1 step: libcurl static link

git-svn-id: http://svn.miranda-ng.org/main/trunk@3763 1316c22d-e87f-b044-9b9b-93d7a3e3ba9c

1 files changed, 2726 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/plugins/FTPFileYM/curl-7.29.0/lib/ssluse.c b/plugins/FTPFileYM/curl-7.29.0/lib/ssluse.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..4a0dba734d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/plugins/FTPFileYM/curl-7.29.0/lib/ssluse.c
@@ -0,0 +1,2726 @@
+/***************************************************************************
+ *                                  _   _ ____  _
+ *  Project                     ___| | | |  _ \| |
+ *                             / __| | | | |_) | |
+ *                            | (__| |_| |  _ <| |___
+ *                             \___|\___/|_| \_\_____|
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 1998 - 2013, Daniel Stenberg, <daniel@haxx.se>, et al.
+ *
+ * This software is licensed as described in the file COPYING, which
+ * you should have received as part of this distribution. The terms
+ * are also available at http://curl.haxx.se/docs/copyright.html.
+ *
+ * You may opt to use, copy, modify, merge, publish, distribute and/or sell
+ * copies of the Software, and permit persons to whom the Software is
+ * furnished to do so, under the terms of the COPYING file.
+ *
+ * This software is distributed on an "AS IS" basis, WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY
+ * KIND, either express or implied.
+ *
+ ***************************************************************************/
+
+/*
+ * Source file for all OpenSSL-specific code for the TLS/SSL layer. No code
+ * but sslgen.c should ever call or use these functions.
+ */
+
+/*
+ * The original SSLeay-using code for curl was written by Linas Vepstas and
+ * Sampo Kellomaki 1998.
+ */
+
+#include "curl_setup.h"
+
+#ifdef HAVE_LIMITS_H
+#include <limits.h>
+#endif
+
+#include "urldata.h"
+#include "sendf.h"
+#include "formdata.h" /* for the boundary function */
+#include "url.h" /* for the ssl config check function */
+#include "inet_pton.h"
+#include "ssluse.h"
+#include "connect.h"
+#include "strequal.h"
+#include "select.h"
+#include "sslgen.h"
+#include "rawstr.h"
+#include "hostcheck.h"
+
+#define _MPRINTF_REPLACE /* use the internal *printf() functions */
+#include <curl/mprintf.h>
+
+#ifdef USE_SSLEAY
+
+#ifdef USE_OPENSSL
+#include <openssl/rand.h>
+#include <openssl/x509v3.h>
+#include <openssl/dsa.h>
+#include <openssl/dh.h>
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+#include <openssl/md5.h>
+#else
+#include <rand.h>
+#include <x509v3.h>
+#include <md5.h>
+#endif
+
+#include "warnless.h"
+#include "curl_memory.h"
+#include "non-ascii.h" /* for Curl_convert_from_utf8 prototype */
+
+/* The last #include file should be: */
+#include "memdebug.h"
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER
+#error "OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER not defined"
+#endif
+
+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x0090581fL
+#define HAVE_SSL_GET1_SESSION 1
+#else
+#undef HAVE_SSL_GET1_SESSION
+#endif
+
+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x00904100L
+#define HAVE_USERDATA_IN_PWD_CALLBACK 1
+#else
+#undef HAVE_USERDATA_IN_PWD_CALLBACK
+#endif
+
+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x00907001L
+/* ENGINE_load_private_key() takes four arguments */
+#define HAVE_ENGINE_LOAD_FOUR_ARGS
+#include <openssl/ui.h>
+#else
+/* ENGINE_load_private_key() takes three arguments */
+#undef HAVE_ENGINE_LOAD_FOUR_ARGS
+#endif
+
+#if (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x00903001L) && defined(HAVE_OPENSSL_PKCS12_H)
+/* OpenSSL has PKCS 12 support */
+#define HAVE_PKCS12_SUPPORT
+#else
+/* OpenSSL/SSLEay does not have PKCS12 support */
+#undef HAVE_PKCS12_SUPPORT
+#endif
+
+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x00906001L
+#define HAVE_ERR_ERROR_STRING_N 1
+#endif
+
+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x00909000L
+#define SSL_METHOD_QUAL const
+#else
+#define SSL_METHOD_QUAL
+#endif
+
+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x00907000L
+/* 0.9.6 didn't have X509_STORE_set_flags() */
+#define HAVE_X509_STORE_SET_FLAGS 1
+#else
+#define X509_STORE_set_flags(x,y) Curl_nop_stmt
+#endif
+
+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10000000L
+#define HAVE_ERR_REMOVE_THREAD_STATE 1
+#endif
+
+#ifndef HAVE_SSLV2_CLIENT_METHOD
+#undef OPENSSL_NO_SSL2 /* undef first to avoid compiler warnings */
+#define OPENSSL_NO_SSL2
+#endif
+
+/*
+ * Number of bytes to read from the random number seed file. This must be
+ * a finite value (because some entropy "files" like /dev/urandom have
+ * an infinite length), but must be large enough to provide enough
+ * entopy to properly seed OpenSSL's PRNG.
+ */
+#define RAND_LOAD_LENGTH 1024
+
+#ifndef HAVE_USERDATA_IN_PWD_CALLBACK
+static char global_passwd[64];
+#endif
+
+static int passwd_callback(char *buf, int num, int encrypting
+#ifdef HAVE_USERDATA_IN_PWD_CALLBACK
+                           /* This was introduced in 0.9.4, we can set this
+                              using SSL_CTX_set_default_passwd_cb_userdata()
+                              */
+                           , void *global_passwd
+#endif
+                           )
+{
+  DEBUGASSERT(0 == encrypting);
+
+  if(!encrypting) {
+    int klen = curlx_uztosi(strlen((char *)global_passwd));
+    if(num > klen) {
+      memcpy(buf, global_passwd, klen+1);
+      return klen;
+    }
+  }
+  return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * rand_enough() is a function that returns TRUE if we have seeded the random
+ * engine properly. We use some preprocessor magic to provide a seed_enough()
+ * macro to use, just to prevent a compiler warning on this function if we
+ * pass in an argument that is never used.
+ */
+
+#ifdef HAVE_RAND_STATUS
+#define seed_enough(x) rand_enough()
+static bool rand_enough(void)
+{
+  return (0 != RAND_status()) ? TRUE : FALSE;
+}
+#else
+#define seed_enough(x) rand_enough(x)
+static bool rand_enough(int nread)
+{
+  /* this is a very silly decision to make */
+  return (nread > 500) ? TRUE : FALSE;
+}
+#endif
+
+static int ossl_seed(struct SessionHandle *data)
+{
+  char *buf = data->state.buffer; /* point to the big buffer */
+  int nread=0;
+
+  /* Q: should we add support for a random file name as a libcurl option?
+     A: Yes, it is here */
+
+#ifndef RANDOM_FILE
+  /* if RANDOM_FILE isn't defined, we only perform this if an option tells
+     us to! */
+  if(data->set.ssl.random_file)
+#define RANDOM_FILE "" /* doesn't matter won't be used */
+#endif
+  {
+    /* let the option override the define */
+    nread += RAND_load_file((data->set.str[STRING_SSL_RANDOM_FILE]?
+                             data->set.str[STRING_SSL_RANDOM_FILE]:
+                             RANDOM_FILE),
+                            RAND_LOAD_LENGTH);
+    if(seed_enough(nread))
+      return nread;
+  }
+
+#if defined(HAVE_RAND_EGD)
+  /* only available in OpenSSL 0.9.5 and later */
+  /* EGD_SOCKET is set at configure time or not at all */
+#ifndef EGD_SOCKET
+  /* If we don't have the define set, we only do this if the egd-option
+     is set */
+  if(data->set.str[STRING_SSL_EGDSOCKET])
+#define EGD_SOCKET "" /* doesn't matter won't be used */
+#endif
+  {
+    /* If there's an option and a define, the option overrides the
+       define */
+    int ret = RAND_egd(data->set.str[STRING_SSL_EGDSOCKET]?
+                       data->set.str[STRING_SSL_EGDSOCKET]:EGD_SOCKET);
+    if(-1 != ret) {
+      nread += ret;
+      if(seed_enough(nread))
+        return nread;
+    }
+  }
+#endif
+
+  /* If we get here, it means we need to seed the PRNG using a "silly"
+     approach! */
+  {
+    int len;
+    char *area;
+
+    /* Changed call to RAND_seed to use the underlying RAND_add implementation
+     * directly.  Do this in a loop, with the amount of additional entropy
+     * being dependent upon the algorithm used by Curl_FormBoundary(): N bytes
+     * of a 7-bit ascii set. -- Richard Gorton, March 11 2003.
+     */
+
+    do {
+      area = Curl_FormBoundary();
+      if(!area)
+        return 3; /* out of memory */
+
+      len = curlx_uztosi(strlen(area));
+      RAND_add(area, len, (len >> 1));
+
+      free(area); /* now remove the random junk */
+    } while(!RAND_status());
+  }
+
+  /* generates a default path for the random seed file */
+  buf[0]=0; /* blank it first */
+  RAND_file_name(buf, BUFSIZE);
+  if(buf[0]) {
+    /* we got a file name to try */
+    nread += RAND_load_file(buf, RAND_LOAD_LENGTH);
+    if(seed_enough(nread))
+      return nread;
+  }
+
+  infof(data, "libcurl is now using a weak random seed!\n");
+  return nread;
+}
+
+int Curl_ossl_seed(struct SessionHandle *data)
+{
+  /* we have the "SSL is seeded" boolean static to prevent multiple
+     time-consuming seedings in vain */
+  static bool ssl_seeded = FALSE;
+
+  if(!ssl_seeded || data->set.str[STRING_SSL_RANDOM_FILE] ||
+     data->set.str[STRING_SSL_EGDSOCKET]) {
+    ossl_seed(data);
+    ssl_seeded = TRUE;
+  }
+  return 0;
+}
+
+
+#ifndef SSL_FILETYPE_ENGINE
+#define SSL_FILETYPE_ENGINE 42
+#endif
+#ifndef SSL_FILETYPE_PKCS12
+#define SSL_FILETYPE_PKCS12 43
+#endif
+static int do_file_type(const char *type)
+{
+  if(!type || !type[0])
+    return SSL_FILETYPE_PEM;
+  if(Curl_raw_equal(type, "PEM"))
+    return SSL_FILETYPE_PEM;
+  if(Curl_raw_equal(type, "DER"))
+    return SSL_FILETYPE_ASN1;
+  if(Curl_raw_equal(type, "ENG"))
+    return SSL_FILETYPE_ENGINE;
+  if(Curl_raw_equal(type, "P12"))
+    return SSL_FILETYPE_PKCS12;
+  return -1;
+}
+
+static
+int cert_stuff(struct connectdata *conn,
+               SSL_CTX* ctx,
+               char *cert_file,
+               const char *cert_type,
+               char *key_file,
+               const char *key_type)
+{
+  struct SessionHandle *data = conn->data;
+
+  int file_type = do_file_type(cert_type);
+
+  if(cert_file != NULL || file_type == SSL_FILETYPE_ENGINE) {
+    SSL *ssl;
+    X509 *x509;
+    int cert_done = 0;
+
+    if(data->set.str[STRING_KEY_PASSWD]) {
+#ifndef HAVE_USERDATA_IN_PWD_CALLBACK
+      /*
+       * If password has been given, we store that in the global
+       * area (*shudder*) for a while:
+       */
+      size_t len = strlen(data->set.str[STRING_KEY_PASSWD]);
+      if(len < sizeof(global_passwd))
+        memcpy(global_passwd, data->set.str[STRING_KEY_PASSWD], len+1);
+      else
+        global_passwd[0] = '\0';
+#else
+      /*
+       * We set the password in the callback userdata
+       */
+      SSL_CTX_set_default_passwd_cb_userdata(ctx,
+                                             data->set.str[STRING_KEY_PASSWD]);
+#endif
+      /* Set passwd callback: */
+      SSL_CTX_set_default_passwd_cb(ctx, passwd_callback);
+    }
+
+
+#define SSL_CLIENT_CERT_ERR \
+    "unable to use client certificate (no key found or wrong pass phrase?)"
+
+    switch(file_type) {
+    case SSL_FILETYPE_PEM:
+      /* SSL_CTX_use_certificate_chain_file() only works on PEM files */
+      if(SSL_CTX_use_certificate_chain_file(ctx,
+                                            cert_file) != 1) {
+        failf(data, SSL_CLIENT_CERT_ERR);
+        return 0;
+      }
+      break;
+
+    case SSL_FILETYPE_ASN1:
+      /* SSL_CTX_use_certificate_file() works with either PEM or ASN1, but
+         we use the case above for PEM so this can only be performed with
+         ASN1 files. */
+      if(SSL_CTX_use_certificate_file(ctx,
+                                      cert_file,
+                                      file_type) != 1) {
+        failf(data, SSL_CLIENT_CERT_ERR);
+        return 0;
+      }
+      break;
+    case SSL_FILETYPE_ENGINE:
+#if defined(HAVE_OPENSSL_ENGINE_H) && defined(ENGINE_CTRL_GET_CMD_FROM_NAME)
+      {
+        if(data->state.engine) {
+          const char *cmd_name = "LOAD_CERT_CTRL";
+          struct {
+            const char *cert_id;
+            X509 *cert;
+          } params;
+
+          params.cert_id = cert_file;
+          params.cert = NULL;
+
+          /* Does the engine supports LOAD_CERT_CTRL ? */
+          if(!ENGINE_ctrl(data->state.engine, ENGINE_CTRL_GET_CMD_FROM_NAME,
+                          0, (void *)cmd_name, NULL)) {
+            failf(data, "ssl engine does not support loading certificates");
+            return 0;
+          }
+
+          /* Load the certificate from the engine */
+          if(!ENGINE_ctrl_cmd(data->state.engine, cmd_name,
+                              0, &params, NULL, 1)) {
+            failf(data, "ssl engine cannot load client cert with id"
+                  " '%s' [%s]", cert_file,
+                  ERR_error_string(ERR_get_error(), NULL));
+            return 0;
+          }
+
+          if(!params.cert) {
+            failf(data, "ssl engine didn't initialized the certificate "
+                  "properly.");
+            return 0;
+          }
+
+          if(SSL_CTX_use_certificate(ctx, params.cert) != 1) {
+            failf(data, "unable to set client certificate");
+            X509_free(params.cert);
+            return 0;
+          }
+          X509_free(params.cert); /* we don't need the handle any more... */
+        }
+        else {
+          failf(data, "crypto engine not set, can't load certificate");
+          return 0;
+        }
+      }
+      break;
+#else
+      failf(data, "file type ENG for certificate not implemented");
+      return 0;
+#endif
+
+    case SSL_FILETYPE_PKCS12:
+    {
+#ifdef HAVE_PKCS12_SUPPORT
+      FILE *f;
+      PKCS12 *p12;
+      EVP_PKEY *pri;
+      STACK_OF(X509) *ca = NULL;
+      int i;
+
+      f = fopen(cert_file,"rb");
+      if(!f) {
+        failf(data, "could not open PKCS12 file '%s'", cert_file);
+        return 0;
+      }
+      p12 = d2i_PKCS12_fp(f, NULL);
+      fclose(f);
+
+      if(!p12) {
+        failf(data, "error reading PKCS12 file '%s'", cert_file );
+        return 0;
+      }
+
+      PKCS12_PBE_add();
+
+      if(!PKCS12_parse(p12, data->set.str[STRING_KEY_PASSWD], &pri, &x509,
+                        &ca)) {
+        failf(data,
+              "could not parse PKCS12 file, check password, OpenSSL error %s",
+              ERR_error_string(ERR_get_error(), NULL) );
+        PKCS12_free(p12);
+        return 0;
+      }
+
+      PKCS12_free(p12);
+
+      if(SSL_CTX_use_certificate(ctx, x509) != 1) {
+        failf(data, SSL_CLIENT_CERT_ERR);
+        EVP_PKEY_free(pri);
+        X509_free(x509);
+        sk_X509_pop_free(ca, X509_free);
+        return 0;
+      }
+
+      if(SSL_CTX_use_PrivateKey(ctx, pri) != 1) {
+        failf(data, "unable to use private key from PKCS12 file '%s'",
+              cert_file);
+        EVP_PKEY_free(pri);
+        X509_free(x509);
+        sk_X509_pop_free(ca, X509_free);
+        return 0;
+      }
+
+      if(!SSL_CTX_check_private_key (ctx)) {
+        failf(data, "private key from PKCS12 file '%s' "
+              "does not match certificate in same file", cert_file);
+        EVP_PKEY_free(pri);
+        X509_free(x509);
+        sk_X509_pop_free(ca, X509_free);
+        return 0;
+      }
+      /* Set Certificate Verification chain */
+      if(ca && sk_X509_num(ca)) {
+        for(i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(ca); i++) {
+          if(!SSL_CTX_add_extra_chain_cert(ctx,sk_X509_value(ca, i))) {
+            failf(data, "cannot add certificate to certificate chain");
+            EVP_PKEY_free(pri);
+            X509_free(x509);
+            sk_X509_pop_free(ca, X509_free);
+            return 0;
+          }
+          if(!SSL_CTX_add_client_CA(ctx, sk_X509_value(ca, i))) {
+            failf(data, "cannot add certificate to client CA list");
+            EVP_PKEY_free(pri);
+            X509_free(x509);
+            sk_X509_pop_free(ca, X509_free);
+            return 0;
+          }
+        }
+      }
+
+      EVP_PKEY_free(pri);
+      X509_free(x509);
+      sk_X509_pop_free(ca, X509_free);
+      cert_done = 1;
+      break;
+#else
+      failf(data, "file type P12 for certificate not supported");
+      return 0;
+#endif
+    }
+    default:
+      failf(data, "not supported file type '%s' for certificate", cert_type);
+      return 0;
+    }
+
+    file_type = do_file_type(key_type);
+
+    switch(file_type) {
+    case SSL_FILETYPE_PEM:
+      if(cert_done)
+        break;
+      if(key_file == NULL)
+        /* cert & key can only be in PEM case in the same file */
+        key_file=cert_file;
+    case SSL_FILETYPE_ASN1:
+      if(SSL_CTX_use_PrivateKey_file(ctx, key_file, file_type) != 1) {
+        failf(data, "unable to set private key file: '%s' type %s",
+              key_file, key_type?key_type:"PEM");
+        return 0;
+      }
+      break;
+    case SSL_FILETYPE_ENGINE:
+#ifdef HAVE_OPENSSL_ENGINE_H
+      {                         /* XXXX still needs some work */
+        EVP_PKEY *priv_key = NULL;
+        if(data->state.engine) {
+#ifdef HAVE_ENGINE_LOAD_FOUR_ARGS
+          UI_METHOD *ui_method = UI_OpenSSL();
+#endif
+          /* the typecast below was added to please mingw32 */
+          priv_key = (EVP_PKEY *)
+            ENGINE_load_private_key(data->state.engine,key_file,
+#ifdef HAVE_ENGINE_LOAD_FOUR_ARGS
+                                    ui_method,
+#endif
+                                    data->set.str[STRING_KEY_PASSWD]);
+          if(!priv_key) {
+            failf(data, "failed to load private key from crypto engine");
+            return 0;
+          }
+          if(SSL_CTX_use_PrivateKey(ctx, priv_key) != 1) {
+            failf(data, "unable to set private key");
+            EVP_PKEY_free(priv_key);
+            return 0;
+          }
+          EVP_PKEY_free(priv_key);  /* we don't need the handle any more... */
+        }
+        else {
+          failf(data, "crypto engine not set, can't load private key");
+          return 0;
+        }
+      }
+      break;
+#else
+      failf(data, "file type ENG for private key not supported");
+      return 0;
+#endif
+    case SSL_FILETYPE_PKCS12:
+      if(!cert_done) {
+        failf(data, "file type P12 for private key not supported");
+        return 0;
+      }
+      break;
+    default:
+      failf(data, "not supported file type for private key");
+      return 0;
+    }
+
+    ssl=SSL_new(ctx);
+    if(NULL == ssl) {
+      failf(data,"unable to create an SSL structure");
+      return 0;
+    }
+
+    x509=SSL_get_certificate(ssl);
+
+    /* This version was provided by Evan Jordan and is supposed to not
+       leak memory as the previous version: */
+    if(x509 != NULL) {
+      EVP_PKEY *pktmp = X509_get_pubkey(x509);
+      EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(pktmp,SSL_get_privatekey(ssl));
+      EVP_PKEY_free(pktmp);
+    }
+
+    SSL_free(ssl);
+
+    /* If we are using DSA, we can copy the parameters from
+     * the private key */
+
+
+    /* Now we know that a key and cert have been set against
+     * the SSL context */
+    if(!SSL_CTX_check_private_key(ctx)) {
+      failf(data, "Private key does not match the certificate public key");
+      return 0;
+    }
+#ifndef HAVE_USERDATA_IN_PWD_CALLBACK
+    /* erase it now */
+    memset(global_passwd, 0, sizeof(global_passwd));
+#endif
+  }
+  return 1;
+}
+
+/* returns non-zero on failure */
+static int x509_name_oneline(X509_NAME *a, char *buf, size_t size)
+{
+#if 0
+  return X509_NAME_oneline(a, buf, size);
+#else
+  BIO *bio_out = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem());
+  BUF_MEM *biomem;
+  int rc;
+
+  if(!bio_out)
+    return 1; /* alloc failed! */
+
+  rc = X509_NAME_print_ex(bio_out, a, 0, XN_FLAG_SEP_SPLUS_SPC);
+  BIO_get_mem_ptr(bio_out, &biomem);
+
+  if((size_t)biomem->length < size)
+    size = biomem->length;
+  else
+    size--; /* don't overwrite the buffer end */
+
+  memcpy(buf, biomem->data, size);
+  buf[size]=0;
+
+  BIO_free(bio_out);
+
+  return !rc;
+#endif
+}
+
+static
+int cert_verify_callback(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
+{
+  X509 *err_cert;
+  char buf[256];
+
+  err_cert=X509_STORE_CTX_get_current_cert(ctx);
+  (void)x509_name_oneline(X509_get_subject_name(err_cert), buf, sizeof(buf));
+  return ok;
+}
+
+/* Return error string for last OpenSSL error
+ */
+static char *SSL_strerror(unsigned long error, char *buf, size_t size)
+{
+#ifdef HAVE_ERR_ERROR_STRING_N
+  /* OpenSSL 0.9.6 and later has a function named
+     ERRO_error_string_n() that takes the size of the buffer as a
+     third argument */
+  ERR_error_string_n(error, buf, size);
+#else
+  (void) size;
+  ERR_error_string(error, buf);
+#endif
+  return buf;
+}
+
+#endif /* USE_SSLEAY */
+
+#ifdef USE_SSLEAY
+/**
+ * Global SSL init
+ *
+ * @retval 0 error initializing SSL
+ * @retval 1 SSL initialized successfully
+ */
+int Curl_ossl_init(void)
+{
+#ifdef HAVE_ENGINE_LOAD_BUILTIN_ENGINES
+  ENGINE_load_builtin_engines();
+#endif
+
+  /* Lets get nice error messages */
+  SSL_load_error_strings();
+
+  /* Init the global ciphers and digests */
+  if(!SSLeay_add_ssl_algorithms())
+    return 0;
+
+  OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms();
+
+  return 1;
+}
+
+#endif /* USE_SSLEAY */
+
+#ifdef USE_SSLEAY
+
+/* Global cleanup */
+void Curl_ossl_cleanup(void)
+{
+  /* Free ciphers and digests lists */
+  EVP_cleanup();
+
+#ifdef HAVE_ENGINE_CLEANUP
+  /* Free engine list */
+  ENGINE_cleanup();
+#endif
+
+#ifdef HAVE_CRYPTO_CLEANUP_ALL_EX_DATA
+  /* Free OpenSSL ex_data table */
+  CRYPTO_cleanup_all_ex_data();
+#endif
+
+  /* Free OpenSSL error strings */
+  ERR_free_strings();
+
+  /* Free thread local error state, destroying hash upon zero refcount */
+#ifdef HAVE_ERR_REMOVE_THREAD_STATE
+  ERR_remove_thread_state(NULL);
+#else
+  ERR_remove_state(0);
+#endif
+}
+
+/*
+ * This function uses SSL_peek to determine connection status.
+ *
+ * Return codes:
+ *     1 means the connection is still in place
+ *     0 means the connection has been closed
+ *    -1 means the connection status is unknown
+ */
+int Curl_ossl_check_cxn(struct connectdata *conn)
+{
+  int rc;
+  char buf;
+
+  rc = SSL_peek(conn->ssl[FIRSTSOCKET].handle, (void*)&buf, 1);
+  if(rc > 0)
+    return 1; /* connection still in place */
+
+  if(rc == 0)
+    return 0; /* connection has been closed */
+
+  return -1; /* connection status unknown */
+}
+
+/* Selects an OpenSSL crypto engine
+ */
+CURLcode Curl_ossl_set_engine(struct SessionHandle *data, const char *engine)
+{
+#if defined(USE_SSLEAY) && defined(HAVE_OPENSSL_ENGINE_H)
+  ENGINE *e;
+
+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x00909000L
+  e = ENGINE_by_id(engine);
+#else
+  /* avoid memory leak */
+  for(e = ENGINE_get_first(); e; e = ENGINE_get_next(e)) {
+    const char *e_id = ENGINE_get_id(e);
+    if(!strcmp(engine, e_id))
+      break;
+  }
+#endif
+
+  if(!e) {
+    failf(data, "SSL Engine '%s' not found", engine);
+    return CURLE_SSL_ENGINE_NOTFOUND;
+  }
+
+  if(data->state.engine) {
+    ENGINE_finish(data->state.engine);
+    ENGINE_free(data->state.engine);
+    data->state.engine = NULL;
+  }
+  if(!ENGINE_init(e)) {
+    char buf[256];
+
+    ENGINE_free(e);
+    failf(data, "Failed to initialise SSL Engine '%s':\n%s",
+          engine, SSL_strerror(ERR_get_error(), buf, sizeof(buf)));
+    return CURLE_SSL_ENGINE_INITFAILED;
+  }
+  data->state.engine = e;
+  return CURLE_OK;
+#else
+  (void)engine;
+  failf(data, "SSL Engine not supported");
+  return CURLE_SSL_ENGINE_NOTFOUND;
+#endif
+}
+
+/* Sets engine as default for all SSL operations
+ */
+CURLcode Curl_ossl_set_engine_default(struct SessionHandle *data)
+{
+#ifdef HAVE_OPENSSL_ENGINE_H
+  if(data->state.engine) {
+    if(ENGINE_set_default(data->state.engine, ENGINE_METHOD_ALL) > 0) {
+      infof(data,"set default crypto engine '%s'\n",
+            ENGINE_get_id(data->state.engine));
+    }
+    else {
+      failf(data, "set default crypto engine '%s' failed",
+            ENGINE_get_id(data->state.engine));
+      return CURLE_SSL_ENGINE_SETFAILED;
+    }
+  }
+#else
+  (void) data;
+#endif
+  return CURLE_OK;
+}
+
+/* Return list of OpenSSL crypto engine names.
+ */
+struct curl_slist *Curl_ossl_engines_list(struct SessionHandle *data)
+{
+  struct curl_slist *list = NULL;
+#if defined(USE_SSLEAY) && defined(HAVE_OPENSSL_ENGINE_H)
+  struct curl_slist *beg;
+  ENGINE *e;
+
+  for(e = ENGINE_get_first(); e; e = ENGINE_get_next(e)) {
+    beg = curl_slist_append(list, ENGINE_get_id(e));
+    if(!beg) {
+      curl_slist_free_all(list);
+      return NULL;
+    }
+    list = beg;
+  }
+#endif
+  (void) data;
+  return list;
+}
+
+
+/*
+ * This function is called when an SSL connection is closed.
+ */
+void Curl_ossl_close(struct connectdata *conn, int sockindex)
+{
+  struct ssl_connect_data *connssl = &conn->ssl[sockindex];
+
+  if(connssl->handle) {
+    (void)SSL_shutdown(connssl->handle);
+    SSL_set_connect_state(connssl->handle);
+
+    SSL_free (connssl->handle);
+    connssl->handle = NULL;
+  }
+  if(connssl->ctx) {
+    SSL_CTX_free (connssl->ctx);
+    connssl->ctx = NULL;
+  }
+}
+
+/*
+ * This function is called to shut down the SSL layer but keep the
+ * socket open (CCC - Clear Command Channel)
+ */
+int Curl_ossl_shutdown(struct connectdata *conn, int sockindex)
+{
+  int retval = 0;
+  struct ssl_connect_data *connssl = &conn->ssl[sockindex];
+  struct SessionHandle *data = conn->data;
+  char buf[120]; /* We will use this for the OpenSSL error buffer, so it has
+                    to be at least 120 bytes long. */
+  unsigned long sslerror;
+  ssize_t nread;
+  int buffsize;
+  int err;
+  int done = 0;
+
+  /* This has only been tested on the proftpd server, and the mod_tls code
+     sends a close notify alert without waiting for a close notify alert in
+     response. Thus we wait for a close notify alert from the server, but
+     we do not send one. Let's hope other servers do the same... */
+
+  if(data->set.ftp_ccc == CURLFTPSSL_CCC_ACTIVE)
+      (void)SSL_shutdown(connssl->handle);
+
+  if(connssl->handle) {
+    buffsize = (int)sizeof(buf);
+    while(!done) {
+      int what = Curl_socket_ready(conn->sock[sockindex],
+                                   CURL_SOCKET_BAD, SSL_SHUTDOWN_TIMEOUT);
+      if(what > 0) {
+        ERR_clear_error();
+
+        /* Something to read, let's do it and hope that it is the close
+           notify alert from the server */
+        nread = (ssize_t)SSL_read(conn->ssl[sockindex].handle, buf,
+                                  buffsize);
+        err = SSL_get_error(conn->ssl[sockindex].handle, (int)nread);
+
+        switch(err) {
+        case SSL_ERROR_NONE: /* this is not an error */
+        case SSL_ERROR_ZERO_RETURN: /* no more data */
+          /* This is the expected response. There was no data but only
+             the close notify alert */
+          done = 1;
+          break;
+        case SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ:
+          /* there's data pending, re-invoke SSL_read() */
+          infof(data, "SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ\n");
+          break;
+        case SSL_ERROR_WANT_WRITE:
+          /* SSL wants a write. Really odd. Let's bail out. */
+          infof(data, "SSL_ERROR_WANT_WRITE\n");
+          done = 1;
+          break;
+        default:
+          /* openssl/ssl.h says "look at error stack/return value/errno" */
+          sslerror = ERR_get_error();
+          failf(conn->data, "SSL read: %s, errno %d",
+                ERR_error_string(sslerror, buf),
+                SOCKERRNO);
+          done = 1;
+          break;
+        }
+      }
+      else if(0 == what) {
+        /* timeout */
+        failf(data, "SSL shutdown timeout");
+        done = 1;
+      }
+      else {
+        /* anything that gets here is fatally bad */
+        failf(data, "select/poll on SSL socket, errno: %d", SOCKERRNO);
+        retval = -1;
+        done = 1;
+      }
+    } /* while()-loop for the select() */
+
+    if(data->set.verbose) {
+#ifdef HAVE_SSL_GET_SHUTDOWN
+      switch(SSL_get_shutdown(connssl->handle)) {
+      case SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN:
+        infof(data, "SSL_get_shutdown() returned SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN\n");
+        break;
+      case SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN:
+        infof(data, "SSL_get_shutdown() returned SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN\n");
+        break;
+      case SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN|SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN:
+        infof(data, "SSL_get_shutdown() returned SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN|"
+              "SSL_RECEIVED__SHUTDOWN\n");
+        break;
+      }
+#endif
+    }
+
+    SSL_free (connssl->handle);
+    connssl->handle = NULL;
+  }
+  return retval;
+}
+
+void Curl_ossl_session_free(void *ptr)
+{
+  /* free the ID */
+  SSL_SESSION_free(ptr);
+}
+
+/*
+ * This function is called when the 'data' struct is going away. Close
+ * down everything and free all resources!
+ */
+int Curl_ossl_close_all(struct SessionHandle *data)
+{
+#ifdef HAVE_OPENSSL_ENGINE_H
+  if(data->state.engine) {
+    ENGINE_finish(data->state.engine);
+    ENGINE_free(data->state.engine);
+    data->state.engine = NULL;
+  }
+#else
+  (void)data;
+#endif
+  return 0;
+}
+
+static int asn1_output(const ASN1_UTCTIME *tm,
+                       char *buf,
+                       size_t sizeofbuf)
+{
+  const char *asn1_string;
+  int gmt=FALSE;
+  int i;
+  int year=0,month=0,day=0,hour=0,minute=0,second=0;
+
+  i=tm->length;
+  asn1_string=(const char *)tm->data;
+
+  if(i < 10)
+    return 1;
+  if(asn1_string[i-1] == 'Z')
+    gmt=TRUE;
+  for(i=0; i<10; i++)
+    if((asn1_string[i] > '9') || (asn1_string[i] < '0'))
+      return 2;
+
+  year= (asn1_string[0]-'0')*10+(asn1_string[1]-'0');
+  if(year < 50)
+    year+=100;
+
+  month= (asn1_string[2]-'0')*10+(asn1_string[3]-'0');
+  if((month > 12) || (month < 1))
+    return 3;
+
+  day= (asn1_string[4]-'0')*10+(asn1_string[5]-'0');
+  hour= (asn1_string[6]-'0')*10+(asn1_string[7]-'0');
+  minute=  (asn1_string[8]-'0')*10+(asn1_string[9]-'0');
+
+  if((asn1_string[10] >= '0') && (asn1_string[10] <= '9') &&
+     (asn1_string[11] >= '0') && (asn1_string[11] <= '9'))
+    second= (asn1_string[10]-'0')*10+(asn1_string[11]-'0');
+
+  snprintf(buf, sizeofbuf,
+           "%04d-%02d-%02d %02d:%02d:%02d %s",
+           year+1900, month, day, hour, minute, second, (gmt?"GMT":""));
+
+  return 0;
+}
+
+/* ====================================================== */
+
+
+/* Quote from RFC2818 section 3.1 "Server Identity"
+
+   If a subjectAltName extension of type dNSName is present, that MUST
+   be used as the identity. Otherwise, the (most specific) Common Name
+   field in the Subject field of the certificate MUST be used. Although
+   the use of the Common Name is existing practice, it is deprecated and
+   Certification Authorities are encouraged to use the dNSName instead.
+
+   Matching is performed using the matching rules specified by
+   [RFC2459].  If more than one identity of a given type is present in
+   the certificate (e.g., more than one dNSName name, a match in any one
+   of the set is considered acceptable.) Names may contain the wildcard
+   character * which is considered to match any single domain name
+   component or component fragment. E.g., *.a.com matches foo.a.com but
+   not bar.foo.a.com. f*.com matches foo.com but not bar.com.
+
+   In some cases, the URI is specified as an IP address rather than a
+   hostname. In this case, the iPAddress subjectAltName must be present
+   in the certificate and must exactly match the IP in the URI.
+
+*/
+static CURLcode verifyhost(struct connectdata *conn,
+                           X509 *server_cert)
+{
+  int matched = -1; /* -1 is no alternative match yet, 1 means match and 0
+                       means mismatch */
+  int target = GEN_DNS; /* target type, GEN_DNS or GEN_IPADD */
+  size_t addrlen = 0;
+  struct SessionHandle *data = conn->data;
+  STACK_OF(GENERAL_NAME) *altnames;
+#ifdef ENABLE_IPV6
+  struct in6_addr addr;
+#else
+  struct in_addr addr;
+#endif
+  CURLcode res = CURLE_OK;
+
+#ifdef ENABLE_IPV6
+  if(conn->bits.ipv6_ip &&
+     Curl_inet_pton(AF_INET6, conn->host.name, &addr)) {
+    target = GEN_IPADD;
+    addrlen = sizeof(struct in6_addr);
+  }
+  else
+#endif
+    if(Curl_inet_pton(AF_INET, conn->host.name, &addr)) {
+      target = GEN_IPADD;
+      addrlen = sizeof(struct in_addr);
+    }
+
+  /* get a "list" of alternative names */
+  altnames = X509_get_ext_d2i(server_cert, NID_subject_alt_name, NULL, NULL);
+
+  if(altnames) {
+    int numalts;
+    int i;
+
+    /* get amount of alternatives, RFC2459 claims there MUST be at least
+       one, but we don't depend on it... */
+    numalts = sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(altnames);
+
+    /* loop through all alternatives while none has matched */
+    for(i=0; (i<numalts) && (matched != 1); i++) {
+      /* get a handle to alternative name number i */
+      const GENERAL_NAME *check = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(altnames, i);
+
+      /* only check alternatives of the same type the target is */
+      if(check->type == target) {
+        /* get data and length */
+        const char *altptr = (char *)ASN1_STRING_data(check->d.ia5);
+        size_t altlen = (size_t) ASN1_STRING_length(check->d.ia5);
+
+        switch(target) {
+        case GEN_DNS: /* name/pattern comparison */
+          /* The OpenSSL man page explicitly says: "In general it cannot be
+             assumed that the data returned by ASN1_STRING_data() is null
+             terminated or does not contain embedded nulls." But also that
+             "The actual format of the data will depend on the actual string
+             type itself: for example for and IA5String the data will be ASCII"
+
+             Gisle researched the OpenSSL sources:
+             "I checked the 0.9.6 and 0.9.8 sources before my patch and
+             it always 0-terminates an IA5String."
+          */
+          if((altlen == strlen(altptr)) &&
+             /* if this isn't true, there was an embedded zero in the name
+                string and we cannot match it. */
+             Curl_cert_hostcheck(altptr, conn->host.name))
+            matched = 1;
+          else
+            matched = 0;
+          break;
+
+        case GEN_IPADD: /* IP address comparison */
+          /* compare alternative IP address if the data chunk is the same size
+             our server IP address is */
+          if((altlen == addrlen) && !memcmp(altptr, &addr, altlen))
+            matched = 1;
+          else
+            matched = 0;
+          break;
+        }
+      }
+    }
+    GENERAL_NAMES_free(altnames);
+  }
+
+  if(matched == 1)
+    /* an alternative name matched the server hostname */
+    infof(data, "\t subjectAltName: %s matched\n", conn->host.dispname);
+  else if(matched == 0) {
+    /* an alternative name field existed, but didn't match and then
+       we MUST fail */
+    infof(data, "\t subjectAltName does not match %s\n", conn->host.dispname);
+    res = CURLE_PEER_FAILED_VERIFICATION;
+  }
+  else {
+    /* we have to look to the last occurrence of a commonName in the
+       distinguished one to get the most significant one. */
+    int j,i=-1 ;
+
+/* The following is done because of a bug in 0.9.6b */
+
+    unsigned char *nulstr = (unsigned char *)"";
+    unsigned char *peer_CN = nulstr;
+
+    X509_NAME *name = X509_get_subject_name(server_cert) ;
+    if(name)
+      while((j = X509_NAME_get_index_by_NID(name, NID_commonName, i))>=0)
+        i=j;
+
+    /* we have the name entry and we will now convert this to a string
+       that we can use for comparison. Doing this we support BMPstring,
+       UTF8 etc. */
+
+    if(i>=0) {
+      ASN1_STRING *tmp = X509_NAME_ENTRY_get_data(X509_NAME_get_entry(name,i));
+
+      /* In OpenSSL 0.9.7d and earlier, ASN1_STRING_to_UTF8 fails if the input
+         is already UTF-8 encoded. We check for this case and copy the raw
+         string manually to avoid the problem. This code can be made
+         conditional in the future when OpenSSL has been fixed. Work-around
+         brought by Alexis S. L. Carvalho. */
+      if(tmp) {
+        if(ASN1_STRING_type(tmp) == V_ASN1_UTF8STRING) {
+          j = ASN1_STRING_length(tmp);
+          if(j >= 0) {
+            peer_CN = OPENSSL_malloc(j+1);
+            if(peer_CN) {
+              memcpy(peer_CN, ASN1_STRING_data(tmp), j);
+              peer_CN[j] = '\0';
+            }
+          }
+        }
+        else /* not a UTF8 name */
+          j = ASN1_STRING_to_UTF8(&peer_CN, tmp);
+
+        if(peer_CN && (curlx_uztosi(strlen((char *)peer_CN)) != j)) {
+          /* there was a terminating zero before the end of string, this
+             cannot match and we return failure! */
+          failf(data, "SSL: illegal cert name field");
+          res = CURLE_PEER_FAILED_VERIFICATION;
+        }
+      }
+    }
+
+    if(peer_CN == nulstr)
+       peer_CN = NULL;
+    else {
+      /* convert peer_CN from UTF8 */
+      CURLcode rc = Curl_convert_from_utf8(data, peer_CN, strlen(peer_CN));
+      /* Curl_convert_from_utf8 calls failf if unsuccessful */
+      if(rc) {
+        OPENSSL_free(peer_CN);
+        return rc;
+      }
+    }
+
+    if(res)
+      /* error already detected, pass through */
+      ;
+    else if(!peer_CN) {
+      failf(data,
+            "SSL: unable to obtain common name from peer certificate");
+      res = CURLE_PEER_FAILED_VERIFICATION;
+    }
+    else if(!Curl_cert_hostcheck((const char *)peer_CN, conn->host.name)) {
+      failf(data, "SSL: certificate subject name '%s' does not match "
+            "target host name '%s'", peer_CN, conn->host.dispname);
+      res = CURLE_PEER_FAILED_VERIFICATION;
+    }
+    else {
+      infof(data, "\t common name: %s (matched)\n", peer_CN);
+    }
+    if(peer_CN)
+      OPENSSL_free(peer_CN);
+  }
+  return res;
+}
+#endif /* USE_SSLEAY */
+
+/* The SSL_CTRL_SET_MSG_CALLBACK doesn't exist in ancient OpenSSL versions
+   and thus this cannot be done there. */
+#ifdef SSL_CTRL_SET_MSG_CALLBACK
+
+static const char *ssl_msg_type(int ssl_ver, int msg)
+{
+  if(ssl_ver == SSL2_VERSION_MAJOR) {
+    switch (msg) {
+      case SSL2_MT_ERROR:
+        return "Error";
+      case SSL2_MT_CLIENT_HELLO:
+        return "Client hello";
+      case SSL2_MT_CLIENT_MASTER_KEY:
+        return "Client key";
+      case SSL2_MT_CLIENT_FINISHED:
+        return "Client finished";
+      case SSL2_MT_SERVER_HELLO:
+        return "Server hello";
+      case SSL2_MT_SERVER_VERIFY:
+        return "Server verify";
+      case SSL2_MT_SERVER_FINISHED:
+        return "Server finished";
+      case SSL2_MT_REQUEST_CERTIFICATE:
+        return "Request CERT";
+      case SSL2_MT_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE:
+        return "Client CERT";
+    }
+  }
+  else if(ssl_ver == SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR) {
+    switch (msg) {
+      case SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST:
+        return "Hello request";
+      case SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO:
+        return "Client hello";
+      case SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO:
+        return "Server hello";
+      case SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE:
+        return "CERT";
+      case SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE:
+        return "Server key exchange";
+      case SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE:
+        return "Client key exchange";
+      case SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST:
+        return "Request CERT";
+      case SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE:
+        return "Server finished";
+      case SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY:
+        return "CERT verify";
+      case SSL3_MT_FINISHED:
+        return "Finished";
+    }
+  }
+  return "Unknown";
+}
+
+static const char *tls_rt_type(int type)
+{
+  return (
+    type == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC ? "TLS change cipher, " :
+    type == SSL3_RT_ALERT              ? "TLS alert, "         :
+    type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE          ? "TLS handshake, "     :
+    type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA   ? "TLS app data, "      :
+                                         "TLS Unknown, ");
+}
+
+
+/*
+ * Our callback from the SSL/TLS layers.
+ */
+static void ssl_tls_trace(int direction, int ssl_ver, int content_type,
+                          const void *buf, size_t len, const SSL *ssl,
+                          struct connectdata *conn)
+{
+  struct SessionHandle *data;
+  const char *msg_name, *tls_rt_name;
+  char ssl_buf[1024];
+  int  ver, msg_type, txt_len;
+
+  if(!conn || !conn->data || !conn->data->set.fdebug ||
+     (direction != 0 && direction != 1))
+    return;
+
+  data = conn->data;
+  ssl_ver >>= 8;
+  ver = (ssl_ver == SSL2_VERSION_MAJOR ? '2' :
+         ssl_ver == SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR ? '3' : '?');
+
+  /* SSLv2 doesn't seem to have TLS record-type headers, so OpenSSL
+   * always pass-up content-type as 0. But the interesting message-type
+   * is at 'buf[0]'.
+   */
+  if(ssl_ver == SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR && content_type != 0)
+    tls_rt_name = tls_rt_type(content_type);
+  else
+    tls_rt_name = "";
+
+  msg_type = *(char*)buf;
+  msg_name = ssl_msg_type(ssl_ver, msg_type);
+
+  txt_len = snprintf(ssl_buf, sizeof(ssl_buf), "SSLv%c, %s%s (%d):\n",
+                     ver, tls_rt_name, msg_name, msg_type);
+  Curl_debug(data, CURLINFO_TEXT, ssl_buf, (size_t)txt_len, NULL);
+
+  Curl_debug(data, (direction == 1) ? CURLINFO_SSL_DATA_OUT :
+             CURLINFO_SSL_DATA_IN, (char *)buf, len, NULL);
+  (void) ssl;
+}
+#endif
+
+#ifdef USE_SSLEAY
+/* ====================================================== */
+
+#ifdef SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_HOSTNAME
+#  define use_sni(x)  sni = (x)
+#else
+#  define use_sni(x)  Curl_nop_stmt
+#endif
+
+static CURLcode
+ossl_connect_step1(struct connectdata *conn,
+                   int sockindex)
+{
+  CURLcode retcode = CURLE_OK;
+
+  struct SessionHandle *data = conn->data;
+  SSL_METHOD_QUAL SSL_METHOD *req_method=NULL;
+  void *ssl_sessionid=NULL;
+  X509_LOOKUP *lookup=NULL;
+  curl_socket_t sockfd = conn->sock[sockindex];
+  struct ssl_connect_data *connssl = &conn->ssl[sockindex];
+  long ctx_options;
+#ifdef SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_HOSTNAME
+  bool sni;
+#ifdef ENABLE_IPV6
+  struct in6_addr addr;
+#else
+  struct in_addr addr;
+#endif
+#endif
+
+  DEBUGASSERT(ssl_connect_1 == connssl->connecting_state);
+
+  /* Make funny stuff to get random input */
+  Curl_ossl_seed(data);
+
+  /* check to see if we've been told to use an explicit SSL/TLS version */
+
+  switch(data->set.ssl.version) {
+  default:
+  case CURL_SSLVERSION_DEFAULT:
+#ifdef USE_TLS_SRP
+    if(data->set.ssl.authtype == CURL_TLSAUTH_SRP) {
+      infof(data, "Set version TLSv1 for SRP authorisation\n");
+      req_method = TLSv1_client_method() ;
+    }
+    else
+#endif
+    /* we try to figure out version */
+    req_method = SSLv23_client_method();
+    use_sni(TRUE);
+    break;
+  case CURL_SSLVERSION_TLSv1:
+    req_method = TLSv1_client_method();
+    use_sni(TRUE);
+    break;
+  case CURL_SSLVERSION_SSLv2:
+#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_SSL2
+    failf(data, "OpenSSL was built without SSLv2 support");
+    return CURLE_NOT_BUILT_IN;
+#else
+#ifdef USE_TLS_SRP
+    if(data->set.ssl.authtype == CURL_TLSAUTH_SRP)
+      return CURLE_SSL_CONNECT_ERROR;
+#endif
+    req_method = SSLv2_client_method();
+    use_sni(FALSE);
+    break;
+#endif
+  case CURL_SSLVERSION_SSLv3:
+#ifdef USE_TLS_SRP
+    if(data->set.ssl.authtype == CURL_TLSAUTH_SRP)
+      return CURLE_SSL_CONNECT_ERROR;
+#endif
+    req_method = SSLv3_client_method();
+    use_sni(FALSE);
+    break;
+  }
+
+  if(connssl->ctx)
+    SSL_CTX_free(connssl->ctx);
+  connssl->ctx = SSL_CTX_new(req_method);
+
+  if(!connssl->ctx) {
+    failf(data, "SSL: couldn't create a context: %s",
+          ERR_error_string(ERR_peek_error(), NULL));
+    return CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY;
+  }
+
+#ifdef SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS
+  SSL_CTX_set_mode(connssl->ctx, SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS);
+#endif
+
+#ifdef SSL_CTRL_SET_MSG_CALLBACK
+  if(data->set.fdebug && data->set.verbose) {
+    /* the SSL trace callback is only used for verbose logging so we only
+       inform about failures of setting it */
+    if(!SSL_CTX_callback_ctrl(connssl->ctx, SSL_CTRL_SET_MSG_CALLBACK,
+                               (void (*)(void))ssl_tls_trace)) {
+      infof(data, "SSL: couldn't set callback!\n");
+    }
+    else if(!SSL_CTX_ctrl(connssl->ctx, SSL_CTRL_SET_MSG_CALLBACK_ARG, 0,
+                          conn)) {
+      infof(data, "SSL: couldn't set callback argument!\n");
+    }
+  }
+#endif
+
+  /* OpenSSL contains code to work-around lots of bugs and flaws in various
+     SSL-implementations. SSL_CTX_set_options() is used to enabled those
+     work-arounds. The man page for this option states that SSL_OP_ALL enables
+     all the work-arounds and that "It is usually safe to use SSL_OP_ALL to
+     enable the bug workaround options if compatibility with somewhat broken
+     implementations is desired."
+
+     The "-no_ticket" option was introduced in Openssl0.9.8j. It's a flag to
+     disable "rfc4507bis session ticket support".  rfc4507bis was later turned
+     into the proper RFC5077 it seems: http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5077
+
+     The enabled extension concerns the session management. I wonder how often
+     libcurl stops a connection and then resumes a TLS session. also, sending
+     the session data is some overhead. .I suggest that you just use your
+     proposed patch (which explicitly disables TICKET).
+
+     If someone writes an application with libcurl and openssl who wants to
+     enable the feature, one can do this in the SSL callback.
+
+     SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_REUSE_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG option enabling allowed proper
+     interoperability with web server Netscape Enterprise Server 2.0.1 which
+     was released back in 1996.
+
+     Due to CVE-2010-4180, option SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_REUSE_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG has
+     become ineffective as of OpenSSL 0.9.8q and 1.0.0c. In order to mitigate
+     CVE-2010-4180 when using previous OpenSSL versions we no longer enable
+     this option regardless of OpenSSL version and SSL_OP_ALL definition.
+
+     OpenSSL added a work-around for a SSL 3.0/TLS 1.0 CBC vulnerability
+     (http://www.openssl.org/~bodo/tls-cbc.txt). In 0.9.6e they added a bit to
+     SSL_OP_ALL that _disables_ that work-around despite the fact that
+     SSL_OP_ALL is documented to do "rather harmless" workarounds. In order to
+     keep the secure work-around, the SSL_OP_DONT_INSERT_EMPTY_FRAGMENTS bit
+     must not be set.
+  */
+
+  ctx_options = SSL_OP_ALL;
+
+#ifdef SSL_OP_NO_TICKET
+  ctx_options |= SSL_OP_NO_TICKET;
+#endif
+
+#ifdef SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION
+  ctx_options |= SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION;
+#endif
+
+#ifdef SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_REUSE_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG
+  /* mitigate CVE-2010-4180 */
+  ctx_options &= ~SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_REUSE_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG;
+#endif
+
+#ifdef SSL_OP_DONT_INSERT_EMPTY_FRAGMENTS
+  /* unless the user explicitly ask to allow the protocol vulnerability we
+     use the work-around */
+  if(!conn->data->set.ssl_enable_beast)
+    ctx_options &= ~SSL_OP_DONT_INSERT_EMPTY_FRAGMENTS;
+#endif
+
+  /* disable SSLv2 in the default case (i.e. allow SSLv3 and TLSv1) */
+  if(data->set.ssl.version == CURL_SSLVERSION_DEFAULT)
+    ctx_options |= SSL_OP_NO_SSLv2;
+
+  SSL_CTX_set_options(connssl->ctx, ctx_options);
+
+  if(data->set.str[STRING_CERT] || data->set.str[STRING_CERT_TYPE]) {
+    if(!cert_stuff(conn,
+                   connssl->ctx,
+                   data->set.str[STRING_CERT],
+                   data->set.str[STRING_CERT_TYPE],
+                   data->set.str[STRING_KEY],
+                   data->set.str[STRING_KEY_TYPE])) {
+      /* failf() is already done in cert_stuff() */
+      return CURLE_SSL_CERTPROBLEM;
+    }
+  }
+
+  if(data->set.str[STRING_SSL_CIPHER_LIST]) {
+    if(!SSL_CTX_set_cipher_list(connssl->ctx,
+                                data->set.str[STRING_SSL_CIPHER_LIST])) {
+      failf(data, "failed setting cipher list");
+      return CURLE_SSL_CIPHER;
+    }
+  }
+
+#ifdef USE_TLS_SRP
+  if(data->set.ssl.authtype == CURL_TLSAUTH_SRP) {
+    infof(data, "Using TLS-SRP username: %s\n", data->set.ssl.username);
+
+    if(!SSL_CTX_set_srp_username(connssl->ctx, data->set.ssl.username)) {
+      failf(data, "Unable to set SRP user name");
+      return CURLE_BAD_FUNCTION_ARGUMENT;
+    }
+    if(!SSL_CTX_set_srp_password(connssl->ctx,data->set.ssl.password)) {
+      failf(data, "failed setting SRP password");
+      return CURLE_BAD_FUNCTION_ARGUMENT;
+    }
+    if(!data->set.str[STRING_SSL_CIPHER_LIST]) {
+      infof(data, "Setting cipher list SRP\n");
+
+      if(!SSL_CTX_set_cipher_list(connssl->ctx, "SRP")) {
+        failf(data, "failed setting SRP cipher list");
+        return CURLE_SSL_CIPHER;
+      }
+    }
+  }
+#endif
+  if(data->set.str[STRING_SSL_CAFILE] || data->set.str[STRING_SSL_CAPATH]) {
+    /* tell SSL where to find CA certificates that are used to verify
+       the servers certificate. */
+    if(!SSL_CTX_load_verify_locations(connssl->ctx,
+                                       data->set.str[STRING_SSL_CAFILE],
+                                       data->set.str[STRING_SSL_CAPATH])) {
+      if(data->set.ssl.verifypeer) {
+        /* Fail if we insist on successfully verifying the server. */
+        failf(data,"error setting certificate verify locations:\n"
+              "  CAfile: %s\n  CApath: %s",
+              data->set.str[STRING_SSL_CAFILE]?
+              data->set.str[STRING_SSL_CAFILE]: "none",
+              data->set.str[STRING_SSL_CAPATH]?
+              data->set.str[STRING_SSL_CAPATH] : "none");
+        return CURLE_SSL_CACERT_BADFILE;
+      }
+      else {
+        /* Just continue with a warning if no strict  certificate verification
+           is required. */
+        infof(data, "error setting certificate verify locations,"
+              " continuing anyway:\n");
+      }
+    }
+    else {
+      /* Everything is fine. */
+      infof(data, "successfully set certificate verify locations:\n");
+    }
+    infof(data,
+          "  CAfile: %s\n"
+          "  CApath: %s\n",
+          data->set.str[STRING_SSL_CAFILE] ? data->set.str[STRING_SSL_CAFILE]:
+          "none",
+          data->set.str[STRING_SSL_CAPATH] ? data->set.str[STRING_SSL_CAPATH]:
+          "none");
+  }
+
+  if(data->set.str[STRING_SSL_CRLFILE]) {
+    /* tell SSL where to find CRL file that is used to check certificate
+     * revocation */
+    lookup=X509_STORE_add_lookup(SSL_CTX_get_cert_store(connssl->ctx),
+                                 X509_LOOKUP_file());
+    if(!lookup ||
+       (!X509_load_crl_file(lookup,data->set.str[STRING_SSL_CRLFILE],
+                            X509_FILETYPE_PEM)) ) {
+      failf(data,"error loading CRL file: %s",
+            data->set.str[STRING_SSL_CRLFILE]);
+      return CURLE_SSL_CRL_BADFILE;
+    }
+    else {
+      /* Everything is fine. */
+      infof(data, "successfully load CRL file:\n");
+      X509_STORE_set_flags(SSL_CTX_get_cert_store(connssl->ctx),
+                           X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK|X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK_ALL);
+    }
+    infof(data,
+          "  CRLfile: %s\n", data->set.str[STRING_SSL_CRLFILE] ?
+          data->set.str[STRING_SSL_CRLFILE]: "none");
+  }
+
+  /* SSL always tries to verify the peer, this only says whether it should
+   * fail to connect if the verification fails, or if it should continue
+   * anyway. In the latter case the result of the verification is checked with
+   * SSL_get_verify_result() below. */
+  SSL_CTX_set_verify(connssl->ctx,
+                     data->set.ssl.verifypeer?SSL_VERIFY_PEER:SSL_VERIFY_NONE,
+                     cert_verify_callback);
+
+  /* give application a chance to interfere with SSL set up. */
+  if(data->set.ssl.fsslctx) {
+    retcode = (*data->set.ssl.fsslctx)(data, connssl->ctx,
+                                       data->set.ssl.fsslctxp);
+    if(retcode) {
+      failf(data,"error signaled by ssl ctx callback");
+      return retcode;
+    }
+  }
+
+  /* Lets make an SSL structure */
+  if(connssl->handle)
+    SSL_free(connssl->handle);
+  connssl->handle = SSL_new(connssl->ctx);
+  if(!connssl->handle) {
+    failf(data, "SSL: couldn't create a context (handle)!");
+    return CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY;
+  }
+  SSL_set_connect_state(connssl->handle);
+
+  connssl->server_cert = 0x0;
+
+#ifdef SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_HOSTNAME
+  if((0 == Curl_inet_pton(AF_INET, conn->host.name, &addr)) &&
+#ifdef ENABLE_IPV6
+     (0 == Curl_inet_pton(AF_INET6, conn->host.name, &addr)) &&
+#endif
+     sni &&
+     !SSL_set_tlsext_host_name(connssl->handle, conn->host.name))
+    infof(data, "WARNING: failed to configure server name indication (SNI) "
+          "TLS extension\n");
+#endif
+
+  /* Check if there's a cached ID we can/should use here! */
+  if(!Curl_ssl_getsessionid(conn, &ssl_sessionid, NULL)) {
+    /* we got a session id, use it! */
+    if(!SSL_set_session(connssl->handle, ssl_sessionid)) {
+      failf(data, "SSL: SSL_set_session failed: %s",
+            ERR_error_string(ERR_get_error(),NULL));
+      return CURLE_SSL_CONNECT_ERROR;
+    }
+    /* Informational message */
+    infof (data, "SSL re-using session ID\n");
+  }
+
+  /* pass the raw socket into the SSL layers */
+  if(!SSL_set_fd(connssl->handle, (int)sockfd)) {
+    failf(data, "SSL: SSL_set_fd failed: %s",
+          ERR_error_string(ERR_get_error(),NULL));
+    return CURLE_SSL_CONNECT_ERROR;
+  }
+
+  connssl->connecting_state = ssl_connect_2;
+  return CURLE_OK;
+}
+
+static CURLcode
+ossl_connect_step2(struct connectdata *conn, int sockindex)
+{
+  struct SessionHandle *data = conn->data;
+  int err;
+  struct ssl_connect_data *connssl = &conn->ssl[sockindex];
+
+  DEBUGASSERT(ssl_connect_2 == connssl->connecting_state
+             || ssl_connect_2_reading == connssl->connecting_state
+             || ssl_connect_2_writing == connssl->connecting_state);
+
+  ERR_clear_error();
+
+  err = SSL_connect(connssl->handle);
+
+  /* 1  is fine
+     0  is "not successful but was shut down controlled"
+     <0 is "handshake was not successful, because a fatal error occurred" */
+  if(1 != err) {
+    int detail = SSL_get_error(connssl->handle, err);
+
+    if(SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ == detail) {
+      connssl->connecting_state = ssl_connect_2_reading;
+      return CURLE_OK;
+    }
+    else if(SSL_ERROR_WANT_WRITE == detail) {
+      connssl->connecting_state = ssl_connect_2_writing;
+      return CURLE_OK;
+    }
+    else {
+      /* untreated error */
+      unsigned long errdetail;
+      char error_buffer[256]; /* OpenSSL documents that this must be at least
+                                 256 bytes long. */
+      CURLcode rc;
+      const char *cert_problem = NULL;
+      long lerr;
+
+      connssl->connecting_state = ssl_connect_2; /* the connection failed,
+                                                    we're not waiting for
+                                                    anything else. */
+
+      errdetail = ERR_get_error(); /* Gets the earliest error code from the
+                                      thread's error queue and removes the
+                                      entry. */
+
+      switch(errdetail) {
+      case 0x1407E086:
+        /* 1407E086:
+           SSL routines:
+           SSL2_SET_CERTIFICATE:
+           certificate verify failed */
+        /* fall-through */
+      case 0x14090086:
+        /* 14090086:
+           SSL routines:
+           SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE:
+           certificate verify failed */
+        rc = CURLE_SSL_CACERT;
+
+        lerr = SSL_get_verify_result(connssl->handle);
+        if(lerr != X509_V_OK) {
+          snprintf(error_buffer, sizeof(error_buffer),
+                   "SSL certificate problem: %s",
+                   X509_verify_cert_error_string(lerr));
+        }
+        else
+          cert_problem = "SSL certificate problem, verify that the CA cert is"
+            " OK.";
+
+        break;
+      default:
+        rc = CURLE_SSL_CONNECT_ERROR;
+        SSL_strerror(errdetail, error_buffer, sizeof(error_buffer));
+        break;
+      }
+
+      /* detail is already set to the SSL error above */
+
+      /* If we e.g. use SSLv2 request-method and the server doesn't like us
+       * (RST connection etc.), OpenSSL gives no explanation whatsoever and
+       * the SO_ERROR is also lost.
+       */
+      if(CURLE_SSL_CONNECT_ERROR == rc && errdetail == 0) {
+        failf(data, "Unknown SSL protocol error in connection to %s:%ld ",
+              conn->host.name, conn->port);
+        return rc;
+      }
+      /* Could be a CERT problem */
+
+      failf(data, "%s%s", cert_problem ? cert_problem : "", error_buffer);
+      return rc;
+    }
+  }
+  else {
+    /* we have been connected fine, we're not waiting for anything else. */
+    connssl->connecting_state = ssl_connect_3;
+
+    /* Informational message */
+    infof (data, "SSL connection using %s\n",
+           SSL_get_cipher(connssl->handle));
+
+    return CURLE_OK;
+  }
+}
+
+static int asn1_object_dump(ASN1_OBJECT *a, char *buf, size_t len)
+{
+  int i, ilen;
+
+  if((ilen = (int)len) < 0)
+    return 1; /* buffer too big */
+
+  i = i2t_ASN1_OBJECT(buf, ilen, a);
+
+  if(i >= ilen)
+    return 1; /* buffer too small */
+
+  return 0;
+}
+
+static CURLcode push_certinfo_len(struct SessionHandle *data,
+                                  int certnum,
+                                  const char *label,
+                                  const char *value,
+                                  size_t valuelen)
+{
+  struct curl_certinfo *ci = &data->info.certs;
+  char *output;
+  struct curl_slist *nl;
+  CURLcode res = CURLE_OK;
+  size_t labellen = strlen(label);
+  size_t outlen = labellen + 1 + valuelen + 1; /* label:value\0 */
+
+  output = malloc(outlen);
+  if(!output)
+    return CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY;
+
+  /* sprintf the label and colon */
+  snprintf(output, outlen, "%s:", label);
+
+  /* memcpy the value (it might not be zero terminated) */
+  memcpy(&output[labellen+1], value, valuelen);
+
+  /* zero terminate the output */
+  output[labellen + 1 + valuelen] = 0;
+
+  /* TODO: we should rather introduce an internal API that can do the
+     equivalent of curl_slist_append but doesn't strdup() the given data as
+     like in this place the extra malloc/free is totally pointless */
+  nl = curl_slist_append(ci->certinfo[certnum], output);
+  free(output);
+  if(!nl) {
+    curl_slist_free_all(ci->certinfo[certnum]);
+    ci->certinfo[certnum] = NULL;
+    res = CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY;
+  }
+  else
+    ci->certinfo[certnum] = nl;
+
+  return res;
+}
+
+/* this is a convenience function for push_certinfo_len that takes a zero
+   terminated value */
+static CURLcode push_certinfo(struct SessionHandle *data,
+                              int certnum,
+                              const char *label,
+                              const char *value)
+{
+  size_t valuelen = strlen(value);
+
+  return push_certinfo_len(data, certnum, label, value, valuelen);
+}
+
+static void pubkey_show(struct SessionHandle *data,
+                        int num,
+                        const char *type,
+                        const char *name,
+                        unsigned char *raw,
+                        int len)
+{
+  size_t left;
+  int i;
+  char namebuf[32];
+  char *buffer;
+
+  left = len*3 + 1;
+  buffer = malloc(left);
+  if(buffer) {
+    char *ptr=buffer;
+    snprintf(namebuf, sizeof(namebuf), "%s(%s)", type, name);
+    for(i=0; i< len; i++) {
+      snprintf(ptr, left, "%02x:", raw[i]);
+      ptr += 3;
+      left -= 3;
+    }
+    infof(data, "   %s: %s\n", namebuf, buffer);
+    push_certinfo(data, num, namebuf, buffer);
+    free(buffer);
+  }
+}
+
+#define print_pubkey_BN(_type, _name, _num)    \
+do {                              \
+  if(pubkey->pkey._type->_name != NULL) { \
+    int len = BN_num_bytes(pubkey->pkey._type->_name);  \
+    if(len < CERTBUFFERSIZE) {                                    \
+      BN_bn2bin(pubkey->pkey._type->_name, (unsigned char*)bufp); \
+      bufp[len] = 0;                                                    \
+      pubkey_show(data, _num, #_type, #_name, (unsigned char*)bufp, len); \
+    } \
+  } \
+} WHILE_FALSE
+
+static int X509V3_ext(struct SessionHandle *data,
+                      int certnum,
+                      STACK_OF(X509_EXTENSION) *exts)
+{
+  int i;
+  size_t j;
+
+  if(sk_X509_EXTENSION_num(exts) <= 0)
+    /* no extensions, bail out */
+    return 1;
+
+  for(i=0; i<sk_X509_EXTENSION_num(exts); i++) {
+    ASN1_OBJECT *obj;
+    X509_EXTENSION *ext = sk_X509_EXTENSION_value(exts, i);
+    BUF_MEM *biomem;
+    char buf[512];
+    char *ptr=buf;
+    char namebuf[128];
+    BIO *bio_out = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem());
+
+    if(!bio_out)
+      return 1;
+
+    obj = X509_EXTENSION_get_object(ext);
+
+    asn1_object_dump(obj, namebuf, sizeof(namebuf));
+
+    infof(data, "%s: %s\n", namebuf,
+          X509_EXTENSION_get_critical(ext)?"(critical)":"");
+
+    if(!X509V3_EXT_print(bio_out, ext, 0, 0))
+      M_ASN1_OCTET_STRING_print(bio_out, ext->value);
+
+    BIO_get_mem_ptr(bio_out, &biomem);
+
+    /* biomem->length bytes at biomem->data, this little loop here is only
+       done for the infof() call, we send the "raw" data to the certinfo
+       function */
+    for(j=0; j<(size_t)biomem->length; j++) {
+      const char *sep="";
+      if(biomem->data[j] == '\n') {
+        sep=", ";
+        j++; /* skip the newline */
+      };
+      while((biomem->data[j] == ' ') && (j<(size_t)biomem->length))
+        j++;
+      if(j<(size_t)biomem->length)
+        ptr+=snprintf(ptr, sizeof(buf)-(ptr-buf), "%s%c", sep,
+                      biomem->data[j]);
+    }
+    infof(data, "  %s\n", buf);
+
+    push_certinfo(data, certnum, namebuf, buf);
+
+    BIO_free(bio_out);
+
+  }
+  return 0; /* all is fine */
+}
+
+
+static void X509_signature(struct SessionHandle *data,
+                           int numcert,
+                           ASN1_STRING *sig)
+{
+  char buf[1024];
+  char *ptr = buf;
+  int i;
+  for(i=0; i<sig->length; i++)
+    ptr+=snprintf(ptr, sizeof(buf)-(ptr-buf), "%02x:", sig->data[i]);
+
+  infof(data, " Signature: %s\n", buf);
+  push_certinfo(data, numcert, "Signature", buf);
+}
+
+static void dumpcert(struct SessionHandle *data, X509 *x, int numcert)
+{
+  BIO *bio_out = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem());
+  BUF_MEM *biomem;
+
+  /* this outputs the cert in this 64 column wide style with newlines and
+     -----BEGIN CERTIFICATE----- texts and more */
+  PEM_write_bio_X509(bio_out, x);
+
+  BIO_get_mem_ptr(bio_out, &biomem);
+
+  infof(data, "%s\n", biomem->data);
+
+  push_certinfo_len(data, numcert, "Cert", biomem->data, biomem->length);
+
+  BIO_free(bio_out);
+
+}
+
+
+static int init_certinfo(struct SessionHandle *data,
+                         int num)
+{
+  struct curl_certinfo *ci = &data->info.certs;
+  struct curl_slist **table;
+
+  Curl_ssl_free_certinfo(data);
+
+  ci->num_of_certs = num;
+  table = calloc((size_t)num, sizeof(struct curl_slist *));
+  if(!table)
+    return 1;
+
+  ci->certinfo = table;
+  return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * This size was previously 512 which has been reported "too small" without
+ * any specifics, so it was enlarged to allow more data to get shown uncut.
+ * The "perfect" size is yet to figure out.
+ */
+#define CERTBUFFERSIZE 8192
+
+static CURLcode get_cert_chain(struct connectdata *conn,
+                               struct ssl_connect_data *connssl)
+
+{
+  STACK_OF(X509) *sk;
+  int i;
+  char *bufp;
+  struct SessionHandle *data = conn->data;
+  int numcerts;
+
+  bufp = malloc(CERTBUFFERSIZE);
+  if(!bufp)
+    return CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY;
+
+  sk = SSL_get_peer_cert_chain(connssl->handle);
+  if(!sk) {
+    free(bufp);
+    return CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY;
+  }
+
+  numcerts = sk_X509_num(sk);
+  if(init_certinfo(data, numcerts)) {
+    free(bufp);
+    return CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY;
+  }
+
+  infof(data, "--- Certificate chain\n");
+  for(i=0; i<numcerts; i++) {
+    long value;
+    ASN1_INTEGER *num;
+    ASN1_TIME *certdate;
+
+    /* get the certs in "importance order" */
+#if 0
+    X509 *x = sk_X509_value(sk, numcerts - i - 1);
+#else
+    X509 *x = sk_X509_value(sk, i);
+#endif
+
+    X509_CINF *cinf;
+    EVP_PKEY *pubkey=NULL;
+    int j;
+    char *ptr;
+
+    (void)x509_name_oneline(X509_get_subject_name(x), bufp, CERTBUFFERSIZE);
+    infof(data, "%2d Subject: %s\n", i, bufp);
+    push_certinfo(data, i, "Subject", bufp);
+
+    (void)x509_name_oneline(X509_get_issuer_name(x), bufp, CERTBUFFERSIZE);
+    infof(data, "   Issuer: %s\n", bufp);
+    push_certinfo(data, i, "Issuer", bufp);
+
+    value = X509_get_version(x);
+    infof(data, "   Version: %lu (0x%lx)\n", value+1, value);
+    snprintf(bufp, CERTBUFFERSIZE, "%lx", value);
+    push_certinfo(data, i, "Version", bufp); /* hex */
+
+    num=X509_get_serialNumber(x);
+    if(num->length <= 4) {
+      value = ASN1_INTEGER_get(num);
+      infof(data,"   Serial Number: %ld (0x%lx)\n", value, value);
+      snprintf(bufp, CERTBUFFERSIZE, "%lx", value);
+    }
+    else {
+      int left = CERTBUFFERSIZE;
+
+      ptr = bufp;
+      *ptr++ = 0;
+      if(num->type == V_ASN1_NEG_INTEGER)
+        *ptr++='-';
+
+      for(j=0; (j<num->length) && (left>=4); j++) {
+        /* TODO: length restrictions */
+        snprintf(ptr, 3, "%02x%c",num->data[j],
+                 ((j+1 == num->length)?'\n':':'));
+        ptr += 3;
+        left-=4;
+      }
+      if(num->length)
+        infof(data,"   Serial Number: %s\n", bufp);
+      else
+        bufp[0]=0;
+    }
+    if(bufp[0])
+      push_certinfo(data, i, "Serial Number", bufp); /* hex */
+
+    cinf = x->cert_info;
+
+    j = asn1_object_dump(cinf->signature->algorithm, bufp, CERTBUFFERSIZE);
+    if(!j) {
+      infof(data, "   Signature Algorithm: %s\n", bufp);
+      push_certinfo(data, i, "Signature Algorithm", bufp);
+    }
+
+    certdate = X509_get_notBefore(x);
+    asn1_output(certdate, bufp, CERTBUFFERSIZE);
+    infof(data, "   Start date: %s\n", bufp);
+    push_certinfo(data, i, "Start date", bufp);
+
+    certdate = X509_get_notAfter(x);
+    asn1_output(certdate, bufp, CERTBUFFERSIZE);
+    infof(data, "   Expire date: %s\n", bufp);
+    push_certinfo(data, i, "Expire date", bufp);
+
+    j = asn1_object_dump(cinf->key->algor->algorithm, bufp, CERTBUFFERSIZE);
+    if(!j) {
+      infof(data, "   Public Key Algorithm: %s\n", bufp);
+      push_certinfo(data, i, "Public Key Algorithm", bufp);
+    }
+
+    pubkey = X509_get_pubkey(x);
+    if(!pubkey)
+      infof(data, "   Unable to load public key\n");
+    else {
+      switch(pubkey->type) {
+      case EVP_PKEY_RSA:
+        infof(data,  "   RSA Public Key (%d bits)\n",
+              BN_num_bits(pubkey->pkey.rsa->n));
+        snprintf(bufp, CERTBUFFERSIZE, "%d", BN_num_bits(pubkey->pkey.rsa->n));
+        push_certinfo(data, i, "RSA Public Key", bufp);
+
+        print_pubkey_BN(rsa, n, i);
+        print_pubkey_BN(rsa, e, i);
+        print_pubkey_BN(rsa, d, i);
+        print_pubkey_BN(rsa, p, i);
+        print_pubkey_BN(rsa, q, i);
+        print_pubkey_BN(rsa, dmp1, i);
+        print_pubkey_BN(rsa, dmq1, i);
+        print_pubkey_BN(rsa, iqmp, i);
+        break;
+      case EVP_PKEY_DSA:
+        print_pubkey_BN(dsa, p, i);
+        print_pubkey_BN(dsa, q, i);
+        print_pubkey_BN(dsa, g, i);
+        print_pubkey_BN(dsa, priv_key, i);
+        print_pubkey_BN(dsa, pub_key, i);
+        break;
+      case EVP_PKEY_DH:
+        print_pubkey_BN(dh, p, i);
+        print_pubkey_BN(dh, g, i);
+        print_pubkey_BN(dh, priv_key, i);
+        print_pubkey_BN(dh, pub_key, i);
+        break;
+#if 0
+      case EVP_PKEY_EC: /* symbol not present in OpenSSL 0.9.6 */
+        /* left TODO */
+        break;
+#endif
+      }
+      EVP_PKEY_free(pubkey);
+    }
+
+    X509V3_ext(data, i, cinf->extensions);
+
+    X509_signature(data, i, x->signature);
+
+    dumpcert(data, x, i);
+  }
+
+  free(bufp);
+
+  return CURLE_OK;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Get the server cert, verify it and show it etc, only call failf() if the
+ * 'strict' argument is TRUE as otherwise all this is for informational
+ * purposes only!
+ *
+ * We check certificates to authenticate the server; otherwise we risk
+ * man-in-the-middle attack.
+ */
+static CURLcode servercert(struct connectdata *conn,
+                           struct ssl_connect_data *connssl,
+                           bool strict)
+{
+  CURLcode retcode = CURLE_OK;
+  int rc;
+  long lerr;
+  ASN1_TIME *certdate;
+  struct SessionHandle *data = conn->data;
+  X509 *issuer;
+  FILE *fp;
+  char *buffer = data->state.buffer;
+
+  if(data->set.ssl.certinfo)
+    /* we've been asked to gather certificate info! */
+    (void)get_cert_chain(conn, connssl);
+
+  data->set.ssl.certverifyresult = !X509_V_OK;
+
+  connssl->server_cert = SSL_get_peer_certificate(connssl->handle);
+  if(!connssl->server_cert) {
+    if(strict)
+      failf(data, "SSL: couldn't get peer certificate!");
+    return CURLE_PEER_FAILED_VERIFICATION;
+  }
+  infof (data, "Server certificate:\n");
+
+  rc = x509_name_oneline(X509_get_subject_name(connssl->server_cert),
+                         buffer, BUFSIZE);
+  if(rc) {
+    if(strict)
+      failf(data, "SSL: couldn't get X509-subject!");
+    X509_free(connssl->server_cert);
+    connssl->server_cert = NULL;
+    return CURLE_SSL_CONNECT_ERROR;
+  }
+  infof(data, "\t subject: %s\n", buffer);
+
+  certdate = X509_get_notBefore(connssl->server_cert);
+  asn1_output(certdate, buffer, BUFSIZE);
+  infof(data, "\t start date: %s\n", buffer);
+
+  certdate = X509_get_notAfter(connssl->server_cert);
+  asn1_output(certdate, buffer, BUFSIZE);
+  infof(data, "\t expire date: %s\n", buffer);
+
+  if(data->set.ssl.verifyhost) {
+    retcode = verifyhost(conn, connssl->server_cert);
+    if(retcode) {
+      X509_free(connssl->server_cert);
+      connssl->server_cert = NULL;
+      return retcode;
+    }
+  }
+
+  rc = x509_name_oneline(X509_get_issuer_name(connssl->server_cert),
+                         buffer, BUFSIZE);
+  if(rc) {
+    if(strict)
+      failf(data, "SSL: couldn't get X509-issuer name!");
+    retcode = CURLE_SSL_CONNECT_ERROR;
+  }
+  else {
+    infof(data, "\t issuer: %s\n", buffer);
+
+    /* We could do all sorts of certificate verification stuff here before
+       deallocating the certificate. */
+
+    /* e.g. match issuer name with provided issuer certificate */
+    if(data->set.str[STRING_SSL_ISSUERCERT]) {
+      fp=fopen(data->set.str[STRING_SSL_ISSUERCERT],"r");
+      if(!fp) {
+        if(strict)
+          failf(data, "SSL: Unable to open issuer cert (%s)",
+                data->set.str[STRING_SSL_ISSUERCERT]);
+        X509_free(connssl->server_cert);
+        connssl->server_cert = NULL;
+        return CURLE_SSL_ISSUER_ERROR;
+      }
+      issuer = PEM_read_X509(fp,NULL,ZERO_NULL,NULL);
+      if(!issuer) {
+        if(strict)
+          failf(data, "SSL: Unable to read issuer cert (%s)",
+                data->set.str[STRING_SSL_ISSUERCERT]);
+        X509_free(connssl->server_cert);
+        X509_free(issuer);
+        fclose(fp);
+        return CURLE_SSL_ISSUER_ERROR;
+      }
+      fclose(fp);
+      if(X509_check_issued(issuer,connssl->server_cert) != X509_V_OK) {
+        if(strict)
+          failf(data, "SSL: Certificate issuer check failed (%s)",
+                data->set.str[STRING_SSL_ISSUERCERT]);
+        X509_free(connssl->server_cert);
+        X509_free(issuer);
+        connssl->server_cert = NULL;
+        return CURLE_SSL_ISSUER_ERROR;
+      }
+      infof(data, "\t SSL certificate issuer check ok (%s)\n",
+            data->set.str[STRING_SSL_ISSUERCERT]);
+      X509_free(issuer);
+    }
+
+    lerr = data->set.ssl.certverifyresult=
+      SSL_get_verify_result(connssl->handle);
+    if(data->set.ssl.certverifyresult != X509_V_OK) {
+      if(data->set.ssl.verifypeer) {
+        /* We probably never reach this, because SSL_connect() will fail
+           and we return earlier if verifypeer is set? */
+        if(strict)
+          failf(data, "SSL certificate verify result: %s (%ld)",
+                X509_verify_cert_error_string(lerr), lerr);
+        retcode = CURLE_PEER_FAILED_VERIFICATION;
+      }
+      else
+        infof(data, "\t SSL certificate verify result: %s (%ld),"
+              " continuing anyway.\n",
+              X509_verify_cert_error_string(lerr), lerr);
+    }
+    else
+      infof(data, "\t SSL certificate verify ok.\n");
+  }
+
+  X509_free(connssl->server_cert);
+  connssl->server_cert = NULL;
+  connssl->connecting_state = ssl_connect_done;
+
+  return retcode;
+}
+
+
+static CURLcode
+ossl_connect_step3(struct connectdata *conn,
+                   int sockindex)
+{
+  CURLcode retcode = CURLE_OK;
+  void *old_ssl_sessionid=NULL;
+  struct SessionHandle *data = conn->data;
+  struct ssl_connect_data *connssl = &conn->ssl[sockindex];
+  int incache;
+  SSL_SESSION *our_ssl_sessionid;
+
+  DEBUGASSERT(ssl_connect_3 == connssl->connecting_state);
+
+#ifdef HAVE_SSL_GET1_SESSION
+  our_ssl_sessionid = SSL_get1_session(connssl->handle);
+
+  /* SSL_get1_session() will increment the reference
+     count and the session will stay in memory until explicitly freed with
+     SSL_SESSION_free(3), regardless of its state.
+     This function was introduced in openssl 0.9.5a. */
+#else
+  our_ssl_sessionid = SSL_get_session(connssl->handle);
+
+  /* if SSL_get1_session() is unavailable, use SSL_get_session().
+     This is an inferior option because the session can be flushed
+     at any time by openssl. It is included only so curl compiles
+     under versions of openssl < 0.9.5a.
+
+     WARNING: How curl behaves if it's session is flushed is
+     untested.
+  */
+#endif
+
+  incache = !(Curl_ssl_getsessionid(conn, &old_ssl_sessionid, NULL));
+  if(incache) {
+    if(old_ssl_sessionid != our_ssl_sessionid) {
+      infof(data, "old SSL session ID is stale, removing\n");
+      Curl_ssl_delsessionid(conn, old_ssl_sessionid);
+      incache = FALSE;
+    }
+  }
+  if(!incache) {
+    retcode = Curl_ssl_addsessionid(conn, our_ssl_sessionid,
+                                    0 /* unknown size */);
+    if(retcode) {
+      failf(data, "failed to store ssl session");
+      return retcode;
+    }
+  }
+#ifdef HAVE_SSL_GET1_SESSION
+  else {
+    /* Session was incache, so refcount already incremented earlier.
+     * Avoid further increments with each SSL_get1_session() call.
+     * This does not free the session as refcount remains > 0
+     */
+    SSL_SESSION_free(our_ssl_sessionid);
+  }
+#endif
+
+  /*
+   * We check certificates to authenticate the server; otherwise we risk
+   * man-in-the-middle attack; NEVERTHELESS, if we're told explicitly not to
+   * verify the peer ignore faults and failures from the server cert
+   * operations.
+   */
+
+  if(!data->set.ssl.verifypeer)
+    (void)servercert(conn, connssl, FALSE);
+  else
+    retcode = servercert(conn, connssl, TRUE);
+
+  if(CURLE_OK == retcode)
+    connssl->connecting_state = ssl_connect_done;
+  return retcode;
+}
+
+static Curl_recv ossl_recv;
+static Curl_send ossl_send;
+
+static CURLcode
+ossl_connect_common(struct connectdata *conn,
+                    int sockindex,
+                    bool nonblocking,
+                    bool *done)
+{
+  CURLcode retcode;
+  struct SessionHandle *data = conn->data;
+  struct ssl_connect_data *connssl = &conn->ssl[sockindex];
+  curl_socket_t sockfd = conn->sock[sockindex];
+  long timeout_ms;
+  int what;
+
+  /* check if the connection has already been established */
+  if(ssl_connection_complete == connssl->state) {
+    *done = TRUE;
+    return CURLE_OK;
+  }
+
+  if(ssl_connect_1==connssl->connecting_state) {
+    /* Find out how much more time we're allowed */
+    timeout_ms = Curl_timeleft(data, NULL, TRUE);
+
+    if(timeout_ms < 0) {
+      /* no need to continue if time already is up */
+      failf(data, "SSL connection timeout");
+      return CURLE_OPERATION_TIMEDOUT;
+    }
+    retcode = ossl_connect_step1(conn, sockindex);
+    if(retcode)
+      return retcode;
+  }
+
+  while(ssl_connect_2 == connssl->connecting_state ||
+        ssl_connect_2_reading == connssl->connecting_state ||
+        ssl_connect_2_writing == connssl->connecting_state) {
+
+    /* check allowed time left */
+    timeout_ms = Curl_timeleft(data, NULL, TRUE);
+
+    if(timeout_ms < 0) {
+      /* no need to continue if time already is up */
+      failf(data, "SSL connection timeout");
+      return CURLE_OPERATION_TIMEDOUT;
+    }
+
+    /* if ssl is expecting something, check if it's available. */
+    if(connssl->connecting_state == ssl_connect_2_reading
+        || connssl->connecting_state == ssl_connect_2_writing) {
+
+      curl_socket_t writefd = ssl_connect_2_writing==
+        connssl->connecting_state?sockfd:CURL_SOCKET_BAD;
+      curl_socket_t readfd = ssl_connect_2_reading==
+        connssl->connecting_state?sockfd:CURL_SOCKET_BAD;
+
+      what = Curl_socket_ready(readfd, writefd, nonblocking?0:timeout_ms);
+      if(what < 0) {
+        /* fatal error */
+        failf(data, "select/poll on SSL socket, errno: %d", SOCKERRNO);
+        return CURLE_SSL_CONNECT_ERROR;
+      }
+      else if(0 == what) {
+        if(nonblocking) {
+          *done = FALSE;
+          return CURLE_OK;
+        }
+        else {
+          /* timeout */
+          failf(data, "SSL connection timeout");
+          return CURLE_OPERATION_TIMEDOUT;
+        }
+      }
+      /* socket is readable or writable */
+    }
+
+    /* Run transaction, and return to the caller if it failed or if this
+     * connection is done nonblocking and this loop would execute again. This
+     * permits the owner of a multi handle to abort a connection attempt
+     * before step2 has completed while ensuring that a client using select()
+     * or epoll() will always have a valid fdset to wait on.
+     */
+    retcode = ossl_connect_step2(conn, sockindex);
+    if(retcode || (nonblocking &&
+                   (ssl_connect_2 == connssl->connecting_state ||
+                    ssl_connect_2_reading == connssl->connecting_state ||
+                    ssl_connect_2_writing == connssl->connecting_state)))
+      return retcode;
+
+  } /* repeat step2 until all transactions are done. */
+
+
+  if(ssl_connect_3==connssl->connecting_state) {
+    retcode = ossl_connect_step3(conn, sockindex);
+    if(retcode)
+      return retcode;
+  }
+
+  if(ssl_connect_done==connssl->connecting_state) {
+    connssl->state = ssl_connection_complete;
+    conn->recv[sockindex] = ossl_recv;
+    conn->send[sockindex] = ossl_send;
+    *done = TRUE;
+  }
+  else
+    *done = FALSE;
+
+  /* Reset our connect state machine */
+  connssl->connecting_state = ssl_connect_1;
+
+  return CURLE_OK;
+}
+
+CURLcode
+Curl_ossl_connect_nonblocking(struct connectdata *conn,
+                              int sockindex,
+                              bool *done)
+{
+  return ossl_connect_common(conn, sockindex, TRUE, done);
+}
+
+CURLcode
+Curl_ossl_connect(struct connectdata *conn,
+                  int sockindex)
+{
+  CURLcode retcode;
+  bool done = FALSE;
+
+  retcode = ossl_connect_common(conn, sockindex, FALSE, &done);
+  if(retcode)
+    return retcode;
+
+  DEBUGASSERT(done);
+
+  return CURLE_OK;
+}
+
+bool Curl_ossl_data_pending(const struct connectdata *conn,
+                            int connindex)
+{
+  if(conn->ssl[connindex].handle)
+    /* SSL is in use */
+    return (0 != SSL_pending(conn->ssl[connindex].handle)) ? TRUE : FALSE;
+  else
+    return FALSE;
+}
+
+static ssize_t ossl_send(struct connectdata *conn,
+                         int sockindex,
+                         const void *mem,
+                         size_t len,
+                         CURLcode *curlcode)
+{
+  /* SSL_write() is said to return 'int' while write() and send() returns
+     'size_t' */
+  int err;
+  char error_buffer[120]; /* OpenSSL documents that this must be at least 120
+                             bytes long. */
+  unsigned long sslerror;
+  int memlen;
+  int rc;
+
+  ERR_clear_error();
+
+  memlen = (len > (size_t)INT_MAX) ? INT_MAX : (int)len;
+  rc = SSL_write(conn->ssl[sockindex].handle, mem, memlen);
+
+  if(rc < 0) {
+    err = SSL_get_error(conn->ssl[sockindex].handle, rc);
+
+    switch(err) {
+    case SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ:
+    case SSL_ERROR_WANT_WRITE:
+      /* The operation did not complete; the same TLS/SSL I/O function
+         should be called again later. This is basically an EWOULDBLOCK
+         equivalent. */
+      *curlcode = CURLE_AGAIN;
+      return -1;
+    case SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL:
+      failf(conn->data, "SSL_write() returned SYSCALL, errno = %d",
+            SOCKERRNO);
+      *curlcode = CURLE_SEND_ERROR;
+      return -1;
+    case SSL_ERROR_SSL:
+      /*  A failure in the SSL library occurred, usually a protocol error.
+          The OpenSSL error queue contains more information on the error. */
+      sslerror = ERR_get_error();
+      failf(conn->data, "SSL_write() error: %s",
+            ERR_error_string(sslerror, error_buffer));
+      *curlcode = CURLE_SEND_ERROR;
+      return -1;
+    }
+    /* a true error */
+    failf(conn->data, "SSL_write() return error %d", err);
+    *curlcode = CURLE_SEND_ERROR;
+    return -1;
+  }
+  return (ssize_t)rc; /* number of bytes */
+}
+
+static ssize_t ossl_recv(struct connectdata *conn, /* connection data */
+                         int num,                  /* socketindex */
+                         char *buf,                /* store read data here */
+                         size_t buffersize,        /* max amount to read */
+                         CURLcode *curlcode)
+{
+  char error_buffer[120]; /* OpenSSL documents that this must be at
+                             least 120 bytes long. */
+  unsigned long sslerror;
+  ssize_t nread;
+  int buffsize;
+
+  ERR_clear_error();
+
+  buffsize = (buffersize > (size_t)INT_MAX) ? INT_MAX : (int)buffersize;
+  nread = (ssize_t)SSL_read(conn->ssl[num].handle, buf, buffsize);
+  if(nread < 0) {
+    /* failed SSL_read */
+    int err = SSL_get_error(conn->ssl[num].handle, (int)nread);
+
+    switch(err) {
+    case SSL_ERROR_NONE: /* this is not an error */
+    case SSL_ERROR_ZERO_RETURN: /* no more data */
+      break;
+    case SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ:
+    case SSL_ERROR_WANT_WRITE:
+      /* there's data pending, re-invoke SSL_read() */
+      *curlcode = CURLE_AGAIN;
+      return -1;
+    default:
+      /* openssl/ssl.h says "look at error stack/return value/errno" */
+      sslerror = ERR_get_error();
+      failf(conn->data, "SSL read: %s, errno %d",
+            ERR_error_string(sslerror, error_buffer),
+            SOCKERRNO);
+      *curlcode = CURLE_RECV_ERROR;
+      return -1;
+    }
+  }
+  return nread;
+}
+
+size_t Curl_ossl_version(char *buffer, size_t size)
+{
+#ifdef YASSL_VERSION
+  /* yassl provides an OpenSSL API compatibility layer so it looks identical
+     to OpenSSL in all other aspects */
+  return snprintf(buffer, size, "yassl/%s", YASSL_VERSION);
+#else /* YASSL_VERSION */
+
+#if(SSLEAY_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x905000)
+  {
+    char sub[2];
+    unsigned long ssleay_value;
+    sub[1]='\0';
+    ssleay_value=SSLeay();
+    if(ssleay_value < 0x906000) {
+      ssleay_value=SSLEAY_VERSION_NUMBER;
+      sub[0]='\0';
+    }
+    else {
+      if(ssleay_value&0xff0) {
+        sub[0]=(char)(((ssleay_value>>4)&0xff) + 'a' -1);
+      }
+      else
+        sub[0]='\0';
+    }
+
+    return snprintf(buffer, size, "OpenSSL/%lx.%lx.%lx%s",
+                    (ssleay_value>>28)&0xf,
+                    (ssleay_value>>20)&0xff,
+                    (ssleay_value>>12)&0xff,
+                    sub);
+  }
+
+#else /* SSLEAY_VERSION_NUMBER is less than 0.9.5 */
+
+#if(SSLEAY_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x900000)
+  return snprintf(buffer, size, "OpenSSL/%lx.%lx.%lx",
+                  (SSLEAY_VERSION_NUMBER>>28)&0xff,
+                  (SSLEAY_VERSION_NUMBER>>20)&0xff,
+                  (SSLEAY_VERSION_NUMBER>>12)&0xf);
+
+#else /* (SSLEAY_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x900000) */
+  {
+    char sub[2];
+    sub[1]='\0';
+    if(SSLEAY_VERSION_NUMBER&0x0f) {
+      sub[0]=(SSLEAY_VERSION_NUMBER&0x0f) + 'a' -1;
+    }
+    else
+      sub[0]='\0';
+
+    return snprintf(buffer, size, "SSL/%x.%x.%x%s",
+                    (SSLEAY_VERSION_NUMBER>>12)&0xff,
+                    (SSLEAY_VERSION_NUMBER>>8)&0xf,
+                    (SSLEAY_VERSION_NUMBER>>4)&0xf, sub);
+  }
+#endif /* (SSLEAY_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x900000) */
+#endif /* SSLEAY_VERSION_NUMBER is less than 0.9.5 */
+
+#endif /* YASSL_VERSION */
+}
+
+void Curl_ossl_random(struct SessionHandle *data, unsigned char *entropy,
+                      size_t length)
+{
+  Curl_ossl_seed(data); /* Initiate the seed if not already done */
+  RAND_bytes(entropy, curlx_uztosi(length));
+}
+
+void Curl_ossl_md5sum(unsigned char *tmp, /* input */
+                      size_t tmplen,
+                      unsigned char *md5sum /* output */,
+                      size_t unused)
+{
+  MD5_CTX MD5pw;
+  (void)unused;
+  MD5_Init(&MD5pw);
+  MD5_Update(&MD5pw, tmp, tmplen);
+  MD5_Final(md5sum, &MD5pw);
+}
+#endif /* USE_SSLEAY */