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authorGeorge Hazan <george.hazan@gmail.com>2012-06-02 20:55:18 +0000
committerGeorge Hazan <george.hazan@gmail.com>2012-06-02 20:55:18 +0000
commit78c0815c4118fe24ab78cce2dc48a6232dcd824a (patch)
tree8512c50df70b8dd80c919e88ade3419207c95956 /plugins/MirOTR/libgcrypt-1.4.6/cipher/elgamal.c
parentce816d83a8c75808e0eb06832592bffefe4a8dc4 (diff)
- code cleaning
git-svn-id: http://svn.miranda-ng.org/main/trunk@270 1316c22d-e87f-b044-9b9b-93d7a3e3ba9c
Diffstat (limited to 'plugins/MirOTR/libgcrypt-1.4.6/cipher/elgamal.c')
-rw-r--r--plugins/MirOTR/libgcrypt-1.4.6/cipher/elgamal.c46
1 files changed, 23 insertions, 23 deletions
diff --git a/plugins/MirOTR/libgcrypt-1.4.6/cipher/elgamal.c b/plugins/MirOTR/libgcrypt-1.4.6/cipher/elgamal.c
index 0b0c07cb4b..776d7a52c2 100644
--- a/plugins/MirOTR/libgcrypt-1.4.6/cipher/elgamal.c
+++ b/plugins/MirOTR/libgcrypt-1.4.6/cipher/elgamal.c
@@ -117,7 +117,7 @@ wiener_map( unsigned int n )
for(i=0; t[i].p_n; i++ )
{
- if( n <= t[i].p_n )
+ if ( n <= t[i].p_n )
return t[i].q_n;
}
/* Not in table - use an arbitrary high number. */
@@ -188,7 +188,7 @@ gen_k( gcry_mpi_t p, int small_k )
* it greatly improves the encryption performance. We use
* Wiener's table and add a large safety margin. */
nbits = wiener_map( orig_nbits ) * 3 / 2;
- if( nbits >= orig_nbits )
+ if ( nbits >= orig_nbits )
BUG();
}
else
@@ -196,12 +196,12 @@ gen_k( gcry_mpi_t p, int small_k )
nbytes = (nbits+7)/8;
- if( DBG_CIPHER )
+ if ( DBG_CIPHER )
log_debug("choosing a random k ");
mpi_sub_ui( p_1, p, 1);
- for(;;)
+ for (;;)
{
- if( !rndbuf || nbits < 32 )
+ if ( !rndbuf || nbits < 32 )
{
gcry_free(rndbuf);
rndbuf = gcry_random_bytes_secure( nbytes, GCRY_STRONG_RANDOM );
@@ -219,30 +219,30 @@ gen_k( gcry_mpi_t p, int small_k )
}
_gcry_mpi_set_buffer( k, rndbuf, nbytes, 0 );
- for(;;)
+ for (;;)
{
- if( !(mpi_cmp( k, p_1 ) < 0) ) /* check: k < (p-1) */
+ if ( !(mpi_cmp( k, p_1 ) < 0) ) /* check: k < (p-1) */
{
- if( DBG_CIPHER )
+ if ( DBG_CIPHER )
progress('+');
break; /* no */
}
- if( !(mpi_cmp_ui( k, 0 ) > 0) ) /* check: k > 0 */
+ if ( !(mpi_cmp_ui( k, 0 ) > 0) ) /* check: k > 0 */
{
- if( DBG_CIPHER )
+ if ( DBG_CIPHER )
progress('-');
break; /* no */
}
if (gcry_mpi_gcd( temp, k, p_1 ))
goto found; /* okay, k is relative prime to (p-1) */
mpi_add_ui( k, k, 1 );
- if( DBG_CIPHER )
+ if ( DBG_CIPHER )
progress('.');
}
}
found:
gcry_free(rndbuf);
- if( DBG_CIPHER )
+ if ( DBG_CIPHER )
progress('\n');
mpi_free(p_1);
mpi_free(temp);
@@ -269,7 +269,7 @@ generate ( ELG_secret_key *sk, unsigned int nbits, gcry_mpi_t **ret_factors )
p_min1 = gcry_mpi_new ( nbits );
qbits = wiener_map( nbits );
- if( qbits & 1 ) /* better have a even one */
+ if ( qbits & 1 ) /* better have a even one */
qbits++;
g = mpi_alloc(1);
p = _gcry_generate_elg_prime( 0, nbits, qbits, g, ret_factors );
@@ -288,19 +288,19 @@ generate ( ELG_secret_key *sk, unsigned int nbits, gcry_mpi_t **ret_factors )
* will be much faster with such an x.
*/
xbits = qbits * 3 / 2;
- if( xbits >= nbits )
+ if ( xbits >= nbits )
BUG();
x = gcry_mpi_snew ( xbits );
- if( DBG_CIPHER )
+ if ( DBG_CIPHER )
log_debug("choosing a random x of size %u", xbits );
rndbuf = NULL;
do
{
- if( DBG_CIPHER )
+ if ( DBG_CIPHER )
progress('.');
- if( rndbuf )
+ if ( rndbuf )
{ /* Change only some of the higher bits */
- if( xbits < 16 ) /* should never happen ... */
+ if ( xbits < 16 ) /* should never happen ... */
{
gcry_free(rndbuf);
rndbuf = gcry_random_bytes_secure( (xbits+7)/8,
@@ -328,7 +328,7 @@ generate ( ELG_secret_key *sk, unsigned int nbits, gcry_mpi_t **ret_factors )
y = gcry_mpi_new (nbits);
gcry_mpi_powm( y, g, x, p );
- if( DBG_CIPHER )
+ if ( DBG_CIPHER )
{
progress('\n');
log_mpidump("elg p= ", p );
@@ -467,7 +467,7 @@ do_encrypt(gcry_mpi_t a, gcry_mpi_t b, gcry_mpi_t input, ELG_public_key *pkey )
gcry_mpi_powm( b, pkey->y, k, pkey->p );
gcry_mpi_mulm( b, b, input, pkey->p );
#if 0
- if( DBG_CIPHER )
+ if ( DBG_CIPHER )
{
log_mpidump("elg encrypted y= ", pkey->y);
log_mpidump("elg encrypted p= ", pkey->p);
@@ -493,7 +493,7 @@ decrypt(gcry_mpi_t output, gcry_mpi_t a, gcry_mpi_t b, ELG_secret_key *skey )
mpi_invm( t1, t1, skey->p );
mpi_mulm( output, b, t1, skey->p );
#if 0
- if( DBG_CIPHER )
+ if ( DBG_CIPHER )
{
log_mpidump("elg decrypted x= ", skey->x);
log_mpidump("elg decrypted p= ", skey->p);
@@ -533,7 +533,7 @@ sign(gcry_mpi_t a, gcry_mpi_t b, gcry_mpi_t input, ELG_secret_key *skey )
mpi_mulm(b, t, inv, p_1 );
#if 0
- if( DBG_CIPHER )
+ if ( DBG_CIPHER )
{
log_mpidump("elg sign p= ", skey->p);
log_mpidump("elg sign g= ", skey->g);
@@ -564,7 +564,7 @@ verify(gcry_mpi_t a, gcry_mpi_t b, gcry_mpi_t input, ELG_public_key *pkey )
gcry_mpi_t base[4];
gcry_mpi_t ex[4];
- if( !(mpi_cmp_ui( a, 0 ) > 0 && mpi_cmp( a, pkey->p ) < 0) )
+ if ( !(mpi_cmp_ui( a, 0 ) > 0 && mpi_cmp( a, pkey->p ) < 0) )
return 0; /* assertion 0 < a < p failed */
t1 = mpi_alloc( mpi_get_nlimbs(a) );