diff options
author | George Hazan <george.hazan@gmail.com> | 2012-06-02 20:55:18 +0000 |
---|---|---|
committer | George Hazan <george.hazan@gmail.com> | 2012-06-02 20:55:18 +0000 |
commit | 78c0815c4118fe24ab78cce2dc48a6232dcd824a (patch) | |
tree | 8512c50df70b8dd80c919e88ade3419207c95956 /plugins/MirOTR/libgcrypt-1.4.6/cipher/elgamal.c | |
parent | ce816d83a8c75808e0eb06832592bffefe4a8dc4 (diff) |
- code cleaning
git-svn-id: http://svn.miranda-ng.org/main/trunk@270 1316c22d-e87f-b044-9b9b-93d7a3e3ba9c
Diffstat (limited to 'plugins/MirOTR/libgcrypt-1.4.6/cipher/elgamal.c')
-rw-r--r-- | plugins/MirOTR/libgcrypt-1.4.6/cipher/elgamal.c | 46 |
1 files changed, 23 insertions, 23 deletions
diff --git a/plugins/MirOTR/libgcrypt-1.4.6/cipher/elgamal.c b/plugins/MirOTR/libgcrypt-1.4.6/cipher/elgamal.c index 0b0c07cb4b..776d7a52c2 100644 --- a/plugins/MirOTR/libgcrypt-1.4.6/cipher/elgamal.c +++ b/plugins/MirOTR/libgcrypt-1.4.6/cipher/elgamal.c @@ -117,7 +117,7 @@ wiener_map( unsigned int n ) for(i=0; t[i].p_n; i++ ) { - if( n <= t[i].p_n ) + if ( n <= t[i].p_n ) return t[i].q_n; } /* Not in table - use an arbitrary high number. */ @@ -188,7 +188,7 @@ gen_k( gcry_mpi_t p, int small_k ) * it greatly improves the encryption performance. We use * Wiener's table and add a large safety margin. */ nbits = wiener_map( orig_nbits ) * 3 / 2; - if( nbits >= orig_nbits ) + if ( nbits >= orig_nbits ) BUG(); } else @@ -196,12 +196,12 @@ gen_k( gcry_mpi_t p, int small_k ) nbytes = (nbits+7)/8; - if( DBG_CIPHER ) + if ( DBG_CIPHER ) log_debug("choosing a random k "); mpi_sub_ui( p_1, p, 1); - for(;;) + for (;;) { - if( !rndbuf || nbits < 32 ) + if ( !rndbuf || nbits < 32 ) { gcry_free(rndbuf); rndbuf = gcry_random_bytes_secure( nbytes, GCRY_STRONG_RANDOM ); @@ -219,30 +219,30 @@ gen_k( gcry_mpi_t p, int small_k ) } _gcry_mpi_set_buffer( k, rndbuf, nbytes, 0 ); - for(;;) + for (;;) { - if( !(mpi_cmp( k, p_1 ) < 0) ) /* check: k < (p-1) */ + if ( !(mpi_cmp( k, p_1 ) < 0) ) /* check: k < (p-1) */ { - if( DBG_CIPHER ) + if ( DBG_CIPHER ) progress('+'); break; /* no */ } - if( !(mpi_cmp_ui( k, 0 ) > 0) ) /* check: k > 0 */ + if ( !(mpi_cmp_ui( k, 0 ) > 0) ) /* check: k > 0 */ { - if( DBG_CIPHER ) + if ( DBG_CIPHER ) progress('-'); break; /* no */ } if (gcry_mpi_gcd( temp, k, p_1 )) goto found; /* okay, k is relative prime to (p-1) */ mpi_add_ui( k, k, 1 ); - if( DBG_CIPHER ) + if ( DBG_CIPHER ) progress('.'); } } found: gcry_free(rndbuf); - if( DBG_CIPHER ) + if ( DBG_CIPHER ) progress('\n'); mpi_free(p_1); mpi_free(temp); @@ -269,7 +269,7 @@ generate ( ELG_secret_key *sk, unsigned int nbits, gcry_mpi_t **ret_factors ) p_min1 = gcry_mpi_new ( nbits ); qbits = wiener_map( nbits ); - if( qbits & 1 ) /* better have a even one */ + if ( qbits & 1 ) /* better have a even one */ qbits++; g = mpi_alloc(1); p = _gcry_generate_elg_prime( 0, nbits, qbits, g, ret_factors ); @@ -288,19 +288,19 @@ generate ( ELG_secret_key *sk, unsigned int nbits, gcry_mpi_t **ret_factors ) * will be much faster with such an x. */ xbits = qbits * 3 / 2; - if( xbits >= nbits ) + if ( xbits >= nbits ) BUG(); x = gcry_mpi_snew ( xbits ); - if( DBG_CIPHER ) + if ( DBG_CIPHER ) log_debug("choosing a random x of size %u", xbits ); rndbuf = NULL; do { - if( DBG_CIPHER ) + if ( DBG_CIPHER ) progress('.'); - if( rndbuf ) + if ( rndbuf ) { /* Change only some of the higher bits */ - if( xbits < 16 ) /* should never happen ... */ + if ( xbits < 16 ) /* should never happen ... */ { gcry_free(rndbuf); rndbuf = gcry_random_bytes_secure( (xbits+7)/8, @@ -328,7 +328,7 @@ generate ( ELG_secret_key *sk, unsigned int nbits, gcry_mpi_t **ret_factors ) y = gcry_mpi_new (nbits); gcry_mpi_powm( y, g, x, p ); - if( DBG_CIPHER ) + if ( DBG_CIPHER ) { progress('\n'); log_mpidump("elg p= ", p ); @@ -467,7 +467,7 @@ do_encrypt(gcry_mpi_t a, gcry_mpi_t b, gcry_mpi_t input, ELG_public_key *pkey ) gcry_mpi_powm( b, pkey->y, k, pkey->p ); gcry_mpi_mulm( b, b, input, pkey->p ); #if 0 - if( DBG_CIPHER ) + if ( DBG_CIPHER ) { log_mpidump("elg encrypted y= ", pkey->y); log_mpidump("elg encrypted p= ", pkey->p); @@ -493,7 +493,7 @@ decrypt(gcry_mpi_t output, gcry_mpi_t a, gcry_mpi_t b, ELG_secret_key *skey ) mpi_invm( t1, t1, skey->p ); mpi_mulm( output, b, t1, skey->p ); #if 0 - if( DBG_CIPHER ) + if ( DBG_CIPHER ) { log_mpidump("elg decrypted x= ", skey->x); log_mpidump("elg decrypted p= ", skey->p); @@ -533,7 +533,7 @@ sign(gcry_mpi_t a, gcry_mpi_t b, gcry_mpi_t input, ELG_secret_key *skey ) mpi_mulm(b, t, inv, p_1 ); #if 0 - if( DBG_CIPHER ) + if ( DBG_CIPHER ) { log_mpidump("elg sign p= ", skey->p); log_mpidump("elg sign g= ", skey->g); @@ -564,7 +564,7 @@ verify(gcry_mpi_t a, gcry_mpi_t b, gcry_mpi_t input, ELG_public_key *pkey ) gcry_mpi_t base[4]; gcry_mpi_t ex[4]; - if( !(mpi_cmp_ui( a, 0 ) > 0 && mpi_cmp( a, pkey->p ) < 0) ) + if ( !(mpi_cmp_ui( a, 0 ) > 0 && mpi_cmp( a, pkey->p ) < 0) ) return 0; /* assertion 0 < a < p failed */ t1 = mpi_alloc( mpi_get_nlimbs(a) ); |