diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'plugins/FTPFileYM/curl-7.29.0/lib/nss.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | plugins/FTPFileYM/curl-7.29.0/lib/nss.c | 1574 |
1 files changed, 1574 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/plugins/FTPFileYM/curl-7.29.0/lib/nss.c b/plugins/FTPFileYM/curl-7.29.0/lib/nss.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..8a2cb09e66 --- /dev/null +++ b/plugins/FTPFileYM/curl-7.29.0/lib/nss.c @@ -0,0 +1,1574 @@ +/*************************************************************************** + * _ _ ____ _ + * Project ___| | | | _ \| | + * / __| | | | |_) | | + * | (__| |_| | _ <| |___ + * \___|\___/|_| \_\_____| + * + * Copyright (C) 1998 - 2012, Daniel Stenberg, <daniel@haxx.se>, et al. + * + * This software is licensed as described in the file COPYING, which + * you should have received as part of this distribution. The terms + * are also available at http://curl.haxx.se/docs/copyright.html. + * + * You may opt to use, copy, modify, merge, publish, distribute and/or sell + * copies of the Software, and permit persons to whom the Software is + * furnished to do so, under the terms of the COPYING file. + * + * This software is distributed on an "AS IS" basis, WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY + * KIND, either express or implied. + * + ***************************************************************************/ + +/* + * Source file for all NSS-specific code for the TLS/SSL layer. No code + * but sslgen.c should ever call or use these functions. + */ + +#include "curl_setup.h" + +#ifdef USE_NSS + +#include "urldata.h" +#include "sendf.h" +#include "formdata.h" /* for the boundary function */ +#include "url.h" /* for the ssl config check function */ +#include "connect.h" +#include "strequal.h" +#include "select.h" +#include "sslgen.h" +#include "llist.h" + +#define _MPRINTF_REPLACE /* use the internal *printf() functions */ +#include <curl/mprintf.h> + +#include "nssg.h" +#include <nspr.h> +#include <nss.h> +#include <ssl.h> +#include <sslerr.h> +#include <secerr.h> +#include <secmod.h> +#include <sslproto.h> +#include <prtypes.h> +#include <pk11pub.h> +#include <prio.h> +#include <secitem.h> +#include <secport.h> +#include <certdb.h> +#include <base64.h> +#include <cert.h> +#include <prerror.h> + +#include "curl_memory.h" +#include "rawstr.h" +#include "warnless.h" + +/* The last #include file should be: */ +#include "memdebug.h" + +#define SSL_DIR "/etc/pki/nssdb" + +/* enough to fit the string "PEM Token #[0|1]" */ +#define SLOTSIZE 13 + +PRFileDesc *PR_ImportTCPSocket(PRInt32 osfd); + +PRLock * nss_initlock = NULL; +PRLock * nss_crllock = NULL; +#ifdef HAVE_NSS_INITCONTEXT +NSSInitContext * nss_context = NULL; +#endif + +volatile int initialized = 0; + +typedef struct { + const char *name; + int num; +} cipher_s; + +#define PK11_SETATTRS(_attr, _idx, _type, _val, _len) do { \ + CK_ATTRIBUTE *ptr = (_attr) + ((_idx)++); \ + ptr->type = (_type); \ + ptr->pValue = (_val); \ + ptr->ulValueLen = (_len); \ +} WHILE_FALSE + +#define CERT_NewTempCertificate __CERT_NewTempCertificate + +#define NUM_OF_CIPHERS sizeof(cipherlist)/sizeof(cipherlist[0]) +static const cipher_s cipherlist[] = { + /* SSL2 cipher suites */ + {"rc4", SSL_EN_RC4_128_WITH_MD5}, + {"rc4-md5", SSL_EN_RC4_128_WITH_MD5}, + {"rc4export", SSL_EN_RC4_128_EXPORT40_WITH_MD5}, + {"rc2", SSL_EN_RC2_128_CBC_WITH_MD5}, + {"rc2export", SSL_EN_RC2_128_CBC_EXPORT40_WITH_MD5}, + {"des", SSL_EN_DES_64_CBC_WITH_MD5}, + {"desede3", SSL_EN_DES_192_EDE3_CBC_WITH_MD5}, + /* SSL3/TLS cipher suites */ + {"rsa_rc4_128_md5", SSL_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_MD5}, + {"rsa_rc4_128_sha", SSL_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA}, + {"rsa_3des_sha", SSL_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA}, + {"rsa_des_sha", SSL_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA}, + {"rsa_rc4_40_md5", SSL_RSA_EXPORT_WITH_RC4_40_MD5}, + {"rsa_rc2_40_md5", SSL_RSA_EXPORT_WITH_RC2_CBC_40_MD5}, + {"rsa_null_md5", SSL_RSA_WITH_NULL_MD5}, + {"rsa_null_sha", SSL_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA}, + {"fips_3des_sha", SSL_RSA_FIPS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA}, + {"fips_des_sha", SSL_RSA_FIPS_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA}, + {"fortezza", SSL_FORTEZZA_DMS_WITH_FORTEZZA_CBC_SHA}, + {"fortezza_rc4_128_sha", SSL_FORTEZZA_DMS_WITH_RC4_128_SHA}, + {"fortezza_null", SSL_FORTEZZA_DMS_WITH_NULL_SHA}, + /* TLS 1.0: Exportable 56-bit Cipher Suites. */ + {"rsa_des_56_sha", TLS_RSA_EXPORT1024_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA}, + {"rsa_rc4_56_sha", TLS_RSA_EXPORT1024_WITH_RC4_56_SHA}, + /* AES ciphers. */ + {"rsa_aes_128_sha", TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA}, + {"rsa_aes_256_sha", TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA}, +#ifdef NSS_ENABLE_ECC + /* ECC ciphers. */ + {"ecdh_ecdsa_null_sha", TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_NULL_SHA}, + {"ecdh_ecdsa_rc4_128_sha", TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA}, + {"ecdh_ecdsa_3des_sha", TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA}, + {"ecdh_ecdsa_aes_128_sha", TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA}, + {"ecdh_ecdsa_aes_256_sha", TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA}, + {"ecdhe_ecdsa_null_sha", TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_NULL_SHA}, + {"ecdhe_ecdsa_rc4_128_sha", TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA}, + {"ecdhe_ecdsa_3des_sha", TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA}, + {"ecdhe_ecdsa_aes_128_sha", TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA}, + {"ecdhe_ecdsa_aes_256_sha", TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA}, + {"ecdh_rsa_null_sha", TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA}, + {"ecdh_rsa_128_sha", TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA}, + {"ecdh_rsa_3des_sha", TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA}, + {"ecdh_rsa_aes_128_sha", TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA}, + {"ecdh_rsa_aes_256_sha", TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA}, + {"echde_rsa_null", TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA}, + {"ecdhe_rsa_rc4_128_sha", TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA}, + {"ecdhe_rsa_3des_sha", TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA}, + {"ecdhe_rsa_aes_128_sha", TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA}, + {"ecdhe_rsa_aes_256_sha", TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA}, + {"ecdh_anon_null_sha", TLS_ECDH_anon_WITH_NULL_SHA}, + {"ecdh_anon_rc4_128sha", TLS_ECDH_anon_WITH_RC4_128_SHA}, + {"ecdh_anon_3des_sha", TLS_ECDH_anon_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA}, + {"ecdh_anon_aes_128_sha", TLS_ECDH_anon_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA}, + {"ecdh_anon_aes_256_sha", TLS_ECDH_anon_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA}, +#endif +}; + +/* following ciphers are new in NSS 3.4 and not enabled by default, therefore + they are enabled explicitly */ +static const int enable_ciphers_by_default[] = { + TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, + TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, + TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, + TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, + TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, + TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, + SSL_NULL_WITH_NULL_NULL +}; + +static const char* pem_library = "libnsspem.so"; +SECMODModule* mod = NULL; + +static const char* nss_error_to_name(PRErrorCode code) +{ + const char *name = PR_ErrorToName(code); + if(name) + return name; + + return "unknown error"; +} + +static void nss_print_error_message(struct SessionHandle *data, PRUint32 err) +{ + failf(data, "%s", PR_ErrorToString(err, PR_LANGUAGE_I_DEFAULT)); +} + +static SECStatus set_ciphers(struct SessionHandle *data, PRFileDesc * model, + char *cipher_list) +{ + unsigned int i; + PRBool cipher_state[NUM_OF_CIPHERS]; + PRBool found; + char *cipher; + SECStatus rv; + + /* First disable all ciphers. This uses a different max value in case + * NSS adds more ciphers later we don't want them available by + * accident + */ + for(i=0; i<SSL_NumImplementedCiphers; i++) { + SSL_CipherPrefSet(model, SSL_ImplementedCiphers[i], SSL_NOT_ALLOWED); + } + + /* Set every entry in our list to false */ + for(i=0; i<NUM_OF_CIPHERS; i++) { + cipher_state[i] = PR_FALSE; + } + + cipher = cipher_list; + + while(cipher_list && (cipher_list[0])) { + while((*cipher) && (ISSPACE(*cipher))) + ++cipher; + + if((cipher_list = strchr(cipher, ','))) { + *cipher_list++ = '\0'; + } + + found = PR_FALSE; + + for(i=0; i<NUM_OF_CIPHERS; i++) { + if(Curl_raw_equal(cipher, cipherlist[i].name)) { + cipher_state[i] = PR_TRUE; + found = PR_TRUE; + break; + } + } + + if(found == PR_FALSE) { + failf(data, "Unknown cipher in list: %s", cipher); + return SECFailure; + } + + if(cipher_list) { + cipher = cipher_list; + } + } + + /* Finally actually enable the selected ciphers */ + for(i=0; i<NUM_OF_CIPHERS; i++) { + rv = SSL_CipherPrefSet(model, cipherlist[i].num, cipher_state[i]); + if(rv != SECSuccess) { + failf(data, "cipher-suite not supported by NSS: %s", cipherlist[i].name); + return SECFailure; + } + } + + return SECSuccess; +} + +/* + * Get the number of ciphers that are enabled. We use this to determine + * if we need to call NSS_SetDomesticPolicy() to enable the default ciphers. + */ +static int num_enabled_ciphers(void) +{ + PRInt32 policy = 0; + int count = 0; + unsigned int i; + + for(i=0; i<NUM_OF_CIPHERS; i++) { + SSL_CipherPolicyGet(cipherlist[i].num, &policy); + if(policy) + count++; + } + return count; +} + +/* + * Determine whether the nickname passed in is a filename that needs to + * be loaded as a PEM or a regular NSS nickname. + * + * returns 1 for a file + * returns 0 for not a file (NSS nickname) + */ +static int is_file(const char *filename) +{ + struct_stat st; + + if(filename == NULL) + return 0; + + if(stat(filename, &st) == 0) + if(S_ISREG(st.st_mode)) + return 1; + + return 0; +} + +/* Check if the given string is filename or nickname of a certificate. If the + * given string is recognized as filename, return NULL. If the given string is + * recognized as nickname, return a duplicated string. The returned string + * should be later deallocated using free(). If the OOM failure occurs, we + * return NULL, too. + */ +static char* dup_nickname(struct SessionHandle *data, enum dupstring cert_kind) +{ + const char *str = data->set.str[cert_kind]; + const char *n; + + if(!is_file(str)) + /* no such file exists, use the string as nickname */ + return strdup(str); + + /* search the last slash; we require at least one slash in a file name */ + n = strrchr(str, '/'); + if(!n) { + infof(data, "warning: certificate file name \"%s\" handled as nickname; " + "please use \"./%s\" to force file name\n", str, str); + return strdup(str); + } + + /* we'll use the PEM reader to read the certificate from file */ + return NULL; +} + +/* Call PK11_CreateGenericObject() with the given obj_class and filename. If + * the call succeeds, append the object handle to the list of objects so that + * the object can be destroyed in Curl_nss_close(). */ +static CURLcode nss_create_object(struct ssl_connect_data *ssl, + CK_OBJECT_CLASS obj_class, + const char *filename, bool cacert) +{ + PK11SlotInfo *slot; + PK11GenericObject *obj; + CK_BBOOL cktrue = CK_TRUE; + CK_BBOOL ckfalse = CK_FALSE; + CK_ATTRIBUTE attrs[/* max count of attributes */ 4]; + int attr_cnt = 0; + CURLcode err = (cacert) + ? CURLE_SSL_CACERT_BADFILE + : CURLE_SSL_CERTPROBLEM; + + const int slot_id = (cacert) ? 0 : 1; + char *slot_name = aprintf("PEM Token #%d", slot_id); + if(!slot_name) + return CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY; + + slot = PK11_FindSlotByName(slot_name); + free(slot_name); + if(!slot) + return err; + + PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, attr_cnt, CKA_CLASS, &obj_class, sizeof(obj_class)); + PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, attr_cnt, CKA_TOKEN, &cktrue, sizeof(CK_BBOOL)); + PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, attr_cnt, CKA_LABEL, (unsigned char *)filename, + strlen(filename) + 1); + + if(CKO_CERTIFICATE == obj_class) { + CK_BBOOL *pval = (cacert) ? (&cktrue) : (&ckfalse); + PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, attr_cnt, CKA_TRUST, pval, sizeof(*pval)); + } + + obj = PK11_CreateGenericObject(slot, attrs, attr_cnt, PR_FALSE); + PK11_FreeSlot(slot); + if(!obj) + return err; + + if(!Curl_llist_insert_next(ssl->obj_list, ssl->obj_list->tail, obj)) { + PK11_DestroyGenericObject(obj); + return CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY; + } + + if(!cacert && CKO_CERTIFICATE == obj_class) + /* store reference to a client certificate */ + ssl->obj_clicert = obj; + + return CURLE_OK; +} + +/* Destroy the NSS object whose handle is given by ptr. This function is + * a callback of Curl_llist_alloc() used by Curl_llist_destroy() to destroy + * NSS objects in Curl_nss_close() */ +static void nss_destroy_object(void *user, void *ptr) +{ + PK11GenericObject *obj = (PK11GenericObject *)ptr; + (void) user; + PK11_DestroyGenericObject(obj); +} + +static CURLcode nss_load_cert(struct ssl_connect_data *ssl, + const char *filename, PRBool cacert) +{ + CURLcode err = (cacert) + ? CURLE_SSL_CACERT_BADFILE + : CURLE_SSL_CERTPROBLEM; + + /* libnsspem.so leaks memory if the requested file does not exist. For more + * details, go to <https://bugzilla.redhat.com/734760>. */ + if(is_file(filename)) + err = nss_create_object(ssl, CKO_CERTIFICATE, filename, cacert); + + if(CURLE_OK == err && !cacert) { + /* we have successfully loaded a client certificate */ + CERTCertificate *cert; + char *nickname = NULL; + char *n = strrchr(filename, '/'); + if(n) + n++; + + /* The following undocumented magic helps to avoid a SIGSEGV on call + * of PK11_ReadRawAttribute() from SelectClientCert() when using an + * immature version of libnsspem.so. For more details, go to + * <https://bugzilla.redhat.com/733685>. */ + nickname = aprintf("PEM Token #1:%s", n); + if(nickname) { + cert = PK11_FindCertFromNickname(nickname, NULL); + if(cert) + CERT_DestroyCertificate(cert); + + free(nickname); + } + } + + return err; +} + +/* add given CRL to cache if it is not already there */ +static SECStatus nss_cache_crl(SECItem *crlDER) +{ + CERTCertDBHandle *db = CERT_GetDefaultCertDB(); + CERTSignedCrl *crl = SEC_FindCrlByDERCert(db, crlDER, 0); + if(crl) { + /* CRL already cached */ + SEC_DestroyCrl(crl); + SECITEM_FreeItem(crlDER, PR_FALSE); + return SECSuccess; + } + + /* acquire lock before call of CERT_CacheCRL() */ + PR_Lock(nss_crllock); + if(SECSuccess != CERT_CacheCRL(db, crlDER)) { + /* unable to cache CRL */ + PR_Unlock(nss_crllock); + SECITEM_FreeItem(crlDER, PR_FALSE); + return SECFailure; + } + + /* we need to clear session cache, so that the CRL could take effect */ + SSL_ClearSessionCache(); + PR_Unlock(nss_crllock); + return SECSuccess; +} + +static SECStatus nss_load_crl(const char* crlfilename) +{ + PRFileDesc *infile; + PRFileInfo info; + SECItem filedata = { 0, NULL, 0 }; + SECItem crlDER = { 0, NULL, 0 }; + char *body; + + infile = PR_Open(crlfilename, PR_RDONLY, 0); + if(!infile) + return SECFailure; + + if(PR_SUCCESS != PR_GetOpenFileInfo(infile, &info)) + goto fail; + + if(!SECITEM_AllocItem(NULL, &filedata, info.size + /* zero ended */ 1)) + goto fail; + + if(info.size != PR_Read(infile, filedata.data, info.size)) + goto fail; + + /* place a trailing zero right after the visible data */ + body = (char*)filedata.data; + body[--filedata.len] = '\0'; + + body = strstr(body, "-----BEGIN"); + if(body) { + /* assume ASCII */ + char *trailer; + char *begin = PORT_Strchr(body, '\n'); + if(!begin) + begin = PORT_Strchr(body, '\r'); + if(!begin) + goto fail; + + trailer = strstr(++begin, "-----END"); + if(!trailer) + goto fail; + + /* retrieve DER from ASCII */ + *trailer = '\0'; + if(ATOB_ConvertAsciiToItem(&crlDER, begin)) + goto fail; + + SECITEM_FreeItem(&filedata, PR_FALSE); + } + else + /* assume DER */ + crlDER = filedata; + + PR_Close(infile); + return nss_cache_crl(&crlDER); + +fail: + PR_Close(infile); + SECITEM_FreeItem(&filedata, PR_FALSE); + return SECFailure; +} + +static CURLcode nss_load_key(struct connectdata *conn, int sockindex, + char *key_file) +{ + PK11SlotInfo *slot; + SECStatus status; + CURLcode rv; + struct ssl_connect_data *ssl = conn->ssl; + (void)sockindex; /* unused */ + + rv = nss_create_object(ssl, CKO_PRIVATE_KEY, key_file, FALSE); + if(CURLE_OK != rv) { + PR_SetError(SEC_ERROR_BAD_KEY, 0); + return rv; + } + + slot = PK11_FindSlotByName("PEM Token #1"); + if(!slot) + return CURLE_SSL_CERTPROBLEM; + + /* This will force the token to be seen as re-inserted */ + SECMOD_WaitForAnyTokenEvent(mod, 0, 0); + PK11_IsPresent(slot); + + status = PK11_Authenticate(slot, PR_TRUE, + conn->data->set.str[STRING_KEY_PASSWD]); + PK11_FreeSlot(slot); + return (SECSuccess == status) + ? CURLE_OK + : CURLE_SSL_CERTPROBLEM; +} + +static int display_error(struct connectdata *conn, PRInt32 err, + const char *filename) +{ + switch(err) { + case SEC_ERROR_BAD_PASSWORD: + failf(conn->data, "Unable to load client key: Incorrect password"); + return 1; + case SEC_ERROR_UNKNOWN_CERT: + failf(conn->data, "Unable to load certificate %s", filename); + return 1; + default: + break; + } + return 0; /* The caller will print a generic error */ +} + +static CURLcode cert_stuff(struct connectdata *conn, int sockindex, + char *cert_file, char *key_file) +{ + struct SessionHandle *data = conn->data; + CURLcode rv; + + if(cert_file) { + rv = nss_load_cert(&conn->ssl[sockindex], cert_file, PR_FALSE); + if(CURLE_OK != rv) { + const PRErrorCode err = PR_GetError(); + if(!display_error(conn, err, cert_file)) { + const char *err_name = nss_error_to_name(err); + failf(data, "unable to load client cert: %d (%s)", err, err_name); + } + + return rv; + } + } + + if(key_file || (is_file(cert_file))) { + if(key_file) + rv = nss_load_key(conn, sockindex, key_file); + else + /* In case the cert file also has the key */ + rv = nss_load_key(conn, sockindex, cert_file); + if(CURLE_OK != rv) { + const PRErrorCode err = PR_GetError(); + if(!display_error(conn, err, key_file)) { + const char *err_name = nss_error_to_name(err); + failf(data, "unable to load client key: %d (%s)", err, err_name); + } + + return rv; + } + } + + return CURLE_OK; +} + +static char * nss_get_password(PK11SlotInfo * slot, PRBool retry, void *arg) +{ + (void)slot; /* unused */ + if(retry || NULL == arg) + return NULL; + else + return (char *)PORT_Strdup((char *)arg); +} + +/* bypass the default SSL_AuthCertificate() hook in case we do not want to + * verify peer */ +static SECStatus nss_auth_cert_hook(void *arg, PRFileDesc *fd, PRBool checksig, + PRBool isServer) +{ + struct connectdata *conn = (struct connectdata *)arg; + if(!conn->data->set.ssl.verifypeer) { + infof(conn->data, "skipping SSL peer certificate verification\n"); + return SECSuccess; + } + + return SSL_AuthCertificate(CERT_GetDefaultCertDB(), fd, checksig, isServer); +} + +/** + * Inform the application that the handshake is complete. + */ +static void HandshakeCallback(PRFileDesc *sock, void *arg) +{ + (void)sock; + (void)arg; +} + +static void display_cert_info(struct SessionHandle *data, + CERTCertificate *cert) +{ + char *subject, *issuer, *common_name; + PRExplodedTime printableTime; + char timeString[256]; + PRTime notBefore, notAfter; + + subject = CERT_NameToAscii(&cert->subject); + issuer = CERT_NameToAscii(&cert->issuer); + common_name = CERT_GetCommonName(&cert->subject); + infof(data, "\tsubject: %s\n", subject); + + CERT_GetCertTimes(cert, ¬Before, ¬After); + PR_ExplodeTime(notBefore, PR_GMTParameters, &printableTime); + PR_FormatTime(timeString, 256, "%b %d %H:%M:%S %Y GMT", &printableTime); + infof(data, "\tstart date: %s\n", timeString); + PR_ExplodeTime(notAfter, PR_GMTParameters, &printableTime); + PR_FormatTime(timeString, 256, "%b %d %H:%M:%S %Y GMT", &printableTime); + infof(data, "\texpire date: %s\n", timeString); + infof(data, "\tcommon name: %s\n", common_name); + infof(data, "\tissuer: %s\n", issuer); + + PR_Free(subject); + PR_Free(issuer); + PR_Free(common_name); +} + +static void display_conn_info(struct connectdata *conn, PRFileDesc *sock) +{ + SSLChannelInfo channel; + SSLCipherSuiteInfo suite; + CERTCertificate *cert; + + if(SSL_GetChannelInfo(sock, &channel, sizeof channel) == + SECSuccess && channel.length == sizeof channel && + channel.cipherSuite) { + if(SSL_GetCipherSuiteInfo(channel.cipherSuite, + &suite, sizeof suite) == SECSuccess) { + infof(conn->data, "SSL connection using %s\n", suite.cipherSuiteName); + } + } + + infof(conn->data, "Server certificate:\n"); + + cert = SSL_PeerCertificate(sock); + display_cert_info(conn->data, cert); + CERT_DestroyCertificate(cert); + + return; +} + +static SECStatus BadCertHandler(void *arg, PRFileDesc *sock) +{ + struct connectdata *conn = (struct connectdata *)arg; + struct SessionHandle *data = conn->data; + PRErrorCode err = PR_GetError(); + CERTCertificate *cert; + + /* remember the cert verification result */ + data->set.ssl.certverifyresult = err; + + if(err == SSL_ERROR_BAD_CERT_DOMAIN && !data->set.ssl.verifyhost) + /* we are asked not to verify the host name */ + return SECSuccess; + + /* print only info about the cert, the error is printed off the callback */ + cert = SSL_PeerCertificate(sock); + if(cert) { + infof(data, "Server certificate:\n"); + display_cert_info(data, cert); + CERT_DestroyCertificate(cert); + } + + return SECFailure; +} + +/** + * + * Check that the Peer certificate's issuer certificate matches the one found + * by issuer_nickname. This is not exactly the way OpenSSL and GNU TLS do the + * issuer check, so we provide comments that mimic the OpenSSL + * X509_check_issued function (in x509v3/v3_purp.c) + */ +static SECStatus check_issuer_cert(PRFileDesc *sock, + char *issuer_nickname) +{ + CERTCertificate *cert,*cert_issuer,*issuer; + SECStatus res=SECSuccess; + void *proto_win = NULL; + + /* + PRArenaPool *tmpArena = NULL; + CERTAuthKeyID *authorityKeyID = NULL; + SECITEM *caname = NULL; + */ + + cert = SSL_PeerCertificate(sock); + cert_issuer = CERT_FindCertIssuer(cert,PR_Now(),certUsageObjectSigner); + + proto_win = SSL_RevealPinArg(sock); + issuer = PK11_FindCertFromNickname(issuer_nickname, proto_win); + + if((!cert_issuer) || (!issuer)) + res = SECFailure; + else if(SECITEM_CompareItem(&cert_issuer->derCert, + &issuer->derCert)!=SECEqual) + res = SECFailure; + + CERT_DestroyCertificate(cert); + CERT_DestroyCertificate(issuer); + CERT_DestroyCertificate(cert_issuer); + return res; +} + +/** + * + * Callback to pick the SSL client certificate. + */ +static SECStatus SelectClientCert(void *arg, PRFileDesc *sock, + struct CERTDistNamesStr *caNames, + struct CERTCertificateStr **pRetCert, + struct SECKEYPrivateKeyStr **pRetKey) +{ + struct ssl_connect_data *connssl = (struct ssl_connect_data *)arg; + struct SessionHandle *data = connssl->data; + const char *nickname = connssl->client_nickname; + + if(connssl->obj_clicert) { + /* use the cert/key provided by PEM reader */ + static const char pem_slotname[] = "PEM Token #1"; + SECItem cert_der = { 0, NULL, 0 }; + void *proto_win = SSL_RevealPinArg(sock); + struct CERTCertificateStr *cert; + struct SECKEYPrivateKeyStr *key; + + PK11SlotInfo *slot = PK11_FindSlotByName(pem_slotname); + if(NULL == slot) { + failf(data, "NSS: PK11 slot not found: %s", pem_slotname); + return SECFailure; + } + + if(PK11_ReadRawAttribute(PK11_TypeGeneric, connssl->obj_clicert, CKA_VALUE, + &cert_der) != SECSuccess) { + failf(data, "NSS: CKA_VALUE not found in PK11 generic object"); + PK11_FreeSlot(slot); + return SECFailure; + } + + cert = PK11_FindCertFromDERCertItem(slot, &cert_der, proto_win); + SECITEM_FreeItem(&cert_der, PR_FALSE); + if(NULL == cert) { + failf(data, "NSS: client certificate from file not found"); + PK11_FreeSlot(slot); + return SECFailure; + } + + key = PK11_FindPrivateKeyFromCert(slot, cert, NULL); + PK11_FreeSlot(slot); + if(NULL == key) { + failf(data, "NSS: private key from file not found"); + CERT_DestroyCertificate(cert); + return SECFailure; + } + + infof(data, "NSS: client certificate from file\n"); + display_cert_info(data, cert); + + *pRetCert = cert; + *pRetKey = key; + return SECSuccess; + } + + /* use the default NSS hook */ + if(SECSuccess != NSS_GetClientAuthData((void *)nickname, sock, caNames, + pRetCert, pRetKey) + || NULL == *pRetCert) { + + if(NULL == nickname) + failf(data, "NSS: client certificate not found (nickname not " + "specified)"); + else + failf(data, "NSS: client certificate not found: %s", nickname); + + return SECFailure; + } + + /* get certificate nickname if any */ + nickname = (*pRetCert)->nickname; + if(NULL == nickname) + nickname = "[unknown]"; + + if(NULL == *pRetKey) { + failf(data, "NSS: private key not found for certificate: %s", nickname); + return SECFailure; + } + + infof(data, "NSS: using client certificate: %s\n", nickname); + display_cert_info(data, *pRetCert); + return SECSuccess; +} + +/* This function is supposed to decide, which error codes should be used + * to conclude server is TLS intolerant. + * + * taken from xulrunner - nsNSSIOLayer.cpp + */ +static PRBool +isTLSIntoleranceError(PRInt32 err) +{ + switch (err) { + case SSL_ERROR_BAD_MAC_ALERT: + case SSL_ERROR_BAD_MAC_READ: + case SSL_ERROR_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE_ALERT: + case SSL_ERROR_HANDSHAKE_UNEXPECTED_ALERT: + case SSL_ERROR_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_FAILURE: + case SSL_ERROR_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER_ALERT: + case SSL_ERROR_NO_CYPHER_OVERLAP: + case SSL_ERROR_BAD_SERVER: + case SSL_ERROR_BAD_BLOCK_PADDING: + case SSL_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_VERSION: + case SSL_ERROR_PROTOCOL_VERSION_ALERT: + case SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_FINISHED: + case SSL_ERROR_BAD_HANDSHAKE_HASH_VALUE: + case SSL_ERROR_DECODE_ERROR_ALERT: + case SSL_ERROR_RX_UNKNOWN_ALERT: + return PR_TRUE; + default: + return PR_FALSE; + } +} + +static CURLcode nss_init_core(struct SessionHandle *data, const char *cert_dir) +{ +#ifdef HAVE_NSS_INITCONTEXT + NSSInitParameters initparams; + + if(nss_context != NULL) + return CURLE_OK; + + memset((void *) &initparams, '\0', sizeof(initparams)); + initparams.length = sizeof(initparams); +#else /* HAVE_NSS_INITCONTEXT */ + SECStatus rv; + + if(NSS_IsInitialized()) + return CURLE_OK; +#endif + + if(cert_dir) { + const bool use_sql = NSS_VersionCheck("3.12.0"); + char *certpath = aprintf("%s%s", use_sql ? "sql:" : "", cert_dir); + if(!certpath) + return CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY; + + infof(data, "Initializing NSS with certpath: %s\n", certpath); +#ifdef HAVE_NSS_INITCONTEXT + nss_context = NSS_InitContext(certpath, "", "", "", &initparams, + NSS_INIT_READONLY | NSS_INIT_PK11RELOAD); + free(certpath); + + if(nss_context != NULL) + return CURLE_OK; +#else /* HAVE_NSS_INITCONTEXT */ + rv = NSS_Initialize(certpath, "", "", "", NSS_INIT_READONLY); + free(certpath); + + if(rv == SECSuccess) + return CURLE_OK; +#endif + + infof(data, "Unable to initialize NSS database\n"); + } + + infof(data, "Initializing NSS with certpath: none\n"); +#ifdef HAVE_NSS_INITCONTEXT + nss_context = NSS_InitContext("", "", "", "", &initparams, NSS_INIT_READONLY + | NSS_INIT_NOCERTDB | NSS_INIT_NOMODDB | NSS_INIT_FORCEOPEN + | NSS_INIT_NOROOTINIT | NSS_INIT_OPTIMIZESPACE | NSS_INIT_PK11RELOAD); + if(nss_context != NULL) + return CURLE_OK; +#else /* HAVE_NSS_INITCONTEXT */ + if(NSS_NoDB_Init(NULL) == SECSuccess) + return CURLE_OK; +#endif + + infof(data, "Unable to initialize NSS\n"); + return CURLE_SSL_CACERT_BADFILE; +} + +static CURLcode nss_init(struct SessionHandle *data) +{ + char *cert_dir; + struct_stat st; + CURLcode rv; + + if(initialized) + return CURLE_OK; + + /* First we check if $SSL_DIR points to a valid dir */ + cert_dir = getenv("SSL_DIR"); + if(cert_dir) { + if((stat(cert_dir, &st) != 0) || + (!S_ISDIR(st.st_mode))) { + cert_dir = NULL; + } + } + + /* Now we check if the default location is a valid dir */ + if(!cert_dir) { + if((stat(SSL_DIR, &st) == 0) && + (S_ISDIR(st.st_mode))) { + cert_dir = (char *)SSL_DIR; + } + } + + rv = nss_init_core(data, cert_dir); + if(rv) + return rv; + + if(num_enabled_ciphers() == 0) + NSS_SetDomesticPolicy(); + + initialized = 1; + return CURLE_OK; +} + +/** + * Global SSL init + * + * @retval 0 error initializing SSL + * @retval 1 SSL initialized successfully + */ +int Curl_nss_init(void) +{ + /* curl_global_init() is not thread-safe so this test is ok */ + if(nss_initlock == NULL) { + PR_Init(PR_USER_THREAD, PR_PRIORITY_NORMAL, 256); + nss_initlock = PR_NewLock(); + nss_crllock = PR_NewLock(); + } + + /* We will actually initialize NSS later */ + + return 1; +} + +CURLcode Curl_nss_force_init(struct SessionHandle *data) +{ + CURLcode rv; + if(!nss_initlock) { + failf(data, + "unable to initialize NSS, curl_global_init() should have been " + "called with CURL_GLOBAL_SSL or CURL_GLOBAL_ALL"); + return CURLE_FAILED_INIT; + } + + PR_Lock(nss_initlock); + rv = nss_init(data); + PR_Unlock(nss_initlock); + return rv; +} + +/* Global cleanup */ +void Curl_nss_cleanup(void) +{ + /* This function isn't required to be threadsafe and this is only done + * as a safety feature. + */ + PR_Lock(nss_initlock); + if(initialized) { + /* Free references to client certificates held in the SSL session cache. + * Omitting this hampers destruction of the security module owning + * the certificates. */ + SSL_ClearSessionCache(); + + if(mod && SECSuccess == SECMOD_UnloadUserModule(mod)) { + SECMOD_DestroyModule(mod); + mod = NULL; + } +#ifdef HAVE_NSS_INITCONTEXT + NSS_ShutdownContext(nss_context); + nss_context = NULL; +#else /* HAVE_NSS_INITCONTEXT */ + NSS_Shutdown(); +#endif + } + PR_Unlock(nss_initlock); + + PR_DestroyLock(nss_initlock); + PR_DestroyLock(nss_crllock); + nss_initlock = NULL; + + initialized = 0; +} + +/* + * This function uses SSL_peek to determine connection status. + * + * Return codes: + * 1 means the connection is still in place + * 0 means the connection has been closed + * -1 means the connection status is unknown + */ +int +Curl_nss_check_cxn(struct connectdata *conn) +{ + int rc; + char buf; + + rc = + PR_Recv(conn->ssl[FIRSTSOCKET].handle, (void *)&buf, 1, PR_MSG_PEEK, + PR_SecondsToInterval(1)); + if(rc > 0) + return 1; /* connection still in place */ + + if(rc == 0) + return 0; /* connection has been closed */ + + return -1; /* connection status unknown */ +} + +/* + * This function is called when an SSL connection is closed. + */ +void Curl_nss_close(struct connectdata *conn, int sockindex) +{ + struct ssl_connect_data *connssl = &conn->ssl[sockindex]; + + if(connssl->handle) { + /* NSS closes the socket we previously handed to it, so we must mark it + as closed to avoid double close */ + fake_sclose(conn->sock[sockindex]); + conn->sock[sockindex] = CURL_SOCKET_BAD; + + if((connssl->client_nickname != NULL) || (connssl->obj_clicert != NULL)) + /* A server might require different authentication based on the + * particular path being requested by the client. To support this + * scenario, we must ensure that a connection will never reuse the + * authentication data from a previous connection. */ + SSL_InvalidateSession(connssl->handle); + + if(connssl->client_nickname != NULL) { + free(connssl->client_nickname); + connssl->client_nickname = NULL; + } + /* destroy all NSS objects in order to avoid failure of NSS shutdown */ + Curl_llist_destroy(connssl->obj_list, NULL); + connssl->obj_list = NULL; + connssl->obj_clicert = NULL; + + PR_Close(connssl->handle); + connssl->handle = NULL; + } +} + +/* + * This function is called when the 'data' struct is going away. Close + * down everything and free all resources! + */ +int Curl_nss_close_all(struct SessionHandle *data) +{ + (void)data; + return 0; +} + +/* return true if NSS can provide error code (and possibly msg) for the + error */ +static bool is_nss_error(CURLcode err) +{ + switch(err) { + case CURLE_PEER_FAILED_VERIFICATION: + case CURLE_SSL_CACERT: + case CURLE_SSL_CERTPROBLEM: + case CURLE_SSL_CONNECT_ERROR: + case CURLE_SSL_ISSUER_ERROR: + return true; + + default: + return false; + } +} + +/* return true if the given error code is related to a client certificate */ +static bool is_cc_error(PRInt32 err) +{ + switch(err) { + case SSL_ERROR_BAD_CERT_ALERT: + case SSL_ERROR_EXPIRED_CERT_ALERT: + case SSL_ERROR_REVOKED_CERT_ALERT: + return true; + + default: + return false; + } +} + +static Curl_recv nss_recv; +static Curl_send nss_send; + +static CURLcode nss_load_ca_certificates(struct connectdata *conn, + int sockindex) +{ + struct SessionHandle *data = conn->data; + const char *cafile = data->set.ssl.CAfile; + const char *capath = data->set.ssl.CApath; + + if(cafile) { + CURLcode rv = nss_load_cert(&conn->ssl[sockindex], cafile, PR_TRUE); + if(CURLE_OK != rv) + return rv; + } + + if(capath) { + struct_stat st; + if(stat(capath, &st) == -1) + return CURLE_SSL_CACERT_BADFILE; + + if(S_ISDIR(st.st_mode)) { + PRDirEntry *entry; + PRDir *dir = PR_OpenDir(capath); + if(!dir) + return CURLE_SSL_CACERT_BADFILE; + + while((entry = PR_ReadDir(dir, PR_SKIP_BOTH | PR_SKIP_HIDDEN))) { + char *fullpath = aprintf("%s/%s", capath, entry->name); + if(!fullpath) { + PR_CloseDir(dir); + return CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY; + } + + if(CURLE_OK != nss_load_cert(&conn->ssl[sockindex], fullpath, PR_TRUE)) + /* This is purposefully tolerant of errors so non-PEM files can + * be in the same directory */ + infof(data, "failed to load '%s' from CURLOPT_CAPATH\n", fullpath); + + free(fullpath); + } + + PR_CloseDir(dir); + } + else + infof(data, "warning: CURLOPT_CAPATH not a directory (%s)\n", capath); + } + + infof(data, " CAfile: %s\n CApath: %s\n", + cafile ? cafile : "none", + capath ? capath : "none"); + + return CURLE_OK; +} + +CURLcode Curl_nss_connect(struct connectdata *conn, int sockindex) +{ + PRErrorCode err = 0; + PRFileDesc *model = NULL; + PRBool ssl2 = PR_FALSE; + PRBool ssl3 = PR_FALSE; + PRBool tlsv1 = PR_FALSE; + PRBool ssl_no_cache; + PRBool ssl_cbc_random_iv; + struct SessionHandle *data = conn->data; + curl_socket_t sockfd = conn->sock[sockindex]; + struct ssl_connect_data *connssl = &conn->ssl[sockindex]; + CURLcode curlerr; + const int *cipher_to_enable; + PRSocketOptionData sock_opt; + long time_left; + PRUint32 timeout; + + if(connssl->state == ssl_connection_complete) + return CURLE_OK; + + connssl->data = data; + + /* list of all NSS objects we need to destroy in Curl_nss_close() */ + connssl->obj_list = Curl_llist_alloc(nss_destroy_object); + if(!connssl->obj_list) + return CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY; + + /* FIXME. NSS doesn't support multiple databases open at the same time. */ + PR_Lock(nss_initlock); + curlerr = nss_init(conn->data); + if(CURLE_OK != curlerr) { + PR_Unlock(nss_initlock); + goto error; + } + + curlerr = CURLE_SSL_CONNECT_ERROR; + + if(!mod) { + char *configstring = aprintf("library=%s name=PEM", pem_library); + if(!configstring) { + PR_Unlock(nss_initlock); + goto error; + } + mod = SECMOD_LoadUserModule(configstring, NULL, PR_FALSE); + free(configstring); + + if(!mod || !mod->loaded) { + if(mod) { + SECMOD_DestroyModule(mod); + mod = NULL; + } + infof(data, "WARNING: failed to load NSS PEM library %s. Using " + "OpenSSL PEM certificates will not work.\n", pem_library); + } + } + + PK11_SetPasswordFunc(nss_get_password); + PR_Unlock(nss_initlock); + + model = PR_NewTCPSocket(); + if(!model) + goto error; + model = SSL_ImportFD(NULL, model); + + /* make the socket nonblocking */ + sock_opt.option = PR_SockOpt_Nonblocking; + sock_opt.value.non_blocking = PR_TRUE; + if(PR_SetSocketOption(model, &sock_opt) != PR_SUCCESS) + goto error; + + if(SSL_OptionSet(model, SSL_SECURITY, PR_TRUE) != SECSuccess) + goto error; + if(SSL_OptionSet(model, SSL_HANDSHAKE_AS_SERVER, PR_FALSE) != SECSuccess) + goto error; + if(SSL_OptionSet(model, SSL_HANDSHAKE_AS_CLIENT, PR_TRUE) != SECSuccess) + goto error; + + /* do not use SSL cache if we are not going to verify peer */ + ssl_no_cache = (data->set.ssl.verifypeer) ? PR_FALSE : PR_TRUE; + if(SSL_OptionSet(model, SSL_NO_CACHE, ssl_no_cache) != SECSuccess) + goto error; + + switch (data->set.ssl.version) { + default: + case CURL_SSLVERSION_DEFAULT: + ssl3 = PR_TRUE; + if(data->state.ssl_connect_retry) + infof(data, "TLS disabled due to previous handshake failure\n"); + else + tlsv1 = PR_TRUE; + break; + case CURL_SSLVERSION_TLSv1: + tlsv1 = PR_TRUE; + break; + case CURL_SSLVERSION_SSLv2: + ssl2 = PR_TRUE; + break; + case CURL_SSLVERSION_SSLv3: + ssl3 = PR_TRUE; + break; + } + + if(SSL_OptionSet(model, SSL_ENABLE_SSL2, ssl2) != SECSuccess) + goto error; + if(SSL_OptionSet(model, SSL_ENABLE_SSL3, ssl3) != SECSuccess) + goto error; + if(SSL_OptionSet(model, SSL_ENABLE_TLS, tlsv1) != SECSuccess) + goto error; + + if(SSL_OptionSet(model, SSL_V2_COMPATIBLE_HELLO, ssl2) != SECSuccess) + goto error; + + ssl_cbc_random_iv = !data->set.ssl_enable_beast; +#ifdef SSL_CBC_RANDOM_IV + /* unless the user explicitly asks to allow the protocol vulnerability, we + use the work-around */ + if(SSL_OptionSet(model, SSL_CBC_RANDOM_IV, ssl_cbc_random_iv) != SECSuccess) + infof(data, "warning: failed to set SSL_CBC_RANDOM_IV = %d\n", + ssl_cbc_random_iv); +#else + if(ssl_cbc_random_iv) + infof(data, "warning: support for SSL_CBC_RANDOM_IV not compiled in\n"); +#endif + + /* reset the flag to avoid an infinite loop */ + data->state.ssl_connect_retry = FALSE; + + /* enable all ciphers from enable_ciphers_by_default */ + cipher_to_enable = enable_ciphers_by_default; + while(SSL_NULL_WITH_NULL_NULL != *cipher_to_enable) { + if(SSL_CipherPrefSet(model, *cipher_to_enable, PR_TRUE) != SECSuccess) { + curlerr = CURLE_SSL_CIPHER; + goto error; + } + cipher_to_enable++; + } + + if(data->set.ssl.cipher_list) { + if(set_ciphers(data, model, data->set.ssl.cipher_list) != SECSuccess) { + curlerr = CURLE_SSL_CIPHER; + goto error; + } + } + + if(!data->set.ssl.verifypeer && data->set.ssl.verifyhost) + infof(data, "warning: ignoring value of ssl.verifyhost\n"); + + /* bypass the default SSL_AuthCertificate() hook in case we do not want to + * verify peer */ + if(SSL_AuthCertificateHook(model, nss_auth_cert_hook, conn) != SECSuccess) + goto error; + + data->set.ssl.certverifyresult=0; /* not checked yet */ + if(SSL_BadCertHook(model, BadCertHandler, conn) != SECSuccess) + goto error; + + if(SSL_HandshakeCallback(model, HandshakeCallback, NULL) != SECSuccess) + goto error; + + if(data->set.ssl.verifypeer) { + const CURLcode rv = nss_load_ca_certificates(conn, sockindex); + if(CURLE_OK != rv) { + curlerr = rv; + goto error; + } + } + + if(data->set.ssl.CRLfile) { + if(SECSuccess != nss_load_crl(data->set.ssl.CRLfile)) { + curlerr = CURLE_SSL_CRL_BADFILE; + goto error; + } + infof(data, + " CRLfile: %s\n", + data->set.ssl.CRLfile ? data->set.ssl.CRLfile : "none"); + } + + if(data->set.str[STRING_CERT]) { + char *nickname = dup_nickname(data, STRING_CERT); + if(nickname) { + /* we are not going to use libnsspem.so to read the client cert */ + connssl->obj_clicert = NULL; + } + else { + CURLcode rv = cert_stuff(conn, sockindex, data->set.str[STRING_CERT], + data->set.str[STRING_KEY]); + if(CURLE_OK != rv) { + /* failf() is already done in cert_stuff() */ + curlerr = rv; + goto error; + } + } + + /* store the nickname for SelectClientCert() called during handshake */ + connssl->client_nickname = nickname; + } + else + connssl->client_nickname = NULL; + + if(SSL_GetClientAuthDataHook(model, SelectClientCert, + (void *)connssl) != SECSuccess) { + curlerr = CURLE_SSL_CERTPROBLEM; + goto error; + } + + /* Import our model socket onto the existing file descriptor */ + connssl->handle = PR_ImportTCPSocket(sockfd); + connssl->handle = SSL_ImportFD(model, connssl->handle); + if(!connssl->handle) + goto error; + + PR_Close(model); /* We don't need this any more */ + model = NULL; + + /* This is the password associated with the cert that we're using */ + if(data->set.str[STRING_KEY_PASSWD]) { + SSL_SetPKCS11PinArg(connssl->handle, data->set.str[STRING_KEY_PASSWD]); + } + + /* Force handshake on next I/O */ + SSL_ResetHandshake(connssl->handle, /* asServer */ PR_FALSE); + + SSL_SetURL(connssl->handle, conn->host.name); + + /* check timeout situation */ + time_left = Curl_timeleft(data, NULL, TRUE); + if(time_left < 0L) { + failf(data, "timed out before SSL handshake"); + curlerr = CURLE_OPERATION_TIMEDOUT; + goto error; + } + timeout = PR_MillisecondsToInterval((PRUint32) time_left); + + /* Force the handshake now */ + if(SSL_ForceHandshakeWithTimeout(connssl->handle, timeout) != SECSuccess) { + if(conn->data->set.ssl.certverifyresult == SSL_ERROR_BAD_CERT_DOMAIN) + curlerr = CURLE_PEER_FAILED_VERIFICATION; + else if(conn->data->set.ssl.certverifyresult!=0) + curlerr = CURLE_SSL_CACERT; + goto error; + } + + connssl->state = ssl_connection_complete; + conn->recv[sockindex] = nss_recv; + conn->send[sockindex] = nss_send; + + display_conn_info(conn, connssl->handle); + + if(data->set.str[STRING_SSL_ISSUERCERT]) { + SECStatus ret = SECFailure; + char *nickname = dup_nickname(data, STRING_SSL_ISSUERCERT); + if(nickname) { + /* we support only nicknames in case of STRING_SSL_ISSUERCERT for now */ + ret = check_issuer_cert(connssl->handle, nickname); + free(nickname); + } + + if(SECFailure == ret) { + infof(data,"SSL certificate issuer check failed\n"); + curlerr = CURLE_SSL_ISSUER_ERROR; + goto error; + } + else { + infof(data, "SSL certificate issuer check ok\n"); + } + } + + return CURLE_OK; + + error: + /* reset the flag to avoid an infinite loop */ + data->state.ssl_connect_retry = FALSE; + + if(is_nss_error(curlerr)) { + /* read NSPR error code */ + err = PR_GetError(); + if(is_cc_error(err)) + curlerr = CURLE_SSL_CERTPROBLEM; + + /* print the error number and error string */ + infof(data, "NSS error %d (%s)\n", err, nss_error_to_name(err)); + + /* print a human-readable message describing the error if available */ + nss_print_error_message(data, err); + } + + if(model) + PR_Close(model); + + /* cleanup on connection failure */ + Curl_llist_destroy(connssl->obj_list, NULL); + connssl->obj_list = NULL; + + if(ssl3 && tlsv1 && isTLSIntoleranceError(err)) { + /* schedule reconnect through Curl_retry_request() */ + data->state.ssl_connect_retry = TRUE; + infof(data, "Error in TLS handshake, trying SSLv3...\n"); + return CURLE_OK; + } + + return curlerr; +} + +static ssize_t nss_send(struct connectdata *conn, /* connection data */ + int sockindex, /* socketindex */ + const void *mem, /* send this data */ + size_t len, /* amount to write */ + CURLcode *curlcode) +{ + int rc; + + rc = PR_Send(conn->ssl[sockindex].handle, mem, (int)len, 0, -1); + + if(rc < 0) { + PRInt32 err = PR_GetError(); + if(err == PR_WOULD_BLOCK_ERROR) + *curlcode = CURLE_AGAIN; + else { + /* print the error number and error string */ + const char *err_name = nss_error_to_name(err); + infof(conn->data, "SSL write: error %d (%s)\n", err, err_name); + + /* print a human-readable message describing the error if available */ + nss_print_error_message(conn->data, err); + + *curlcode = (is_cc_error(err)) + ? CURLE_SSL_CERTPROBLEM + : CURLE_SEND_ERROR; + } + return -1; + } + return rc; /* number of bytes */ +} + +static ssize_t nss_recv(struct connectdata * conn, /* connection data */ + int num, /* socketindex */ + char *buf, /* store read data here */ + size_t buffersize, /* max amount to read */ + CURLcode *curlcode) +{ + ssize_t nread; + + nread = PR_Recv(conn->ssl[num].handle, buf, (int)buffersize, 0, -1); + if(nread < 0) { + /* failed SSL read */ + PRInt32 err = PR_GetError(); + + if(err == PR_WOULD_BLOCK_ERROR) + *curlcode = CURLE_AGAIN; + else { + /* print the error number and error string */ + const char *err_name = nss_error_to_name(err); + infof(conn->data, "SSL read: errno %d (%s)\n", err, err_name); + + /* print a human-readable message describing the error if available */ + nss_print_error_message(conn->data, err); + + *curlcode = (is_cc_error(err)) + ? CURLE_SSL_CERTPROBLEM + : CURLE_RECV_ERROR; + } + return -1; + } + return nread; +} + +size_t Curl_nss_version(char *buffer, size_t size) +{ + return snprintf(buffer, size, "NSS/%s", NSS_VERSION); +} + +int Curl_nss_seed(struct SessionHandle *data) +{ + /* TODO: implement? */ + (void) data; + return 0; +} + +void Curl_nss_random(struct SessionHandle *data, + unsigned char *entropy, + size_t length) +{ + Curl_nss_seed(data); /* Initiate the seed if not already done */ + PK11_GenerateRandom(entropy, curlx_uztosi(length)); +} + +void Curl_nss_md5sum(unsigned char *tmp, /* input */ + size_t tmplen, + unsigned char *md5sum, /* output */ + size_t md5len) +{ + PK11Context *MD5pw = PK11_CreateDigestContext(SEC_OID_MD5); + unsigned int MD5out; + PK11_DigestOp(MD5pw, tmp, curlx_uztoui(tmplen)); + PK11_DigestFinal(MD5pw, md5sum, &MD5out, curlx_uztoui(md5len)); + PK11_DestroyContext(MD5pw, PR_TRUE); +} + +#endif /* USE_NSS */ |