mir_sha1_byte_t => BYTE;

mir_sha1_long_t => ULONG;
mir_hmac_sha1 went to core


git-svn-id: http://svn.miranda-ng.org/main/trunk@5707 1316c22d-e87f-b044-9b9b-93d7a3e3ba9c

2 files changed, 2 insertions, 62 deletions

diff --git a/protocols/MRA/src/MraUtils.cpp b/protocols/MRA/src/MraUtils.cpp
deleted file mode 100644
index d35255d4a9..0000000000
--- a/protocols/MRA/src/MraUtils.cpp
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,60 +0,0 @@
-#include "Mra.h"

-#include "MraSendQueue.h"

-

-void hmac_sha1(BYTE *text,size_t text_len,BYTE *key,size_t key_len,BYTE *digest)

-{

-	mir_sha1_ctx context;

-	BYTE k_ipad[65];	/* inner padding - key XORd with ipad */

-	BYTE k_opad[65];	/* outer padding - key XORd with opad */

-	BYTE tk[MIR_SHA1_HASH_SIZE];

-	/* if key is longer than 64 bytes reset it to key=SHA1(key) */

-	if (key_len>64)

-	{

-		mir_sha1_ctx tctx;

-

-		mir_sha1_init(&tctx);

-		mir_sha1_append(&tctx,key,key_len);

-		mir_sha1_finish(&tctx,(BYTE*)&tk);

-

-		key=tk;

-		key_len=MIR_SHA1_HASH_SIZE;

-	}

-

-	/*

-	* the HMAC_SHA1 transform looks like:

-	*

-	* SHA1(K XOR opad, SHA1(K XOR ipad, text))

-	*

-	* where K is an n byte key

-	* ipad is the byte 0x36 repeated 64 times

-	* opad is the byte 0x5c repeated 64 times

-	* and text is the data being protected

-	*/

-

-	/* start out by storing key in pads */

-	memmove(&k_ipad,key,key_len);

-	memmove(&k_opad,key,key_len);

-	memset(&k_ipad[key_len], 0, (sizeof(k_ipad)-key_len));

-	memset(&k_opad[key_len], 0 , (sizeof(k_opad)-key_len));

-

-	/* XOR key with ipad and opad values */

-	for (size_t i=0;i<(64/sizeof(ULONGLONG));i++)

-	{

-		((ULONGLONG*)k_ipad)[i]^=0x3636363636363636;

-		((ULONGLONG*)k_opad)[i]^=0x5C5C5C5C5C5C5C5C;

-	}

-	/* perform inner SHA1 */

-	mir_sha1_init(&context);				/* init context for 1st pass */

-	mir_sha1_append(&context,k_ipad,64);		/* start with inner pad */

-	mir_sha1_append(&context,text,text_len);	/* then text of datagram */

-	mir_sha1_finish(&context,digest);		/* finish up 1st pass */

-	/* perform outer SHA1 */

-	mir_sha1_init(&context);							/* init context for 2nd pass */

-	mir_sha1_append(&context,k_opad,64);					/* start with outer pad */

-	mir_sha1_append(&context,(BYTE*)digest,MIR_SHA1_HASH_SIZE);	/* then results of 1st hash */

-	mir_sha1_finish(&context,digest);					/* finish up 2nd pass */

-

-	bzero(k_ipad,sizeof(k_ipad));

-	bzero(k_opad,sizeof(k_opad));

-	bzero(tk,sizeof(tk));

-}

diff --git a/protocols/MRA/src/Mra_functions.cpp b/protocols/MRA/src/Mra_functions.cpp
index 114de07da0..23b19814f3 100644
--- a/protocols/MRA/src/Mra_functions.cpp
+++ b/protocols/MRA/src/Mra_functions.cpp
@@ -1544,7 +1544,7 @@ BOOL CMraProto::SetPassDB(LPSTR lpszBuff, size_t dwBuffSize)
 		btCryptedPass[0] = (BYTE)dwBuffSize;

 		//memmove(&btCryptedPass[1], lpszBuff, dwBuffSize);

 

-		hmac_sha1(btRandomData, sizeof(btRandomData), (BYTE*)szEMail, dwEMailSize, bthmacSHA1);

+		mir_hmac_sha1(bthmacSHA1, (BYTE*)szEMail, dwEMailSize, btRandomData, sizeof(btRandomData));

 

 		RC4(btCryptedPass, sizeof(btCryptedPass), bthmacSHA1, MIR_SHA1_HASH_SIZE);

 		RC4(btCryptedPass, sizeof(btCryptedPass), btRandomData, sizeof(btRandomData));

@@ -1583,7 +1583,7 @@ BOOL CMraProto::GetPassDB(LPSTR lpszBuff, size_t dwBuffSize, size_t *pdwBuffSize
 	if (mraGetContactSettingBlob(NULL, "pCryptPass", btCryptedPass, sizeof(btCryptedPass), &dwCryptedPass))

 	if (dwCryptedPass == sizeof(btCryptedPass))

 	if (mraGetStaticStringA(NULL, "e-mail", szEMail, SIZEOF(szEMail), &dwEMailSize)) {

-		hmac_sha1(btRandomData, sizeof(btRandomData), (BYTE*)szEMail, dwEMailSize, bthmacSHA1);

+		mir_hmac_sha1(bthmacSHA1, (BYTE*)szEMail, dwEMailSize, btRandomData, sizeof(btRandomData));

 

 		RC4(btCryptedPass, sizeof(btCryptedPass), bthmacSHA1, MIR_SHA1_HASH_SIZE);

 		CopyMemoryReverseDWORD(btCryptedPass, btCryptedPass, sizeof(btCryptedPass));