MirOTR: part one of many file/folder structure changes

git-svn-id: http://svn.miranda-ng.org/main/trunk@12402 1316c22d-e87f-b044-9b9b-93d7a3e3ba9c

1 files changed, 0 insertions, 1379 deletions

diff --git a/plugins/MirOTR/libgcrypt-1.4.6/cipher/rsa.c b/plugins/MirOTR/libgcrypt-1.4.6/cipher/rsa.c
deleted file mode 100644
index cf278c2532..0000000000
--- a/plugins/MirOTR/libgcrypt-1.4.6/cipher/rsa.c
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,1379 +0,0 @@
-/* rsa.c - RSA implementation
- * Copyright (C) 1997, 1998, 1999 by Werner Koch (dd9jn)
- * Copyright (C) 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2008 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
- *
- * This file is part of Libgcrypt.
- *
- * Libgcrypt is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
- * it under the terms of the GNU Lesser General Public License as
- * published by the Free Software Foundation; either version 2.1 of
- * the License, or (at your option) any later version.
- *
- * Libgcrypt is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
- * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
- * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
- * GNU Lesser General Public License for more details.
- *
- * You should have received a copy of the GNU Lesser General Public
- * License along with this program; if not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
- */
-
-/* This code uses an algorithm protected by U.S. Patent #4,405,829
-   which expired on September 20, 2000.  The patent holder placed that
-   patent into the public domain on Sep 6th, 2000.
-*/
-
-#include <config.h>
-#include <stdio.h>
-#include <stdlib.h>
-#include <string.h>
-#include <errno.h>
-
-#include "g10lib.h"
-#include "mpi.h"
-#include "cipher.h"
-
-
-typedef struct
-{
-  gcry_mpi_t n;	    /* modulus */
-  gcry_mpi_t e;	    /* exponent */
-} RSA_public_key;
-
-
-typedef struct
-{
-  gcry_mpi_t n;	    /* public modulus */
-  gcry_mpi_t e;	    /* public exponent */
-  gcry_mpi_t d;	    /* exponent */
-  gcry_mpi_t p;	    /* prime  p. */
-  gcry_mpi_t q;	    /* prime  q. */
-  gcry_mpi_t u;	    /* inverse of p mod q. */
-} RSA_secret_key;
-
-
-/* A sample 1024 bit RSA key used for the selftests.  */
-static const char sample_secret_key[] =
-"(private-key"
-" (rsa"
-"  (n #00e0ce96f90b6c9e02f3922beada93fe50a875eac6bcc18bb9a9cf2e84965caa"
-"      2d1ff95a7f542465c6c0c19d276e4526ce048868a7a914fd343cc3a87dd74291"
-"      ffc565506d5bbb25cbac6a0e2dd1f8bcaab0d4a29c2f37c950f363484bf269f7"
-"      891440464baf79827e03a36e70b814938eebdc63e964247be75dc58b014b7ea251#)"
-"  (e #010001#)"
-"  (d #046129f2489d71579be0a75fe029bd6cdb574ebf57ea8a5b0fda942cab943b11"
-"      7d7bb95e5d28875e0f9fc5fcc06a72f6d502464dabded78ef6b716177b83d5bd"
-"      c543dc5d3fed932e59f5897e92e6f58a0f33424106a3b6fa2cbf877510e4ac21"
-"      c3ee47851e97d12996222ac3566d4ccb0b83d164074abf7de655fc2446da1781#)"
-"  (p #00e861b700e17e8afe6837e7512e35b6ca11d0ae47d8b85161c67baf64377213"
-"      fe52d772f2035b3ca830af41d8a4120e1c1c70d12cc22f00d28d31dd48a8d424f1#)"
-"  (q #00f7a7ca5367c661f8e62df34f0d05c10c88e5492348dd7bddc942c9a8f369f9"
-"      35a07785d2db805215ed786e4285df1658eed3ce84f469b81b50d358407b4ad361#)"
-"  (u #304559a9ead56d2309d203811a641bb1a09626bc8eb36fffa23c968ec5bd891e"
-"      ebbafc73ae666e01ba7c8990bae06cc2bbe10b75e69fcacb353a6473079d8e9b#)))";
-/* A sample 1024 bit RSA key used for the selftests (public only).  */
-static const char sample_public_key[] = 
-"(public-key"
-" (rsa"
-"  (n #00e0ce96f90b6c9e02f3922beada93fe50a875eac6bcc18bb9a9cf2e84965caa"
-"      2d1ff95a7f542465c6c0c19d276e4526ce048868a7a914fd343cc3a87dd74291"
-"      ffc565506d5bbb25cbac6a0e2dd1f8bcaab0d4a29c2f37c950f363484bf269f7"
-"      891440464baf79827e03a36e70b814938eebdc63e964247be75dc58b014b7ea251#)"
-"  (e #010001#)))";
-
-
-
-
-static int test_keys (RSA_secret_key *sk, unsigned nbits);
-static int  check_secret_key (RSA_secret_key *sk);
-static void public (gcry_mpi_t output, gcry_mpi_t input, RSA_public_key *skey);
-static void secret (gcry_mpi_t output, gcry_mpi_t input, RSA_secret_key *skey);
-
-
-/* Check that a freshly generated key actually works.  Returns 0 on success. */
-static int
-test_keys (RSA_secret_key *sk, unsigned int nbits)
-{
-  int result = -1; /* Default to failure.  */
-  RSA_public_key pk;
-  gcry_mpi_t plaintext = gcry_mpi_new (nbits);
-  gcry_mpi_t ciphertext = gcry_mpi_new (nbits);
-  gcry_mpi_t decr_plaintext = gcry_mpi_new (nbits);
-  gcry_mpi_t signature = gcry_mpi_new (nbits);
-
-  /* Put the relevant parameters into a public key structure.  */
-  pk.n = sk->n;
-  pk.e = sk->e;
-
-  /* Create a random plaintext.  */
-  gcry_mpi_randomize (plaintext, nbits, GCRY_WEAK_RANDOM);
-
-  /* Encrypt using the public key.  */
-  public (ciphertext, plaintext, &pk);
-
-  /* Check that the cipher text does not match the plaintext.  */
-  if (!gcry_mpi_cmp (ciphertext, plaintext))
-    goto leave; /* Ciphertext is identical to the plaintext.  */
-
-  /* Decrypt using the secret key.  */
-  secret (decr_plaintext, ciphertext, sk);
-
-  /* Check that the decrypted plaintext matches the original plaintext.  */
-  if (gcry_mpi_cmp (decr_plaintext, plaintext))
-    goto leave; /* Plaintext does not match.  */
-
-  /* Create another random plaintext as data for signature checking.  */
-  gcry_mpi_randomize (plaintext, nbits, GCRY_WEAK_RANDOM);
-
-  /* Use the RSA secret function to create a signature of the plaintext.  */
-  secret (signature, plaintext, sk);
-  
-  /* Use the RSA public function to verify this signature.  */
-  public (decr_plaintext, signature, &pk);
-  if (gcry_mpi_cmp (decr_plaintext, plaintext))
-    goto leave; /* Signature does not match.  */
-
-  /* Modify the signature and check that the signing fails.  */
-  gcry_mpi_add_ui (signature, signature, 1);
-  public (decr_plaintext, signature, &pk);
-  if (!gcry_mpi_cmp (decr_plaintext, plaintext))
-    goto leave; /* Signature matches but should not.  */
-
-  result = 0; /* All tests succeeded.  */
-
- leave:
-  gcry_mpi_release (signature);
-  gcry_mpi_release (decr_plaintext);
-  gcry_mpi_release (ciphertext);
-  gcry_mpi_release (plaintext);
-  return result;
-}
-
-
-/* Callback used by the prime generation to test whether the exponent
-   is suitable. Returns 0 if the test has been passed. */
-static int
-check_exponent (void *arg, gcry_mpi_t a)
-{
-  gcry_mpi_t e = arg;
-  gcry_mpi_t tmp;
-  int result;
-  
-  mpi_sub_ui (a, a, 1);
-  tmp = _gcry_mpi_alloc_like (a);
-  result = !gcry_mpi_gcd(tmp, e, a); /* GCD is not 1. */
-  gcry_mpi_release (tmp);
-  mpi_add_ui (a, a, 1);
-  return result;
-}
-
-/****************
- * Generate a key pair with a key of size NBITS.  
- * USE_E = 0 let Libcgrypt decide what exponent to use.
- *       = 1 request the use of a "secure" exponent; this is required by some 
- *           specification to be 65537.
- *       > 2 Use this public exponent.  If the given exponent
- *           is not odd one is internally added to it. 
- * TRANSIENT_KEY:  If true, generate the primes using the standard RNG.
- * Returns: 2 structures filled with all needed values
- */
-static gpg_err_code_t
-generate_std (RSA_secret_key *sk, unsigned int nbits, unsigned long use_e,
-              int transient_key)
-{
-  gcry_mpi_t p, q; /* the two primes */
-  gcry_mpi_t d;    /* the private key */
-  gcry_mpi_t u;
-  gcry_mpi_t t1, t2;
-  gcry_mpi_t n;    /* the public key */
-  gcry_mpi_t e;    /* the exponent */
-  gcry_mpi_t phi;  /* helper: (p-1)(q-1) */
-  gcry_mpi_t g;
-  gcry_mpi_t f;
-  gcry_random_level_t random_level;
-
-  if (fips_mode ())
-    {
-      if (nbits < 1024)
-        return GPG_ERR_INV_VALUE;
-      if (transient_key)
-        return GPG_ERR_INV_VALUE;
-    }
-
-  /* The random quality depends on the transient_key flag.  */
-  random_level = transient_key ? GCRY_STRONG_RANDOM : GCRY_VERY_STRONG_RANDOM;
-
-  /* Make sure that nbits is even so that we generate p, q of equal size. */
-  if ( (nbits&1) )
-    nbits++; 
-
-  if (use_e == 1)   /* Alias for a secure value */
-    use_e = 65537;  /* as demanded by Sphinx. */
-
-  /* Public exponent:
-     In general we use 41 as this is quite fast and more secure than the
-     commonly used 17.  Benchmarking the RSA verify function
-     with a 1024 bit key yields (2001-11-08): 
-     e=17    0.54 ms
-     e=41    0.75 ms
-     e=257   0.95 ms
-     e=65537 1.80 ms
-  */
-  e = mpi_alloc( (32+BITS_PER_MPI_LIMB-1)/BITS_PER_MPI_LIMB );
-  if (!use_e)
-    mpi_set_ui (e, 41);     /* This is a reasonable secure and fast value */
-  else 
-    {
-      use_e |= 1; /* make sure this is odd */
-      mpi_set_ui (e, use_e); 
-    }
-    
-  n = gcry_mpi_new (nbits);
-
-  p = q = NULL;
-  do
-    {
-      /* select two (very secret) primes */
-      if (p)
-        gcry_mpi_release (p);
-      if (q)
-        gcry_mpi_release (q);
-      if (use_e)
-        { /* Do an extra test to ensure that the given exponent is
-             suitable. */
-          p = _gcry_generate_secret_prime (nbits/2, random_level,
-                                           check_exponent, e);
-          q = _gcry_generate_secret_prime (nbits/2, random_level,
-                                           check_exponent, e);
-        }
-      else
-        { /* We check the exponent later. */
-          p = _gcry_generate_secret_prime (nbits/2, random_level, NULL, NULL);
-          q = _gcry_generate_secret_prime (nbits/2, random_level, NULL, NULL);
-        }
-      if (mpi_cmp (p, q) > 0 ) /* p shall be smaller than q (for calc of u)*/
-        mpi_swap(p,q);
-      /* calculate the modulus */
-      mpi_mul( n, p, q );
-    }
-  while ( mpi_get_nbits(n) != nbits );
-
-  /* calculate Euler totient: phi = (p-1)(q-1) */
-  t1 = mpi_alloc_secure( mpi_get_nlimbs(p) );
-  t2 = mpi_alloc_secure( mpi_get_nlimbs(p) );
-  phi = gcry_mpi_snew ( nbits );
-  g	= gcry_mpi_snew ( nbits );
-  f	= gcry_mpi_snew ( nbits );
-  mpi_sub_ui( t1, p, 1 );
-  mpi_sub_ui( t2, q, 1 );
-  mpi_mul( phi, t1, t2 );
-  gcry_mpi_gcd(g, t1, t2);
-  mpi_fdiv_q(f, phi, g);
-
-  while (!gcry_mpi_gcd(t1, e, phi)) /* (while gcd is not 1) */
-    {
-      if (use_e)
-        BUG (); /* The prime generator already made sure that we
-                   never can get to here. */
-      mpi_add_ui (e, e, 2);
-    }
-
-  /* calculate the secret key d = e^1 mod phi */
-  d = gcry_mpi_snew ( nbits );
-  mpi_invm(d, e, f );
-  /* calculate the inverse of p and q (used for chinese remainder theorem)*/
-  u = gcry_mpi_snew ( nbits );
-  mpi_invm(u, p, q );
-
-  if( DBG_CIPHER )
-    {
-      log_mpidump("  p= ", p );
-      log_mpidump("  q= ", q );
-      log_mpidump("phi= ", phi );
-      log_mpidump("  g= ", g );
-      log_mpidump("  f= ", f );
-      log_mpidump("  n= ", n );
-      log_mpidump("  e= ", e );
-      log_mpidump("  d= ", d );
-      log_mpidump("  u= ", u );
-    }
-
-  gcry_mpi_release (t1);
-  gcry_mpi_release (t2);
-  gcry_mpi_release (phi);
-  gcry_mpi_release (f);
-  gcry_mpi_release (g);
-
-  sk->n = n;
-  sk->e = e;
-  sk->p = p;
-  sk->q = q;
-  sk->d = d;
-  sk->u = u;
-
-  /* Now we can test our keys. */
-  if (test_keys (sk, nbits - 64))
-    {
-      gcry_mpi_release (sk->n); sk->n = NULL;
-      gcry_mpi_release (sk->e); sk->e = NULL;
-      gcry_mpi_release (sk->p); sk->p = NULL;
-      gcry_mpi_release (sk->q); sk->q = NULL;
-      gcry_mpi_release (sk->d); sk->d = NULL;
-      gcry_mpi_release (sk->u); sk->u = NULL;
-      fips_signal_error ("self-test after key generation failed");
-      return GPG_ERR_SELFTEST_FAILED;
-    }
-
-  return 0;
-}
-
-
-/* Helper for generate_x931.  */
-static gcry_mpi_t 
-gen_x931_parm_xp (unsigned int nbits)
-{
-  gcry_mpi_t xp;
-
-  xp = gcry_mpi_snew (nbits);
-  gcry_mpi_randomize (xp, nbits, GCRY_VERY_STRONG_RANDOM);
-      
-  /* The requirement for Xp is:
-
-       sqrt{2}*2^{nbits-1} <= xp <= 2^{nbits} - 1
-
-     We set the two high order bits to 1 to satisfy the lower bound.
-     By using mpi_set_highbit we make sure that the upper bound is
-     satisfied as well.  */
-  mpi_set_highbit (xp, nbits-1);
-  mpi_set_bit (xp, nbits-2);
-  gcry_assert ( mpi_get_nbits (xp) == nbits );
-  
-  return xp;
-}     
-
-
-/* Helper for generate_x931.  */
-static gcry_mpi_t 
-gen_x931_parm_xi (void)
-{
-  gcry_mpi_t xi;
-
-  xi = gcry_mpi_snew (101);
-  gcry_mpi_randomize (xi, 101, GCRY_VERY_STRONG_RANDOM);
-  mpi_set_highbit (xi, 100);
-  gcry_assert ( mpi_get_nbits (xi) == 101 );
-  
-  return xi;
-}     
-
-
-
-/* Variant of the standard key generation code using the algorithm
-   from X9.31.  Using this algorithm has the advantage that the
-   generation can be made deterministic which is required for CAVS
-   testing.  */
-static gpg_err_code_t
-generate_x931 (RSA_secret_key *sk, unsigned int nbits, unsigned long e_value,
-               gcry_sexp_t deriveparms, int *swapped)
-{
-  gcry_mpi_t p, q; /* The two primes.  */
-  gcry_mpi_t e;    /* The public exponent.  */
-  gcry_mpi_t n;    /* The public key.  */
-  gcry_mpi_t d;    /* The private key */
-  gcry_mpi_t u;    /* The inverse of p and q.  */
-  gcry_mpi_t pm1;  /* p - 1  */
-  gcry_mpi_t qm1;  /* q - 1  */
-  gcry_mpi_t phi;  /* Euler totient.  */
-  gcry_mpi_t f, g; /* Helper.  */
-
-  *swapped = 0;
-
-  if (e_value == 1)   /* Alias for a secure value. */
-    e_value = 65537; 
-
-  /* Point 1 of section 4.1:  k = 1024 + 256s with S >= 0  */
-  if (nbits < 1024 || (nbits % 256))
-    return GPG_ERR_INV_VALUE;
-  
-  /* Point 2:  2 <= bitlength(e) < 2^{k-2}
-     Note that we do not need to check the upper bound because we use
-     an unsigned long for E and thus there is no way for E to reach
-     that limit.  */
-  if (e_value < 3)
-    return GPG_ERR_INV_VALUE;
-     
-  /* Our implementaion requires E to be odd.  */
-  if (!(e_value & 1))
-    return GPG_ERR_INV_VALUE;
-
-  /* Point 3:  e > 0 or e 0 if it is to be randomly generated.
-     We support only a fixed E and thus there is no need for an extra test.  */
-
-
-  /* Compute or extract the derive parameters.  */
-  {
-    gcry_mpi_t xp1 = NULL;
-    gcry_mpi_t xp2 = NULL;
-    gcry_mpi_t xp  = NULL;
-    gcry_mpi_t xq1 = NULL;
-    gcry_mpi_t xq2 = NULL;
-    gcry_mpi_t xq  = NULL;
-    gcry_mpi_t tmpval;
-
-    if (!deriveparms)
-      {
-        /* Not given: Generate them.  */
-        xp = gen_x931_parm_xp (nbits/2);
-        /* Make sure that |xp - xq| > 2^{nbits - 100} holds.  */
-        tmpval = gcry_mpi_snew (nbits/2);
-        do
-          {
-            gcry_mpi_release (xq);
-            xq = gen_x931_parm_xp (nbits/2);
-            mpi_sub (tmpval, xp, xq);
-          }
-        while (mpi_get_nbits (tmpval) <= (nbits/2 - 100));
-        gcry_mpi_release (tmpval);
-
-        xp1 = gen_x931_parm_xi ();
-        xp2 = gen_x931_parm_xi ();
-        xq1 = gen_x931_parm_xi ();
-        xq2 = gen_x931_parm_xi ();
-
-      }
-    else
-      {
-        /* Parameters to derive the key are given.  */
-        struct { const char *name; gcry_mpi_t *value; } tbl[] = {
-          { "Xp1", &xp1 },
-          { "Xp2", &xp2 },
-          { "Xp",  &xp  },
-          { "Xq1", &xq1 },
-          { "Xq2", &xq2 },
-          { "Xq",  &xq  },
-          { NULL,  NULL }
-        };
-        int idx;
-        gcry_sexp_t oneparm;
-        
-        for (idx=0; tbl[idx].name; idx++)
-          {
-            oneparm = gcry_sexp_find_token (deriveparms, tbl[idx].name, 0);
-            if (oneparm)
-              {
-                *tbl[idx].value = gcry_sexp_nth_mpi (oneparm, 1,
-                                                     GCRYMPI_FMT_USG);
-                gcry_sexp_release (oneparm);
-              }
-          }
-        for (idx=0; tbl[idx].name; idx++)
-          if (!*tbl[idx].value)
-            break;
-        if (tbl[idx].name)
-          {
-            /* At least one parameter is missing.  */
-            for (idx=0; tbl[idx].name; idx++)
-              gcry_mpi_release (*tbl[idx].value);
-            return GPG_ERR_MISSING_VALUE;
-          }
-      }
-    
-    e = mpi_alloc_set_ui (e_value); 
-
-    /* Find two prime numbers.  */
-    p = _gcry_derive_x931_prime (xp, xp1, xp2, e, NULL, NULL);
-    q = _gcry_derive_x931_prime (xq, xq1, xq2, e, NULL, NULL);
-    gcry_mpi_release (xp);  xp  = NULL;
-    gcry_mpi_release (xp1); xp1 = NULL;
-    gcry_mpi_release (xp2); xp2 = NULL;
-    gcry_mpi_release (xq);  xq  = NULL; 
-    gcry_mpi_release (xq1); xq1 = NULL;
-    gcry_mpi_release (xq2); xq2 = NULL;
-    if (!p || !q)
-      {
-        gcry_mpi_release (p);
-        gcry_mpi_release (q);
-        gcry_mpi_release (e);
-        return GPG_ERR_NO_PRIME;
-      }
-  }
-
-
-  /* Compute the public modulus.  We make sure that p is smaller than
-     q to allow the use of the CRT.  */
-  if (mpi_cmp (p, q) > 0 )
-    {
-      mpi_swap (p, q);
-      *swapped = 1;
-    }
-  n = gcry_mpi_new (nbits);
-  mpi_mul (n, p, q);
-
-  /* Compute the Euler totient:  phi = (p-1)(q-1)  */
-  pm1 = gcry_mpi_snew (nbits/2);
-  qm1 = gcry_mpi_snew (nbits/2);
-  phi = gcry_mpi_snew (nbits);
-  mpi_sub_ui (pm1, p, 1);
-  mpi_sub_ui (qm1, q, 1);
-  mpi_mul (phi, pm1, qm1);
-
-  g = gcry_mpi_snew (nbits);
-  gcry_assert (gcry_mpi_gcd (g, e, phi));
-
-  /* Compute: f = lcm(p-1,q-1) = phi / gcd(p-1,q-1) */
-  gcry_mpi_gcd (g, pm1, qm1);
-  f = pm1; pm1 = NULL;
-  gcry_mpi_release (qm1); qm1 = NULL;
-  mpi_fdiv_q (f, phi, g);
-  gcry_mpi_release (phi); phi = NULL;
-  d = g; g = NULL;
-  /* Compute the secret key:  d = e^{-1} mod lcm(p-1,q-1) */
-  mpi_invm (d, e, f);
-
-  /* Compute the inverse of p and q.  */
-  u = f; f = NULL;
-  mpi_invm (u, p, q );
-
-  if( DBG_CIPHER )
-    {
-      if (*swapped)
-        log_debug ("p and q are swapped\n");
-      log_mpidump("  p", p );
-      log_mpidump("  q", q );
-      log_mpidump("  n", n );
-      log_mpidump("  e", e );
-      log_mpidump("  d", d );
-      log_mpidump("  u", u );
-    }
-
-
-  sk->n = n;
-  sk->e = e;
-  sk->p = p;
-  sk->q = q;
-  sk->d = d;
-  sk->u = u;
-
-  /* Now we can test our keys. */
-  if (test_keys (sk, nbits - 64))
-    {
-      gcry_mpi_release (sk->n); sk->n = NULL;
-      gcry_mpi_release (sk->e); sk->e = NULL;
-      gcry_mpi_release (sk->p); sk->p = NULL;
-      gcry_mpi_release (sk->q); sk->q = NULL;
-      gcry_mpi_release (sk->d); sk->d = NULL;
-      gcry_mpi_release (sk->u); sk->u = NULL;
-      fips_signal_error ("self-test after key generation failed");
-      return GPG_ERR_SELFTEST_FAILED;
-    }
-
-  return 0;
-}
-
-
-/****************
- * Test wether the secret key is valid.
- * Returns: true if this is a valid key.
- */
-static int
-check_secret_key( RSA_secret_key *sk )
-{
-  int rc;
-  gcry_mpi_t temp = mpi_alloc( mpi_get_nlimbs(sk->p)*2 );
-  
-  mpi_mul(temp, sk->p, sk->q );
-  rc = mpi_cmp( temp, sk->n );
-  mpi_free(temp);
-  return !rc;
-}
-
-
-
-/****************
- * Public key operation. Encrypt INPUT with PKEY and put result into OUTPUT.
- *
- *	c = m^e mod n
- *
- * Where c is OUTPUT, m is INPUT and e,n are elements of PKEY.
- */
-static void
-public(gcry_mpi_t output, gcry_mpi_t input, RSA_public_key *pkey )
-{
-  if( output == input )  /* powm doesn't like output and input the same */
-    {
-      gcry_mpi_t x = mpi_alloc( mpi_get_nlimbs(input)*2 );
-      mpi_powm( x, input, pkey->e, pkey->n );
-      mpi_set(output, x);
-      mpi_free(x);
-    }
-  else
-    mpi_powm( output, input, pkey->e, pkey->n );
-}
-
-#if 0
-static void
-stronger_key_check ( RSA_secret_key *skey )
-{
-  gcry_mpi_t t = mpi_alloc_secure ( 0 );
-  gcry_mpi_t t1 = mpi_alloc_secure ( 0 );
-  gcry_mpi_t t2 = mpi_alloc_secure ( 0 );
-  gcry_mpi_t phi = mpi_alloc_secure ( 0 );
-
-  /* check that n == p * q */
-  mpi_mul( t, skey->p, skey->q);
-  if (mpi_cmp( t, skey->n) )
-    log_info ( "RSA Oops: n != p * q\n" );
-
-  /* check that p is less than q */
-  if( mpi_cmp( skey->p, skey->q ) > 0 )
-    {
-      log_info ("RSA Oops: p >= q - fixed\n");
-      _gcry_mpi_swap ( skey->p, skey->q);
-    }
-
-    /* check that e divides neither p-1 nor q-1 */
-    mpi_sub_ui(t, skey->p, 1 );
-    mpi_fdiv_r(t, t, skey->e );
-    if ( !mpi_cmp_ui( t, 0) )
-        log_info ( "RSA Oops: e divides p-1\n" );
-    mpi_sub_ui(t, skey->q, 1 );
-    mpi_fdiv_r(t, t, skey->e );
-    if ( !mpi_cmp_ui( t, 0) )
-        log_info ( "RSA Oops: e divides q-1\n" );
-
-    /* check that d is correct */
-    mpi_sub_ui( t1, skey->p, 1 );
-    mpi_sub_ui( t2, skey->q, 1 );
-    mpi_mul( phi, t1, t2 );
-    gcry_mpi_gcd(t, t1, t2);
-    mpi_fdiv_q(t, phi, t);
-    mpi_invm(t, skey->e, t );
-    if ( mpi_cmp(t, skey->d ) )
-      {
-        log_info ( "RSA Oops: d is wrong - fixed\n");
-        mpi_set (skey->d, t);
-        _gcry_log_mpidump ("  fixed d", skey->d);
-      }
-
-    /* check for correctness of u */
-    mpi_invm(t, skey->p, skey->q );
-    if ( mpi_cmp(t, skey->u ) )
-      {
-        log_info ( "RSA Oops: u is wrong - fixed\n");
-        mpi_set (skey->u, t);
-        _gcry_log_mpidump ("  fixed u", skey->u);
-      }
-
-    log_info ( "RSA secret key check finished\n");
-
-    mpi_free (t);
-    mpi_free (t1);
-    mpi_free (t2);
-    mpi_free (phi);
-}
-#endif
-
-
-
-/****************
- * Secret key operation. Encrypt INPUT with SKEY and put result into OUTPUT.
- *
- *	m = c^d mod n
- *
- * Or faster:
- *
- *      m1 = c ^ (d mod (p-1)) mod p 
- *      m2 = c ^ (d mod (q-1)) mod q 
- *      h = u * (m2 - m1) mod q 
- *      m = m1 + h * p
- *
- * Where m is OUTPUT, c is INPUT and d,n,p,q,u are elements of SKEY.
- */
-static void
-secret(gcry_mpi_t output, gcry_mpi_t input, RSA_secret_key *skey )
-{
-  if (!skey->p || !skey->q || !skey->u)
-    {
-      mpi_powm (output, input, skey->d, skey->n);
-    }
-  else
-    {
-      gcry_mpi_t m1 = mpi_alloc_secure( mpi_get_nlimbs(skey->n)+1 );
-      gcry_mpi_t m2 = mpi_alloc_secure( mpi_get_nlimbs(skey->n)+1 );
-      gcry_mpi_t h  = mpi_alloc_secure( mpi_get_nlimbs(skey->n)+1 );
-      
-      /* m1 = c ^ (d mod (p-1)) mod p */
-      mpi_sub_ui( h, skey->p, 1  );
-      mpi_fdiv_r( h, skey->d, h );   
-      mpi_powm( m1, input, h, skey->p );
-      /* m2 = c ^ (d mod (q-1)) mod q */
-      mpi_sub_ui( h, skey->q, 1  );
-      mpi_fdiv_r( h, skey->d, h );
-      mpi_powm( m2, input, h, skey->q );
-      /* h = u * ( m2 - m1 ) mod q */
-      mpi_sub( h, m2, m1 );
-      if ( mpi_is_neg( h ) ) 
-        mpi_add ( h, h, skey->q );
-      mpi_mulm( h, skey->u, h, skey->q ); 
-      /* m = m2 + h * p */
-      mpi_mul ( h, h, skey->p );
-      mpi_add ( output, m1, h );
-    
-      mpi_free ( h );
-      mpi_free ( m1 );
-      mpi_free ( m2 );
-    }
-}
-
-
-
-/* Perform RSA blinding.  */
-static gcry_mpi_t
-rsa_blind (gcry_mpi_t x, gcry_mpi_t r, gcry_mpi_t e, gcry_mpi_t n)
-{
-  /* A helper.  */
-  gcry_mpi_t a;
-
-  /* Result.  */
-  gcry_mpi_t y;
-
-  a = gcry_mpi_snew (gcry_mpi_get_nbits (n));
-  y = gcry_mpi_snew (gcry_mpi_get_nbits (n));
-  
-  /* Now we calculate: y = (x * r^e) mod n, where r is the random
-     number, e is the public exponent, x is the non-blinded data and n
-     is the RSA modulus.  */
-  gcry_mpi_powm (a, r, e, n);
-  gcry_mpi_mulm (y, a, x, n);
-
-  gcry_mpi_release (a);
-
-  return y;
-}
-
-/* Undo RSA blinding.  */
-static gcry_mpi_t
-rsa_unblind (gcry_mpi_t x, gcry_mpi_t ri, gcry_mpi_t n)
-{
-  gcry_mpi_t y;
-
-  y = gcry_mpi_snew (gcry_mpi_get_nbits (n));
-
-  /* Here we calculate: y = (x * r^-1) mod n, where x is the blinded
-     decrypted data, ri is the modular multiplicative inverse of r and
-     n is the RSA modulus.  */
-
-  gcry_mpi_mulm (y, ri, x, n);
-
-  return y;
-}
-
-/*********************************************
- **************  interface  ******************
- *********************************************/
-
-static gcry_err_code_t
-rsa_generate_ext (int algo, unsigned int nbits, unsigned long evalue,
-                  const gcry_sexp_t genparms,
-                  gcry_mpi_t *skey, gcry_mpi_t **retfactors,
-                  gcry_sexp_t *r_extrainfo)
-{
-  RSA_secret_key sk;
-  gpg_err_code_t ec;
-  gcry_sexp_t deriveparms;
-  int transient_key = 0;
-  int use_x931 = 0;
-  gcry_sexp_t l1;
-
-  (void)algo;
-  
-  *retfactors = NULL; /* We don't return them.  */
-
-  deriveparms = (genparms?
-                 gcry_sexp_find_token (genparms, "derive-parms", 0) : NULL);
-  if (!deriveparms)
-    {
-      /* Parse the optional "use-x931" flag. */
-      l1 = gcry_sexp_find_token (genparms, "use-x931", 0);
-      if (l1)
-        {
-          use_x931 = 1;
-          gcry_sexp_release (l1);
-        }
-    }
-
-  if (deriveparms || use_x931 || fips_mode ())
-    {
-      int swapped;
-      ec = generate_x931 (&sk, nbits, evalue, deriveparms, &swapped);
-      gcry_sexp_release (deriveparms);
-      if (!ec && r_extrainfo && swapped)
-        {
-          ec = gcry_sexp_new (r_extrainfo, 
-                              "(misc-key-info(p-q-swapped))", 0, 1);
-          if (ec)
-            {
-              gcry_mpi_release (sk.n); sk.n = NULL;
-              gcry_mpi_release (sk.e); sk.e = NULL;
-              gcry_mpi_release (sk.p); sk.p = NULL;
-              gcry_mpi_release (sk.q); sk.q = NULL;
-              gcry_mpi_release (sk.d); sk.d = NULL;
-              gcry_mpi_release (sk.u); sk.u = NULL;
-            }
-        }
-    }
-  else
-    {
-      /* Parse the optional "transient-key" flag. */
-      l1 = gcry_sexp_find_token (genparms, "transient-key", 0);
-      if (l1)
-        {
-          transient_key = 1;
-          gcry_sexp_release (l1);
-        }
-      /* Generate.  */
-      ec = generate_std (&sk, nbits, evalue, transient_key);
-    }
-
-  if (!ec)
-    {
-      skey[0] = sk.n;
-      skey[1] = sk.e;
-      skey[2] = sk.d;
-      skey[3] = sk.p;
-      skey[4] = sk.q;
-      skey[5] = sk.u;
-    }
-  
-  return ec;
-}
-
-
-static gcry_err_code_t
-rsa_generate (int algo, unsigned int nbits, unsigned long evalue,
-              gcry_mpi_t *skey, gcry_mpi_t **retfactors)
-{
-  return rsa_generate_ext (algo, nbits, evalue, NULL, skey, retfactors, NULL);
-}
-
-
-static gcry_err_code_t
-rsa_check_secret_key (int algo, gcry_mpi_t *skey)
-{
-  gcry_err_code_t err = GPG_ERR_NO_ERROR;
-  RSA_secret_key sk;
-
-  (void)algo;
-
-  sk.n = skey[0];
-  sk.e = skey[1];
-  sk.d = skey[2];
-  sk.p = skey[3];
-  sk.q = skey[4];
-  sk.u = skey[5];
-
-  if (!sk.p || !sk.q || !sk.u)
-    err = GPG_ERR_NO_OBJ;  /* To check the key we need the optional
-                              parameters. */
-  else if (!check_secret_key (&sk))
-    err = GPG_ERR_PUBKEY_ALGO;
-
-  return err;
-}
-
-
-static gcry_err_code_t
-rsa_encrypt (int algo, gcry_mpi_t *resarr, gcry_mpi_t data,
-             gcry_mpi_t *pkey, int flags)
-{
-  RSA_public_key pk;
-
-  (void)algo;
-  (void)flags;
-  
-  pk.n = pkey[0];
-  pk.e = pkey[1];
-  resarr[0] = mpi_alloc (mpi_get_nlimbs (pk.n));
-  public (resarr[0], data, &pk);
-  
-  return GPG_ERR_NO_ERROR;
-}
-
-
-static gcry_err_code_t
-rsa_decrypt (int algo, gcry_mpi_t *result, gcry_mpi_t *data,
-             gcry_mpi_t *skey, int flags)
-{
-  RSA_secret_key sk;
-  gcry_mpi_t r = MPI_NULL;	/* Random number needed for blinding.  */
-  gcry_mpi_t ri = MPI_NULL;	/* Modular multiplicative inverse of
-				   r.  */
-  gcry_mpi_t x = MPI_NULL;	/* Data to decrypt.  */
-  gcry_mpi_t y;			/* Result.  */
-
-  (void)algo;
-
-  /* Extract private key.  */
-  sk.n = skey[0];
-  sk.e = skey[1];
-  sk.d = skey[2];
-  sk.p = skey[3]; /* Optional. */
-  sk.q = skey[4]; /* Optional. */
-  sk.u = skey[5]; /* Optional. */
-
-  y = gcry_mpi_snew (gcry_mpi_get_nbits (sk.n));
-
-  /* We use blinding by default to mitigate timing attacks which can
-     be practically mounted over the network as shown by Brumley and
-     Boney in 2003.  */ 
-  if (! (flags & PUBKEY_FLAG_NO_BLINDING))
-    {
-      /* Initialize blinding.  */
-      
-      /* First, we need a random number r between 0 and n - 1, which
-	 is relatively prime to n (i.e. it is neither p nor q).  The
-	 random number needs to be only unpredictable, thus we employ
-	 the gcry_create_nonce function by using GCRY_WEAK_RANDOM with
-	 gcry_mpi_randomize.  */
-      r = gcry_mpi_snew (gcry_mpi_get_nbits (sk.n));
-      ri = gcry_mpi_snew (gcry_mpi_get_nbits (sk.n));
-      
-      gcry_mpi_randomize (r, gcry_mpi_get_nbits (sk.n), GCRY_WEAK_RANDOM);
-      gcry_mpi_mod (r, r, sk.n);
-
-      /* Calculate inverse of r.  It practically impossible that the
-         follwing test fails, thus we do not add code to release
-         allocated resources.  */
-      if (!gcry_mpi_invm (ri, r, sk.n))
-	return GPG_ERR_INTERNAL;
-    }
-
-  if (! (flags & PUBKEY_FLAG_NO_BLINDING))
-    x = rsa_blind (data[0], r, sk.e, sk.n);
-  else
-    x = data[0];
-
-  /* Do the encryption.  */
-  secret (y, x, &sk);
-
-  if (! (flags & PUBKEY_FLAG_NO_BLINDING))
-    {
-      /* Undo blinding.  */
-      gcry_mpi_t a = gcry_mpi_copy (y);
-      
-      gcry_mpi_release (y);
-      y = rsa_unblind (a, ri, sk.n);
-
-      gcry_mpi_release (a);
-    }
-
-  if (! (flags & PUBKEY_FLAG_NO_BLINDING))
-    {
-      /* Deallocate resources needed for blinding.  */
-      gcry_mpi_release (x);
-      gcry_mpi_release (r);
-      gcry_mpi_release (ri);
-    }
-
-  /* Copy out result.  */
-  *result = y;
-  
-  return GPG_ERR_NO_ERROR;
-}
-
-
-static gcry_err_code_t
-rsa_sign (int algo, gcry_mpi_t *resarr, gcry_mpi_t data, gcry_mpi_t *skey)
-{
-  RSA_secret_key sk;
-
-  (void)algo;
-  
-  sk.n = skey[0];
-  sk.e = skey[1];
-  sk.d = skey[2];
-  sk.p = skey[3];
-  sk.q = skey[4];
-  sk.u = skey[5];
-  resarr[0] = mpi_alloc( mpi_get_nlimbs (sk.n));
-  secret (resarr[0], data, &sk);
-
-  return GPG_ERR_NO_ERROR;
-}
-
-
-static gcry_err_code_t
-rsa_verify (int algo, gcry_mpi_t hash, gcry_mpi_t *data, gcry_mpi_t *pkey,
-		  int (*cmp) (void *opaque, gcry_mpi_t tmp),
-		  void *opaquev)
-{
-  RSA_public_key pk;
-  gcry_mpi_t result;
-  gcry_err_code_t rc;
-
-  (void)algo;
-  (void)cmp;
-  (void)opaquev;
-
-  pk.n = pkey[0];
-  pk.e = pkey[1];
-  result = gcry_mpi_new ( 160 );
-  public( result, data[0], &pk );
-#ifdef IS_DEVELOPMENT_VERSION
-  if (DBG_CIPHER)
-    {
-      log_mpidump ("rsa verify result:", result );
-      log_mpidump ("             hash:", hash );
-    }
-#endif /*IS_DEVELOPMENT_VERSION*/
-  /*rc = (*cmp)( opaquev, result );*/
-  rc = mpi_cmp (result, hash) ? GPG_ERR_BAD_SIGNATURE : GPG_ERR_NO_ERROR;
-  gcry_mpi_release (result);
-  
-  return rc;
-}
-
-
-static unsigned int
-rsa_get_nbits (int algo, gcry_mpi_t *pkey)
-{
-  (void)algo;
-
-  return mpi_get_nbits (pkey[0]);
-}
-
-
-/* Compute a keygrip.  MD is the hash context which we are going to
-   update.  KEYPARAM is an S-expression with the key parameters, this
-   is usually a public key but may also be a secret key.  An example
-   of such an S-expression is:
-
-      (rsa
-        (n #00B...#)
-        (e #010001#))
-        
-   PKCS-15 says that for RSA only the modulus should be hashed -
-   however, it is not clear wether this is meant to use the raw bytes
-   (assuming this is an unsigned integer) or whether the DER required
-   0 should be prefixed.  We hash the raw bytes.  */
-static gpg_err_code_t
-compute_keygrip (gcry_md_hd_t md, gcry_sexp_t keyparam)
-{
-  gcry_sexp_t l1;
-  const char *data;
-  size_t datalen;
-
-  l1 = gcry_sexp_find_token (keyparam, "n", 1);
-  if (!l1)
-    return GPG_ERR_NO_OBJ;
-
-  data = gcry_sexp_nth_data (l1, 1, &datalen);
-  if (!data)
-    {
-      gcry_sexp_release (l1);
-      return GPG_ERR_NO_OBJ;
-    }
-
-  gcry_md_write (md, data, datalen);
-  gcry_sexp_release (l1);
-
-  return 0;
-}
-
-
-
-
-/* 
-     Self-test section.
- */
-
-static const char *
-selftest_sign_1024 (gcry_sexp_t pkey, gcry_sexp_t skey)
-{
-  static const char sample_data[] = 
-    "(data (flags pkcs1)"
-    " (hash sha1 #11223344556677889900aabbccddeeff10203040#))";
-  static const char sample_data_bad[] = 
-    "(data (flags pkcs1)"
-    " (hash sha1 #11223344556677889900aabbccddeeff80203040#))";
-
-  const char *errtxt = NULL;
-  gcry_error_t err;
-  gcry_sexp_t data = NULL;
-  gcry_sexp_t data_bad = NULL;
-  gcry_sexp_t sig = NULL;
-
-  err = gcry_sexp_sscan (&data, NULL,
-                         sample_data, strlen (sample_data));
-  if (!err)
-    err = gcry_sexp_sscan (&data_bad, NULL, 
-                           sample_data_bad, strlen (sample_data_bad));
-  if (err)
-    {
-      errtxt = "converting data failed";
-      goto leave;
-    }
-
-  err = gcry_pk_sign (&sig, data, skey);
-  if (err)
-    {
-      errtxt = "signing failed";
-      goto leave;
-    }
-  err = gcry_pk_verify (sig, data, pkey);
-  if (err)
-    {
-      errtxt = "verify failed";
-      goto leave;
-    }
-  err = gcry_pk_verify (sig, data_bad, pkey);
-  if (gcry_err_code (err) != GPG_ERR_BAD_SIGNATURE)
-    {
-      errtxt = "bad signature not detected";
-      goto leave;
-    }
-
-
- leave:
-  gcry_sexp_release (sig);
-  gcry_sexp_release (data_bad);
-  gcry_sexp_release (data);
-  return errtxt;
-}
-
-
-
-/* Given an S-expression ENCR_DATA of the form:
-
-   (enc-val
-    (rsa
-     (a a-value)))
-
-   as returned by gcry_pk_decrypt, return the the A-VALUE.  On error,
-   return NULL.  */
-static gcry_mpi_t
-extract_a_from_sexp (gcry_sexp_t encr_data)
-{
-  gcry_sexp_t l1, l2, l3;
-  gcry_mpi_t a_value;
-
-  l1 = gcry_sexp_find_token (encr_data, "enc-val", 0);
-  if (!l1)
-    return NULL;
-  l2 = gcry_sexp_find_token (l1, "rsa", 0);
-  gcry_sexp_release (l1);
-  if (!l2)
-    return NULL;
-  l3 = gcry_sexp_find_token (l2, "a", 0);
-  gcry_sexp_release (l2);
-  if (!l3)
-    return NULL;
-  a_value = gcry_sexp_nth_mpi (l3, 1, 0);
-  gcry_sexp_release (l3);
-
-  return a_value;
-}
-
-
-static const char *
-selftest_encr_1024 (gcry_sexp_t pkey, gcry_sexp_t skey)
-{
-  const char *errtxt = NULL;
-  gcry_error_t err;
-  const unsigned int nbits = 1000; /* Encrypt 1000 random bits.  */
-  gcry_mpi_t plaintext = NULL;
-  gcry_sexp_t plain = NULL;
-  gcry_sexp_t encr  = NULL;
-  gcry_mpi_t  ciphertext = NULL;
-  gcry_sexp_t decr  = NULL;
-  gcry_mpi_t  decr_plaintext = NULL;
-  gcry_sexp_t tmplist = NULL;
-
-  /* Create plaintext.  The plaintext is actually a big integer number.  */
-  plaintext = gcry_mpi_new (nbits);
-  gcry_mpi_randomize (plaintext, nbits, GCRY_WEAK_RANDOM);
-  
-  /* Put the plaintext into an S-expression.  */
-  err = gcry_sexp_build (&plain, NULL,
-                         "(data (flags raw) (value %m))", plaintext);
-  if (err)
-    {
-      errtxt = "converting data failed";
-      goto leave;
-    }
-
-  /* Encrypt.  */
-  err = gcry_pk_encrypt (&encr, plain, pkey);
-  if (err)
-    {
-      errtxt = "encrypt failed";
-      goto leave;
-    }
-
-  /* Extraxt the ciphertext from the returned S-expression.  */
-  /*gcry_sexp_dump (encr);*/
-  ciphertext = extract_a_from_sexp (encr);
-  if (!ciphertext)
-    {
-      errtxt = "gcry_pk_decrypt returned garbage";
-      goto leave;
-    }
-
-  /* Check that the ciphertext does no match the plaintext.  */
-  /* _gcry_log_mpidump ("plaintext", plaintext); */
-  /* _gcry_log_mpidump ("ciphertxt", ciphertext); */
-  if (!gcry_mpi_cmp (plaintext, ciphertext))
-    {
-      errtxt = "ciphertext matches plaintext";
-      goto leave;
-    }
-
-  /* Decrypt.  */
-  err = gcry_pk_decrypt (&decr, encr, skey);
-  if (err)
-    {
-      errtxt = "decrypt failed";
-      goto leave;
-    }
-
-  /* Extract the decrypted data from the S-expression.  Note that the
-     output of gcry_pk_decrypt depends on whether a flags lists occurs
-     in its input data.  Because we passed the output of
-     gcry_pk_encrypt directly to gcry_pk_decrypt, such a flag value
-     won't be there as of today.  To be prepared for future changes we
-     take care of it anyway.  */
-  tmplist = gcry_sexp_find_token (decr, "value", 0);
-  if (tmplist)
-    decr_plaintext = gcry_sexp_nth_mpi (tmplist, 1, GCRYMPI_FMT_USG);
-  else
-    decr_plaintext = gcry_sexp_nth_mpi (decr, 0, GCRYMPI_FMT_USG);
-  if (!decr_plaintext)
-    {
-      errtxt = "decrypt returned no plaintext";
-      goto leave;
-    }
-  
-  /* Check that the decrypted plaintext matches the original  plaintext.  */
-  if (gcry_mpi_cmp (plaintext, decr_plaintext))
-    {
-      errtxt = "mismatch";
-      goto leave;
-    }
-
- leave:
-  gcry_sexp_release (tmplist);
-  gcry_mpi_release (decr_plaintext);
-  gcry_sexp_release (decr);
-  gcry_mpi_release (ciphertext);
-  gcry_sexp_release (encr);
-  gcry_sexp_release (plain);
-  gcry_mpi_release (plaintext);
-  return errtxt;
-}
-
-
-static gpg_err_code_t
-selftests_rsa (selftest_report_func_t report)
-{
-  const char *what;
-  const char *errtxt;
-  gcry_error_t err;
-  gcry_sexp_t skey = NULL;
-  gcry_sexp_t pkey = NULL;
-  
-  /* Convert the S-expressions into the internal representation.  */
-  what = "convert";
-  err = gcry_sexp_sscan (&skey, NULL, 
-                         sample_secret_key, strlen (sample_secret_key));
-  if (!err)
-    err = gcry_sexp_sscan (&pkey, NULL, 
-                           sample_public_key, strlen (sample_public_key));
-  if (err)
-    {
-      errtxt = gcry_strerror (err);
-      goto failed;
-    }
-
-  what = "key consistency";
-  err = gcry_pk_testkey (skey);
-  if (err)
-    {
-      errtxt = gcry_strerror (err);
-      goto failed;
-    }
-
-  what = "sign";
-  errtxt = selftest_sign_1024 (pkey, skey);
-  if (errtxt)
-    goto failed;
-
-  what = "encrypt";
-  errtxt = selftest_encr_1024 (pkey, skey);
-  if (errtxt)
-    goto failed;
-
-  gcry_sexp_release (pkey);
-  gcry_sexp_release (skey);
-  return 0; /* Succeeded. */
-
- failed:
-  gcry_sexp_release (pkey);
-  gcry_sexp_release (skey);
-  if (report)
-    report ("pubkey", GCRY_PK_RSA, what, errtxt);
-  return GPG_ERR_SELFTEST_FAILED;
-}
-
-
-/* Run a full self-test for ALGO and return 0 on success.  */
-static gpg_err_code_t
-run_selftests (int algo, int extended, selftest_report_func_t report)
-{
-  gpg_err_code_t ec;
-
-  (void)extended;
-
-  switch (algo)
-    {
-    case GCRY_PK_RSA:
-      ec = selftests_rsa (report);
-      break;
-    default:
-      ec = GPG_ERR_PUBKEY_ALGO;
-      break;
-        
-    }
-  return ec;
-}
-
-
-
-
-static const char *rsa_names[] =
-  {
-    "rsa",
-    "openpgp-rsa",
-    "oid.1.2.840.113549.1.1.1",
-    NULL,
-  };
-
-gcry_pk_spec_t _gcry_pubkey_spec_rsa =
-  {
-    "RSA", rsa_names,
-    "ne", "nedpqu", "a", "s", "n",
-    GCRY_PK_USAGE_SIGN | GCRY_PK_USAGE_ENCR,
-    rsa_generate,
-    rsa_check_secret_key,
-    rsa_encrypt,
-    rsa_decrypt,
-    rsa_sign,
-    rsa_verify,
-    rsa_get_nbits,
-  };
-pk_extra_spec_t _gcry_pubkey_extraspec_rsa = 
-  {
-    run_selftests,
-    rsa_generate_ext,
-    compute_keygrip
-  };
-