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Diffstat (limited to 'protocols/Telegram/libevent/arc4random.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | protocols/Telegram/libevent/arc4random.c | 556 |
1 files changed, 556 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/protocols/Telegram/libevent/arc4random.c b/protocols/Telegram/libevent/arc4random.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..a2338e692a --- /dev/null +++ b/protocols/Telegram/libevent/arc4random.c @@ -0,0 +1,556 @@ +/* Portable arc4random.c based on arc4random.c from OpenBSD. + * Portable version by Chris Davis, adapted for Libevent by Nick Mathewson + * Copyright (c) 2010 Chris Davis, Niels Provos, and Nick Mathewson + * Copyright (c) 2010-2012 Niels Provos and Nick Mathewson + * + * Note that in Libevent, this file isn't compiled directly. Instead, + * it's included from evutil_rand.c + */ + +/* + * Copyright (c) 1996, David Mazieres <dm@uun.org> + * Copyright (c) 2008, Damien Miller <djm@openbsd.org> + * + * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any + * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above + * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. + * + * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES + * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF + * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR + * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES + * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN + * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF + * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. + */ + +/* + * Arc4 random number generator for OpenBSD. + * + * This code is derived from section 17.1 of Applied Cryptography, + * second edition, which describes a stream cipher allegedly + * compatible with RSA Labs "RC4" cipher (the actual description of + * which is a trade secret). The same algorithm is used as a stream + * cipher called "arcfour" in Tatu Ylonen's ssh package. + * + * Here the stream cipher has been modified always to include the time + * when initializing the state. That makes it impossible to + * regenerate the same random sequence twice, so this can't be used + * for encryption, but will generate good random numbers. + * + * RC4 is a registered trademark of RSA Laboratories. + */ + +#ifndef ARC4RANDOM_EXPORT +#define ARC4RANDOM_EXPORT +#endif + +#ifndef ARC4RANDOM_UINT32 +#define ARC4RANDOM_UINT32 uint32_t +#endif + +#ifndef ARC4RANDOM_NO_INCLUDES +#include "evconfig-private.h" +#ifdef _WIN32 +#include <wincrypt.h> +#include <process.h> +#else +#include <fcntl.h> +#include <unistd.h> +#include <sys/param.h> +#include <sys/time.h> +#ifdef EVENT__HAVE_SYS_SYSCTL_H +#include <sys/sysctl.h> +#endif +#endif +#include <limits.h> +#include <stdlib.h> +#include <string.h> +#endif + +/* Add platform entropy 32 bytes (256 bits) at a time. */ +#define ADD_ENTROPY 32 + +/* Re-seed from the platform RNG after generating this many bytes. */ +#define BYTES_BEFORE_RESEED 1600000 + +struct arc4_stream { + unsigned char i; + unsigned char j; + unsigned char s[256]; +}; + +#ifdef _WIN32 +#define getpid _getpid +#define pid_t int +#endif + +static int rs_initialized; +static struct arc4_stream rs; +static pid_t arc4_stir_pid; +static int arc4_count; +static int arc4_seeded_ok; + +static inline unsigned char arc4_getbyte(void); + +static inline void +arc4_init(void) +{ + int n; + + for (n = 0; n < 256; n++) + rs.s[n] = n; + rs.i = 0; + rs.j = 0; +} + +static inline void +arc4_addrandom(const unsigned char *dat, int datlen) +{ + int n; + unsigned char si; + + rs.i--; + for (n = 0; n < 256; n++) { + rs.i = (rs.i + 1); + si = rs.s[rs.i]; + rs.j = (rs.j + si + dat[n % datlen]); + rs.s[rs.i] = rs.s[rs.j]; + rs.s[rs.j] = si; + } + rs.j = rs.i; +} + +#ifndef _WIN32 +static ssize_t +read_all(int fd, unsigned char *buf, size_t count) +{ + size_t numread = 0; + ssize_t result; + + while (numread < count) { + result = read(fd, buf+numread, count-numread); + if (result<0) + return -1; + else if (result == 0) + break; + numread += result; + } + + return (ssize_t)numread; +} +#endif + +#ifdef _WIN32 +#define TRY_SEED_WIN32 +static int +arc4_seed_win32(void) +{ + /* This is adapted from Tor's crypto_seed_rng() */ + static int provider_set = 0; + static HCRYPTPROV provider; + unsigned char buf[ADD_ENTROPY]; + + if (!provider_set) { + if (!CryptAcquireContext(&provider, NULL, NULL, PROV_RSA_FULL, + CRYPT_VERIFYCONTEXT)) { + if (GetLastError() != (DWORD)NTE_BAD_KEYSET) + return -1; + } + provider_set = 1; + } + if (!CryptGenRandom(provider, sizeof(buf), buf)) + return -1; + arc4_addrandom(buf, sizeof(buf)); + evutil_memclear_(buf, sizeof(buf)); + arc4_seeded_ok = 1; + return 0; +} +#endif + +#if defined(EVENT__HAVE_SYS_SYSCTL_H) && defined(EVENT__HAVE_SYSCTL) +#if EVENT__HAVE_DECL_CTL_KERN && EVENT__HAVE_DECL_KERN_RANDOM && EVENT__HAVE_DECL_RANDOM_UUID +#define TRY_SEED_SYSCTL_LINUX +static int +arc4_seed_sysctl_linux(void) +{ + /* Based on code by William Ahern, this function tries to use the + * RANDOM_UUID sysctl to get entropy from the kernel. This can work + * even if /dev/urandom is inaccessible for some reason (e.g., we're + * running in a chroot). */ + int mib[] = { CTL_KERN, KERN_RANDOM, RANDOM_UUID }; + unsigned char buf[ADD_ENTROPY]; + size_t len, n; + unsigned i; + int any_set; + + memset(buf, 0, sizeof(buf)); + + for (len = 0; len < sizeof(buf); len += n) { + n = sizeof(buf) - len; + + if (0 != sysctl(mib, 3, &buf[len], &n, NULL, 0)) + return -1; + } + /* make sure that the buffer actually got set. */ + for (i=0,any_set=0; i<sizeof(buf); ++i) { + any_set |= buf[i]; + } + if (!any_set) + return -1; + + arc4_addrandom(buf, sizeof(buf)); + evutil_memclear_(buf, sizeof(buf)); + arc4_seeded_ok = 1; + return 0; +} +#endif + +#if EVENT__HAVE_DECL_CTL_KERN && EVENT__HAVE_DECL_KERN_ARND +#define TRY_SEED_SYSCTL_BSD +static int +arc4_seed_sysctl_bsd(void) +{ + /* Based on code from William Ahern and from OpenBSD, this function + * tries to use the KERN_ARND syscall to get entropy from the kernel. + * This can work even if /dev/urandom is inaccessible for some reason + * (e.g., we're running in a chroot). */ + int mib[] = { CTL_KERN, KERN_ARND }; + unsigned char buf[ADD_ENTROPY]; + size_t len, n; + int i, any_set; + + memset(buf, 0, sizeof(buf)); + + len = sizeof(buf); + if (sysctl(mib, 2, buf, &len, NULL, 0) == -1) { + for (len = 0; len < sizeof(buf); len += sizeof(unsigned)) { + n = sizeof(unsigned); + if (n + len > sizeof(buf)) + n = len - sizeof(buf); + if (sysctl(mib, 2, &buf[len], &n, NULL, 0) == -1) + return -1; + } + } + /* make sure that the buffer actually got set. */ + for (i=any_set=0; i<sizeof(buf); ++i) { + any_set |= buf[i]; + } + if (!any_set) + return -1; + + arc4_addrandom(buf, sizeof(buf)); + evutil_memclear_(buf, sizeof(buf)); + arc4_seeded_ok = 1; + return 0; +} +#endif +#endif /* defined(EVENT__HAVE_SYS_SYSCTL_H) */ + +#ifdef __linux__ +#define TRY_SEED_PROC_SYS_KERNEL_RANDOM_UUID +static int +arc4_seed_proc_sys_kernel_random_uuid(void) +{ + /* Occasionally, somebody will make /proc/sys accessible in a chroot, + * but not /dev/urandom. Let's try /proc/sys/kernel/random/uuid. + * Its format is stupid, so we need to decode it from hex. + */ + int fd; + char buf[128]; + unsigned char entropy[64]; + int bytes, n, i, nybbles; + for (bytes = 0; bytes<ADD_ENTROPY; ) { + fd = evutil_open_closeonexec_("/proc/sys/kernel/random/uuid", O_RDONLY, 0); + if (fd < 0) + return -1; + n = read(fd, buf, sizeof(buf)); + close(fd); + if (n<=0) + return -1; + memset(entropy, 0, sizeof(entropy)); + for (i=nybbles=0; i<n; ++i) { + if (EVUTIL_ISXDIGIT_(buf[i])) { + int nyb = evutil_hex_char_to_int_(buf[i]); + if (nybbles & 1) { + entropy[nybbles/2] |= nyb; + } else { + entropy[nybbles/2] |= nyb<<4; + } + ++nybbles; + } + } + if (nybbles < 2) + return -1; + arc4_addrandom(entropy, nybbles/2); + bytes += nybbles/2; + } + evutil_memclear_(entropy, sizeof(entropy)); + evutil_memclear_(buf, sizeof(buf)); + arc4_seeded_ok = 1; + return 0; +} +#endif + +#ifndef _WIN32 +#define TRY_SEED_URANDOM +static char *arc4random_urandom_filename = NULL; + +static int arc4_seed_urandom_helper_(const char *fname) +{ + unsigned char buf[ADD_ENTROPY]; + int fd; + size_t n; + + fd = evutil_open_closeonexec_(fname, O_RDONLY, 0); + if (fd<0) + return -1; + n = read_all(fd, buf, sizeof(buf)); + close(fd); + if (n != sizeof(buf)) + return -1; + arc4_addrandom(buf, sizeof(buf)); + evutil_memclear_(buf, sizeof(buf)); + arc4_seeded_ok = 1; + return 0; +} + +static int +arc4_seed_urandom(void) +{ + /* This is adapted from Tor's crypto_seed_rng() */ + static const char *filenames[] = { + "/dev/srandom", "/dev/urandom", "/dev/random", NULL + }; + int i; + if (arc4random_urandom_filename) + return arc4_seed_urandom_helper_(arc4random_urandom_filename); + + for (i = 0; filenames[i]; ++i) { + if (arc4_seed_urandom_helper_(filenames[i]) == 0) { + return 0; + } + } + + return -1; +} +#endif + +static int +arc4_seed(void) +{ + int ok = 0; + /* We try every method that might work, and don't give up even if one + * does seem to work. There's no real harm in over-seeding, and if + * one of these sources turns out to be broken, that would be bad. */ +#ifdef TRY_SEED_WIN32 + if (0 == arc4_seed_win32()) + ok = 1; +#endif +#ifdef TRY_SEED_URANDOM + if (0 == arc4_seed_urandom()) + ok = 1; +#endif +#ifdef TRY_SEED_PROC_SYS_KERNEL_RANDOM_UUID + if (arc4random_urandom_filename == NULL && + 0 == arc4_seed_proc_sys_kernel_random_uuid()) + ok = 1; +#endif +#ifdef TRY_SEED_SYSCTL_LINUX + /* Apparently Linux is deprecating sysctl, and spewing warning + * messages when you try to use it. */ + if (!ok && 0 == arc4_seed_sysctl_linux()) + ok = 1; +#endif +#ifdef TRY_SEED_SYSCTL_BSD + if (0 == arc4_seed_sysctl_bsd()) + ok = 1; +#endif + return ok ? 0 : -1; +} + +static int +arc4_stir(void) +{ + int i; + + if (!rs_initialized) { + arc4_init(); + rs_initialized = 1; + } + + arc4_seed(); + if (!arc4_seeded_ok) + return -1; + + /* + * Discard early keystream, as per recommendations in + * "Weaknesses in the Key Scheduling Algorithm of RC4" by + * Scott Fluhrer, Itsik Mantin, and Adi Shamir. + * http://www.wisdom.weizmann.ac.il/~itsik/RC4/Papers/Rc4_ksa.ps + * + * Ilya Mironov's "(Not So) Random Shuffles of RC4" suggests that + * we drop at least 2*256 bytes, with 12*256 as a conservative + * value. + * + * RFC4345 says to drop 6*256. + * + * At least some versions of this code drop 4*256, in a mistaken + * belief that "words" in the Fluhrer/Mantin/Shamir paper refers + * to processor words. + * + * We add another sect to the cargo cult, and choose 12*256. + */ + for (i = 0; i < 12*256; i++) + (void)arc4_getbyte(); + + arc4_count = BYTES_BEFORE_RESEED; + + return 0; +} + + +static void +arc4_stir_if_needed(void) +{ + pid_t pid = getpid(); + + if (arc4_count <= 0 || !rs_initialized || arc4_stir_pid != pid) + { + arc4_stir_pid = pid; + arc4_stir(); + } +} + +static inline unsigned char +arc4_getbyte(void) +{ + unsigned char si, sj; + + rs.i = (rs.i + 1); + si = rs.s[rs.i]; + rs.j = (rs.j + si); + sj = rs.s[rs.j]; + rs.s[rs.i] = sj; + rs.s[rs.j] = si; + return (rs.s[(si + sj) & 0xff]); +} + +static inline unsigned int +arc4_getword(void) +{ + unsigned int val; + + val = arc4_getbyte() << 24; + val |= arc4_getbyte() << 16; + val |= arc4_getbyte() << 8; + val |= arc4_getbyte(); + + return val; +} + +#ifndef ARC4RANDOM_NOSTIR +ARC4RANDOM_EXPORT int +arc4random_stir(void) +{ + int val; + ARC4_LOCK_(); + val = arc4_stir(); + ARC4_UNLOCK_(); + return val; +} +#endif + +#ifndef ARC4RANDOM_NOADDRANDOM +ARC4RANDOM_EXPORT void +arc4random_addrandom(const unsigned char *dat, int datlen) +{ + int j; + ARC4_LOCK_(); + if (!rs_initialized) + arc4_stir(); + for (j = 0; j < datlen; j += 256) { + /* arc4_addrandom() ignores all but the first 256 bytes of + * its input. We want to make sure to look at ALL the + * data in 'dat', just in case the user is doing something + * crazy like passing us all the files in /var/log. */ + arc4_addrandom(dat + j, datlen - j); + } + ARC4_UNLOCK_(); +} +#endif + +#ifndef ARC4RANDOM_NORANDOM +ARC4RANDOM_EXPORT ARC4RANDOM_UINT32 +arc4random(void) +{ + ARC4RANDOM_UINT32 val; + ARC4_LOCK_(); + arc4_count -= 4; + arc4_stir_if_needed(); + val = arc4_getword(); + ARC4_UNLOCK_(); + return val; +} +#endif + +ARC4RANDOM_EXPORT void +arc4random_buf(void *buf_, size_t n) +{ + unsigned char *buf = buf_; + ARC4_LOCK_(); + arc4_stir_if_needed(); + while (n--) { + if (--arc4_count <= 0) + arc4_stir(); + buf[n] = arc4_getbyte(); + } + ARC4_UNLOCK_(); +} + +#ifndef ARC4RANDOM_NOUNIFORM +/* + * Calculate a uniformly distributed random number less than upper_bound + * avoiding "modulo bias". + * + * Uniformity is achieved by generating new random numbers until the one + * returned is outside the range [0, 2**32 % upper_bound). This + * guarantees the selected random number will be inside + * [2**32 % upper_bound, 2**32) which maps back to [0, upper_bound) + * after reduction modulo upper_bound. + */ +ARC4RANDOM_EXPORT unsigned int +arc4random_uniform(unsigned int upper_bound) +{ + ARC4RANDOM_UINT32 r, min; + + if (upper_bound < 2) + return 0; + +#if (UINT_MAX > 0xffffffffUL) + min = 0x100000000UL % upper_bound; +#else + /* Calculate (2**32 % upper_bound) avoiding 64-bit math */ + if (upper_bound > 0x80000000) + min = 1 + ~upper_bound; /* 2**32 - upper_bound */ + else { + /* (2**32 - (x * 2)) % x == 2**32 % x when x <= 2**31 */ + min = ((0xffffffff - (upper_bound * 2)) + 1) % upper_bound; + } +#endif + + /* + * This could theoretically loop forever but each retry has + * p > 0.5 (worst case, usually far better) of selecting a + * number inside the range we need, so it should rarely need + * to re-roll. + */ + for (;;) { + r = arc4random(); + if (r >= min) + break; + } + + return r % upper_bound; +} +#endif |