstr = NULL;
+ struct connectdata *conn = userp;
+ int cf_idx = ossl_get_ssl_cf_index();
+ struct ssl_connect_data *connssl;
+ struct Curl_easy *data = NULL;
+ struct Curl_cfilter *cf;
+
+ DEBUGASSERT(cf_idx >= 0);
+ cf = (struct Curl_cfilter*) SSL_get_ex_data(ssl, cf_idx);
+ DEBUGASSERT(cf);
+ connssl = cf->ctx;
+ DEBUGASSERT(connssl);
+ DEBUGASSERT(connssl->backend);
+ data = connssl->backend->logger;
+
+ if(!conn || !data || !data->set.fdebug ||
+ (direction != 0 && direction != 1))
+ return;
+
+ switch(ssl_ver) {
+#ifdef SSL2_VERSION /* removed in recent versions */
+ case SSL2_VERSION:
+ verstr = "SSLv2";
+ break;
+#endif
+#ifdef SSL3_VERSION
+ case SSL3_VERSION:
+ verstr = "SSLv3";
+ break;
+#endif
+ case TLS1_VERSION:
+ verstr = "TLSv1.0";
+ break;
+#ifdef TLS1_1_VERSION
+ case TLS1_1_VERSION:
+ verstr = "TLSv1.1";
+ break;
+#endif
+#ifdef TLS1_2_VERSION
+ case TLS1_2_VERSION:
+ verstr = "TLSv1.2";
+ break;
+#endif
+#ifdef TLS1_3_VERSION
+ case TLS1_3_VERSION:
+ verstr = "TLSv1.3";
+ break;
+#endif
+ case 0:
+ break;
+ default:
+ msnprintf(unknown, sizeof(unknown), "(%x)", ssl_ver);
+ verstr = unknown;
+ break;
+ }
+
+ /* Log progress for interesting records only (like Handshake or Alert), skip
+ * all raw record headers (content_type == SSL3_RT_HEADER or ssl_ver == 0).
+ * For TLS 1.3, skip notification of the decrypted inner Content-Type.
+ */
+ if(ssl_ver
+#ifdef SSL3_RT_INNER_CONTENT_TYPE
+ && content_type != SSL3_RT_INNER_CONTENT_TYPE
+#endif
+ ) {
+ const char *msg_name, *tls_rt_name;
+ char ssl_buf[1024];
+ int msg_type, txt_len;
+
+ /* the info given when the version is zero is not that useful for us */
+
+ ssl_ver >>= 8; /* check the upper 8 bits only below */
+
+ /* SSLv2 doesn't seem to have TLS record-type headers, so OpenSSL
+ * always pass-up content-type as 0. But the interesting message-type
+ * is at 'buf[0]'.
+ */
+ if(ssl_ver == SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR && content_type)
+ tls_rt_name = tls_rt_type(content_type);
+ else
+ tls_rt_name = "";
+
+ if(content_type == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
+ msg_type = *(char *)buf;
+ msg_name = "Change cipher spec";
+ }
+ else if(content_type == SSL3_RT_ALERT) {
+ msg_type = (((char *)buf)[0] << 8) + ((char *)buf)[1];
+ msg_name = SSL_alert_desc_string_long(msg_type);
+ }
+ else {
+ msg_type = *(char *)buf;
+ msg_name = ssl_msg_type(ssl_ver, msg_type);
+ }
+
+ txt_len = msnprintf(ssl_buf, sizeof(ssl_buf),
+ CFMSG(cf, "%s (%s), %s, %s (%d):\n"),
+ verstr, direction?"OUT":"IN",
+ tls_rt_name, msg_name, msg_type);
+ if(0 <= txt_len && (unsigned)txt_len < sizeof(ssl_buf)) {
+ Curl_debug(data, CURLINFO_TEXT, ssl_buf, (size_t)txt_len);
+ }
+ }
+
+ Curl_debug(data, (direction == 1) ? CURLINFO_SSL_DATA_OUT :
+ CURLINFO_SSL_DATA_IN, (char *)buf, len);
+ (void) ssl;
+}
+#endif
+
+#ifdef USE_OPENSSL
+/* ====================================================== */
+
+#ifdef SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_HOSTNAME
+# define use_sni(x) sni = (x)
+#else
+# define use_sni(x) Curl_nop_stmt
+#endif
+
+/* Check for OpenSSL 1.0.2 which has ALPN support. */
+#undef HAS_ALPN
+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10002000L \
+ && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT)
+# define HAS_ALPN 1
+#endif
+
+#if (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10100000L) /* 1.1.0 */
+static CURLcode
+set_ssl_version_min_max(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, SSL_CTX *ctx)
+{
+ struct ssl_primary_config *conn_config = Curl_ssl_cf_get_primary_config(cf);
+ /* first, TLS min version... */
+ long curl_ssl_version_min = conn_config->version;
+ long curl_ssl_version_max;
+
+ /* convert curl min SSL version option to OpenSSL constant */
+#if defined(OPENSSL_IS_BORINGSSL) || defined(LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER)
+ uint16_t ossl_ssl_version_min = 0;
+ uint16_t ossl_ssl_version_max = 0;
+#else
+ long ossl_ssl_version_min = 0;
+ long ossl_ssl_version_max = 0;
+#endif
+ switch(curl_ssl_version_min) {
+ case CURL_SSLVERSION_TLSv1: /* TLS 1.x */
+ case CURL_SSLVERSION_TLSv1_0:
+ ossl_ssl_version_min = TLS1_VERSION;
+ break;
+ case CURL_SSLVERSION_TLSv1_1:
+ ossl_ssl_version_min = TLS1_1_VERSION;
+ break;
+ case CURL_SSLVERSION_TLSv1_2:
+ ossl_ssl_version_min = TLS1_2_VERSION;
+ break;
+ case CURL_SSLVERSION_TLSv1_3:
+#ifdef TLS1_3_VERSION
+ ossl_ssl_version_min = TLS1_3_VERSION;
+ break;
+#else
+ return CURLE_NOT_BUILT_IN;
+#endif
+ }
+
+ /* CURL_SSLVERSION_DEFAULT means that no option was selected.
+ We don't want to pass 0 to SSL_CTX_set_min_proto_version as
+ it would enable all versions down to the lowest supported by
+ the library.
+ So we skip this, and stay with the library default
+ */
+ if(curl_ssl_version_min != CURL_SSLVERSION_DEFAULT) {
+ if(!SSL_CTX_set_min_proto_version(ctx, ossl_ssl_version_min)) {
+ return CURLE_SSL_CONNECT_ERROR;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* ... then, TLS max version */
+ curl_ssl_version_max = conn_config->version_max;
+
+ /* convert curl max SSL version option to OpenSSL constant */
+ switch(curl_ssl_version_max) {
+ case CURL_SSLVERSION_MAX_TLSv1_0:
+ ossl_ssl_version_max = TLS1_VERSION;
+ break;
+ case CURL_SSLVERSION_MAX_TLSv1_1:
+ ossl_ssl_version_max = TLS1_1_VERSION;
+ break;
+ case CURL_SSLVERSION_MAX_TLSv1_2:
+ ossl_ssl_version_max = TLS1_2_VERSION;
+ break;
+#ifdef TLS1_3_VERSION
+ case CURL_SSLVERSION_MAX_TLSv1_3:
+ ossl_ssl_version_max = TLS1_3_VERSION;
+ break;
+#endif
+ case CURL_SSLVERSION_MAX_NONE: /* none selected */
+ case CURL_SSLVERSION_MAX_DEFAULT: /* max selected */
+ default:
+ /* SSL_CTX_set_max_proto_version states that:
+ setting the maximum to 0 will enable
+ protocol versions up to the highest version
+ supported by the library */
+ ossl_ssl_version_max = 0;
+ break;
+ }
+
+ if(!SSL_CTX_set_max_proto_version(ctx, ossl_ssl_version_max)) {
+ return CURLE_SSL_CONNECT_ERROR;
+ }
+
+ return CURLE_OK;
+}
+#endif
+
+#ifdef OPENSSL_IS_BORINGSSL
+typedef uint32_t ctx_option_t;
+#elif OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x30000000L
+typedef uint64_t ctx_option_t;
+#else
+typedef long ctx_option_t;
+#endif
+
+#if (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10100000L) /* 1.1.0 */
+static CURLcode
+set_ssl_version_min_max_legacy(ctx_option_t *ctx_options,
+ struct Curl_cfilter *cf,
+ struct Curl_easy *data)
+{
+ struct ssl_primary_config *conn_config = Curl_ssl_cf_get_primary_config(cf);
+ long ssl_version = conn_config->version;
+ long ssl_version_max = conn_config->version_max;
+
+ (void) data; /* In case it's unused. */
+
+ switch(ssl_version) {
+ case CURL_SSLVERSION_TLSv1_3:
+#ifdef TLS1_3_VERSION
+ {
+ struct ssl_connect_data *connssl = cf->ctx;
+ DEBUGASSERT(connssl->backend);
+ SSL_CTX_set_max_proto_version(connssl->backend->ctx, TLS1_3_VERSION);
+ *ctx_options |= SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_2;
+ }
+#else
+ (void)ctx_options;
+ failf(data, OSSL_PACKAGE " was built without TLS 1.3 support");
+ return CURLE_NOT_BUILT_IN;
+#endif
+ /* FALLTHROUGH */
+ case CURL_SSLVERSION_TLSv1_2:
+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x1000100FL
+ *ctx_options |= SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1;
+#else
+ failf(data, OSSL_PACKAGE " was built without TLS 1.2 support");
+ return CURLE_NOT_BUILT_IN;
+#endif
+ /* FALLTHROUGH */
+ case CURL_SSLVERSION_TLSv1_1:
+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x1000100FL
+ *ctx_options |= SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1;
+#else
+ failf(data, OSSL_PACKAGE " was built without TLS 1.1 support");
+ return CURLE_NOT_BUILT_IN;
+#endif
+ /* FALLTHROUGH */
+ case CURL_SSLVERSION_TLSv1_0:
+ case CURL_SSLVERSION_TLSv1:
+ break;
+ }
+
+ switch(ssl_version_max) {
+ case CURL_SSLVERSION_MAX_TLSv1_0:
+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x1000100FL
+ *ctx_options |= SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1;
+#endif
+ /* FALLTHROUGH */
+ case CURL_SSLVERSION_MAX_TLSv1_1:
+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x1000100FL
+ *ctx_options |= SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_2;
+#endif
+ /* FALLTHROUGH */
+ case CURL_SSLVERSION_MAX_TLSv1_2:
+#ifdef TLS1_3_VERSION
+ *ctx_options |= SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_3;
+#endif
+ break;
+ case CURL_SSLVERSION_MAX_TLSv1_3:
+#ifdef TLS1_3_VERSION
+ break;
+#else
+ failf(data, OSSL_PACKAGE " was built without TLS 1.3 support");
+ return CURLE_NOT_BUILT_IN;
+#endif
+ }
+ return CURLE_OK;
+}
+#endif
+
+/* The "new session" callback must return zero if the session can be removed
+ * or non-zero if the session has been put into the session cache.
+ */
+static int ossl_new_session_cb(SSL *ssl, SSL_SESSION *ssl_sessionid)
+{
+ int res = 0;
+ struct Curl_easy *data;
+ struct Curl_cfilter *cf;
+ const struct ssl_config_data *config;
+ curl_socket_t *sockindex_ptr;
+ int data_idx = ossl_get_ssl_data_index();
+ int cf_idx = ossl_get_ssl_cf_index();
+ int sockindex_idx = ossl_get_ssl_sockindex_index();
+ int proxy_idx = ossl_get_proxy_index();
+ bool isproxy;
+
+ if(data_idx < 0 || cf_idx < 0 || sockindex_idx < 0 || proxy_idx < 0)
+ return 0;
+
+ cf = (struct Curl_cfilter*) SSL_get_ex_data(ssl, cf_idx);
+ data = (struct Curl_easy *) SSL_get_ex_data(ssl, data_idx);
+ /* The sockindex has been stored as a pointer to an array element */
+ sockindex_ptr = (curl_socket_t*) SSL_get_ex_data(ssl, sockindex_idx);
+ if(!cf || !data || !sockindex_ptr)
+ return 0;
+
+ isproxy = Curl_ssl_cf_is_proxy(cf);
+
+ config = Curl_ssl_cf_get_config(cf, data);
+ if(config->primary.sessionid) {
+ bool incache;
+ bool added = FALSE;
+ void *old_ssl_sessionid = NULL;
+
+ Curl_ssl_sessionid_lock(data);
+ if(isproxy)
+ incache = FALSE;
+ else
+ incache = !(Curl_ssl_getsessionid(cf, data, &old_ssl_sessionid, NULL));
+ if(incache) {
+ if(old_ssl_sessionid != ssl_sessionid) {
+ infof(data, "old SSL session ID is stale, removing");
+ Curl_ssl_delsessionid(data, old_ssl_sessionid);
+ incache = FALSE;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if(!incache) {
+ if(!Curl_ssl_addsessionid(cf, data, ssl_sessionid,
+ 0 /* unknown size */, &added)) {
+ if(added) {
+ /* the session has been put into the session cache */
+ res = 1;
+ }
+ }
+ else
+ failf(data, "failed to store ssl session");
+ }
+ Curl_ssl_sessionid_unlock(data);
+ }
+
+ return res;
+}
+
+static CURLcode load_cacert_from_memory(X509_STORE *store,
+ const struct curl_blob *ca_info_blob)
+{
+ /* these need to be freed at the end */
+ BIO *cbio = NULL;
+ STACK_OF(X509_INFO) *inf = NULL;
+
+ /* everything else is just a reference */
+ int i, count = 0;
+ X509_INFO *itmp = NULL;
+
+ if(ca_info_blob->len > (size_t)INT_MAX)
+ return CURLE_SSL_CACERT_BADFILE;
+
+ cbio = BIO_new_mem_buf(ca_info_blob->data, (int)ca_info_blob->len);
+ if(!cbio)
+ return CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY;
+
+ inf = PEM_X509_INFO_read_bio(cbio, NULL, NULL, NULL);
+ if(!inf) {
+ BIO_free(cbio);
+ return CURLE_SSL_CACERT_BADFILE;
+ }
+
+ /* add each entry from PEM file to x509_store */
+ for(i = 0; i < (int)sk_X509_INFO_num(inf); ++i) {
+ itmp = sk_X509_INFO_value(inf, i);
+ if(itmp->x509) {
+ if(X509_STORE_add_cert(store, itmp->x509)) {
+ ++count;
+ }
+ else {
+ /* set count to 0 to return an error */
+ count = 0;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ if(itmp->crl) {
+ if(X509_STORE_add_crl(store, itmp->crl)) {
+ ++count;
+ }
+ else {
+ /* set count to 0 to return an error */
+ count = 0;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ sk_X509_INFO_pop_free(inf, X509_INFO_free);
+ BIO_free(cbio);
+
+ /* if we didn't end up importing anything, treat that as an error */
+ return (count > 0 ? CURLE_OK : CURLE_SSL_CACERT_BADFILE);
+}
+
+static CURLcode populate_x509_store(struct Curl_cfilter *cf,
+ struct Curl_easy *data,
+ X509_STORE *store)
+{
+ struct ssl_primary_config *conn_config = Curl_ssl_cf_get_primary_config(cf);
+ struct ssl_config_data *ssl_config = Curl_ssl_cf_get_config(cf, data);
+ CURLcode result = CURLE_OK;
+ X509_LOOKUP *lookup = NULL;
+ const struct curl_blob *ca_info_blob = conn_config->ca_info_blob;
+ const char * const ssl_cafile =
+ /* CURLOPT_CAINFO_BLOB overrides CURLOPT_CAINFO */
+ (ca_info_blob ? NULL : conn_config->CAfile);
+ const char * const ssl_capath = conn_config->CApath;
+ const char * const ssl_crlfile = ssl_config->primary.CRLfile;
+ const bool verifypeer = conn_config->verifypeer;
+ bool imported_native_ca = false;
+
+ if(!store)
+ return CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY;
+
+#if defined(USE_WIN32_CRYPTO)
+ /* Import certificates from the Windows root certificate store if requested.
+ https://stackoverflow.com/questions/9507184/
+ https://github.com/d3x0r/SACK/blob/master/src/netlib/ssl_layer.c#L1037
+ https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc5280 */
+ if((conn_config->verifypeer || conn_config->verifyhost) &&
+ (ssl_config->native_ca_store)) {
+ HCERTSTORE hStore = CertOpenSystemStore(0, TEXT("ROOT"));
+
+ if(hStore) {
+ PCCERT_CONTEXT pContext = NULL;
+ /* The array of enhanced key usage OIDs will vary per certificate and is
+ declared outside of the loop so that rather than malloc/free each
+ iteration we can grow it with realloc, when necessary. */
+ CERT_ENHKEY_USAGE *enhkey_usage = NULL;
+ DWORD enhkey_usage_size = 0;
+
+ /* This loop makes a best effort to import all valid certificates from
+ the MS root store. If a certificate cannot be imported it is skipped.
+ 'result' is used to store only hard-fail conditions (such as out of
+ memory) that cause an early break. */
+ result = CURLE_OK;
+ for(;;) {
+ X509 *x509;
+ FILETIME now;
+ BYTE key_usage[2];
+ DWORD req_size;
+ const unsigned char *encoded_cert;
+#if defined(DEBUGBUILD) && !defined(CURL_DISABLE_VERBOSE_STRINGS)
+ char cert_name[256];
+#endif
+
+ pContext = CertEnumCertificatesInStore(hStore, pContext);
+ if(!pContext)
+ break;
+
+#if defined(DEBUGBUILD) && !defined(CURL_DISABLE_VERBOSE_STRINGS)
+ if(!CertGetNameStringA(pContext, CERT_NAME_SIMPLE_DISPLAY_TYPE, 0,
+ NULL, cert_name, sizeof(cert_name))) {
+ strcpy(cert_name, "Unknown");
+ }
+ infof(data, "SSL: Checking cert \"%s\"", cert_name);
+#endif
+
+ encoded_cert = (const unsigned char *)pContext->pbCertEncoded;
+ if(!encoded_cert)
+ continue;
+
+ GetSystemTimeAsFileTime(&now);
+ if(CompareFileTime(&pContext->pCertInfo->NotBefore, &now) > 0 ||
+ CompareFileTime(&now, &pContext->pCertInfo->NotAfter) > 0)
+ continue;
+
+ /* If key usage exists check for signing attribute */
+ if(CertGetIntendedKeyUsage(pContext->dwCertEncodingType,
+ pContext->pCertInfo,
+ key_usage, sizeof(key_usage))) {
+ if(!(key_usage[0] & CERT_KEY_CERT_SIGN_KEY_USAGE))
+ continue;
+ }
+ else if(GetLastError())
+ continue;
+
+ /* If enhanced key usage exists check for server auth attribute.
+ *
+ * Note "In a Microsoft environment, a certificate might also have EKU
+ * extended properties that specify valid uses for the certificate."
+ * The call below checks both, and behavior varies depending on what is
+ * found. For more details see CertGetEnhancedKeyUsage doc.
+ */
+ if(CertGetEnhancedKeyUsage(pContext, 0, NULL, &req_size)) {
+ if(req_size && req_size > enhkey_usage_size) {
+ void *tmp = realloc(enhkey_usage, req_size);
+
+ if(!tmp) {
+ failf(data, "SSL: Out of memory allocating for OID list");
+ result = CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY;
+ break;
+ }
+
+ enhkey_usage = (CERT_ENHKEY_USAGE *)tmp;
+ enhkey_usage_size = req_size;
+ }
+
+ if(CertGetEnhancedKeyUsage(pContext, 0, enhkey_usage, &req_size)) {
+ if(!enhkey_usage->cUsageIdentifier) {
+ /* "If GetLastError returns CRYPT_E_NOT_FOUND, the certificate is
+ good for all uses. If it returns zero, the certificate has no
+ valid uses." */
+ if((HRESULT)GetLastError() != CRYPT_E_NOT_FOUND)
+ continue;
+ }
+ else {
+ DWORD i;
+ bool found = false;
+
+ for(i = 0; i < enhkey_usage->cUsageIdentifier; ++i) {
+ if(!strcmp("1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.1" /* OID server auth */,
+ enhkey_usage->rgpszUsageIdentifier[i])) {
+ found = true;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if(!found)
+ continue;
+ }
+ }
+ else
+ continue;
+ }
+ else
+ continue;
+
+ x509 = d2i_X509(NULL, &encoded_cert, pContext->cbCertEncoded);
+ if(!x509)
+ continue;
+
+ /* Try to import the certificate. This may fail for legitimate reasons
+ such as duplicate certificate, which is allowed by MS but not
+ OpenSSL. */
+ if(X509_STORE_add_cert(store, x509) == 1) {
+#if defined(DEBUGBUILD) && !defined(CURL_DISABLE_VERBOSE_STRINGS)
+ infof(data, "SSL: Imported cert \"%s\"", cert_name);
+#endif
+ imported_native_ca = true;
+ }
+ X509_free(x509);
+ }
+
+ free(enhkey_usage);
+ CertFreeCertificateContext(pContext);
+ CertCloseStore(hStore, 0);
+
+ if(result)
+ return result;
+ }
+ if(imported_native_ca)
+ infof(data, "successfully imported Windows CA store");
+ else
+ infof(data, "error importing Windows CA store, continuing anyway");
+ }
+#endif
+
+ if(ca_info_blob) {
+ result = load_cacert_from_memory(store, ca_info_blob);
+ if(result) {
+ if(result == CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY ||
+ (verifypeer && !imported_native_ca)) {
+ failf(data, "error importing CA certificate blob");
+ return result;
+ }
+ /* Only warn if no certificate verification is required. */
+ infof(data, "error importing CA certificate blob, continuing anyway");
+ }
+ }
+
+ if(verifypeer && !imported_native_ca && (ssl_cafile || ssl_capath)) {
+#if defined(OPENSSL_VERSION_MAJOR) && (OPENSSL_VERSION_MAJOR >= 3)
+ /* OpenSSL 3.0.0 has deprecated SSL_CTX_load_verify_locations */
+ if(ssl_cafile &&
+ !X509_STORE_load_file(store, ssl_cafile)) {
+ /* Fail if we insist on successfully verifying the server. */
+ failf(data, "error setting certificate file: %s", ssl_cafile);
+ return CURLE_SSL_CACERT_BADFILE;
+ }
+ if(ssl_capath &&
+ !X509_STORE_load_path(store, ssl_capath)) {
+ /* Fail if we insist on successfully verifying the server. */
+ failf(data, "error setting certificate path: %s", ssl_capath);
+ return CURLE_SSL_CACERT_BADFILE;
+ }
+#else
+ /* tell OpenSSL where to find CA certificates that are used to verify the
+ server's certificate. */
+ if(!X509_STORE_load_locations(store, ssl_cafile, ssl_capath)) {
+ /* Fail if we insist on successfully verifying the server. */
+ failf(data, "error setting certificate verify locations:"
+ " CAfile: %s CApath: %s",
+ ssl_cafile ? ssl_cafile : "none",
+ ssl_capath ? ssl_capath : "none");
+ return CURLE_SSL_CACERT_BADFILE;
+ }
+#endif
+ infof(data, " CAfile: %s", ssl_cafile ? ssl_cafile : "none");
+ infof(data, " CApath: %s", ssl_capath ? ssl_capath : "none");
+ }
+
+#ifdef CURL_CA_FALLBACK
+ if(verifypeer &&
+ !ca_info_blob && !ssl_cafile && !ssl_capath && !imported_native_ca) {
+ /* verifying the peer without any CA certificates won't
+ work so use openssl's built-in default as fallback */
+ X509_STORE_set_default_paths(store);
+ }
+#endif
+
+ if(ssl_crlfile) {
+ /* tell OpenSSL where to find CRL file that is used to check certificate
+ * revocation */
+ lookup = X509_STORE_add_lookup(store, X509_LOOKUP_file());
+ if(!lookup ||
+ (!X509_load_crl_file(lookup, ssl_crlfile, X509_FILETYPE_PEM)) ) {
+ failf(data, "error loading CRL file: %s", ssl_crlfile);
+ return CURLE_SSL_CRL_BADFILE;
+ }
+ /* Everything is fine. */
+ infof(data, "successfully loaded CRL file:");
+ X509_STORE_set_flags(store,
+ X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK|X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK_ALL);
+
+ infof(data, " CRLfile: %s", ssl_crlfile);
+ }
+
+ if(verifypeer) {
+ /* Try building a chain using issuers in the trusted store first to avoid
+ problems with server-sent legacy intermediates. Newer versions of
+ OpenSSL do alternate chain checking by default but we do not know how to
+ determine that in a reliable manner.
+ https://rt.openssl.org/Ticket/Display.html?id=3621&user=guest&pass=guest
+ */
+#if defined(X509_V_FLAG_TRUSTED_FIRST)
+ X509_STORE_set_flags(store, X509_V_FLAG_TRUSTED_FIRST);
+#endif
+#ifdef X509_V_FLAG_PARTIAL_CHAIN
+ if(!ssl_config->no_partialchain && !ssl_crlfile) {
+ /* Have intermediate certificates in the trust store be treated as
+ trust-anchors, in the same way as self-signed root CA certificates
+ are. This allows users to verify servers using the intermediate cert
+ only, instead of needing the whole chain.
+
+ Due to OpenSSL bug https://github.com/openssl/openssl/issues/5081 we
+ cannot do partial chains with a CRL check.
+ */
+ X509_STORE_set_flags(store, X509_V_FLAG_PARTIAL_CHAIN);
+ }
+#endif
+ }
+
+ return result;
+}
+
+#if defined(HAVE_SSL_X509_STORE_SHARE)
+static bool cached_x509_store_expired(const struct Curl_easy *data,
+ const struct multi_ssl_backend_data *mb)
+{
+ const struct ssl_general_config *cfg = &data->set.general_ssl;
+ struct curltime now = Curl_now();
+ timediff_t elapsed_ms = Curl_timediff(now, mb->time);
+ timediff_t timeout_ms = cfg->ca_cache_timeout * (timediff_t)1000;
+
+ if(timeout_ms < 0)
+ return false;
+
+ return elapsed_ms >= timeout_ms;
+}
+
+static bool cached_x509_store_different(
+ struct Curl_cfilter *cf,
+ const struct multi_ssl_backend_data *mb)
+{
+ struct ssl_primary_config *conn_config = Curl_ssl_cf_get_primary_config(cf);
+ if(!mb->CAfile || !conn_config->CAfile)
+ return mb->CAfile != conn_config->CAfile;
+
+ return strcmp(mb->CAfile, conn_config->CAfile);
+}
+
+static X509_STORE *get_cached_x509_store(struct Curl_cfilter *cf,
+ const struct Curl_easy *data)
+{
+ struct Curl_multi *multi = data->multi_easy ? data->multi_easy : data->multi;
+ X509_STORE *store = NULL;
+
+ if(multi &&
+ multi->ssl_backend_data &&
+ multi->ssl_backend_data->store &&
+ !cached_x509_store_expired(data, multi->ssl_backend_data) &&
+ !cached_x509_store_different(cf, multi->ssl_backend_data)) {
+ store = multi->ssl_backend_data->store;
+ }
+
+ return store;
+}
+
+static void set_cached_x509_store(struct Curl_cfilter *cf,
+ const struct Curl_easy *data,
+ X509_STORE *store)
+{
+ struct ssl_primary_config *conn_config = Curl_ssl_cf_get_primary_config(cf);
+ struct Curl_multi *multi = data->multi_easy ? data->multi_easy : data->multi;
+ struct multi_ssl_backend_data *mbackend;
+
+ if(!multi)
+ return;
+
+ if(!multi->ssl_backend_data) {
+ multi->ssl_backend_data = calloc(1, sizeof(struct multi_ssl_backend_data));
+ if(!multi->ssl_backend_data)
+ return;
+ }
+
+ mbackend = multi->ssl_backend_data;
+
+ if(X509_STORE_up_ref(store)) {
+ char *CAfile = NULL;
+
+ if(conn_config->CAfile) {
+ CAfile = strdup(conn_config->CAfile);
+ if(!CAfile) {
+ X509_STORE_free(store);
+ return;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if(mbackend->store) {
+ X509_STORE_free(mbackend->store);
+ free(mbackend->CAfile);
+ }
+
+ mbackend->time = Curl_now();
+ mbackend->store = store;
+ mbackend->CAfile = CAfile;
+ }
+}
+
+static CURLcode set_up_x509_store(struct Curl_cfilter *cf,
+ struct Curl_easy *data,
+ struct ssl_backend_data *backend)
+{
+ struct ssl_primary_config *conn_config = Curl_ssl_cf_get_primary_config(cf);
+ struct ssl_config_data *ssl_config = Curl_ssl_cf_get_config(cf, data);
+ CURLcode result = CURLE_OK;
+ X509_STORE *cached_store;
+ bool cache_criteria_met;
+
+ /* Consider the X509 store cacheable if it comes exclusively from a CAfile,
+ or no source is provided and we are falling back to openssl's built-in
+ default. */
+ cache_criteria_met = (data->set.general_ssl.ca_cache_timeout != 0) &&
+ conn_config->verifypeer &&
+ !conn_config->CApath &&
+ !conn_config->ca_info_blob &&
+ !ssl_config->primary.CRLfile &&
+ !ssl_config->native_ca_store;
+
+ cached_store = get_cached_x509_store(cf, data);
+ if(cached_store && cache_criteria_met && X509_STORE_up_ref(cached_store)) {
+ SSL_CTX_set_cert_store(backend->ctx, cached_store);
+ }
+ else {
+ X509_STORE *store = SSL_CTX_get_cert_store(backend->ctx);
+
+ result = populate_x509_store(cf, data, store);
+ if(result == CURLE_OK && cache_criteria_met) {
+ set_cached_x509_store(cf, data, store);
+ }
+ }
+
+ return result;
+}
+#else /* HAVE_SSL_X509_STORE_SHARE */
+static CURLcode set_up_x509_store(struct Curl_cfilter *cf,
+ struct Curl_easy *data,
+ struct ssl_backend_data *backend)
+{
+ X509_STORE *store = SSL_CTX_get_cert_store(backend->ctx);
+
+ return populate_x509_store(cf, data, store);
+}
+#endif /* HAVE_SSL_X509_STORE_SHARE */
+
+static CURLcode ossl_connect_step1(struct Curl_cfilter *cf,
+ struct Curl_easy *data)
+{
+ CURLcode result = CURLE_OK;
+ char *ciphers;
+ SSL_METHOD_QUAL SSL_METHOD *req_method = NULL;
+ struct ssl_connect_data *connssl = cf->ctx;
+ ctx_option_t ctx_options = 0;
+ void *ssl_sessionid = NULL;
+ struct ssl_primary_config *conn_config = Curl_ssl_cf_get_primary_config(cf);
+ struct ssl_config_data *ssl_config = Curl_ssl_cf_get_config(cf, data);
+ BIO *bio;
+
+#ifdef SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_HOSTNAME
+ bool sni;
+ const char *hostname = connssl->hostname;
+
+#ifdef ENABLE_IPV6
+ struct in6_addr addr;
+#else
+ struct in_addr addr;
+#endif
+#endif
+ const long int ssl_version = conn_config->version;
+#ifdef USE_OPENSSL_SRP
+ const enum CURL_TLSAUTH ssl_authtype = ssl_config->primary.authtype;
+#endif
+ char * const ssl_cert = ssl_config->primary.clientcert;
+ const struct curl_blob *ssl_cert_blob = ssl_config->primary.cert_blob;
+ const char * const ssl_cert_type = ssl_config->cert_type;
+ const bool verifypeer = conn_config->verifypeer;
+ char error_buffer[256];
+ struct ssl_backend_data *backend = connssl->backend;
+
+ DEBUGASSERT(ssl_connect_1 == connssl->connecting_state);
+ DEBUGASSERT(backend);
+
+ /* Make funny stuff to get random input */
+ result = ossl_seed(data);
+ if(result)
+ return result;
+
+ ssl_config->certverifyresult = !X509_V_OK;
+
+ /* check to see if we've been told to use an explicit SSL/TLS version */
+
+ switch(ssl_version) {
+ case CURL_SSLVERSION_DEFAULT:
+ case CURL_SSLVERSION_TLSv1:
+ case CURL_SSLVERSION_TLSv1_0:
+ case CURL_SSLVERSION_TLSv1_1:
+ case CURL_SSLVERSION_TLSv1_2:
+ case CURL_SSLVERSION_TLSv1_3:
+ /* it will be handled later with the context options */
+#if (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10100000L)
+ req_method = TLS_client_method();
+#else
+ req_method = SSLv23_client_method();
+#endif
+ use_sni(TRUE);
+ break;
+ case CURL_SSLVERSION_SSLv2:
+ failf(data, "No SSLv2 support");
+ return CURLE_NOT_BUILT_IN;
+ case CURL_SSLVERSION_SSLv3:
+ failf(data, "No SSLv3 support");
+ return CURLE_NOT_BUILT_IN;
+ default:
+ failf(data, "Unrecognized parameter passed via CURLOPT_SSLVERSION");
+ return CURLE_SSL_CONNECT_ERROR;
+ }
+
+ if(backend->ctx) {
+ /* This happens when an error was encountered before in this
+ * step and we are called to do it again. Get rid of any leftover
+ * from the previous call. */
+ ossl_close(cf, data);
+ }
+ backend->ctx = SSL_CTX_new(req_method);
+
+ if(!backend->ctx) {
+ failf(data, "SSL: couldn't create a context: %s",
+ ossl_strerror(ERR_peek_error(), error_buffer, sizeof(error_buffer)));
+ return CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY;
+ }
+
+#ifdef SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS
+ SSL_CTX_set_mode(backend->ctx, SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS);
+#endif
+
+#ifdef SSL_CTRL_SET_MSG_CALLBACK
+ if(data->set.fdebug && data->set.verbose) {
+ /* the SSL trace callback is only used for verbose logging */
+ SSL_CTX_set_msg_callback(backend->ctx, ossl_trace);
+ SSL_CTX_set_msg_callback_arg(backend->ctx, cf->conn);
+ set_logger(connssl, data);
+ }
+#endif
+
+ /* OpenSSL contains code to work around lots of bugs and flaws in various
+ SSL-implementations. SSL_CTX_set_options() is used to enabled those
+ work-arounds. The man page for this option states that SSL_OP_ALL enables
+ all the work-arounds and that "It is usually safe to use SSL_OP_ALL to
+ enable the bug workaround options if compatibility with somewhat broken
+ implementations is desired."
+
+ The "-no_ticket" option was introduced in OpenSSL 0.9.8j. It's a flag to
+ disable "rfc4507bis session ticket support". rfc4507bis was later turned
+ into the proper RFC5077: https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc5077
+
+ The enabled extension concerns the session management. I wonder how often
+ libcurl stops a connection and then resumes a TLS session. Also, sending
+ the session data is some overhead. I suggest that you just use your
+ proposed patch (which explicitly disables TICKET).
+
+ If someone writes an application with libcurl and OpenSSL who wants to
+ enable the feature, one can do this in the SSL callback.
+
+ SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_REUSE_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG option enabling allowed proper
+ interoperability with web server Netscape Enterprise Server 2.0.1 which
+ was released back in 1996.
+
+ Due to CVE-2010-4180, option SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_REUSE_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG has
+ become ineffective as of OpenSSL 0.9.8q and 1.0.0c. In order to mitigate
+ CVE-2010-4180 when using previous OpenSSL versions we no longer enable
+ this option regardless of OpenSSL version and SSL_OP_ALL definition.
+
+ OpenSSL added a work-around for a SSL 3.0/TLS 1.0 CBC vulnerability
+ (https://www.openssl.org/~bodo/tls-cbc.txt). In 0.9.6e they added a bit to
+ SSL_OP_ALL that _disables_ that work-around despite the fact that
+ SSL_OP_ALL is documented to do "rather harmless" workarounds. In order to
+ keep the secure work-around, the SSL_OP_DONT_INSERT_EMPTY_FRAGMENTS bit
+ must not be set.
+ */
+
+ ctx_options = SSL_OP_ALL;
+
+#ifdef SSL_OP_NO_TICKET
+ ctx_options |= SSL_OP_NO_TICKET;
+#endif
+
+#ifdef SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION
+ ctx_options |= SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION;
+#endif
+
+#ifdef SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_REUSE_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG
+ /* mitigate CVE-2010-4180 */
+ ctx_options &= ~SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_REUSE_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG;
+#endif
+
+#ifdef SSL_OP_DONT_INSERT_EMPTY_FRAGMENTS
+ /* unless the user explicitly asks to allow the protocol vulnerability we
+ use the work-around */
+ if(!ssl_config->enable_beast)
+ ctx_options &= ~SSL_OP_DONT_INSERT_EMPTY_FRAGMENTS;
+#endif
+
+ switch(ssl_version) {
+ case CURL_SSLVERSION_SSLv2:
+ case CURL_SSLVERSION_SSLv3:
+ return CURLE_NOT_BUILT_IN;
+
+ /* "--tlsv<x.y>" options mean TLS >= version <x.y> */
+ case CURL_SSLVERSION_DEFAULT:
+ case CURL_SSLVERSION_TLSv1: /* TLS >= version 1.0 */
+ case CURL_SSLVERSION_TLSv1_0: /* TLS >= version 1.0 */
+ case CURL_SSLVERSION_TLSv1_1: /* TLS >= version 1.1 */
+ case CURL_SSLVERSION_TLSv1_2: /* TLS >= version 1.2 */
+ case CURL_SSLVERSION_TLSv1_3: /* TLS >= version 1.3 */
+ /* asking for any TLS version as the minimum, means no SSL versions
+ allowed */
+ ctx_options |= SSL_OP_NO_SSLv2;
+ ctx_options |= SSL_OP_NO_SSLv3;
+
+#if (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10100000L) /* 1.1.0 */
+ result = set_ssl_version_min_max(cf, backend->ctx);
+#else
+ result = set_ssl_version_min_max_legacy(&ctx_options, cf, data);
+#endif
+ if(result != CURLE_OK)
+ return result;
+ break;
+
+ default:
+ failf(data, "Unrecognized parameter passed via CURLOPT_SSLVERSION");
+ return CURLE_SSL_CONNECT_ERROR;
+ }
+
+ SSL_CTX_set_options(backend->ctx, ctx_options);
+
+#ifdef HAS_ALPN
+ if(cf->conn->bits.tls_enable_alpn) {
+ int cur = 0;
+ unsigned char protocols[128];
+
+#ifdef USE_HTTP2
+ if(data->state.httpwant >= CURL_HTTP_VERSION_2
+#ifndef CURL_DISABLE_PROXY
+ && (!Curl_ssl_cf_is_proxy(cf) || !cf->conn->bits.tunnel_proxy)
+#endif
+ ) {
+ protocols[cur++] = ALPN_H2_LENGTH;
+
+ memcpy(&protocols[cur], ALPN_H2, ALPN_H2_LENGTH);
+ cur += ALPN_H2_LENGTH;
+ infof(data, VTLS_INFOF_ALPN_OFFER_1STR, ALPN_H2);
+ }
+#endif
+
+ protocols[cur++] = ALPN_HTTP_1_1_LENGTH;
+ memcpy(&protocols[cur], ALPN_HTTP_1_1, ALPN_HTTP_1_1_LENGTH);
+ cur += ALPN_HTTP_1_1_LENGTH;
+ infof(data, VTLS_INFOF_ALPN_OFFER_1STR, ALPN_HTTP_1_1);
+
+ /* expects length prefixed preference ordered list of protocols in wire
+ * format
+ */
+ if(SSL_CTX_set_alpn_protos(backend->ctx, protocols, cur)) {
+ failf(data, "Error setting ALPN");
+ return CURLE_SSL_CONNECT_ERROR;
+ }
+ }
+#endif
+
+ if(ssl_cert || ssl_cert_blob || ssl_cert_type) {
+ if(!result &&
+ !cert_stuff(data, backend->ctx,
+ ssl_cert, ssl_cert_blob, ssl_cert_type,
+ ssl_config->key, ssl_config->key_blob,
+ ssl_config->key_type, ssl_config->key_passwd))
+ result = CURLE_SSL_CERTPROBLEM;
+ if(result)
+ /* failf() is already done in cert_stuff() */
+ return result;
+ }
+
+ ciphers = conn_config->cipher_list;
+ if(!ciphers)
+ ciphers = (char *)DEFAULT_CIPHER_SELECTION;
+ if(ciphers) {
+ if(!SSL_CTX_set_cipher_list(backend->ctx, ciphers)) {
+ failf(data, "failed setting cipher list: %s", ciphers);
+ return CURLE_SSL_CIPHER;
+ }
+ infof(data, "Cipher selection: %s", ciphers);
+ }
+
+#ifdef HAVE_SSL_CTX_SET_CIPHERSUITES
+ {
+ char *ciphers13 = conn_config->cipher_list13;
+ if(ciphers13) {
+ if(!SSL_CTX_set_ciphersuites(backend->ctx, ciphers13)) {
+ failf(data, "failed setting TLS 1.3 cipher suite: %s", ciphers13);
+ return CURLE_SSL_CIPHER;
+ }
+ infof(data, "TLS 1.3 cipher selection: %s", ciphers13);
+ }
+ }
+#endif
+
+#ifdef HAVE_SSL_CTX_SET_POST_HANDSHAKE_AUTH
+ /* OpenSSL 1.1.1 requires clients to opt-in for PHA */
+ SSL_CTX_set_post_handshake_auth(backend->ctx, 1);
+#endif
+
+#ifdef HAVE_SSL_CTX_SET_EC_CURVES
+ {
+ char *curves = conn_config->curves;
+ if(curves) {
+ if(!SSL_CTX_set1_curves_list(backend->ctx, curves)) {
+ failf(data, "failed setting curves list: '%s'", curves);
+ return CURLE_SSL_CIPHER;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+#endif
+
+#ifdef USE_OPENSSL_SRP
+ if((ssl_authtype == CURL_TLSAUTH_SRP) &&
+ Curl_auth_allowed_to_host(data)) {
+ char * const ssl_username = ssl_config->primary.username;
+ char * const ssl_password = ssl_config->primary.password;
+ infof(data, "Using TLS-SRP username: %s", ssl_username);
+
+ if(!SSL_CTX_set_srp_username(backend->ctx, ssl_username)) {
+ failf(data, "Unable to set SRP user name");
+ return CURLE_BAD_FUNCTION_ARGUMENT;
+ }
+ if(!SSL_CTX_set_srp_password(backend->ctx, ssl_password)) {
+ failf(data, "failed setting SRP password");
+ return CURLE_BAD_FUNCTION_ARGUMENT;
+ }
+ if(!conn_config->cipher_list) {
+ infof(data, "Setting cipher list SRP");
+
+ if(!SSL_CTX_set_cipher_list(backend->ctx, "SRP")) {
+ failf(data, "failed setting SRP cipher list");
+ return CURLE_SSL_CIPHER;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+#endif
+
+ result = set_up_x509_store(cf, data, backend);
+ if(result)
+ return result;
+
+ /* OpenSSL always tries to verify the peer, this only says whether it should
+ * fail to connect if the verification fails, or if it should continue
+ * anyway. In the latter case the result of the verification is checked with
+ * SSL_get_verify_result() below. */
+ SSL_CTX_set_verify(backend->ctx,
+ verifypeer ? SSL_VERIFY_PEER : SSL_VERIFY_NONE, NULL);
+
+ /* Enable logging of secrets to the file specified in env SSLKEYLOGFILE. */
+#ifdef HAVE_KEYLOG_CALLBACK
+ if(Curl_tls_keylog_enabled()) {
+ SSL_CTX_set_keylog_callback(backend->ctx, ossl_keylog_callback);
+ }
+#endif
+
+ /* Enable the session cache because it's a prerequisite for the "new session"
+ * callback. Use the "external storage" mode to prevent OpenSSL from creating
+ * an internal session cache.
+ */
+ SSL_CTX_set_session_cache_mode(backend->ctx,
+ SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT | SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_INTERNAL);
+ SSL_CTX_sess_set_new_cb(backend->ctx, ossl_new_session_cb);
+
+ /* give application a chance to interfere with SSL set up. */
+ if(data->set.ssl.fsslctx) {
+ Curl_set_in_callback(data, true);
+ result = (*data->set.ssl.fsslctx)(data, backend->ctx,
+ data->set.ssl.fsslctxp);
+ Curl_set_in_callback(data, false);
+ if(result) {
+ failf(data, "error signaled by ssl ctx callback");
+ return result;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* Let's make an SSL structure */
+ if(backend->handle)
+ SSL_free(backend->handle);
+ backend->handle = SSL_new(backend->ctx);
+ if(!backend->handle) {
+ failf(data, "SSL: couldn't create a context (handle)");
+ return CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY;
+ }
+
+#if (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x0090808fL) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) && \
+ !defined(OPENSSL_NO_OCSP)
+ if(conn_config->verifystatus)
+ SSL_set_tlsext_status_type(backend->handle, TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp);
+#endif
+
+#if defined(OPENSSL_IS_BORINGSSL) && defined(ALLOW_RENEG)
+ SSL_set_renegotiate_mode(backend->handle, ssl_renegotiate_freely);
+#endif
+
+ SSL_set_connect_state(backend->handle);
+
+ backend->server_cert = 0x0;
+#ifdef SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_HOSTNAME
+ if((0 == Curl_inet_pton(AF_INET, hostname, &addr)) &&
+#ifdef ENABLE_IPV6
+ (0 == Curl_inet_pton(AF_INET6, hostname, &addr)) &&
+#endif
+ sni) {
+ char *snihost = Curl_ssl_snihost(data, hostname, NULL);
+ if(!snihost || !SSL_set_tlsext_host_name(backend->handle, snihost)) {
+ failf(data, "Failed set SNI");
+ return CURLE_SSL_CONNECT_ERROR;
+ }
+ }
+#endif
+
+ if(!ossl_attach_data(cf, data)) {
+ /* Maybe the internal errors of SSL_get_ex_new_index or SSL_set_ex_data */
+ failf(data, "SSL: ossl_attach_data failed: %s",
+ ossl_strerror(ERR_get_error(), error_buffer,
+ sizeof(error_buffer)));
+ return CURLE_SSL_CONNECT_ERROR;
+ }
+
+ if(ssl_config->primary.sessionid) {
+ Curl_ssl_sessionid_lock(data);
+ if(!Curl_ssl_getsessionid(cf, data, &ssl_sessionid, NULL)) {
+ /* we got a session id, use it! */
+ if(!SSL_set_session(backend->handle, ssl_sessionid)) {
+ Curl_ssl_sessionid_unlock(data);
+ failf(data, "SSL: SSL_set_session failed: %s",
+ ossl_strerror(ERR_get_error(), error_buffer,
+ sizeof(error_buffer)));
+ return CURLE_SSL_CONNECT_ERROR;
+ }
+ /* Informational message */
+ infof(data, "SSL re-using session ID");
+ }
+ Curl_ssl_sessionid_unlock(data);
+ }
+
+ bio = BIO_new(bio_cf_method);
+ if(!bio)
+ return CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY;
+
+ BIO_set_data(bio, cf);
+ SSL_set_bio(backend->handle, bio, bio);
+
+ connssl->connecting_state = ssl_connect_2;
+
+ return CURLE_OK;
+}
+
+static CURLcode ossl_connect_step2(struct Curl_cfilter *cf,
+ struct Curl_easy *data)
+{
+ int err;
+ struct ssl_connect_data *connssl = cf->ctx;
+ struct ssl_backend_data *backend = connssl->backend;
+ struct ssl_config_data *ssl_config = Curl_ssl_cf_get_config(cf, data);
+ DEBUGASSERT(ssl_connect_2 == connssl->connecting_state
+ || ssl_connect_2_reading == connssl->connecting_state
+ || ssl_connect_2_writing == connssl->connecting_state);
+ DEBUGASSERT(backend);
+
+ ERR_clear_error();
+
+ err = SSL_connect(backend->handle);
+#ifndef HAVE_KEYLOG_CALLBACK
+ if(Curl_tls_keylog_enabled()) {
+ /* If key logging is enabled, wait for the handshake to complete and then
+ * proceed with logging secrets (for TLS 1.2 or older).
+ */
+ ossl_log_tls12_secret(backend->handle, &backend->keylog_done);
+ }
+#endif
+
+ /* 1 is fine
+ 0 is "not successful but was shut down controlled"
+ <0 is "handshake was not successful, because a fatal error occurred" */
+ if(1 != err) {
+ int detail = SSL_get_error(backend->handle, err);
+
+ if(SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ == detail) {
+ connssl->connecting_state = ssl_connect_2_reading;
+ return CURLE_OK;
+ }
+ if(SSL_ERROR_WANT_WRITE == detail) {
+ connssl->connecting_state = ssl_connect_2_writing;
+ return CURLE_OK;
+ }
+#ifdef SSL_ERROR_WANT_ASYNC
+ if(SSL_ERROR_WANT_ASYNC == detail) {
+ connssl->connecting_state = ssl_connect_2;
+ return CURLE_OK;
+ }
+#endif
+ else if(backend->io_result == CURLE_AGAIN) {
+ return CURLE_OK;
+ }
+ else {
+ /* untreated error */
+ unsigned long errdetail;
+ char error_buffer[256]="";
+ CURLcode result;
+ long lerr;
+ int lib;
+ int reason;
+
+ /* the connection failed, we're not waiting for anything else. */
+ connssl->connecting_state = ssl_connect_2;
+
+ /* Get the earliest error code from the thread's error queue and remove
+ the entry. */
+ errdetail = ERR_get_error();
+
+ /* Extract which lib and reason */
+ lib = ERR_GET_LIB(errdetail);
+ reason = ERR_GET_REASON(errdetail);
+
+ if((lib == ERR_LIB_SSL) &&
+ ((reason == SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED) ||
+ (reason == SSL_R_SSLV3_ALERT_CERTIFICATE_EXPIRED))) {
+ result = CURLE_PEER_FAILED_VERIFICATION;
+
+ lerr = SSL_get_verify_result(backend->handle);
+ if(lerr != X509_V_OK) {
+ ssl_config->certverifyresult = lerr;
+ msnprintf(error_buffer, sizeof(error_buffer),
+ "SSL certificate problem: %s",
+ X509_verify_cert_error_string(lerr));
+ }
+ else
+ /* strcpy() is fine here as long as the string fits within
+ error_buffer */
+ strcpy(error_buffer, "SSL certificate verification failed");
+ }
+#if (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10101000L && \
+ !defined(LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER) && \
+ !defined(OPENSSL_IS_BORINGSSL))
+ /* SSL_R_TLSV13_ALERT_CERTIFICATE_REQUIRED is only available on
+ OpenSSL version above v1.1.1, not LibreSSL nor BoringSSL */
+ else if((lib == ERR_LIB_SSL) &&
+ (reason == SSL_R_TLSV13_ALERT_CERTIFICATE_REQUIRED)) {
+ /* If client certificate is required, communicate the
+ error to client */
+ result = CURLE_SSL_CLIENTCERT;
+ ossl_strerror(errdetail, error_buffer, sizeof(error_buffer));
+ }
+#endif
+ else {
+ result = CURLE_SSL_CONNECT_ERROR;
+ ossl_strerror(errdetail, error_buffer, sizeof(error_buffer));
+ }
+
+ /* detail is already set to the SSL error above */
+
+ /* If we e.g. use SSLv2 request-method and the server doesn't like us
+ * (RST connection, etc.), OpenSSL gives no explanation whatsoever and
+ * the SO_ERROR is also lost.
+ */
+ if(CURLE_SSL_CONNECT_ERROR == result && errdetail == 0) {
+ char extramsg[80]="";
+ int sockerr = SOCKERRNO;
+
+ if(sockerr && detail == SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL)
+ Curl_strerror(sockerr, extramsg, sizeof(extramsg));
+ failf(data, OSSL_PACKAGE " SSL_connect: %s in connection to %s:%d ",
+ extramsg[0] ? extramsg : SSL_ERROR_to_str(detail),
+ connssl->hostname, connssl->port);
+ return result;
+ }
+
+ /* Could be a CERT problem */
+ failf(data, "%s", error_buffer);
+
+ return result;
+ }
+ }
+ else {
+ /* we connected fine, we're not waiting for anything else. */
+ connssl->connecting_state = ssl_connect_3;
+
+ /* Informational message */
+ infof(data, "SSL connection using %s / %s",
+ SSL_get_version(backend->handle),
+ SSL_get_cipher(backend->handle));
+
+#ifdef HAS_ALPN
+ /* Sets data and len to negotiated protocol, len is 0 if no protocol was
+ * negotiated
+ */
+ if(cf->conn->bits.tls_enable_alpn) {
+ const unsigned char *neg_protocol;
+ unsigned int len;
+ SSL_get0_alpn_selected(backend->handle, &neg_protocol, &len);
+ if(len) {
+ infof(data, VTLS_INFOF_ALPN_ACCEPTED_LEN_1STR, len, neg_protocol);
+
+#ifdef USE_HTTP2
+ if(len == ALPN_H2_LENGTH &&
+ !memcmp(ALPN_H2, neg_protocol, len)) {
+ cf->conn->alpn = CURL_HTTP_VERSION_2;
+ }
+ else
+#endif
+ if(len == ALPN_HTTP_1_1_LENGTH &&
+ !memcmp(ALPN_HTTP_1_1, neg_protocol, ALPN_HTTP_1_1_LENGTH)) {
+ cf->conn->alpn = CURL_HTTP_VERSION_1_1;
+ }
+ }
+ else
+ infof(data, VTLS_INFOF_NO_ALPN);
+
+ Curl_multiuse_state(data, cf->conn->alpn == CURL_HTTP_VERSION_2 ?
+ BUNDLE_MULTIPLEX : BUNDLE_NO_MULTIUSE);
+ }
+#endif
+
+ return CURLE_OK;
+ }
+}
+
+/*
+ * Heavily modified from:
+ * https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Certificate_and_Public_Key_Pinning#OpenSSL
+ */
+static CURLcode pkp_pin_peer_pubkey(struct Curl_easy *data, X509* cert,
+ const char *pinnedpubkey)
+{
+ /* Scratch */
+ int len1 = 0, len2 = 0;
+ unsigned char *buff1 = NULL, *temp = NULL;
+
+ /* Result is returned to caller */
+ CURLcode result = CURLE_SSL_PINNEDPUBKEYNOTMATCH;
+
+ /* if a path wasn't specified, don't pin */
+ if(!pinnedpubkey)
+ return CURLE_OK;
+
+ if(!cert)
+ return result;
+
+ do {
+ /* Begin Gyrations to get the subjectPublicKeyInfo */
+ /* Thanks to Viktor Dukhovni on the OpenSSL mailing list */
+
+ /* https://groups.google.com/group/mailing.openssl.users/browse_thread
+ /thread/d61858dae102c6c7 */
+ len1 = i2d_X509_PUBKEY(X509_get_X509_PUBKEY(cert), NULL);
+ if(len1 < 1)
+ break; /* failed */
+
+ buff1 = temp = malloc(len1);
+ if(!buff1)
+ break; /* failed */
+
+ /* https://www.openssl.org/docs/crypto/d2i_X509.html */
+ len2 = i2d_X509_PUBKEY(X509_get_X509_PUBKEY(cert), &temp);
+
+ /*
+ * These checks are verifying we got back the same values as when we
+ * sized the buffer. It's pretty weak since they should always be the
+ * same. But it gives us something to test.
+ */
+ if((len1 != len2) || !temp || ((temp - buff1) != len1))
+ break; /* failed */
+
+ /* End Gyrations */
+
+ /* The one good exit point */
+ result = Curl_pin_peer_pubkey(data, pinnedpubkey, buff1, len1);
+ } while(0);
+
+ if(buff1)
+ free(buff1);
+
+ return result;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Get the server cert, verify it and show it, etc., only call failf() if the
+ * 'strict' argument is TRUE as otherwise all this is for informational
+ * purposes only!
+ *
+ * We check certificates to authenticate the server; otherwise we risk
+ * man-in-the-middle attack.
+ */
+static CURLcode servercert(struct Curl_cfilter *cf,
+ struct Curl_easy *data,
+ bool strict)
+{
+ struct connectdata *conn = cf->conn;
+ struct ssl_connect_data *connssl = cf->ctx;
+ struct ssl_config_data *ssl_config = Curl_ssl_cf_get_config(cf, data);
+ struct ssl_primary_config *conn_config = Curl_ssl_cf_get_primary_config(cf);
+ CURLcode result = CURLE_OK;
+ int rc;
+ long lerr;
+ X509 *issuer;
+ BIO *fp = NULL;
+ char error_buffer[256]="";
+ char buffer[2048];
+ const char *ptr;
+ BIO *mem = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem());
+ struct ssl_backend_data *backend = connssl->backend;
+
+ DEBUGASSERT(backend);
+
+ if(!mem) {
+ failf(data,
+ "BIO_new return NULL, " OSSL_PACKAGE
+ " error %s",
+ ossl_strerror(ERR_get_error(), error_buffer,
+ sizeof(error_buffer)) );
+ return CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY;
+ }
+
+ if(data->set.ssl.certinfo)
+ /* asked to gather certificate info */
+ (void)Curl_ossl_certchain(data, connssl->backend->handle);
+
+ backend->server_cert = SSL_get1_peer_certificate(backend->handle);
+ if(!backend->server_cert) {
+ BIO_free(mem);
+ if(!strict)
+ return CURLE_OK;
+
+ failf(data, "SSL: couldn't get peer certificate");
+ return CURLE_PEER_FAILED_VERIFICATION;
+ }
+
+ infof(data, "%s certificate:",
+ Curl_ssl_cf_is_proxy(cf)? "Proxy" : "Server");
+
+ rc = x509_name_oneline(X509_get_subject_name(backend->server_cert),
+ buffer, sizeof(buffer));
+ infof(data, " subject: %s", rc?"[NONE]":buffer);
+
+#ifndef CURL_DISABLE_VERBOSE_STRINGS
+ {
+ long len;
+ ASN1_TIME_print(mem, X509_get0_notBefore(backend->server_cert));
+ len = BIO_get_mem_data(mem, (char **) &ptr);
+ infof(data, " start date: %.*s", (int)len, ptr);
+ (void)BIO_reset(mem);
+
+ ASN1_TIME_print(mem, X509_get0_notAfter(backend->server_cert));
+ len = BIO_get_mem_data(mem, (char **) &ptr);
+ infof(data, " expire date: %.*s", (int)len, ptr);
+ (void)BIO_reset(mem);
+ }
+#endif
+
+ BIO_free(mem);
+
+ if(conn_config->verifyhost) {
+ result = Curl_ossl_verifyhost(data, conn, backend->server_cert);
+ if(result) {
+ X509_free(backend->server_cert);
+ backend->server_cert = NULL;
+ return result;
+ }
+ }
+
+ rc = x509_name_oneline(X509_get_issuer_name(backend->server_cert),
+ buffer, sizeof(buffer));
+ if(rc) {
+ if(strict)
+ failf(data, "SSL: couldn't get X509-issuer name");
+ result = CURLE_PEER_FAILED_VERIFICATION;
+ }
+ else {
+ infof(data, " issuer: %s", buffer);
+
+ /* We could do all sorts of certificate verification stuff here before
+ deallocating the certificate. */
+
+ /* e.g. match issuer name with provided issuer certificate */
+ if(conn_config->issuercert || conn_config->issuercert_blob) {
+ if(conn_config->issuercert_blob) {
+ fp = BIO_new_mem_buf(conn_config->issuercert_blob->data,
+ (int)conn_config->issuercert_blob->len);
+ if(!fp) {
+ failf(data,
+ "BIO_new_mem_buf NULL, " OSSL_PACKAGE
+ " error %s",
+ ossl_strerror(ERR_get_error(), error_buffer,
+ sizeof(error_buffer)) );
+ X509_free(backend->server_cert);
+ backend->server_cert = NULL;
+ return CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY;
+ }
+ }
+ else {
+ fp = BIO_new(BIO_s_file());
+ if(!fp) {
+ failf(data,
+ "BIO_new return NULL, " OSSL_PACKAGE
+ " error %s",
+ ossl_strerror(ERR_get_error(), error_buffer,
+ sizeof(error_buffer)) );
+ X509_free(backend->server_cert);
+ backend->server_cert = NULL;
+ return CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY;
+ }
+
+ if(BIO_read_filename(fp, conn_config->issuercert) <= 0) {
+ if(strict)
+ failf(data, "SSL: Unable to open issuer cert (%s)",
+ conn_config->issuercert);
+ BIO_free(fp);
+ X509_free(backend->server_cert);
+ backend->server_cert = NULL;
+ return CURLE_SSL_ISSUER_ERROR;
+ }
+ }
+
+ issuer = PEM_read_bio_X509(fp, NULL, ZERO_NULL, NULL);
+ if(!issuer) {
+ if(strict)
+ failf(data, "SSL: Unable to read issuer cert (%s)",
+ conn_config->issuercert);
+ BIO_free(fp);
+ X509_free(issuer);
+ X509_free(backend->server_cert);
+ backend->server_cert = NULL;
+ return CURLE_SSL_ISSUER_ERROR;
+ }
+
+ if(X509_check_issued(issuer, backend->server_cert) != X509_V_OK) {
+ if(strict)
+ failf(data, "SSL: Certificate issuer check failed (%s)",
+ conn_config->issuercert);
+ BIO_free(fp);
+ X509_free(issuer);
+ X509_free(backend->server_cert);
+ backend->server_cert = NULL;
+ return CURLE_SSL_ISSUER_ERROR;
+ }
+
+ infof(data, " SSL certificate issuer check ok (%s)",
+ conn_config->issuercert);
+ BIO_free(fp);
+ X509_free(issuer);
+ }
+
+ lerr = SSL_get_verify_result(backend->handle);
+ ssl_config->certverifyresult = lerr;
+ if(lerr != X509_V_OK) {
+ if(conn_config->verifypeer) {
+ /* We probably never reach this, because SSL_connect() will fail
+ and we return earlier if verifypeer is set? */
+ if(strict)
+ failf(data, "SSL certificate verify result: %s (%ld)",
+ X509_verify_cert_error_string(lerr), lerr);
+ result = CURLE_PEER_FAILED_VERIFICATION;
+ }
+ else
+ infof(data, " SSL certificate verify result: %s (%ld),"
+ " continuing anyway.",
+ X509_verify_cert_error_string(lerr), lerr);
+ }
+ else
+ infof(data, " SSL certificate verify ok.");
+ }
+
+#if (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x0090808fL) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) && \
+ !defined(OPENSSL_NO_OCSP)
+ if(conn_config->verifystatus) {
+ result = verifystatus(cf, data);
+ if(result) {
+ X509_free(backend->server_cert);
+ backend->server_cert = NULL;
+ return result;
+ }
+ }
+#endif
+
+ if(!strict)
+ /* when not strict, we don't bother about the verify cert problems */
+ result = CURLE_OK;
+
+ ptr = Curl_ssl_cf_is_proxy(cf)?
+ data->set.str[STRING_SSL_PINNEDPUBLICKEY_PROXY]:
+ data->set.str[STRING_SSL_PINNEDPUBLICKEY];
+ if(!result && ptr) {
+ result = pkp_pin_peer_pubkey(data, backend->server_cert, ptr);
+ if(result)
+ failf(data, "SSL: public key does not match pinned public key");
+ }
+
+ X509_free(backend->server_cert);
+ backend->server_cert = NULL;
+ connssl->connecting_state = ssl_connect_done;
+
+ return result;
+}
+
+static CURLcode ossl_connect_step3(struct Curl_cfilter *cf,
+ struct Curl_easy *data)
+{
+ CURLcode result = CURLE_OK;
+ struct ssl_connect_data *connssl = cf->ctx;
+ struct ssl_primary_config *conn_config = Curl_ssl_cf_get_primary_config(cf);
+
+ DEBUGASSERT(ssl_connect_3 == connssl->connecting_state);
+
+ /*
+ * We check certificates to authenticate the server; otherwise we risk
+ * man-in-the-middle attack; NEVERTHELESS, if we're told explicitly not to
+ * verify the peer, ignore faults and failures from the server cert
+ * operations.
+ */
+
+ result = servercert(cf, data, conn_config->verifypeer ||
+ conn_config->verifyhost);
+
+ if(!result)
+ connssl->connecting_state = ssl_connect_done;
+
+ return result;
+}
+
+static CURLcode ossl_connect_common(struct Curl_cfilter *cf,
+ struct Curl_easy *data,
+ bool nonblocking,
+ bool *done)
+{
+ CURLcode result = CURLE_OK;
+ struct ssl_connect_data *connssl = cf->ctx;
+ curl_socket_t sockfd = cf->conn->sock[cf->sockindex];
+ int what;
+
+ /* check if the connection has already been established */
+ if(ssl_connection_complete == connssl->state) {
+ *done = TRUE;
+ return CURLE_OK;
+ }
+
+ if(ssl_connect_1 == connssl->connecting_state) {
+ /* Find out how much more time we're allowed */
+ const timediff_t timeout_ms = Curl_timeleft(data, NULL, TRUE);
+
+ if(timeout_ms < 0) {
+ /* no need to continue if time is already up */
+ failf(data, "SSL connection timeout");
+ return CURLE_OPERATION_TIMEDOUT;
+ }
+
+ result = ossl_connect_step1(cf, data);
+ if(result)
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ while(ssl_connect_2 == connssl->connecting_state ||
+ ssl_connect_2_reading == connssl->connecting_state ||
+ ssl_connect_2_writing == connssl->connecting_state) {
+
+ /* check allowed time left */
+ const timediff_t timeout_ms = Curl_timeleft(data, NULL, TRUE);
+
+ if(timeout_ms < 0) {
+ /* no need to continue if time already is up */
+ failf(data, "SSL connection timeout");
+ result = CURLE_OPERATION_TIMEDOUT;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ /* if ssl is expecting something, check if it's available. */
+ if(connssl->connecting_state == ssl_connect_2_reading ||
+ connssl->connecting_state == ssl_connect_2_writing) {
+
+ curl_socket_t writefd = ssl_connect_2_writing ==
+ connssl->connecting_state?sockfd:CURL_SOCKET_BAD;
+ curl_socket_t readfd = ssl_connect_2_reading ==
+ connssl->connecting_state?sockfd:CURL_SOCKET_BAD;
+
+ what = Curl_socket_check(readfd, CURL_SOCKET_BAD, writefd,
+ nonblocking?0:timeout_ms);
+ if(what < 0) {
+ /* fatal error */
+ failf(data, "select/poll on SSL socket, errno: %d", SOCKERRNO);
+ result = CURLE_SSL_CONNECT_ERROR;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if(0 == what) {
+ if(nonblocking) {
+ *done = FALSE;
+ result = CURLE_OK;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ /* timeout */
+ failf(data, "SSL connection timeout");
+ result = CURLE_OPERATION_TIMEDOUT;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ /* socket is readable or writable */
+ }
+
+ /* Run transaction, and return to the caller if it failed or if this
+ * connection is done nonblocking and this loop would execute again. This
+ * permits the owner of a multi handle to abort a connection attempt
+ * before step2 has completed while ensuring that a client using select()
+ * or epoll() will always have a valid fdset to wait on.
+ */
+ result = ossl_connect_step2(cf, data);
+ if(result || (nonblocking &&
+ (ssl_connect_2 == connssl->connecting_state ||
+ ssl_connect_2_reading == connssl->connecting_state ||
+ ssl_connect_2_writing == connssl->connecting_state)))
+ goto out;
+
+ } /* repeat step2 until all transactions are done. */
+
+ if(ssl_connect_3 == connssl->connecting_state) {
+ result = ossl_connect_step3(cf, data);
+ if(result)
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ if(ssl_connect_done == connssl->connecting_state) {
+ connssl->state = ssl_connection_complete;
+ *done = TRUE;
+ }
+ else
+ *done = FALSE;
+
+ /* Reset our connect state machine */
+ connssl->connecting_state = ssl_connect_1;
+
+out:
+ return result;
+}
+
+static CURLcode ossl_connect_nonblocking(struct Curl_cfilter *cf,
+ struct Curl_easy *data,
+ bool *done)
+{
+ return ossl_connect_common(cf, data, TRUE, done);
+}
+
+static CURLcode ossl_connect(struct Curl_cfilter *cf,
+ struct Curl_easy *data)
+{
+ CURLcode result;
+ bool done = FALSE;
+
+ result = ossl_connect_common(cf, data, FALSE, &done);
+ if(result)
+ return result;
+
+ DEBUGASSERT(done);
+
+ return CURLE_OK;
+}
+
+static bool ossl_data_pending(struct Curl_cfilter *cf,
+ const struct Curl_easy *data)
+{
+ struct ssl_connect_data *ctx = cf->ctx;
+
+ (void)data;
+ DEBUGASSERT(ctx && ctx->backend);
+ if(ctx->backend->handle && SSL_pending(ctx->backend->handle))
+ return TRUE;
+ return FALSE;
+}
+
+static ssize_t ossl_send(struct Curl_cfilter *cf,
+ struct Curl_easy *data,
+ const void *mem,
+ size_t len,
+ CURLcode *curlcode)
+{
+ /* SSL_write() is said to return 'int' while write() and send() returns
+ 'size_t' */
+ int err;
+ char error_buffer[256];
+ unsigned long sslerror;
+ int memlen;
+ int rc;
+ struct ssl_connect_data *connssl = cf->ctx;
+ struct ssl_backend_data *backend = connssl->backend;
+
+ (void)data;
+ DEBUGASSERT(backend);
+
+ ERR_clear_error();
+
+ memlen = (len > (size_t)INT_MAX) ? INT_MAX : (int)len;
+ set_logger(connssl, data);
+ rc = SSL_write(backend->handle, mem, memlen);
+
+ if(rc <= 0) {
+ err = SSL_get_error(backend->handle, rc);
+
+ switch(err) {
+ case SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ:
+ case SSL_ERROR_WANT_WRITE:
+ /* The operation did not complete; the same TLS/SSL I/O function
+ should be called again later. This is basically an EWOULDBLOCK
+ equivalent. */
+ *curlcode = CURLE_AGAIN;
+ rc = -1;
+ goto out;
+ case SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL:
+ {
+ int sockerr = SOCKERRNO;
+
+ if(backend->io_result == CURLE_AGAIN) {
+ *curlcode = CURLE_AGAIN;
+ rc = -1;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ sslerror = ERR_get_error();
+ if(sslerror)
+ ossl_strerror(sslerror, error_buffer, sizeof(error_buffer));
+ else if(sockerr)
+ Curl_strerror(sockerr, error_buffer, sizeof(error_buffer));
+ else {
+ strncpy(error_buffer, SSL_ERROR_to_str(err), sizeof(error_buffer));
+ error_buffer[sizeof(error_buffer) - 1] = '\0';
+ }
+ failf(data, OSSL_PACKAGE " SSL_write: %s, errno %d",
+ error_buffer, sockerr);
+ *curlcode = CURLE_SEND_ERROR;
+ rc = -1;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ case SSL_ERROR_SSL: {
+ /* A failure in the SSL library occurred, usually a protocol error.
+ The OpenSSL error queue contains more information on the error. */
+ struct Curl_cfilter *cf_ssl_next = Curl_ssl_cf_get_ssl(cf->next);
+ struct ssl_connect_data *connssl_next = cf_ssl_next?
+ cf_ssl_next->ctx : NULL;
+ sslerror = ERR_get_error();
+ if(ERR_GET_LIB(sslerror) == ERR_LIB_SSL &&
+ ERR_GET_REASON(sslerror) == SSL_R_BIO_NOT_SET &&
+ connssl->state == ssl_connection_complete &&
+ (connssl_next && connssl_next->state == ssl_connection_complete)
+ ) {
+ char ver[120];
+ (void)ossl_version(ver, sizeof(ver));
+ failf(data, "Error: %s does not support double SSL tunneling.", ver);
+ }
+ else
+ failf(data, "SSL_write() error: %s",
+ ossl_strerror(sslerror, error_buffer, sizeof(error_buffer)));
+ *curlcode = CURLE_SEND_ERROR;
+ rc = -1;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ default:
+ /* a true error */
+ failf(data, OSSL_PACKAGE " SSL_write: %s, errno %d",
+ SSL_ERROR_to_str(err), SOCKERRNO);
+ *curlcode = CURLE_SEND_ERROR;
+ rc = -1;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ }
+ *curlcode = CURLE_OK;
+
+out:
+ return (ssize_t)rc; /* number of bytes */
+}
+
+static ssize_t ossl_recv(struct Curl_cfilter *cf,
+ struct Curl_easy *data, /* transfer */
+ char *buf, /* store read data here */
+ size_t buffersize, /* max amount to read */
+ CURLcode *curlcode)
+{
+ char error_buffer[256];
+ unsigned long sslerror;
+ ssize_t nread;
+ int buffsize;
+ struct connectdata *conn = cf->conn;
+ struct ssl_connect_data *connssl = cf->ctx;
+ struct ssl_backend_data *backend = connssl->backend;
+
+ (void)data;
+ DEBUGASSERT(backend);
+
+ ERR_clear_error();
+
+ buffsize = (buffersize > (size_t)INT_MAX) ? INT_MAX : (int)buffersize;
+ set_logger(connssl, data);
+ nread = (ssize_t)SSL_read(backend->handle, buf, buffsize);
+
+ if(nread <= 0) {
+ /* failed SSL_read */
+ int err = SSL_get_error(backend->handle, (int)nread);
+
+ switch(err) {
+ case SSL_ERROR_NONE: /* this is not an error */
+ break;
+ case SSL_ERROR_ZERO_RETURN: /* no more data */
+ /* close_notify alert */
+ if(cf->sockindex == FIRSTSOCKET)
+ /* mark the connection for close if it is indeed the control
+ connection */
+ connclose(conn, "TLS close_notify");
+ break;
+ case SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ:
+ case SSL_ERROR_WANT_WRITE:
+ /* there's data pending, re-invoke SSL_read() */
+ *curlcode = CURLE_AGAIN;
+ nread = -1;
+ goto out;
+ default:
+ /* openssl/ssl.h for SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL says "look at error stack/return
+ value/errno" */
+ /* https://www.openssl.org/docs/crypto/ERR_get_error.html */
+ if(backend->io_result == CURLE_AGAIN) {
+ *curlcode = CURLE_AGAIN;
+ nread = -1;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ sslerror = ERR_get_error();
+ if((nread < 0) || sslerror) {
+ /* If the return code was negative or there actually is an error in the
+ queue */
+ int sockerr = SOCKERRNO;
+ if(sslerror)
+ ossl_strerror(sslerror, error_buffer, sizeof(error_buffer));
+ else if(sockerr && err == SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL)
+ Curl_strerror(sockerr, error_buffer, sizeof(error_buffer));
+ else {
+ strncpy(error_buffer, SSL_ERROR_to_str(err), sizeof(error_buffer));
+ error_buffer[sizeof(error_buffer) - 1] = '\0';
+ }
+ failf(data, OSSL_PACKAGE " SSL_read: %s, errno %d",
+ error_buffer, sockerr);
+ *curlcode = CURLE_RECV_ERROR;
+ nread = -1;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ /* For debug builds be a little stricter and error on any
+ SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL. For example a server may have closed the connection
+ abruptly without a close_notify alert. For compatibility with older
+ peers we don't do this by default. #4624
+
+ We can use this to gauge how many users may be affected, and
+ if it goes ok eventually transition to allow in dev and release with
+ the newest OpenSSL: #if (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10101000L) */
+#ifdef DEBUGBUILD
+ if(err == SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL) {
+ int sockerr = SOCKERRNO;
+ if(sockerr)
+ Curl_strerror(sockerr, error_buffer, sizeof(error_buffer));
+ else {
+ msnprintf(error_buffer, sizeof(error_buffer),
+ "Connection closed abruptly");
+ }
+ failf(data, OSSL_PACKAGE " SSL_read: %s, errno %d"
+ " (Fatal because this is a curl debug build)",
+ error_buffer, sockerr);
+ *curlcode = CURLE_RECV_ERROR;
+ nread = -1;
+ goto out;
+ }
+#endif
+ }
+ }
+
+out:
+ return nread;
+}
+
+static size_t ossl_version(char *buffer, size_t size)
+{
+#ifdef LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER
+#ifdef HAVE_OPENSSL_VERSION
+ char *p;
+ int count;
+ const char *ver = OpenSSL_version(OPENSSL_VERSION);
+ const char expected[] = OSSL_PACKAGE " "; /* ie "LibreSSL " */
+ if(strncasecompare(ver, expected, sizeof(expected) - 1)) {
+ ver += sizeof(expected) - 1;
+ }
+ count = msnprintf(buffer, size, "%s/%s", OSSL_PACKAGE, ver);
+ for(p = buffer; *p; ++p) {
+ if(ISBLANK(*p))
+ *p = '_';
+ }
+ return count;
+#else
+ return msnprintf(buffer, size, "%s/%lx.%lx.%lx",
+ OSSL_PACKAGE,
+ (LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER>>28)&0xf,
+ (LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER>>20)&0xff,
+ (LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER>>12)&0xff);
+#endif
+#elif defined(OPENSSL_IS_BORINGSSL)
+#ifdef CURL_BORINGSSL_VERSION
+ return msnprintf(buffer, size, "%s/%s",
+ OSSL_PACKAGE,
+ CURL_BORINGSSL_VERSION);
+#else
+ return msnprintf(buffer, size, OSSL_PACKAGE);
+#endif
+#elif defined(HAVE_OPENSSL_VERSION) && defined(OPENSSL_VERSION_STRING)
+ return msnprintf(buffer, size, "%s/%s",
+ OSSL_PACKAGE, OpenSSL_version(OPENSSL_VERSION_STRING));
+#else
+ /* not LibreSSL, BoringSSL and not using OpenSSL_version */
+
+ char sub[3];
+ unsigned long ssleay_value;
+ sub[2]='\0';
+ sub[1]='\0';
+ ssleay_value = OpenSSL_version_num();
+ if(ssleay_value < 0x906000) {
+ ssleay_value = SSLEAY_VERSION_NUMBER;
+ sub[0]='\0';
+ }
+ else {
+ if(ssleay_value&0xff0) {
+ int minor_ver = (ssleay_value >> 4) & 0xff;
+ if(minor_ver > 26) {
+ /* handle extended version introduced for 0.9.8za */
+ sub[1] = (char) ((minor_ver - 1) % 26 + 'a' + 1);
+ sub[0] = 'z';
+ }
+ else {
+ sub[0] = (char) (minor_ver + 'a' - 1);
+ }
+ }
+ else
+ sub[0]='\0';
+ }
+
+ return msnprintf(buffer, size, "%s/%lx.%lx.%lx%s"
+#ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
+ "-fips"
+#endif
+ ,
+ OSSL_PACKAGE,
+ (ssleay_value>>28)&0xf,
+ (ssleay_value>>20)&0xff,
+ (ssleay_value>>12)&0xff,
+ sub);
+#endif /* OPENSSL_IS_BORINGSSL */
+}
+
+/* can be called with data == NULL */
+static CURLcode ossl_random(struct Curl_easy *data,
+ unsigned char *entropy, size_t length)
+{
+ int rc;
+ if(data) {
+ if(ossl_seed(data)) /* Initiate the seed if not already done */
+ return CURLE_FAILED_INIT; /* couldn't seed for some reason */
+ }
+ else {
+ if(!rand_enough())
+ return CURLE_FAILED_INIT;
+ }
+ /* RAND_bytes() returns 1 on success, 0 otherwise. */
+ rc = RAND_bytes(entropy, curlx_uztosi(length));
+ return (rc == 1 ? CURLE_OK : CURLE_FAILED_INIT);
+}
+
+#if (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x0090800fL) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_SHA256)
+static CURLcode ossl_sha256sum(const unsigned char *tmp, /* input */
+ size_t tmplen,
+ unsigned char *sha256sum /* output */,
+ size_t unused)
+{
+ EVP_MD_CTX *mdctx;
+ unsigned int len = 0;
+ (void) unused;
+
+ mdctx = EVP_MD_CTX_create();
+ if(!mdctx)
+ return CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY;
+ EVP_DigestInit(mdctx, EVP_sha256());
+ EVP_DigestUpdate(mdctx, tmp, tmplen);
+ EVP_DigestFinal_ex(mdctx, sha256sum, &len);
+ EVP_MD_CTX_destroy(mdctx);
+ return CURLE_OK;
+}
+#endif
+
+static bool ossl_cert_status_request(void)
+{
+#if (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x0090808fL) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) && \
+ !defined(OPENSSL_NO_OCSP)
+ return TRUE;
+#else
+ return FALSE;
+#endif
+}
+
+static void *ossl_get_internals(struct ssl_connect_data *connssl,
+ CURLINFO info)
+{
+ /* Legacy: CURLINFO_TLS_SESSION must return an SSL_CTX pointer. */
+ struct ssl_backend_data *backend = connssl->backend;
+ DEBUGASSERT(backend);
+ return info == CURLINFO_TLS_SESSION ?
+ (void *)backend->ctx : (void *)backend->handle;
+}
+
+static bool ossl_attach_data(struct Curl_cfilter *cf,
+ struct Curl_easy *data)
+{
+ struct ssl_connect_data *connssl = cf->ctx;
+ struct ssl_backend_data *backend = connssl->backend;
+ const struct ssl_config_data *config;
+
+ DEBUGASSERT(backend);
+
+ /* If we don't have SSL context, do nothing. */
+ if(!backend->handle)
+ return FALSE;
+
+ config = Curl_ssl_cf_get_config(cf, data);
+ if(config->primary.sessionid) {
+ int data_idx = ossl_get_ssl_data_index();
+ int cf_idx = ossl_get_ssl_cf_index();
+ int sockindex_idx = ossl_get_ssl_sockindex_index();
+ int proxy_idx = ossl_get_proxy_index();
+
+ if(data_idx >= 0 && cf_idx >= 0 && sockindex_idx >= 0 &&
+ proxy_idx >= 0) {
+ int data_status, cf_status, sockindex_status, proxy_status;
+
+ /* Store the data needed for the "new session" callback.
+ * The sockindex is stored as a pointer to an array element. */
+ data_status = SSL_set_ex_data(backend->handle, data_idx, data);
+ cf_status = SSL_set_ex_data(backend->handle, cf_idx, cf);
+ sockindex_status = SSL_set_ex_data(backend->handle, sockindex_idx,
+ cf->conn->sock + cf->sockindex);
+#ifndef CURL_DISABLE_PROXY
+ proxy_status = SSL_set_ex_data(backend->handle, proxy_idx,
+ Curl_ssl_cf_is_proxy(cf)?
+ (void *) 1 : NULL);
+#else
+ proxy_status = SSL_set_ex_data(backend->handle, proxy_idx, NULL);
+#endif
+ if(data_status && cf_status && sockindex_status && proxy_status)
+ return TRUE;
+ }
+ return FALSE;
+ }
+ return TRUE;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Starting with TLS 1.3, the ossl_new_session_cb callback gets called after
+ * the handshake. If the transfer that sets up the callback gets killed before
+ * this callback arrives, we must make sure to properly clear the data to
+ * avoid UAF problems. A future optimization could be to instead store another
+ * transfer that might still be using the same connection.
+ */
+
+static void ossl_detach_data(struct Curl_cfilter *cf,
+ struct Curl_easy *data)
+{
+ struct ssl_config_data *ssl_config = Curl_ssl_cf_get_config(cf, data);
+ struct ssl_connect_data *connssl = cf->ctx;
+ struct ssl_backend_data *backend = connssl->backend;
+ DEBUGASSERT(backend);
+
+ /* If we don't have SSL context, do nothing. */
+ if(!backend->handle)
+ return;
+
+ if(ssl_config->primary.sessionid) {
+ int data_idx = ossl_get_ssl_data_index();
+ int cf_idx = ossl_get_ssl_cf_index();
+ int sockindex_idx = ossl_get_ssl_sockindex_index();
+ int proxy_idx = ossl_get_proxy_index();
+
+ if(data_idx >= 0 && cf_idx >= 0 && sockindex_idx >= 0 &&
+ proxy_idx >= 0) {
+ /* Disable references to data in "new session" callback to avoid
+ * accessing a stale pointer. */
+ SSL_set_ex_data(backend->handle, data_idx, NULL);
+ SSL_set_ex_data(backend->handle, cf_idx, NULL);
+ SSL_set_ex_data(backend->handle, sockindex_idx, NULL);
+ SSL_set_ex_data(backend->handle, proxy_idx, NULL);
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+static void ossl_free_multi_ssl_backend_data(
+ struct multi_ssl_backend_data *mbackend)
+{
+#if defined(HAVE_SSL_X509_STORE_SHARE)
+ if(mbackend->store) {
+ X509_STORE_free(mbackend->store);
+ }
+ free(mbackend->CAfile);
+ free(mbackend);
+#else /* HAVE_SSL_X509_STORE_SHARE */
+ (void)mbackend;
+#endif /* HAVE_SSL_X509_STORE_SHARE */
+}
+
+const struct Curl_ssl Curl_ssl_openssl = {
+ { CURLSSLBACKEND_OPENSSL, "openssl" }, /* info */
+
+ SSLSUPP_CA_PATH |
+ SSLSUPP_CAINFO_BLOB |
+ SSLSUPP_CERTINFO |
+ SSLSUPP_PINNEDPUBKEY |
+ SSLSUPP_SSL_CTX |
+#ifdef HAVE_SSL_CTX_SET_CIPHERSUITES
+ SSLSUPP_TLS13_CIPHERSUITES |
+#endif
+ SSLSUPP_HTTPS_PROXY,
+
+ sizeof(struct ssl_backend_data),
+
+ ossl_init, /* init */
+ ossl_cleanup, /* cleanup */
+ ossl_version, /* version */
+ ossl_check_cxn, /* check_cxn */
+ ossl_shutdown, /* shutdown */
+ ossl_data_pending, /* data_pending */
+ ossl_random, /* random */
+ ossl_cert_status_request, /* cert_status_request */
+ ossl_connect, /* connect */
+ ossl_connect_nonblocking, /* connect_nonblocking */
+ Curl_ssl_get_select_socks,/* getsock */
+ ossl_get_internals, /* get_internals */
+ ossl_close, /* close_one */
+ ossl_close_all, /* close_all */
+ ossl_session_free, /* session_free */
+ ossl_set_engine, /* set_engine */
+ ossl_set_engine_default, /* set_engine_default */
+ ossl_engines_list, /* engines_list */
+ Curl_none_false_start, /* false_start */
+#if (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x0090800fL) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_SHA256)
+ ossl_sha256sum, /* sha256sum */
+#else
+ NULL, /* sha256sum */
+#endif
+ ossl_attach_data, /* use of data in this connection */
+ ossl_detach_data, /* remote of data from this connection */
+ ossl_free_multi_ssl_backend_data, /* free_multi_ssl_backend_data */
+ ossl_recv, /* recv decrypted data */
+ ossl_send, /* send data to encrypt */
+};
+
+#endif /* USE_OPENSSL */
generated by cgit v1.2.3 (git 2.25.1) at 2024-11-15 09:16:39 +0000