old version

git-svn-id: http://svn.miranda-ng.org/main/trunk@16458 1316c22d-e87f-b044-9b9b-93d7a3e3ba9c

1 files changed, 0 insertions, 556 deletions

diff --git a/protocols/Telegram/tgl/libevent/arc4random.c b/protocols/Telegram/tgl/libevent/arc4random.c
deleted file mode 100644
index a2338e692a..0000000000
--- a/protocols/Telegram/tgl/libevent/arc4random.c
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,556 +0,0 @@
-/* Portable arc4random.c based on arc4random.c from OpenBSD.
- * Portable version by Chris Davis, adapted for Libevent by Nick Mathewson
- * Copyright (c) 2010 Chris Davis, Niels Provos, and Nick Mathewson
- * Copyright (c) 2010-2012 Niels Provos and Nick Mathewson
- *
- * Note that in Libevent, this file isn't compiled directly.  Instead,
- * it's included from evutil_rand.c
- */
-
-/*
- * Copyright (c) 1996, David Mazieres <dm@uun.org>
- * Copyright (c) 2008, Damien Miller <djm@openbsd.org>
- *
- * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
- * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
- * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
- *
- * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
- * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
- * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
- * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
- * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
- * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
- * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
- */
-
-/*
- * Arc4 random number generator for OpenBSD.
- *
- * This code is derived from section 17.1 of Applied Cryptography,
- * second edition, which describes a stream cipher allegedly
- * compatible with RSA Labs "RC4" cipher (the actual description of
- * which is a trade secret).  The same algorithm is used as a stream
- * cipher called "arcfour" in Tatu Ylonen's ssh package.
- *
- * Here the stream cipher has been modified always to include the time
- * when initializing the state.  That makes it impossible to
- * regenerate the same random sequence twice, so this can't be used
- * for encryption, but will generate good random numbers.
- *
- * RC4 is a registered trademark of RSA Laboratories.
- */
-
-#ifndef ARC4RANDOM_EXPORT
-#define ARC4RANDOM_EXPORT
-#endif
-
-#ifndef ARC4RANDOM_UINT32
-#define ARC4RANDOM_UINT32 uint32_t
-#endif
-
-#ifndef ARC4RANDOM_NO_INCLUDES
-#include "evconfig-private.h"
-#ifdef _WIN32
-#include <wincrypt.h>
-#include <process.h>
-#else
-#include <fcntl.h>
-#include <unistd.h>
-#include <sys/param.h>
-#include <sys/time.h>
-#ifdef EVENT__HAVE_SYS_SYSCTL_H
-#include <sys/sysctl.h>
-#endif
-#endif
-#include <limits.h>
-#include <stdlib.h>
-#include <string.h>
-#endif
-
-/* Add platform entropy 32 bytes (256 bits) at a time. */
-#define ADD_ENTROPY 32
-
-/* Re-seed from the platform RNG after generating this many bytes. */
-#define BYTES_BEFORE_RESEED 1600000
-
-struct arc4_stream {
-	unsigned char i;
-	unsigned char j;
-	unsigned char s[256];
-};
-
-#ifdef _WIN32
-#define getpid _getpid
-#define pid_t int
-#endif
-
-static int rs_initialized;
-static struct arc4_stream rs;
-static pid_t arc4_stir_pid;
-static int arc4_count;
-static int arc4_seeded_ok;
-
-static inline unsigned char arc4_getbyte(void);
-
-static inline void
-arc4_init(void)
-{
-	int     n;
-
-	for (n = 0; n < 256; n++)
-		rs.s[n] = n;
-	rs.i = 0;
-	rs.j = 0;
-}
-
-static inline void
-arc4_addrandom(const unsigned char *dat, int datlen)
-{
-	int     n;
-	unsigned char si;
-
-	rs.i--;
-	for (n = 0; n < 256; n++) {
-		rs.i = (rs.i + 1);
-		si = rs.s[rs.i];
-		rs.j = (rs.j + si + dat[n % datlen]);
-		rs.s[rs.i] = rs.s[rs.j];
-		rs.s[rs.j] = si;
-	}
-	rs.j = rs.i;
-}
-
-#ifndef _WIN32
-static ssize_t
-read_all(int fd, unsigned char *buf, size_t count)
-{
-	size_t numread = 0;
-	ssize_t result;
-
-	while (numread < count) {
-		result = read(fd, buf+numread, count-numread);
-		if (result<0)
-			return -1;
-		else if (result == 0)
-			break;
-		numread += result;
-	}
-
-	return (ssize_t)numread;
-}
-#endif
-
-#ifdef _WIN32
-#define TRY_SEED_WIN32
-static int
-arc4_seed_win32(void)
-{
-	/* This is adapted from Tor's crypto_seed_rng() */
-	static int provider_set = 0;
-	static HCRYPTPROV provider;
-	unsigned char buf[ADD_ENTROPY];
-
-	if (!provider_set) {
-		if (!CryptAcquireContext(&provider, NULL, NULL, PROV_RSA_FULL,
-		    CRYPT_VERIFYCONTEXT)) {
-			if (GetLastError() != (DWORD)NTE_BAD_KEYSET)
-				return -1;
-		}
-		provider_set = 1;
-	}
-	if (!CryptGenRandom(provider, sizeof(buf), buf))
-		return -1;
-	arc4_addrandom(buf, sizeof(buf));
-	evutil_memclear_(buf, sizeof(buf));
-	arc4_seeded_ok = 1;
-	return 0;
-}
-#endif
-
-#if defined(EVENT__HAVE_SYS_SYSCTL_H) && defined(EVENT__HAVE_SYSCTL)
-#if EVENT__HAVE_DECL_CTL_KERN && EVENT__HAVE_DECL_KERN_RANDOM && EVENT__HAVE_DECL_RANDOM_UUID
-#define TRY_SEED_SYSCTL_LINUX
-static int
-arc4_seed_sysctl_linux(void)
-{
-	/* Based on code by William Ahern, this function tries to use the
-	 * RANDOM_UUID sysctl to get entropy from the kernel.  This can work
-	 * even if /dev/urandom is inaccessible for some reason (e.g., we're
-	 * running in a chroot). */
-	int mib[] = { CTL_KERN, KERN_RANDOM, RANDOM_UUID };
-	unsigned char buf[ADD_ENTROPY];
-	size_t len, n;
-	unsigned i;
-	int any_set;
-
-	memset(buf, 0, sizeof(buf));
-
-	for (len = 0; len < sizeof(buf); len += n) {
-		n = sizeof(buf) - len;
-
-		if (0 != sysctl(mib, 3, &buf[len], &n, NULL, 0))
-			return -1;
-	}
-	/* make sure that the buffer actually got set. */
-	for (i=0,any_set=0; i<sizeof(buf); ++i) {
-		any_set |= buf[i];
-	}
-	if (!any_set)
-		return -1;
-
-	arc4_addrandom(buf, sizeof(buf));
-	evutil_memclear_(buf, sizeof(buf));
-	arc4_seeded_ok = 1;
-	return 0;
-}
-#endif
-
-#if EVENT__HAVE_DECL_CTL_KERN && EVENT__HAVE_DECL_KERN_ARND
-#define TRY_SEED_SYSCTL_BSD
-static int
-arc4_seed_sysctl_bsd(void)
-{
-	/* Based on code from William Ahern and from OpenBSD, this function
-	 * tries to use the KERN_ARND syscall to get entropy from the kernel.
-	 * This can work even if /dev/urandom is inaccessible for some reason
-	 * (e.g., we're running in a chroot). */
-	int mib[] = { CTL_KERN, KERN_ARND };
-	unsigned char buf[ADD_ENTROPY];
-	size_t len, n;
-	int i, any_set;
-
-	memset(buf, 0, sizeof(buf));
-
-	len = sizeof(buf);
-	if (sysctl(mib, 2, buf, &len, NULL, 0) == -1) {
-		for (len = 0; len < sizeof(buf); len += sizeof(unsigned)) {
-			n = sizeof(unsigned);
-			if (n + len > sizeof(buf))
-			    n = len - sizeof(buf);
-			if (sysctl(mib, 2, &buf[len], &n, NULL, 0) == -1)
-				return -1;
-		}
-	}
-	/* make sure that the buffer actually got set. */
-	for (i=any_set=0; i<sizeof(buf); ++i) {
-		any_set |= buf[i];
-	}
-	if (!any_set)
-		return -1;
-
-	arc4_addrandom(buf, sizeof(buf));
-	evutil_memclear_(buf, sizeof(buf));
-	arc4_seeded_ok = 1;
-	return 0;
-}
-#endif
-#endif /* defined(EVENT__HAVE_SYS_SYSCTL_H) */
-
-#ifdef __linux__
-#define TRY_SEED_PROC_SYS_KERNEL_RANDOM_UUID
-static int
-arc4_seed_proc_sys_kernel_random_uuid(void)
-{
-	/* Occasionally, somebody will make /proc/sys accessible in a chroot,
-	 * but not /dev/urandom.  Let's try /proc/sys/kernel/random/uuid.
-	 * Its format is stupid, so we need to decode it from hex.
-	 */
-	int fd;
-	char buf[128];
-	unsigned char entropy[64];
-	int bytes, n, i, nybbles;
-	for (bytes = 0; bytes<ADD_ENTROPY; ) {
-		fd = evutil_open_closeonexec_("/proc/sys/kernel/random/uuid", O_RDONLY, 0);
-		if (fd < 0)
-			return -1;
-		n = read(fd, buf, sizeof(buf));
-		close(fd);
-		if (n<=0)
-			return -1;
-		memset(entropy, 0, sizeof(entropy));
-		for (i=nybbles=0; i<n; ++i) {
-			if (EVUTIL_ISXDIGIT_(buf[i])) {
-				int nyb = evutil_hex_char_to_int_(buf[i]);
-				if (nybbles & 1) {
-					entropy[nybbles/2] |= nyb;
-				} else {
-					entropy[nybbles/2] |= nyb<<4;
-				}
-				++nybbles;
-			}
-		}
-		if (nybbles < 2)
-			return -1;
-		arc4_addrandom(entropy, nybbles/2);
-		bytes += nybbles/2;
-	}
-	evutil_memclear_(entropy, sizeof(entropy));
-	evutil_memclear_(buf, sizeof(buf));
-	arc4_seeded_ok = 1;
-	return 0;
-}
-#endif
-
-#ifndef _WIN32
-#define TRY_SEED_URANDOM
-static char *arc4random_urandom_filename = NULL;
-
-static int arc4_seed_urandom_helper_(const char *fname)
-{
-	unsigned char buf[ADD_ENTROPY];
-	int fd;
-	size_t n;
-
-	fd = evutil_open_closeonexec_(fname, O_RDONLY, 0);
-	if (fd<0)
-		return -1;
-	n = read_all(fd, buf, sizeof(buf));
-	close(fd);
-	if (n != sizeof(buf))
-		return -1;
-	arc4_addrandom(buf, sizeof(buf));
-	evutil_memclear_(buf, sizeof(buf));
-	arc4_seeded_ok = 1;
-	return 0;
-}
-
-static int
-arc4_seed_urandom(void)
-{
-	/* This is adapted from Tor's crypto_seed_rng() */
-	static const char *filenames[] = {
-		"/dev/srandom", "/dev/urandom", "/dev/random", NULL
-	};
-	int i;
-	if (arc4random_urandom_filename)
-		return arc4_seed_urandom_helper_(arc4random_urandom_filename);
-
-	for (i = 0; filenames[i]; ++i) {
-		if (arc4_seed_urandom_helper_(filenames[i]) == 0) {
-			return 0;
-		}
-	}
-
-	return -1;
-}
-#endif
-
-static int
-arc4_seed(void)
-{
-	int ok = 0;
-	/* We try every method that might work, and don't give up even if one
-	 * does seem to work.  There's no real harm in over-seeding, and if
-	 * one of these sources turns out to be broken, that would be bad. */
-#ifdef TRY_SEED_WIN32
-	if (0 == arc4_seed_win32())
-		ok = 1;
-#endif
-#ifdef TRY_SEED_URANDOM
-	if (0 == arc4_seed_urandom())
-		ok = 1;
-#endif
-#ifdef TRY_SEED_PROC_SYS_KERNEL_RANDOM_UUID
-	if (arc4random_urandom_filename == NULL &&
-	    0 == arc4_seed_proc_sys_kernel_random_uuid())
-		ok = 1;
-#endif
-#ifdef TRY_SEED_SYSCTL_LINUX
-	/* Apparently Linux is deprecating sysctl, and spewing warning
-	 * messages when you try to use it. */
-	if (!ok && 0 == arc4_seed_sysctl_linux())
-		ok = 1;
-#endif
-#ifdef TRY_SEED_SYSCTL_BSD
-	if (0 == arc4_seed_sysctl_bsd())
-		ok = 1;
-#endif
-	return ok ? 0 : -1;
-}
-
-static int
-arc4_stir(void)
-{
-	int     i;
-
-	if (!rs_initialized) {
-		arc4_init();
-		rs_initialized = 1;
-	}
-
-	arc4_seed();
-	if (!arc4_seeded_ok)
-		return -1;
-
-	/*
-	 * Discard early keystream, as per recommendations in
-	 * "Weaknesses in the Key Scheduling Algorithm of RC4" by
-	 * Scott Fluhrer, Itsik Mantin, and Adi Shamir.
-	 * http://www.wisdom.weizmann.ac.il/~itsik/RC4/Papers/Rc4_ksa.ps
-	 *
-	 * Ilya Mironov's "(Not So) Random Shuffles of RC4" suggests that
-	 * we drop at least 2*256 bytes, with 12*256 as a conservative
-	 * value.
-	 *
-	 * RFC4345 says to drop 6*256.
-	 *
-	 * At least some versions of this code drop 4*256, in a mistaken
-	 * belief that "words" in the Fluhrer/Mantin/Shamir paper refers
-	 * to processor words.
-	 *
-	 * We add another sect to the cargo cult, and choose 12*256.
-	 */
-	for (i = 0; i < 12*256; i++)
-		(void)arc4_getbyte();
-
-	arc4_count = BYTES_BEFORE_RESEED;
-
-	return 0;
-}
-
-
-static void
-arc4_stir_if_needed(void)
-{
-	pid_t pid = getpid();
-
-	if (arc4_count <= 0 || !rs_initialized || arc4_stir_pid != pid)
-	{
-		arc4_stir_pid = pid;
-		arc4_stir();
-	}
-}
-
-static inline unsigned char
-arc4_getbyte(void)
-{
-	unsigned char si, sj;
-
-	rs.i = (rs.i + 1);
-	si = rs.s[rs.i];
-	rs.j = (rs.j + si);
-	sj = rs.s[rs.j];
-	rs.s[rs.i] = sj;
-	rs.s[rs.j] = si;
-	return (rs.s[(si + sj) & 0xff]);
-}
-
-static inline unsigned int
-arc4_getword(void)
-{
-	unsigned int val;
-
-	val = arc4_getbyte() << 24;
-	val |= arc4_getbyte() << 16;
-	val |= arc4_getbyte() << 8;
-	val |= arc4_getbyte();
-
-	return val;
-}
-
-#ifndef ARC4RANDOM_NOSTIR
-ARC4RANDOM_EXPORT int
-arc4random_stir(void)
-{
-	int val;
-	ARC4_LOCK_();
-	val = arc4_stir();
-	ARC4_UNLOCK_();
-	return val;
-}
-#endif
-
-#ifndef ARC4RANDOM_NOADDRANDOM
-ARC4RANDOM_EXPORT void
-arc4random_addrandom(const unsigned char *dat, int datlen)
-{
-	int j;
-	ARC4_LOCK_();
-	if (!rs_initialized)
-		arc4_stir();
-	for (j = 0; j < datlen; j += 256) {
-		/* arc4_addrandom() ignores all but the first 256 bytes of
-		 * its input.  We want to make sure to look at ALL the
-		 * data in 'dat', just in case the user is doing something
-		 * crazy like passing us all the files in /var/log. */
-		arc4_addrandom(dat + j, datlen - j);
-	}
-	ARC4_UNLOCK_();
-}
-#endif
-
-#ifndef ARC4RANDOM_NORANDOM
-ARC4RANDOM_EXPORT ARC4RANDOM_UINT32
-arc4random(void)
-{
-	ARC4RANDOM_UINT32 val;
-	ARC4_LOCK_();
-	arc4_count -= 4;
-	arc4_stir_if_needed();
-	val = arc4_getword();
-	ARC4_UNLOCK_();
-	return val;
-}
-#endif
-
-ARC4RANDOM_EXPORT void
-arc4random_buf(void *buf_, size_t n)
-{
-	unsigned char *buf = buf_;
-	ARC4_LOCK_();
-	arc4_stir_if_needed();
-	while (n--) {
-		if (--arc4_count <= 0)
-			arc4_stir();
-		buf[n] = arc4_getbyte();
-	}
-	ARC4_UNLOCK_();
-}
-
-#ifndef ARC4RANDOM_NOUNIFORM
-/*
- * Calculate a uniformly distributed random number less than upper_bound
- * avoiding "modulo bias".
- *
- * Uniformity is achieved by generating new random numbers until the one
- * returned is outside the range [0, 2**32 % upper_bound).  This
- * guarantees the selected random number will be inside
- * [2**32 % upper_bound, 2**32) which maps back to [0, upper_bound)
- * after reduction modulo upper_bound.
- */
-ARC4RANDOM_EXPORT unsigned int
-arc4random_uniform(unsigned int upper_bound)
-{
-	ARC4RANDOM_UINT32 r, min;
-
-	if (upper_bound < 2)
-		return 0;
-
-#if (UINT_MAX > 0xffffffffUL)
-	min = 0x100000000UL % upper_bound;
-#else
-	/* Calculate (2**32 % upper_bound) avoiding 64-bit math */
-	if (upper_bound > 0x80000000)
-		min = 1 + ~upper_bound;		/* 2**32 - upper_bound */
-	else {
-		/* (2**32 - (x * 2)) % x == 2**32 % x when x <= 2**31 */
-		min = ((0xffffffff - (upper_bound * 2)) + 1) % upper_bound;
-	}
-#endif
-
-	/*
-	 * This could theoretically loop forever but each retry has
-	 * p > 0.5 (worst case, usually far better) of selecting a
-	 * number inside the range we need, so it should rarely need
-	 * to re-roll.
-	 */
-	for (;;) {
-		r = arc4random();
-		if (r >= min)
-			break;
-	}
-
-	return r % upper_bound;
-}
-#endif