added MirOTR

git-svn-id: http://svn.miranda-ng.org/main/trunk@83 1316c22d-e87f-b044-9b9b-93d7a3e3ba9c

14 files changed, 6573 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/plugins/MirOTR/libgcrypt-1.4.6/random/ChangeLog b/plugins/MirOTR/libgcrypt-1.4.6/random/ChangeLog
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..b1639c4ca4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/plugins/MirOTR/libgcrypt-1.4.6/random/ChangeLog
@@ -0,0 +1,139 @@
+2009-12-10  Werner Koch  <wk@g10code.com>
+
+	* rndw32.c (system_is_w2000): New.
+	(_gcry_rndw32_gather_random): Set it.
+	(slow_gatherer): Ignore SystemObjectInformation on W2000.  Fixes
+	bug#1167.
+
+2009-06-24  Werner Koch  <wk@g10code.com>
+
+	* rndhw.c (poll_padlock): Asm change from Fedora.
+
+2009-01-22  Werner Koch  <wk@g10code.com>
+
+	* random.c (_gcry_random_deinit_external_test): Do not return a
+	value.  Reported Albert Chin.
+
+2008-09-16  Werner Koch  <wk@g10code.com>
+
+	* random-fips.c (x931_aes_driver): No re-seeding with test contexts.
+	(_gcry_rngfips_init_external_test): Fix setting of test_dt_ptr.
+	(struct rng_context): Add flag TEST_NO_DUP_CHECK.
+	(x931_aes_driver): Use that flag.
+	(_gcry_rngfips_init_external_test): Add arg FLAGS and use it to
+	modify the test.
+	* random.c (_gcry_random_init_external_test): Pass FLAGS.
+
+2008-09-15  Werner Koch  <wk@g10code.com>
+
+	* random.c (_gcry_random_init_external_test): New.
+	(_gcry_random_run_external_test): New. 
+	(_gcry_random_deinit_external_test): New.
+	* random-fips.c (struct rng_context): Turn TEST_DT_COUNTER into a
+	32 bit integer.
+	(x931_get_dt): Ditto.
+	(selftest_kat): Intialize it accordingly.
+	(_gcry_rngfips_init_external_test): New.
+	(_gcry_rngfips_run_external_test): New. 
+	(_gcry_rngfips_deinit_external_test): New.
+
+2008-09-05  Werner Koch  <wk@g10code.com>
+
+	* random.c (_gcry_random_selftest): Return success if not in fips
+	mode.
+
+2008-09-01  Werner Koch  <wk@g10code.com>
+
+	* random-fips.c (x931_get_dt) [W32]: Do not use getppid.
+	(get_entropy): Prepare for use under Windows.
+	(_gcry_rngfips_selftest): Ditto.
+	(entropy_collect_cb): Make sure that the gatherer never overflows
+	the buffers.
+
+2008-08-29  Werner Koch  <wk@g10code.com>
+
+	* random-fips.c (SEED_TTL): New.
+	(struct rng_context): Add USE_COUNTER, remove NEED_STRONG_ENTROPY.
+	(x931_aes_driver): Do re-seeding if required.
+	(x931_generate_key, x931_generate_seed): Factor common code out to ..
+	(get_entropy): .. new.  Always use /dev/random.
+	(x931_generate_key): Seed key for nonce_context from std_rng_context.
+	(x931_reseed): New. Seed nonce context from std_rng_context.
+	(get_random): Use x931_reseed.
+	(_gcry_rngfips_selftest): Return an error if no /dev/radom support
+	has been compiled in.
+	(get_random): Remove locking.
+	(_gcry_rngfips_randomize, _gcry_rngfips_create_nonce): Lock here.
+
+2008-08-28  Werner Koch  <wk@g10code.com>
+
+	* random-daemon.c (connect_to_socket): Use GPG_ERR_ENAMETOOLONG.
+
+2008-08-25  Werner Koch  <wk@g10code.com>
+
+	* random-fips.c (x931_aes): Take datetime_GT from an arg.
+	(x931_aes_driver): Call x931_get_dt here.
+	(x931_get_dt): Implement the KAT hack.
+	(x931_generate_seed): Copy the seed value to the provided buffer.
+	(selftest_kat): New.
+
+2008-08-22  Werner Koch  <wk@g10code.com>
+
+	* random.c (_gcry_update_random_seed_file): Move operational check
+	to _gcry_vcontrol.
+	(_gcry_fast_random_poll): Ditto.
+	(_gcry_random_selftest): New.
+	* random-fips.c (_gcry_rngfips_selftest): New.
+
+2008-08-21  Werner Koch  <wk@g10code.com>
+
+	* random-fips.c: Finish implementation.
+
+2008-08-15  Werner Koch  <wk@g10code.com>
+
+	* random-fips.c: New.
+
+	* random-csprng.c (process-cb, progress_cb_data): Move to
+	random.c.
+	(_gcry_register_random_progress, _gcry_random_progress): Ditto.
+	(_gcry_random_initialize): Rename to _gcry_rngcsprng_initialize.
+	(_gcry_random_dump_stats): Rename to _gcry_rngcsprng_dump_stats.
+	(_gcry_secure_random_alloc): Rename to
+	_gcry_rngcsprng_secure_alloc.
+	(_gcry_enable_quick_random_gen): Rename to
+	_gcry_rngcsprng_enable_quick_gen.
+	(_gcry_set_random_daemon_socket): Rename to
+	_gcry_rngcsprng_set_daemon_socket.
+	(_gcry_use_random_daemon): Rename to _gcry_rngcsprng_use_daemon.
+	(_gcry_random_is_faked): Rename to _gcry_rngcsprng_is_faked.
+	(gcry_random_add_bytes): Rename to _gcry_rngcsprng_add_bytes.
+	(gcry_random_bytes): Remove
+	(gcry_random_bytes_secure): Remove.
+	(gcry_randomize): Rename to _gcry_rngcsprng_randomize.
+	(_gcry_set_random_seed_file): Rename to
+	_gcry_rngcsprng_set_seed_file.
+	(_gcry_update_random_seed_file): Rename to
+	_gcry_rngcsprng_update_seed_file.
+	(_gcry_fast_random_poll): Rename to _gcry_rngcsprng_fast_poll.
+	(gcry_create_nonce): Rename to _gcry_rngcsprng_create_nonce.
+
+	* random.c: Factor all code out to random-csprng.c and implement
+	wrapper functions.
+
+2008-07-05  Werner Koch  <wk@g10code.com>
+
+	* random-daemon.c, random.h, rndhw.c, rndunix.c, rand-internal.h *
+	random.c, rndegd.c, rndlinux.c, rndw32.c: Move from ../cipher/ to
+	here.
+	* Makefile.am: New.
+
+ Copyright 2008 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
+
+ This file is free software; as a special exception the author gives
+ unlimited permission to copy and/or distribute it, with or without
+ modifications, as long as this notice is preserved.
+
+ This file is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
+ WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY, to the extent permitted by law; without even the
+ implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.
+	
diff --git a/plugins/MirOTR/libgcrypt-1.4.6/random/Makefile.am b/plugins/MirOTR/libgcrypt-1.4.6/random/Makefile.am
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..336109a6ad
--- /dev/null
+++ b/plugins/MirOTR/libgcrypt-1.4.6/random/Makefile.am
@@ -0,0 +1,49 @@
+# Makefile for cipher modules
+# Copyright (C) 2008 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
+#
+# This file is part of Libgcrypt.
+#
+# Libgcrypt is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+# it under the terms of the GNU Lesser General Public License as
+# published by the Free Software Foundation; either version 2.1 of
+# the License, or (at your option) any later version.
+#
+# Libgcrypt is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+# but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+# MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
+# GNU Lesser General Public License for more details.
+#
+# You should have received a copy of the GNU Lesser General Public
+# License along with this program; if not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
+
+# Process this file with automake to produce Makefile.in
+
+# Need to include ../src in addition to top_srcdir because gcrypt.h is
+# a built header.
+AM_CPPFLAGS = -I../src -I$(top_srcdir)/src 
+AM_CFLAGS = $(GPG_ERROR_CFLAGS)
+
+noinst_LTLIBRARIES = librandom.la
+
+GCRYPT_MODULES = @GCRYPT_RANDOM@
+
+librandom_la_DEPENDENCIES = $(GCRYPT_MODULES)
+librandom_la_LIBADD = $(GCRYPT_MODULES)
+
+librandom_la_SOURCES = \
+random.c random.h \
+rand-internal.h \
+random-csprng.c \
+random-fips.c \
+rndhw.c
+
+if USE_RANDOM_DAEMON
+librandom_la_SOURCES += random-daemon.c 
+endif USE_RANDOM_DAEMON
+
+
+EXTRA_librandom_la_SOURCES = \
+rndlinux.c \
+rndegd.c \
+rndunix.c \
+rndw32.c 
diff --git a/plugins/MirOTR/libgcrypt-1.4.6/random/Makefile.in b/plugins/MirOTR/libgcrypt-1.4.6/random/Makefile.in
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..679abc8245
--- /dev/null
+++ b/plugins/MirOTR/libgcrypt-1.4.6/random/Makefile.in
@@ -0,0 +1,519 @@
+# Makefile.in generated by automake 1.10.2 from Makefile.am.
+# @configure_input@
+
+# Copyright (C) 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002,
+# 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008  Free Software Foundation, Inc.
+# This Makefile.in is free software; the Free Software Foundation
+# gives unlimited permission to copy and/or distribute it,
+# with or without modifications, as long as this notice is preserved.
+
+# This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+# but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY, to the extent permitted by law; without
+# even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A
+# PARTICULAR PURPOSE.
+
+@SET_MAKE@
+
+# Makefile for cipher modules
+# Copyright (C) 2008 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
+#
+# This file is part of Libgcrypt.
+#
+# Libgcrypt is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+# it under the terms of the GNU Lesser General Public License as
+# published by the Free Software Foundation; either version 2.1 of
+# the License, or (at your option) any later version.
+#
+# Libgcrypt is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+# but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+# MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
+# GNU Lesser General Public License for more details.
+#
+# You should have received a copy of the GNU Lesser General Public
+# License along with this program; if not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
+
+# Process this file with automake to produce Makefile.in
+
+VPATH = @srcdir@
+pkgdatadir = $(datadir)/@PACKAGE@
+pkglibdir = $(libdir)/@PACKAGE@
+pkgincludedir = $(includedir)/@PACKAGE@
+am__cd = CDPATH="$${ZSH_VERSION+.}$(PATH_SEPARATOR)" && cd
+install_sh_DATA = $(install_sh) -c -m 644
+install_sh_PROGRAM = $(install_sh) -c
+install_sh_SCRIPT = $(install_sh) -c
+INSTALL_HEADER = $(INSTALL_DATA)
+transform = $(program_transform_name)
+NORMAL_INSTALL = :
+PRE_INSTALL = :
+POST_INSTALL = :
+NORMAL_UNINSTALL = :
+PRE_UNINSTALL = :
+POST_UNINSTALL = :
+build_triplet = @build@
+host_triplet = @host@
+@USE_RANDOM_DAEMON_TRUE@am__append_1 = random-daemon.c 
+subdir = random
+DIST_COMMON = $(srcdir)/Makefile.am $(srcdir)/Makefile.in ChangeLog
+ACLOCAL_M4 = $(top_srcdir)/aclocal.m4
+am__aclocal_m4_deps = $(top_srcdir)/m4/libtool.m4 \
+	$(top_srcdir)/m4/noexecstack.m4 $(top_srcdir)/m4/onceonly.m4 \
+	$(top_srcdir)/m4/socklen.m4 $(top_srcdir)/m4/sys_socket_h.m4 \
+	$(top_srcdir)/acinclude.m4 $(top_srcdir)/configure.ac
+am__configure_deps = $(am__aclocal_m4_deps) $(CONFIGURE_DEPENDENCIES) \
+	$(ACLOCAL_M4)
+mkinstalldirs = $(SHELL) $(top_srcdir)/mkinstalldirs
+CONFIG_HEADER = $(top_builddir)/config.h
+CONFIG_CLEAN_FILES =
+LTLIBRARIES = $(noinst_LTLIBRARIES)
+am__DEPENDENCIES_1 =
+am__librandom_la_SOURCES_DIST = random.c random.h rand-internal.h \
+	random-csprng.c random-fips.c rndhw.c random-daemon.c
+@USE_RANDOM_DAEMON_TRUE@am__objects_1 = random-daemon.lo
+am_librandom_la_OBJECTS = random.lo random-csprng.lo random-fips.lo \
+	rndhw.lo $(am__objects_1)
+librandom_la_OBJECTS = $(am_librandom_la_OBJECTS)
+DEFAULT_INCLUDES = -I.@am__isrc@ -I$(top_builddir)
+depcomp = $(SHELL) $(top_srcdir)/depcomp
+am__depfiles_maybe = depfiles
+COMPILE = $(CC) $(DEFS) $(DEFAULT_INCLUDES) $(INCLUDES) $(AM_CPPFLAGS) \
+	$(CPPFLAGS) $(AM_CFLAGS) $(CFLAGS)
+LTCOMPILE = $(LIBTOOL) --tag=CC $(AM_LIBTOOLFLAGS) $(LIBTOOLFLAGS) \
+	--mode=compile $(CC) $(DEFS) $(DEFAULT_INCLUDES) $(INCLUDES) \
+	$(AM_CPPFLAGS) $(CPPFLAGS) $(AM_CFLAGS) $(CFLAGS)
+CCLD = $(CC)
+LINK = $(LIBTOOL) --tag=CC $(AM_LIBTOOLFLAGS) $(LIBTOOLFLAGS) \
+	--mode=link $(CCLD) $(AM_CFLAGS) $(CFLAGS) $(AM_LDFLAGS) \
+	$(LDFLAGS) -o $@
+SOURCES = $(librandom_la_SOURCES) $(EXTRA_librandom_la_SOURCES)
+DIST_SOURCES = $(am__librandom_la_SOURCES_DIST) \
+	$(EXTRA_librandom_la_SOURCES)
+ETAGS = etags
+CTAGS = ctags
+DISTFILES = $(DIST_COMMON) $(DIST_SOURCES) $(TEXINFOS) $(EXTRA_DIST)
+ACLOCAL = @ACLOCAL@
+AMTAR = @AMTAR@
+AR = @AR@
+AS = @AS@
+AUTOCONF = @AUTOCONF@
+AUTOHEADER = @AUTOHEADER@
+AUTOMAKE = @AUTOMAKE@
+AWK = @AWK@
+BUILD_FILEVERSION = @BUILD_FILEVERSION@
+BUILD_REVISION = @BUILD_REVISION@
+BUILD_TIMESTAMP = @BUILD_TIMESTAMP@
+CC = @CC@
+CCAS = @CCAS@
+CCASDEPMODE = @CCASDEPMODE@
+CCASFLAGS = @CCASFLAGS@
+CCDEPMODE = @CCDEPMODE@
+CFLAGS = @CFLAGS@
+CPP = @CPP@
+CPPFLAGS = @CPPFLAGS@
+CXX = @CXX@
+CXXCPP = @CXXCPP@
+CXXDEPMODE = @CXXDEPMODE@
+CXXFLAGS = @CXXFLAGS@
+CYGPATH_W = @CYGPATH_W@
+DEFS = @DEFS@
+DEPDIR = @DEPDIR@
+DLLTOOL = @DLLTOOL@
+DL_LIBS = @DL_LIBS@
+ECHO = @ECHO@
+ECHO_C = @ECHO_C@
+ECHO_N = @ECHO_N@
+ECHO_T = @ECHO_T@
+EGREP = @EGREP@
+EXEEXT = @EXEEXT@
+F77 = @F77@
+FALLBACK_SOCKLEN_T = @FALLBACK_SOCKLEN_T@
+FFLAGS = @FFLAGS@
+GCRYPT_CIPHERS = @GCRYPT_CIPHERS@
+GCRYPT_DIGESTS = @GCRYPT_DIGESTS@
+GCRYPT_PUBKEY_CIPHERS = @GCRYPT_PUBKEY_CIPHERS@
+GCRYPT_RANDOM = @GCRYPT_RANDOM@
+GPG_ERROR_CFLAGS = @GPG_ERROR_CFLAGS@
+GPG_ERROR_CONFIG = @GPG_ERROR_CONFIG@
+GPG_ERROR_LIBS = @GPG_ERROR_LIBS@
+GREP = @GREP@
+INSTALL = @INSTALL@
+INSTALL_DATA = @INSTALL_DATA@
+INSTALL_PROGRAM = @INSTALL_PROGRAM@
+INSTALL_SCRIPT = @INSTALL_SCRIPT@
+INSTALL_STRIP_PROGRAM = @INSTALL_STRIP_PROGRAM@
+LDFLAGS = @LDFLAGS@
+LIBGCRYPT_CIPHERS = @LIBGCRYPT_CIPHERS@
+LIBGCRYPT_CONFIG_API_VERSION = @LIBGCRYPT_CONFIG_API_VERSION@
+LIBGCRYPT_CONFIG_CFLAGS = @LIBGCRYPT_CONFIG_CFLAGS@
+LIBGCRYPT_CONFIG_LIBS = @LIBGCRYPT_CONFIG_LIBS@
+LIBGCRYPT_DIGESTS = @LIBGCRYPT_DIGESTS@
+LIBGCRYPT_LT_AGE = @LIBGCRYPT_LT_AGE@
+LIBGCRYPT_LT_CURRENT = @LIBGCRYPT_LT_CURRENT@
+LIBGCRYPT_LT_REVISION = @LIBGCRYPT_LT_REVISION@
+LIBGCRYPT_PUBKEY_CIPHERS = @LIBGCRYPT_PUBKEY_CIPHERS@
+LIBGCRYPT_THREAD_MODULES = @LIBGCRYPT_THREAD_MODULES@
+LIBOBJS = @LIBOBJS@
+LIBS = @LIBS@
+LIBTOOL = @LIBTOOL@
+LN_S = @LN_S@
+LTLIBOBJS = @LTLIBOBJS@
+MAINT = @MAINT@
+MAKEINFO = @MAKEINFO@
+MKDIR_P = @MKDIR_P@
+MPI_SFLAGS = @MPI_SFLAGS@
+NOEXECSTACK_FLAGS = @NOEXECSTACK_FLAGS@
+OBJDUMP = @OBJDUMP@
+OBJEXT = @OBJEXT@
+PACKAGE = @PACKAGE@
+PACKAGE_BUGREPORT = @PACKAGE_BUGREPORT@
+PACKAGE_NAME = @PACKAGE_NAME@
+PACKAGE_STRING = @PACKAGE_STRING@
+PACKAGE_TARNAME = @PACKAGE_TARNAME@
+PACKAGE_URL = @PACKAGE_URL@
+PACKAGE_VERSION = @PACKAGE_VERSION@
+PATH_SEPARATOR = @PATH_SEPARATOR@
+PTH_CFLAGS = @PTH_CFLAGS@
+PTH_CONFIG = @PTH_CONFIG@
+PTH_LIBS = @PTH_LIBS@
+RANLIB = @RANLIB@
+RC = @RC@
+SET_MAKE = @SET_MAKE@
+SHELL = @SHELL@
+STRIP = @STRIP@
+SYS_SOCKET_H = @SYS_SOCKET_H@
+VERSION = @VERSION@
+abs_builddir = @abs_builddir@
+abs_srcdir = @abs_srcdir@
+abs_top_builddir = @abs_top_builddir@
+abs_top_srcdir = @abs_top_srcdir@
+ac_ct_CC = @ac_ct_CC@
+ac_ct_CXX = @ac_ct_CXX@
+ac_ct_F77 = @ac_ct_F77@
+am__include = @am__include@
+am__leading_dot = @am__leading_dot@
+am__quote = @am__quote@
+am__tar = @am__tar@
+am__untar = @am__untar@
+bindir = @bindir@
+build = @build@
+build_alias = @build_alias@
+build_cpu = @build_cpu@
+build_os = @build_os@
+build_vendor = @build_vendor@
+builddir = @builddir@
+datadir = @datadir@
+datarootdir = @datarootdir@
+docdir = @docdir@
+dvidir = @dvidir@
+exec_prefix = @exec_prefix@
+host = @host@
+host_alias = @host_alias@
+host_cpu = @host_cpu@
+host_os = @host_os@
+host_vendor = @host_vendor@
+htmldir = @htmldir@
+includedir = @includedir@
+infodir = @infodir@
+install_sh = @install_sh@
+libdir = @libdir@
+libexecdir = @libexecdir@
+localedir = @localedir@
+localstatedir = @localstatedir@
+mandir = @mandir@
+mkdir_p = @mkdir_p@
+oldincludedir = @oldincludedir@
+pdfdir = @pdfdir@
+prefix = @prefix@
+program_transform_name = @program_transform_name@
+psdir = @psdir@
+sbindir = @sbindir@
+sharedstatedir = @sharedstatedir@
+srcdir = @srcdir@
+sysconfdir = @sysconfdir@
+target_alias = @target_alias@
+top_build_prefix = @top_build_prefix@
+top_builddir = @top_builddir@
+top_srcdir = @top_srcdir@
+
+# Need to include ../src in addition to top_srcdir because gcrypt.h is
+# a built header.
+AM_CPPFLAGS = -I../src -I$(top_srcdir)/src 
+AM_CFLAGS = $(GPG_ERROR_CFLAGS)
+noinst_LTLIBRARIES = librandom.la
+GCRYPT_MODULES = @GCRYPT_RANDOM@
+librandom_la_DEPENDENCIES = $(GCRYPT_MODULES)
+librandom_la_LIBADD = $(GCRYPT_MODULES)
+librandom_la_SOURCES = random.c random.h rand-internal.h \
+	random-csprng.c random-fips.c rndhw.c $(am__append_1)
+EXTRA_librandom_la_SOURCES = \
+rndlinux.c \
+rndegd.c \
+rndunix.c \
+rndw32.c 
+
+all: all-am
+
+.SUFFIXES:
+.SUFFIXES: .c .lo .o .obj
+$(srcdir)/Makefile.in: @MAINTAINER_MODE_TRUE@ $(srcdir)/Makefile.am  $(am__configure_deps)
+	@for dep in $?; do \
+	  case '$(am__configure_deps)' in \
+	    *$$dep*) \
+	      ( cd $(top_builddir) && $(MAKE) $(AM_MAKEFLAGS) am--refresh ) \
+	        && { if test -f $@; then exit 0; else break; fi; }; \
+	      exit 1;; \
+	  esac; \
+	done; \
+	echo ' cd $(top_srcdir) && $(AUTOMAKE) --gnu  random/Makefile'; \
+	cd $(top_srcdir) && \
+	  $(AUTOMAKE) --gnu  random/Makefile
+.PRECIOUS: Makefile
+Makefile: $(srcdir)/Makefile.in $(top_builddir)/config.status
+	@case '$?' in \
+	  *config.status*) \
+	    cd $(top_builddir) && $(MAKE) $(AM_MAKEFLAGS) am--refresh;; \
+	  *) \
+	    echo ' cd $(top_builddir) && $(SHELL) ./config.status $(subdir)/$@ $(am__depfiles_maybe)'; \
+	    cd $(top_builddir) && $(SHELL) ./config.status $(subdir)/$@ $(am__depfiles_maybe);; \
+	esac;
+
+$(top_builddir)/config.status: $(top_srcdir)/configure $(CONFIG_STATUS_DEPENDENCIES)
+	cd $(top_builddir) && $(MAKE) $(AM_MAKEFLAGS) am--refresh
+
+$(top_srcdir)/configure: @MAINTAINER_MODE_TRUE@ $(am__configure_deps)
+	cd $(top_builddir) && $(MAKE) $(AM_MAKEFLAGS) am--refresh
+$(ACLOCAL_M4): @MAINTAINER_MODE_TRUE@ $(am__aclocal_m4_deps)
+	cd $(top_builddir) && $(MAKE) $(AM_MAKEFLAGS) am--refresh
+
+clean-noinstLTLIBRARIES:
+	-test -z "$(noinst_LTLIBRARIES)" || rm -f $(noinst_LTLIBRARIES)
+	@list='$(noinst_LTLIBRARIES)'; for p in $$list; do \
+	  dir="`echo $$p | sed -e 's|/[^/]*$$||'`"; \
+	  test "$$dir" != "$$p" || dir=.; \
+	  echo "rm -f \"$${dir}/so_locations\""; \
+	  rm -f "$${dir}/so_locations"; \
+	done
+librandom.la: $(librandom_la_OBJECTS) $(librandom_la_DEPENDENCIES) 
+	$(LINK)  $(librandom_la_OBJECTS) $(librandom_la_LIBADD) $(LIBS)
+
+mostlyclean-compile:
+	-rm -f *.$(OBJEXT)
+
+distclean-compile:
+	-rm -f *.tab.c
+
+@AMDEP_TRUE@@am__include@ @am__quote@./$(DEPDIR)/random-csprng.Plo@am__quote@
+@AMDEP_TRUE@@am__include@ @am__quote@./$(DEPDIR)/random-daemon.Plo@am__quote@
+@AMDEP_TRUE@@am__include@ @am__quote@./$(DEPDIR)/random-fips.Plo@am__quote@
+@AMDEP_TRUE@@am__include@ @am__quote@./$(DEPDIR)/random.Plo@am__quote@
+@AMDEP_TRUE@@am__include@ @am__quote@./$(DEPDIR)/rndegd.Plo@am__quote@
+@AMDEP_TRUE@@am__include@ @am__quote@./$(DEPDIR)/rndhw.Plo@am__quote@
+@AMDEP_TRUE@@am__include@ @am__quote@./$(DEPDIR)/rndlinux.Plo@am__quote@
+@AMDEP_TRUE@@am__include@ @am__quote@./$(DEPDIR)/rndunix.Plo@am__quote@
+@AMDEP_TRUE@@am__include@ @am__quote@./$(DEPDIR)/rndw32.Plo@am__quote@
+
+.c.o:
+@am__fastdepCC_TRUE@	$(COMPILE) -MT $@ -MD -MP -MF $(DEPDIR)/$*.Tpo -c -o $@ $<
+@am__fastdepCC_TRUE@	mv -f $(DEPDIR)/$*.Tpo $(DEPDIR)/$*.Po
+@AMDEP_TRUE@@am__fastdepCC_FALSE@	source='$<' object='$@' libtool=no @AMDEPBACKSLASH@
+@AMDEP_TRUE@@am__fastdepCC_FALSE@	DEPDIR=$(DEPDIR) $(CCDEPMODE) $(depcomp) @AMDEPBACKSLASH@
+@am__fastdepCC_FALSE@	$(COMPILE) -c $<
+
+.c.obj:
+@am__fastdepCC_TRUE@	$(COMPILE) -MT $@ -MD -MP -MF $(DEPDIR)/$*.Tpo -c -o $@ `$(CYGPATH_W) '$<'`
+@am__fastdepCC_TRUE@	mv -f $(DEPDIR)/$*.Tpo $(DEPDIR)/$*.Po
+@AMDEP_TRUE@@am__fastdepCC_FALSE@	source='$<' object='$@' libtool=no @AMDEPBACKSLASH@
+@AMDEP_TRUE@@am__fastdepCC_FALSE@	DEPDIR=$(DEPDIR) $(CCDEPMODE) $(depcomp) @AMDEPBACKSLASH@
+@am__fastdepCC_FALSE@	$(COMPILE) -c `$(CYGPATH_W) '$<'`
+
+.c.lo:
+@am__fastdepCC_TRUE@	$(LTCOMPILE) -MT $@ -MD -MP -MF $(DEPDIR)/$*.Tpo -c -o $@ $<
+@am__fastdepCC_TRUE@	mv -f $(DEPDIR)/$*.Tpo $(DEPDIR)/$*.Plo
+@AMDEP_TRUE@@am__fastdepCC_FALSE@	source='$<' object='$@' libtool=yes @AMDEPBACKSLASH@
+@AMDEP_TRUE@@am__fastdepCC_FALSE@	DEPDIR=$(DEPDIR) $(CCDEPMODE) $(depcomp) @AMDEPBACKSLASH@
+@am__fastdepCC_FALSE@	$(LTCOMPILE) -c -o $@ $<
+
+mostlyclean-libtool:
+	-rm -f *.lo
+
+clean-libtool:
+	-rm -rf .libs _libs
+
+ID: $(HEADERS) $(SOURCES) $(LISP) $(TAGS_FILES)
+	list='$(SOURCES) $(HEADERS) $(LISP) $(TAGS_FILES)'; \
+	unique=`for i in $$list; do \
+	    if test -f "$$i"; then echo $$i; else echo $(srcdir)/$$i; fi; \
+	  done | \
+	  $(AWK) '{ files[$$0] = 1; nonempty = 1; } \
+	      END { if (nonempty) { for (i in files) print i; }; }'`; \
+	mkid -fID $$unique
+tags: TAGS
+
+TAGS:  $(HEADERS) $(SOURCES)  $(TAGS_DEPENDENCIES) \
+		$(TAGS_FILES) $(LISP)
+	tags=; \
+	here=`pwd`; \
+	list='$(SOURCES) $(HEADERS)  $(LISP) $(TAGS_FILES)'; \
+	unique=`for i in $$list; do \
+	    if test -f "$$i"; then echo $$i; else echo $(srcdir)/$$i; fi; \
+	  done | \
+	  $(AWK) '{ files[$$0] = 1; nonempty = 1; } \
+	      END { if (nonempty) { for (i in files) print i; }; }'`; \
+	if test -z "$(ETAGS_ARGS)$$tags$$unique"; then :; else \
+	  test -n "$$unique" || unique=$$empty_fix; \
+	  $(ETAGS) $(ETAGSFLAGS) $(AM_ETAGSFLAGS) $(ETAGS_ARGS) \
+	    $$tags $$unique; \
+	fi
+ctags: CTAGS
+CTAGS:  $(HEADERS) $(SOURCES)  $(TAGS_DEPENDENCIES) \
+		$(TAGS_FILES) $(LISP)
+	tags=; \
+	list='$(SOURCES) $(HEADERS)  $(LISP) $(TAGS_FILES)'; \
+	unique=`for i in $$list; do \
+	    if test -f "$$i"; then echo $$i; else echo $(srcdir)/$$i; fi; \
+	  done | \
+	  $(AWK) '{ files[$$0] = 1; nonempty = 1; } \
+	      END { if (nonempty) { for (i in files) print i; }; }'`; \
+	test -z "$(CTAGS_ARGS)$$tags$$unique" \
+	  || $(CTAGS) $(CTAGSFLAGS) $(AM_CTAGSFLAGS) $(CTAGS_ARGS) \
+	     $$tags $$unique
+
+GTAGS:
+	here=`$(am__cd) $(top_builddir) && pwd` \
+	  && cd $(top_srcdir) \
+	  && gtags -i $(GTAGS_ARGS) $$here
+
+distclean-tags:
+	-rm -f TAGS ID GTAGS GRTAGS GSYMS GPATH tags
+
+distdir: $(DISTFILES)
+	@srcdirstrip=`echo "$(srcdir)" | sed 's/[].[^$$\\*]/\\\\&/g'`; \
+	topsrcdirstrip=`echo "$(top_srcdir)" | sed 's/[].[^$$\\*]/\\\\&/g'`; \
+	list='$(DISTFILES)'; \
+	  dist_files=`for file in $$list; do echo $$file; done | \
+	  sed -e "s|^$$srcdirstrip/||;t" \
+	      -e "s|^$$topsrcdirstrip/|$(top_builddir)/|;t"`; \
+	case $$dist_files in \
+	  */*) $(MKDIR_P) `echo "$$dist_files" | \
+			   sed '/\//!d;s|^|$(distdir)/|;s,/[^/]*$$,,' | \
+			   sort -u` ;; \
+	esac; \
+	for file in $$dist_files; do \
+	  if test -f $$file || test -d $$file; then d=.; else d=$(srcdir); fi; \
+	  if test -d $$d/$$file; then \
+	    dir=`echo "/$$file" | sed -e 's,/[^/]*$$,,'`; \
+	    if test -d $(srcdir)/$$file && test $$d != $(srcdir); then \
+	      cp -pR $(srcdir)/$$file $(distdir)$$dir || exit 1; \
+	    fi; \
+	    cp -pR $$d/$$file $(distdir)$$dir || exit 1; \
+	  else \
+	    test -f $(distdir)/$$file \
+	    || cp -p $$d/$$file $(distdir)/$$file \
+	    || exit 1; \
+	  fi; \
+	done
+check-am: all-am
+check: check-am
+all-am: Makefile $(LTLIBRARIES)
+installdirs:
+install: install-am
+install-exec: install-exec-am
+install-data: install-data-am
+uninstall: uninstall-am
+
+install-am: all-am
+	@$(MAKE) $(AM_MAKEFLAGS) install-exec-am install-data-am
+
+installcheck: installcheck-am
+install-strip:
+	$(MAKE) $(AM_MAKEFLAGS) INSTALL_PROGRAM="$(INSTALL_STRIP_PROGRAM)" \
+	  install_sh_PROGRAM="$(INSTALL_STRIP_PROGRAM)" INSTALL_STRIP_FLAG=-s \
+	  `test -z '$(STRIP)' || \
+	    echo "INSTALL_PROGRAM_ENV=STRIPPROG='$(STRIP)'"` install
+mostlyclean-generic:
+
+clean-generic:
+
+distclean-generic:
+	-test -z "$(CONFIG_CLEAN_FILES)" || rm -f $(CONFIG_CLEAN_FILES)
+
+maintainer-clean-generic:
+	@echo "This command is intended for maintainers to use"
+	@echo "it deletes files that may require special tools to rebuild."
+clean: clean-am
+
+clean-am: clean-generic clean-libtool clean-noinstLTLIBRARIES \
+	mostlyclean-am
+
+distclean: distclean-am
+	-rm -rf ./$(DEPDIR)
+	-rm -f Makefile
+distclean-am: clean-am distclean-compile distclean-generic \
+	distclean-tags
+
+dvi: dvi-am
+
+dvi-am:
+
+html: html-am
+
+info: info-am
+
+info-am:
+
+install-data-am:
+
+install-dvi: install-dvi-am
+
+install-exec-am:
+
+install-html: install-html-am
+
+install-info: install-info-am
+
+install-man:
+
+install-pdf: install-pdf-am
+
+install-ps: install-ps-am
+
+installcheck-am:
+
+maintainer-clean: maintainer-clean-am
+	-rm -rf ./$(DEPDIR)
+	-rm -f Makefile
+maintainer-clean-am: distclean-am maintainer-clean-generic
+
+mostlyclean: mostlyclean-am
+
+mostlyclean-am: mostlyclean-compile mostlyclean-generic \
+	mostlyclean-libtool
+
+pdf: pdf-am
+
+pdf-am:
+
+ps: ps-am
+
+ps-am:
+
+uninstall-am:
+
+.MAKE: install-am install-strip
+
+.PHONY: CTAGS GTAGS all all-am check check-am clean clean-generic \
+	clean-libtool clean-noinstLTLIBRARIES ctags distclean \
+	distclean-compile distclean-generic distclean-libtool \
+	distclean-tags distdir dvi dvi-am html html-am info info-am \
+	install install-am install-data install-data-am install-dvi \
+	install-dvi-am install-exec install-exec-am install-html \
+	install-html-am install-info install-info-am install-man \
+	install-pdf install-pdf-am install-ps install-ps-am \
+	install-strip installcheck installcheck-am installdirs \
+	maintainer-clean maintainer-clean-generic mostlyclean \
+	mostlyclean-compile mostlyclean-generic mostlyclean-libtool \
+	pdf pdf-am ps ps-am tags uninstall uninstall-am
+
+# Tell versions [3.59,3.63) of GNU make to not export all variables.
+# Otherwise a system limit (for SysV at least) may be exceeded.
+.NOEXPORT:
diff --git a/plugins/MirOTR/libgcrypt-1.4.6/random/rand-internal.h b/plugins/MirOTR/libgcrypt-1.4.6/random/rand-internal.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..534d8284e5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/plugins/MirOTR/libgcrypt-1.4.6/random/rand-internal.h
@@ -0,0 +1,137 @@
+/* rand-internal.h - header to glue the random functions
+ *	Copyright (C) 1998, 2002 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
+ *
+ * This file is part of Libgcrypt.
+ *
+ * Libgcrypt is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ * it under the terms of the GNU Lesser general Public License as
+ * published by the Free Software Foundation; either version 2.1 of
+ * the License, or (at your option) any later version.
+ *
+ * Libgcrypt is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
+ * GNU Lesser General Public License for more details.
+ *
+ * You should have received a copy of the GNU Lesser General Public
+ * License along with this program; if not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
+ */
+
+#ifndef G10_RAND_INTERNAL_H
+#define G10_RAND_INTERNAL_H
+
+#include "../src/cipher-proto.h"
+
+/* Constants used to define the origin of random added to the pool.
+   The code is sensitive to the order of the values.  */
+enum random_origins 
+  {
+    RANDOM_ORIGIN_INIT = 0,      /* Used only for initialization. */
+    RANDOM_ORIGIN_EXTERNAL = 1,  /* Added from an external source.  */
+    RANDOM_ORIGIN_FASTPOLL = 2,  /* Fast random poll function.  */
+    RANDOM_ORIGIN_SLOWPOLL = 3,  /* Slow poll function.  */
+    RANDOM_ORIGIN_EXTRAPOLL = 4  /* Used to mark an extra pool seed
+                                    due to a GCRY_VERY_STRONG_RANDOM
+                                    random request.  */
+  };
+
+
+
+/*-- random.c --*/
+void _gcry_random_progress (const char *what, int printchar,
+                            int current, int total);
+
+
+/*-- random-csprng.c --*/
+void _gcry_rngcsprng_initialize (int full);
+void _gcry_rngcsprng_dump_stats (void);
+void _gcry_rngcsprng_secure_alloc (void);
+void _gcry_rngcsprng_enable_quick_gen (void);
+void _gcry_rngcsprng_set_daemon_socket (const char *socketname);
+int  _gcry_rngcsprng_use_daemon (int onoff);
+int  _gcry_rngcsprng_is_faked (void);
+gcry_error_t _gcry_rngcsprng_add_bytes (const void *buf, size_t buflen,
+                                        int quality);
+void *_gcry_rngcsprng_get_bytes (size_t nbytes,
+                                 enum gcry_random_level level);
+void *_gcry_rngcsprng_get_bytes_secure (size_t nbytes, 
+                                        enum gcry_random_level level);
+void _gcry_rngcsprng_randomize (void *buffer, size_t length,
+                                enum gcry_random_level level);
+void _gcry_rngcsprng_set_seed_file (const char *name);
+void _gcry_rngcsprng_update_seed_file (void);
+void _gcry_rngcsprng_fast_poll (void);
+void _gcry_rngcsprng_create_nonce (void *buffer, size_t length);
+
+/*-- random-rngcsprng.c --*/
+void _gcry_rngfips_initialize (int full);
+void _gcry_rngfips_dump_stats (void);
+int  _gcry_rngfips_is_faked (void);
+gcry_error_t _gcry_rngfips_add_bytes (const void *buf, size_t buflen,
+                                        int quality);
+void *_gcry_rngfips_get_bytes (size_t nbytes,
+                               enum gcry_random_level level);
+void *_gcry_rngfips_get_bytes_secure (size_t nbytes, 
+                                      enum gcry_random_level level);
+void _gcry_rngfips_randomize (void *buffer, size_t length,
+                                enum gcry_random_level level);
+void _gcry_rngfips_create_nonce (void *buffer, size_t length);
+
+gcry_error_t _gcry_rngfips_selftest (selftest_report_func_t report);
+
+gcry_err_code_t _gcry_rngfips_init_external_test (void **r_context,
+                                                  unsigned int flags,
+                                                  const void *key,
+                                                  size_t keylen,
+                                                  const void *seed,
+                                                  size_t seedlen,
+                                                  const void *dt,
+                                                  size_t dtlen);
+gcry_err_code_t _gcry_rngfips_run_external_test (void *context,
+                                                 char *buffer, size_t buflen);
+void _gcry_rngfips_deinit_external_test (void *context);
+
+
+
+
+
+/*-- rndlinux.c --*/
+int _gcry_rndlinux_gather_random (void (*add) (const void *, size_t,
+                                               enum random_origins),
+                                   enum random_origins origin,
+                                  size_t length, int level);
+
+/*-- rndunix.c --*/
+int _gcry_rndunix_gather_random (void (*add) (const void *, size_t,
+                                              enum random_origins),
+                                 enum random_origins origin,
+                                 size_t length, int level);
+
+/*-- rndelg.c --*/
+int _gcry_rndegd_gather_random (void (*add) (const void *, size_t,
+                                             enum random_origins),
+                                enum random_origins origin,
+                                size_t length, int level);
+int _gcry_rndegd_connect_socket (int nofail);
+
+/*-- rndw32.c --*/
+int _gcry_rndw32_gather_random (void (*add) (const void *, size_t,
+                                             enum random_origins),
+                                enum random_origins origin,
+                                size_t length, int level);
+void _gcry_rndw32_gather_random_fast (void (*add)(const void*, size_t, 
+                                                  enum random_origins),
+                                      enum random_origins origin );
+
+/*-- rndhw.c --*/
+int _gcry_rndhw_failed_p (void);
+void _gcry_rndhw_poll_fast (void (*add)(const void*, size_t,
+                                        enum random_origins),
+                            enum random_origins origin);
+size_t _gcry_rndhw_poll_slow (void (*add)(const void*, size_t,
+                                          enum random_origins),
+                              enum random_origins origin);
+
+
+
+#endif /*G10_RAND_INTERNAL_H*/
diff --git a/plugins/MirOTR/libgcrypt-1.4.6/random/random-csprng.c b/plugins/MirOTR/libgcrypt-1.4.6/random/random-csprng.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..6ab868ae37
--- /dev/null
+++ b/plugins/MirOTR/libgcrypt-1.4.6/random/random-csprng.c
@@ -0,0 +1,1397 @@
+/* random-csprng.c - CSPRNG style random number generator (libgcrypt classic)
+ * Copyright (C) 1998, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006,
+ *               2007, 2008  Free Software Foundation, Inc.
+ *
+ * This file is part of Libgcrypt.
+ *
+ * Libgcrypt is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ * it under the terms of the GNU Lesser General Public License as
+ * published by the Free Software Foundation; either version 2.1 of
+ * the License, or (at your option) any later version.
+ *
+ * Libgcrypt is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
+ * GNU Lesser General Public License for more details.
+ *
+ * You should have received a copy of the GNU Lesser General Public
+ * License along with this program; if not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
+ */
+
+/*
+   This random number generator is modelled after the one described in
+   Peter Gutmann's 1998 Usenix Security Symposium paper: "Software
+   Generation of Practically Strong Random Numbers".  See also chapter
+   6 in his book "Cryptographic Security Architecture", New York,
+   2004, ISBN 0-387-95387-6.
+
+   Note that the acronym CSPRNG stands for "Continuously Seeded
+   PseudoRandom Number Generator" as used in Peter's implementation of
+   the paper and not only for "Cryptographically Secure PseudoRandom
+   Number Generator".
+ */
+
+
+#include <config.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <sys/time.h>
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/stat.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include <fcntl.h>
+#include <time.h>
+#ifdef	HAVE_GETHRTIME
+#include <sys/times.h>
+#endif
+#ifdef HAVE_GETTIMEOFDAY
+#include <sys/time.h>
+#endif
+#ifdef HAVE_GETRUSAGE
+#include <sys/resource.h>
+#endif
+#ifdef __MINGW32__
+#include <process.h>
+#endif
+#include "g10lib.h"
+#include "../cipher/rmd.h"
+#include "random.h"
+#include "rand-internal.h"
+#include "cipher.h" /* Required for the rmd160_hash_buffer() prototype.  */
+#include "ath.h"
+
+#ifndef RAND_MAX   /* For SunOS. */
+#define RAND_MAX 32767
+#endif
+
+/* Check whether we can lock the seed file read write. */
+#if defined(HAVE_FCNTL) && defined(HAVE_FTRUNCATE) && !defined(HAVE_W32_SYSTEM)
+#define LOCK_SEED_FILE 1
+#else
+#define LOCK_SEED_FILE 0
+#endif
+
+/* Define the constant we use for transforming the pool at read-out. */
+#if SIZEOF_UNSIGNED_LONG == 8
+#define ADD_VALUE 0xa5a5a5a5a5a5a5a5
+#elif SIZEOF_UNSIGNED_LONG == 4
+#define ADD_VALUE 0xa5a5a5a5
+#else
+#error weird size for an unsigned long
+#endif
+
+/* Contstants pertaining to the hash pool. */
+#define BLOCKLEN  64   /* Hash this amount of bytes... */
+#define DIGESTLEN 20   /* ... into a digest of this length (rmd160). */
+/* POOLBLOCKS is the number of digests which make up the pool.  */
+#define POOLBLOCKS 30
+/* POOLSIZE must be a multiple of the digest length to make the AND
+   operations faster, the size should also be a multiple of unsigned
+   long.  */
+#define POOLSIZE (POOLBLOCKS*DIGESTLEN)
+#if (POOLSIZE % SIZEOF_UNSIGNED_LONG)
+#error Please make sure that poolsize is a multiple of unsigned long
+#endif
+#define POOLWORDS (POOLSIZE / SIZEOF_UNSIGNED_LONG)
+
+
+/* RNDPOOL is the pool we use to collect the entropy and to stir it
+   up.  Its allocated size is POOLSIZE+BLOCKLEN.  Note that this is
+   also an indication on whether the module has been fully
+   initialized. */
+static unsigned char *rndpool;	
+
+/* KEYPOOL is used as a scratch copy to read out random from RNDPOOL.
+   Its allocated size is also POOLSIZE+BLOCKLEN.  */
+static unsigned char *keypool;	
+
+/* This is the offset into RNDPOOL where the next random bytes are to
+   be mixed in.  */
+static size_t pool_writepos;
+
+/* When reading data out of KEYPOOL, we start the read at different
+   positions.  This variable keeps track on where to read next.  */
+static size_t pool_readpos;
+
+/* This flag is set to true as soon as the pool has been completely
+   filled the first time.  This may happen either by rereading a seed
+   file or by adding enough entropy.  */
+static int pool_filled;
+
+/* This counter is used to track whether the initial seeding has been
+   done with enough bytes from a reliable entropy source.  */
+static size_t pool_filled_counter;
+
+/* If random of level GCRY_VERY_STRONG_RANDOM has been requested we
+   have stricter requirements on what kind of entropy is in the pool.
+   In particular POOL_FILLED is not sufficient.  Thus we add some
+   extra seeding and set this flag to true if the extra seeding has
+   been done.  */
+static int did_initial_extra_seeding;
+
+/* This variable is used to estimated the amount of fresh entropy
+   available in RNDPOOL.  */
+static int pool_balance;
+
+/* After a mixing operation this variable will be set to true and
+   cleared if new entropy has been added or a remix is required for
+   otehr reasons.  */
+static int just_mixed;
+
+/* The name of the seed file or NULL if no seed file has been defined.
+   The seed file needs to be regsitered at initialiation time.  We
+   keep a malloced copy here.  */
+static char *seed_file_name;
+
+/* If a seed file has been registered and maybe updated on exit this
+   flag set. */
+static int allow_seed_file_update;
+
+/* Option flag set at initialiation time to force allocation of the
+   pool in secure memory.  */
+static int secure_alloc;
+
+/* This function pointer is set to the actual entropy gathering
+   function during initailization.  After initialization it is
+   guaranteed to point to function.  (On systems without a random
+   gatherer module a dummy function is used).*/
+static int (*slow_gather_fnc)(void (*)(const void*, size_t,
+									   enum random_origins),
+							  enum random_origins, size_t, int);
+
+/* This function is set to the actual fast entropy gathering fucntion
+   during initialization.  If it is NULL, no such function is
+   available. */
+static void (*fast_gather_fnc)(void (*)(const void*, size_t,
+										enum random_origins),
+							   enum random_origins);
+
+
+/* Option flag useful for debugging and the test suite.  If set
+   requests for very strong random are degraded to strong random.  Not
+   used by regular applications.  */
+static int quick_test;
+
+/* On systems without entropy gathering modules, this flag is set to
+   indicate that the random generator is not working properly.  A
+   warning message is issued as well.  This is useful only for
+   debugging and during development.  */
+static int faked_rng;
+
+/* This is the lock we use to protect all pool operations.  */
+static ath_mutex_t pool_lock = ATH_MUTEX_INITIALIZER;
+
+/* This is a helper for assert calls.  These calls are used to assert
+   that functions are called in a locked state.  It is not meant to be
+   thread-safe but as a method to get aware of missing locks in the
+   test suite.  */
+static int pool_is_locked;
+
+/* This is the lock we use to protect the buffer used by the nonce
+   generation.  */
+static ath_mutex_t nonce_buffer_lock = ATH_MUTEX_INITIALIZER;
+
+
+/* We keep some counters in this structure for the sake of the
+   _gcry_random_dump_stats () function.  */
+static struct
+{
+  unsigned long mixrnd;
+  unsigned long mixkey;
+  unsigned long slowpolls;
+  unsigned long fastpolls;
+  unsigned long getbytes1;
+  unsigned long ngetbytes1;
+  unsigned long getbytes2;
+  unsigned long ngetbytes2;
+  unsigned long addbytes;
+  unsigned long naddbytes;
+} rndstats;
+
+
+
+/* --- Stuff pertaining to the random daemon support. --- */
+#ifdef USE_RANDOM_DAEMON
+
+/* If ALLOW_DAEMON is true, the module will try to use the random
+   daemon first.  If the daemon has failed, this variable is set to
+   back to false and the code continues as normal.  Note, we don't
+   test this flag in a locked state because a wrong value does not
+   harm and the trhead will find out itself that the daemon does not
+   work and set it (again) to false.  */
+static int allow_daemon;       
+
+/* During initialization, the user may set a non-default socket name
+   for accessing the random daemon.  If this value is NULL, the
+   default name will be used. */
+static char *daemon_socket_name;
+
+#endif /*USE_RANDOM_DAEMON*/
+
+
+
+/* ---  Prototypes  --- */
+static void read_pool (byte *buffer, size_t length, int level );
+static void add_randomness (const void *buffer, size_t length, 
+							enum random_origins origin);
+static void random_poll (void);
+static void do_fast_random_poll (void);
+static int (*getfnc_gather_random (void))(void (*)(const void*, size_t, 
+												   enum random_origins), 
+										  enum random_origins, size_t, int);
+static void (*getfnc_fast_random_poll (void))(void (*)(const void*, size_t,
+													   enum random_origins),
+											  enum random_origins);
+static void read_random_source (enum random_origins origin,
+								size_t length, int level);
+static int gather_faked (void (*add)(const void*, size_t, enum random_origins),
+						 enum random_origins, size_t length, int level );
+
+
+ 
+/* ---  Functions  --- */
+
+
+/* Basic initialization which is required to initialize mutexes and
+   such.  It does not run a full initialization so that the filling of
+   the random pool can be delayed until it is actually needed.  We
+   assume that this function is used before any concurrent access
+   happens. */
+static void
+initialize_basics(void)
+{
+  static int initialized;
+  int err;
+
+  if (!initialized)
+	{
+	  initialized = 1;
+	  err = ath_mutex_init (&pool_lock);
+	  if (err)
+		log_fatal ("failed to create the pool lock: %s\n", strerror (err) );
+	  
+	  err = ath_mutex_init (&nonce_buffer_lock);
+	  if (err)
+		log_fatal ("failed to create the nonce buffer lock: %s\n",
+				   strerror (err) );
+
+#ifdef USE_RANDOM_DAEMON
+	  _gcry_daemon_initialize_basics ();
+#endif /*USE_RANDOM_DAEMON*/
+
+	  /* Make sure that we are still using the values we have
+		 traditionally used for the random levels.  */
+	  gcry_assert (GCRY_WEAK_RANDOM == 0 
+				   && GCRY_STRONG_RANDOM == 1
+				   && GCRY_VERY_STRONG_RANDOM == 2);
+	}
+}
+
+/* Take the pool lock. */
+static void
+lock_pool (void)
+{
+  int err; 
+
+  err = ath_mutex_lock (&pool_lock);
+  if (err)
+	log_fatal ("failed to acquire the pool lock: %s\n", strerror (err));
+  pool_is_locked = 1;
+}
+
+/* Release the pool lock. */
+static void
+unlock_pool (void)
+{
+  int err; 
+
+  pool_is_locked = 0;
+  err = ath_mutex_unlock (&pool_lock);
+  if (err)
+	log_fatal ("failed to release the pool lock: %s\n", strerror (err));
+}
+
+
+/* Full initialization of this module. */
+static void
+initialize(void)
+{
+  /* Although the basic initialization should have happened already,
+	 we call it here to make sure that all prerequisites are met.  */
+  initialize_basics ();
+
+  /* Now we can look the pool and complete the initialization if
+	 necessary.  */
+  lock_pool ();
+  if (!rndpool)
+	{
+	  /* The data buffer is allocated somewhat larger, so that we can
+		 use this extra space (which is allocated in secure memory) as
+		 a temporary hash buffer */
+	  rndpool = (secure_alloc
+				 ? gcry_xcalloc_secure (1, POOLSIZE + BLOCKLEN)
+				 : gcry_xcalloc (1, POOLSIZE + BLOCKLEN));
+	  keypool = (secure_alloc
+				 ? gcry_xcalloc_secure (1, POOLSIZE + BLOCKLEN)
+				 : gcry_xcalloc (1, POOLSIZE + BLOCKLEN));
+
+	  /* Setup the slow entropy gathering function.  The code requires
+		 that this function exists. */
+	  slow_gather_fnc = getfnc_gather_random ();
+	  if (!slow_gather_fnc)
+		{
+		  faked_rng = 1;
+		  slow_gather_fnc = gather_faked;
+	}
+	  
+	  /* Setup the fast entropy gathering function.  */
+	  fast_gather_fnc = getfnc_fast_random_poll ();
+
+	}
+  unlock_pool ();
+}
+
+
+
+
+/* Initialize this random subsystem.  If FULL is false, this function
+   merely calls the initialize and does not do anything more.  Doing
+   this is not really required but when running in a threaded
+   environment we might get a race condition otherwise. */
+void
+_gcry_rngcsprng_initialize (int full)
+{
+  if (!full)
+	initialize_basics ();
+  else
+	initialize ();
+}
+
+
+void
+_gcry_rngcsprng_dump_stats (void)
+{
+  /* In theory we would need to lock the stats here.  However this
+	 function is usually called during cleanup and then we _might_ run
+	 into problems.  */
+
+  log_info ("random usage: poolsize=%d mixed=%lu polls=%lu/%lu added=%lu/%lu\n"
+		"              outmix=%lu getlvl1=%lu/%lu getlvl2=%lu/%lu%s\n",
+			POOLSIZE, rndstats.mixrnd, rndstats.slowpolls, rndstats.fastpolls,
+			rndstats.naddbytes, rndstats.addbytes,
+			rndstats.mixkey, rndstats.ngetbytes1, rndstats.getbytes1,
+			rndstats.ngetbytes2, rndstats.getbytes2,
+			_gcry_rndhw_failed_p()? " (hwrng failed)":"");
+}
+
+
+/* This function should be called during initialization and before
+   intialization of this module to place the random pools into secure
+   memory.  */
+void
+_gcry_rngcsprng_secure_alloc (void)
+{
+  secure_alloc = 1;
+}
+
+
+/* This may be called before full initialization to degrade the
+   quality of the RNG for the sake of a faster running test suite.  */
+void
+_gcry_rngcsprng_enable_quick_gen (void)
+{
+  quick_test = 1;
+}
+
+
+void
+_gcry_rngcsprng_set_daemon_socket (const char *socketname)
+{
+#ifdef USE_RANDOM_DAEMON
+  if (daemon_socket_name)
+	BUG ();
+
+  daemon_socket_name = gcry_xstrdup (socketname);
+#else /*!USE_RANDOM_DAEMON*/
+  (void)socketname;
+#endif /*!USE_RANDOM_DAEMON*/
+}
+
+/* With ONOFF set to 1, enable the use of the daemon.  With ONOFF set
+   to 0, disable the use of the daemon.  With ONOF set to -1, return
+   whether the daemon has been enabled. */
+int
+_gcry_rngcsprng_use_daemon (int onoff)
+{
+#ifdef USE_RANDOM_DAEMON
+  int last;
+  
+  /* This is not really thread safe.  However it is expected that this
+	 function is being called during initialization and at that point
+	 we are for other reasons not really thread safe.  We do not want
+	 to lock it because we might eventually decide that this function
+	 may even be called prior to gcry_check_version.  */
+  last = allow_daemon;
+  if (onoff != -1)
+	allow_daemon = onoff;
+
+  return last;
+#else /*!USE_RANDOM_DAEMON*/
+  (void)onoff;
+  return 0;
+#endif /*!USE_RANDOM_DAEMON*/
+}
+
+
+/* This function returns true if no real RNG is available or the
+   quality of the RNG has been degraded for test purposes.  */
+int
+_gcry_rngcsprng_is_faked (void)
+{
+  /* We need to initialize due to the runtime determination of
+	 available entropy gather modules.  */
+  initialize();
+  return (faked_rng || quick_test);
+}
+
+
+/* Add BUFLEN bytes from BUF to the internal random pool.  QUALITY
+   should be in the range of 0..100 to indicate the goodness of the
+   entropy added, or -1 for goodness not known.  */
+gcry_error_t
+_gcry_rngcsprng_add_bytes (const void *buf, size_t buflen, int quality)
+{
+  size_t nbytes;
+  const char *bufptr;
+
+  if (quality == -1)
+	quality = 35;
+  else if (quality > 100)
+	quality = 100;
+  else if (quality < 0)
+	quality = 0;
+	  
+  if (!buf)
+	return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_ARG);
+
+  if (!buflen || quality < 10)
+	return 0; /* Take a shortcut. */
+
+  /* Because we don't increment the entropy estimation with FASTPOLL,
+	 we don't need to take lock that estimation while adding from an
+	 external source.  This limited entropy estimation also means that
+	 we can't take QUALITY into account.  */
+  initialize_basics ();
+  bufptr = buf;
+  while (buflen)
+	{
+	  nbytes = buflen > POOLSIZE? POOLSIZE : buflen;
+	  lock_pool ();
+	  if (rndpool)
+		add_randomness (bufptr, nbytes, RANDOM_ORIGIN_EXTERNAL);
+	  unlock_pool ();
+	  bufptr += nbytes;
+	  buflen -= nbytes;
+	}
+  return 0;
+}   
+
+	
+/* Public function to fill the buffer with LENGTH bytes of
+   cryptographically strong random bytes.  Level GCRY_WEAK_RANDOM is
+   not very strong, GCRY_STRONG_RANDOM is strong enough for most
+   usage, GCRY_VERY_STRONG_RANDOM is good for key generation stuff but
+   may be very slow.  */
+void
+_gcry_rngcsprng_randomize (void *buffer, size_t length,
+						   enum gcry_random_level level)
+{
+  unsigned char *p;
+
+  /* Make sure we are initialized. */
+  initialize ();
+
+  /* Handle our hack used for regression tests of Libgcrypt. */
+  if ( quick_test && level > GCRY_STRONG_RANDOM )
+	level = GCRY_STRONG_RANDOM;
+
+  /* Make sure the level is okay. */
+  level &= 3;
+
+#ifdef USE_RANDOM_DAEMON
+  if (allow_daemon
+	  && !_gcry_daemon_randomize (daemon_socket_name, buffer, length, level))
+	return; /* The daemon succeeded. */
+  allow_daemon = 0; /* Daemon failed - switch off. */
+#endif /*USE_RANDOM_DAEMON*/
+
+  /* Acquire the pool lock. */
+  lock_pool ();
+
+  /* Update the statistics. */
+  if (level >= GCRY_VERY_STRONG_RANDOM)
+	{
+	  rndstats.getbytes2 += length;
+	  rndstats.ngetbytes2++;
+	}
+  else
+	{
+	  rndstats.getbytes1 += length;
+	  rndstats.ngetbytes1++;
+	}
+
+  /* Read the random into the provided buffer. */
+  for (p = buffer; length > 0;)
+	{
+	  size_t n;
+
+	  n = length > POOLSIZE? POOLSIZE : length;
+	  read_pool (p, n, level);
+	  length -= n;
+	  p += n;
+	}
+
+  /* Release the pool lock. */
+  unlock_pool ();
+}
+
+
+
+
+/*
+   Mix the pool:
+
+   |........blocks*20byte........|20byte|..44byte..|
+   <..44byte..>           <20byte> 
+		|                    |
+		|                    +------+
+		+---------------------------|----------+
+									v          v
+   |........blocks*20byte........|20byte|..44byte..|
+								 <.....64bytes.....>   
+										 |
+	  +----------------------------------+
+	 Hash
+	  v
+   |.............................|20byte|..44byte..|
+   <20byte><20byte><..44byte..>
+	  |                |
+	  |                +---------------------+
+	  +-----------------------------+        |
+									v        v
+   |.............................|20byte|..44byte..|
+								 <.....64byte......>
+										|
+			  +-------------------------+
+			 Hash
+			  v
+   |.............................|20byte|..44byte..|
+   <20byte><20byte><..44byte..>
+
+   and so on until we did this for all blocks. 
+
+   To better protect against implementation errors in this code, we
+   xor a digest of the entire pool into the pool before mixing.
+
+   Note: this function must only be called with a locked pool.
+ */
+static void
+mix_pool(unsigned char *pool)
+{
+  static unsigned char failsafe_digest[DIGESTLEN];
+  static int failsafe_digest_valid;
+
+  unsigned char *hashbuf = pool + POOLSIZE;
+  unsigned char *p, *pend;
+  int i, n;
+  RMD160_CONTEXT md;
+
+#if DIGESTLEN != 20
+#error must have a digest length of 20 for ripe-md-160
+#endif
+
+  gcry_assert (pool_is_locked);
+  _gcry_rmd160_init( &md );
+
+  /* Loop over the pool.  */
+  pend = pool + POOLSIZE;
+  memcpy(hashbuf, pend - DIGESTLEN, DIGESTLEN );
+  memcpy(hashbuf+DIGESTLEN, pool, BLOCKLEN-DIGESTLEN);
+  _gcry_rmd160_mixblock( &md, hashbuf);
+  memcpy(pool, hashbuf, 20 );
+
+  if (failsafe_digest_valid && pool == rndpool)
+	{
+	  for (i=0; i < 20; i++)
+		pool[i] ^= failsafe_digest[i];
+	}
+  
+  p = pool;
+  for (n=1; n < POOLBLOCKS; n++)
+	{
+	  memcpy (hashbuf, p, DIGESTLEN);
+
+	  p += DIGESTLEN;
+	  if (p+DIGESTLEN+BLOCKLEN < pend)
+		memcpy (hashbuf+DIGESTLEN, p+DIGESTLEN, BLOCKLEN-DIGESTLEN);
+	  else 
+		{
+		  unsigned char *pp = p + DIGESTLEN;
+		  
+		  for (i=DIGESTLEN; i < BLOCKLEN; i++ )
+			{
+			  if ( pp >= pend )
+				pp = pool;
+			  hashbuf[i] = *pp++;
+		}
+	}
+	  
+	  _gcry_rmd160_mixblock ( &md, hashbuf);
+	  memcpy(p, hashbuf, 20 );
+	}
+
+	/* Our hash implementation does only leave small parts (64 bytes)
+	   of the pool on the stack, so it is okay not to require secure
+	   memory here.  Before we use this pool, it will be copied to the
+	   help buffer anyway. */
+	if ( pool == rndpool)
+	  {
+		_gcry_rmd160_hash_buffer (failsafe_digest, pool, POOLSIZE);
+		failsafe_digest_valid = 1;
+	  }
+
+	_gcry_burn_stack (384); /* for the rmd160_mixblock(), rmd160_hash_buffer */
+}
+
+
+void
+_gcry_rngcsprng_set_seed_file (const char *name)
+{
+  if (seed_file_name)
+	BUG ();
+  seed_file_name = gcry_xstrdup (name);
+}
+
+
+/* Lock an open file identified by file descriptor FD and wait a
+   reasonable time to succeed.  With FOR_WRITE set to true a write
+   lock will be taken.  FNAME is used only for diagnostics. Returns 0
+   on success or -1 on error. */
+static int
+lock_seed_file (int fd, const char *fname, int for_write)
+{
+#if LOCK_SEED_FILE
+  struct flock lck;
+  struct timeval tv;
+  int backoff=0;
+
+  /* We take a lock on the entire file. */
+  memset (&lck, 0, sizeof lck);
+  lck.l_type = for_write? F_WRLCK : F_RDLCK;
+  lck.l_whence = SEEK_SET;
+
+  while (fcntl (fd, F_SETLK, &lck) == -1)
+	{
+	  if (errno != EAGAIN && errno != EACCES)
+		{
+		  log_info (_("can't lock `%s': %s\n"), fname, strerror (errno));
+		  return -1;
+		}
+
+	  if (backoff > 2) /* Show the first message after ~2.25 seconds. */
+		log_info( _("waiting for lock on `%s'...\n"), fname);
+	  
+	  tv.tv_sec = backoff;
+	  tv.tv_usec = 250000;
+	  select (0, NULL, NULL, NULL, &tv);
+	  if (backoff < 10)
+		backoff++ ;
+	}
+#endif /*LOCK_SEED_FILE*/
+  return 0;
+}
+
+
+/* Read in a seed from the random_seed file and return true if this
+   was successful.
+
+   Note: Multiple instances of applications sharing the same random
+   seed file can be started in parallel, in which case they will read
+   out the same pool and then race for updating it (the last update
+   overwrites earlier updates).  They will differentiate only by the
+   weak entropy that is added in read_seed_file based on the PID and
+   clock, and up to 16 bytes of weak random non-blockingly.  The
+   consequence is that the output of these different instances is
+   correlated to some extent.  In the perfect scenario, the attacker
+   can control (or at least guess) the PID and clock of the
+   application, and drain the system's entropy pool to reduce the "up
+   to 16 bytes" above to 0.  Then the dependencies of the inital
+   states of the pools are completely known.  */
+static int
+read_seed_file (void)
+{
+  int fd;
+  struct stat sb;
+  unsigned char buffer[POOLSIZE];
+  int n;
+
+  gcry_assert (pool_is_locked);
+
+  if (!seed_file_name)
+	return 0;
+  
+#ifdef HAVE_DOSISH_SYSTEM
+  fd = open( seed_file_name, O_RDONLY | O_BINARY );
+#else
+  fd = open( seed_file_name, O_RDONLY );
+#endif
+  if( fd == -1 && errno == ENOENT)
+	{
+	  allow_seed_file_update = 1;
+	  return 0;
+	}
+
+  if (fd == -1 )
+	{
+	  log_info(_("can't open `%s': %s\n"), seed_file_name, strerror(errno) );
+	  return 0;
+	}
+  if (lock_seed_file (fd, seed_file_name, 0))
+	{
+	  close (fd);
+	  return 0;
+	}
+  if (fstat( fd, &sb ) )
+	{
+	  log_info(_("can't stat `%s': %s\n"), seed_file_name, strerror(errno) );
+	  close(fd);
+	  return 0;
+	}
+  if (!S_ISREG(sb.st_mode) )
+	{
+	  log_info(_("`%s' is not a regular file - ignored\n"), seed_file_name );
+	  close(fd);
+	  return 0;
+	}
+  if (!sb.st_size )
+	{
+	  log_info(_("note: random_seed file is empty\n") );
+	  close(fd);
+	  allow_seed_file_update = 1;
+	  return 0;
+	}
+  if (sb.st_size != POOLSIZE ) 
+	{
+	  log_info(_("warning: invalid size of random_seed file - not used\n") );
+	  close(fd);
+	  return 0;
+	}
+
+  do
+	{
+	  n = read( fd, buffer, POOLSIZE );
+	} 
+  while (n == -1 && errno == EINTR );
+
+  if (n != POOLSIZE)
+	{
+	  log_fatal(_("can't read `%s': %s\n"), seed_file_name,strerror(errno) );
+	  close(fd);/*NOTREACHED*/
+	  return 0;
+	}
+  
+  close(fd);
+
+  add_randomness( buffer, POOLSIZE, RANDOM_ORIGIN_INIT );
+  /* add some minor entropy to the pool now (this will also force a mixing) */
+  {	
+	pid_t x = getpid();
+	add_randomness( &x, sizeof(x), RANDOM_ORIGIN_INIT );
+  }
+  {
+	time_t x = time(NULL);
+	add_randomness( &x, sizeof(x), RANDOM_ORIGIN_INIT );
+  }
+  {	
+	clock_t x = clock();
+	add_randomness( &x, sizeof(x), RANDOM_ORIGIN_INIT );
+  }
+
+  /* And read a few bytes from our entropy source.  By using a level
+   * of 0 this will not block and might not return anything with some
+   * entropy drivers, however the rndlinux driver will use
+   * /dev/urandom and return some stuff - Do not read too much as we
+   * want to be friendly to the scare system entropy resource. */
+  read_random_source ( RANDOM_ORIGIN_INIT, 16, GCRY_WEAK_RANDOM );
+
+  allow_seed_file_update = 1;
+  return 1;
+}
+
+
+void
+_gcry_rngcsprng_update_seed_file (void)
+{
+  unsigned long *sp, *dp;
+  int fd, i;
+
+  /* We do only a basic initialization so that we can lock the pool.
+	 This is required to cope with the case that this function is
+	 called by some cleanup code at a point where the RNG has never
+	 been initialized.  */
+  initialize_basics ();
+  lock_pool ();
+
+  if ( !seed_file_name || !rndpool || !pool_filled )
+	{
+	  unlock_pool ();
+	  return;
+	}
+  if ( !allow_seed_file_update )
+	{
+	  unlock_pool ();
+	  log_info(_("note: random_seed file not updated\n"));
+	  return;
+	}
+
+  /* At this point we know that there is something in the pool and
+	 thus we can conclude that the pool has been fully initialized.  */
+
+
+  /* Copy the entropy pool to a scratch pool and mix both of them. */
+  for (i=0,dp=(unsigned long*)keypool, sp=(unsigned long*)rndpool;
+	   i < POOLWORDS; i++, dp++, sp++ ) 
+	{
+	  *dp = *sp + ADD_VALUE;
+	}
+  mix_pool(rndpool); rndstats.mixrnd++;
+  mix_pool(keypool); rndstats.mixkey++;
+
+#if defined(HAVE_DOSISH_SYSTEM) || defined(__CYGWIN__)
+  fd = open (seed_file_name, O_WRONLY|O_CREAT|O_TRUNC|O_BINARY,
+			 S_IRUSR|S_IWUSR );
+#else
+# if LOCK_SEED_FILE
+	fd = open (seed_file_name, O_WRONLY|O_CREAT, S_IRUSR|S_IWUSR );
+# else
+	fd = open (seed_file_name, O_WRONLY|O_CREAT|O_TRUNC, S_IRUSR|S_IWUSR );
+# endif
+#endif
+
+  if (fd == -1 )
+	log_info (_("can't create `%s': %s\n"), seed_file_name, strerror(errno) );
+  else if (lock_seed_file (fd, seed_file_name, 1))
+	{
+	  close (fd);
+	}
+#if LOCK_SEED_FILE
+  else if (ftruncate (fd, 0))
+	{
+	  log_info(_("can't write `%s': %s\n"), seed_file_name, strerror(errno));
+	  close (fd);
+	}
+#endif /*LOCK_SEED_FILE*/
+  else 
+	{
+	  do
+		{
+		  i = write (fd, keypool, POOLSIZE );
+		} 
+	  while (i == -1 && errno == EINTR);
+	  if (i != POOLSIZE) 
+		log_info (_("can't write `%s': %s\n"),seed_file_name, strerror(errno));
+	  if (close(fd))
+		log_info (_("can't close `%s': %s\n"),seed_file_name, strerror(errno));
+	}
+  
+  unlock_pool ();
+}
+
+
+/* Read random out of the pool.  This function is the core of the
+   public random functions.  Note that Level GCRY_WEAK_RANDOM is not
+   anymore handled special and in fact is an alias in the API for
+   level GCRY_STRONG_RANDOM.  Must be called with the pool already
+   locked.  */
+static void
+read_pool (byte *buffer, size_t length, int level)
+{
+  int i;
+  unsigned long *sp, *dp;
+  /* The volatile is there to make sure the compiler does not optimize
+	 the code away in case the getpid function is badly attributed.
+	 Note that we keep a pid in a static variable as well as in a
+	 stack based one; the latter is to detect ill behaving thread
+	 libraries, ignoring the pool mutexes. */
+  static volatile pid_t my_pid = (pid_t)(-1); 
+  volatile pid_t my_pid2;
+
+  gcry_assert (pool_is_locked);
+
+ retry:
+  /* Get our own pid, so that we can detect a fork. */
+  my_pid2 = getpid ();
+  if (my_pid == (pid_t)(-1))                                
+	my_pid = my_pid2;
+  if ( my_pid != my_pid2 )
+	{
+	  /* We detected a plain fork; i.e. we are now the child.  Update
+		 the static pid and add some randomness. */
+	  pid_t x;
+
+	  my_pid = my_pid2;
+	  x = my_pid;
+	  add_randomness (&x, sizeof(x), RANDOM_ORIGIN_INIT);
+	  just_mixed = 0; /* Make sure it will get mixed. */
+	}
+
+  gcry_assert (pool_is_locked);
+
+  /* Our code does not allow to extract more than POOLSIZE.  Better
+	 check it here. */
+  if (length > POOLSIZE)
+	{
+	  log_bug("too many random bits requested\n");
+	}
+
+  if (!pool_filled)
+	{
+	  if (read_seed_file() )
+		pool_filled = 1;
+	}
+
+  /* For level 2 quality (key generation) we always make sure that the
+	 pool has been seeded enough initially. */
+  if (level == GCRY_VERY_STRONG_RANDOM && !did_initial_extra_seeding)
+	{
+	  size_t needed;
+
+	  pool_balance = 0;
+	  needed = length - pool_balance;
+	  if (needed < POOLSIZE/2)
+		needed = POOLSIZE/2;
+	  else if( needed > POOLSIZE )
+		BUG ();
+	  read_random_source (RANDOM_ORIGIN_EXTRAPOLL, needed,
+						  GCRY_VERY_STRONG_RANDOM);
+	  pool_balance += needed;
+	  did_initial_extra_seeding = 1;
+	}
+
+  /* For level 2 make sure that there is enough random in the pool. */
+  if (level == GCRY_VERY_STRONG_RANDOM && pool_balance < length)
+	{
+	  size_t needed;
+	  
+	  if (pool_balance < 0)
+		pool_balance = 0;
+	  needed = length - pool_balance;
+	  if (needed > POOLSIZE)
+		BUG ();
+	  read_random_source (RANDOM_ORIGIN_EXTRAPOLL, needed,
+						  GCRY_VERY_STRONG_RANDOM);
+	  pool_balance += needed;
+	}
+
+  /* Make sure the pool is filled. */
+  while (!pool_filled)
+	random_poll();
+
+  /* Always do a fast random poll (we have to use the unlocked version). */
+  do_fast_random_poll();
+  
+  /* Mix the pid in so that we for sure won't deliver the same random
+	 after a fork. */
+  {
+	pid_t apid = my_pid;
+	add_randomness (&apid, sizeof (apid), RANDOM_ORIGIN_INIT);
+  }
+
+  /* Mix the pool (if add_randomness() didn't it). */
+  if (!just_mixed)
+	{
+	  mix_pool(rndpool);
+	  rndstats.mixrnd++;
+	}
+
+  /* Create a new pool. */
+  for(i=0,dp=(unsigned long*)keypool, sp=(unsigned long*)rndpool;
+	  i < POOLWORDS; i++, dp++, sp++ )
+	*dp = *sp + ADD_VALUE;
+
+  /* Mix both pools. */
+  mix_pool(rndpool); rndstats.mixrnd++;
+  mix_pool(keypool); rndstats.mixkey++;
+
+  /* Read the requested data.  We use a read pointer to read from a
+	 different position each time.  */
+  while (length--)
+	{
+	  *buffer++ = keypool[pool_readpos++];
+	  if (pool_readpos >= POOLSIZE)
+		pool_readpos = 0;
+	  pool_balance--;
+	}
+ 
+  if (pool_balance < 0)
+	pool_balance = 0;
+
+  /* Clear the keypool. */
+  memset (keypool, 0, POOLSIZE);
+
+  /* We need to detect whether a fork has happened.  A fork might have
+	 an identical pool and thus the child and the parent could emit
+	 the very same random number.  This test here is to detect forks
+	 in a multi-threaded process.  It does not work with all thread
+	 implementations in particular not with pthreads.  However it is
+	 good enough for GNU Pth. */
+  if ( getpid () != my_pid2 )
+	{
+	  pid_t x = getpid();
+	  add_randomness (&x, sizeof(x), RANDOM_ORIGIN_INIT);
+	  just_mixed = 0; /* Make sure it will get mixed. */
+	  my_pid = x;     /* Also update the static pid. */
+	  goto retry;
+	}
+}
+
+
+
+/* Add LENGTH bytes of randomness from buffer to the pool.  ORIGIN is
+   used to specify the randomness origin.  This is one of the
+   RANDOM_ORIGIN_* values. */
+static void
+add_randomness (const void *buffer, size_t length, enum random_origins origin)
+{
+  const unsigned char *p = buffer;
+  size_t count = 0;
+
+  gcry_assert (pool_is_locked);
+
+  rndstats.addbytes += length;
+  rndstats.naddbytes++;
+  while (length-- )
+	{
+	  rndpool[pool_writepos++] ^= *p++;
+	  count++;
+	  if (pool_writepos >= POOLSIZE )
+		{
+		  /* It is possible that we are invoked before the pool is
+			 filled using an unreliable origin of entropy, for example
+			 the fast random poll.  To avoid flagging the pool as
+			 filled in this case, we track the initial filling state
+			 separately.  See also the remarks about the seed file. */
+		  if (origin >= RANDOM_ORIGIN_SLOWPOLL && !pool_filled)
+			{
+			  pool_filled_counter += count;
+			  count = 0;
+			  if (pool_filled_counter >= POOLSIZE)
+				pool_filled = 1;
+			}
+		  pool_writepos = 0;
+		  mix_pool(rndpool); rndstats.mixrnd++;
+		  just_mixed = !length;
+	}
+	}
+}
+
+
+
+static void
+random_poll()
+{
+  rndstats.slowpolls++;
+  read_random_source (RANDOM_ORIGIN_SLOWPOLL, POOLSIZE/5, GCRY_STRONG_RANDOM);
+}
+
+
+/* Runtime determination of the slow entropy gathering module.  */
+static int (*
+getfnc_gather_random (void))(void (*)(const void*, size_t, 
+									  enum random_origins), 
+							 enum random_origins, size_t, int)
+{
+  int (*fnc)(void (*)(const void*, size_t, enum random_origins), 
+			 enum random_origins, size_t, int);
+  
+#if USE_RNDLINUX
+  if ( !access (NAME_OF_DEV_RANDOM, R_OK)
+	   && !access (NAME_OF_DEV_URANDOM, R_OK))
+	{
+	  fnc = _gcry_rndlinux_gather_random;
+	  return fnc;
+	}
+#endif
+
+#if USE_RNDEGD
+  if ( _gcry_rndegd_connect_socket (1) != -1 )
+	{
+	  fnc = _gcry_rndegd_gather_random;
+	  return fnc;
+	}
+#endif
+
+#if USE_RNDUNIX
+  fnc = _gcry_rndunix_gather_random;
+  return fnc;
+#endif
+
+#if USE_RNDW32
+  fnc = _gcry_rndw32_gather_random;
+  return fnc;
+#endif
+
+  log_fatal (_("no entropy gathering module detected\n"));
+
+  return NULL; /*NOTREACHED*/
+}
+
+/* Runtime determination of the fast entropy gathering function.
+   (Currently a compile time method is used.)  */
+static void (*
+getfnc_fast_random_poll (void))( void (*)(const void*, size_t,
+										  enum random_origins),
+								 enum random_origins)
+{
+#if USE_RNDW32
+  return _gcry_rndw32_gather_random_fast;
+#endif
+  return NULL;
+}
+
+
+
+static void
+do_fast_random_poll (void)
+{
+  gcry_assert (pool_is_locked);
+
+  rndstats.fastpolls++;
+
+  if (fast_gather_fnc)
+	fast_gather_fnc (add_randomness, RANDOM_ORIGIN_FASTPOLL);
+
+  /* Continue with the generic functions. */
+#if HAVE_GETHRTIME
+  {	
+	hrtime_t tv;
+	tv = gethrtime();
+	add_randomness( &tv, sizeof(tv), RANDOM_ORIGIN_FASTPOLL );
+  }
+#elif HAVE_GETTIMEOFDAY
+  {	
+	struct timeval tv;
+	if( gettimeofday( &tv, NULL ) )
+	  BUG();
+	add_randomness( &tv.tv_sec, sizeof(tv.tv_sec), RANDOM_ORIGIN_FASTPOLL );
+	add_randomness( &tv.tv_usec, sizeof(tv.tv_usec), RANDOM_ORIGIN_FASTPOLL );
+  }
+#elif HAVE_CLOCK_GETTIME
+  {	struct timespec tv;
+  if( clock_gettime( CLOCK_REALTIME, &tv ) == -1 )
+	BUG();
+  add_randomness( &tv.tv_sec, sizeof(tv.tv_sec), RANDOM_ORIGIN_FASTPOLL );
+  add_randomness( &tv.tv_nsec, sizeof(tv.tv_nsec), RANDOM_ORIGIN_FASTPOLL );
+  }
+#else /* use times */
+# ifndef HAVE_DOSISH_SYSTEM
+  {	struct tms buf;
+  times( &buf );
+  add_randomness( &buf, sizeof buf, RANDOM_ORIGIN_FASTPOLL );
+  }
+# endif
+#endif
+
+#ifdef HAVE_GETRUSAGE
+# ifdef RUSAGE_SELF
+  {	
+	struct rusage buf;
+	/* QNX/Neutrino does return ENOSYS - so we just ignore it and add
+	   whatever is in buf.  In a chroot environment it might not work
+	   at all (i.e. because /proc/ is not accessible), so we better
+	   ignore all error codes and hope for the best. */
+	getrusage (RUSAGE_SELF, &buf );
+	add_randomness( &buf, sizeof buf, RANDOM_ORIGIN_FASTPOLL );
+	memset( &buf, 0, sizeof buf );
+  }
+# else /*!RUSAGE_SELF*/
+#  ifdef __GCC__
+#   warning There is no RUSAGE_SELF on this system
+#  endif
+# endif /*!RUSAGE_SELF*/
+#endif /*HAVE_GETRUSAGE*/
+
+  /* Time and clock are availabe on all systems - so we better do it
+	 just in case one of the above functions didn't work.  */
+  {
+	time_t x = time(NULL);
+	add_randomness( &x, sizeof(x), RANDOM_ORIGIN_FASTPOLL );
+  }
+  {	
+	clock_t x = clock();
+	add_randomness( &x, sizeof(x), RANDOM_ORIGIN_FASTPOLL );
+  }
+
+  /* If the system features a fast hardware RNG, read some bytes from
+	 there.  */
+  _gcry_rndhw_poll_fast (add_randomness, RANDOM_ORIGIN_FASTPOLL);
+}
+
+
+/* The fast random pool function as called at some places in
+   libgcrypt.  This is merely a wrapper to make sure that this module
+   is initalized and to look the pool.  Note, that this function is a
+   NOP unless a random function has been used or _gcry_initialize (1)
+   has been used.  We use this hack so that the internal use of this
+   function in cipher_open and md_open won't start filling up the
+   random pool, even if no random will be required by the process. */
+void
+_gcry_rngcsprng_fast_poll (void)
+{
+  initialize_basics ();
+
+  lock_pool ();
+  if (rndpool)
+	{
+	  /* Yes, we are fully initialized. */
+	  do_fast_random_poll ();
+	}
+  unlock_pool ();
+}
+
+
+
+static void
+read_random_source (enum random_origins orgin, size_t length, int level )
+{
+  if ( !slow_gather_fnc )
+	log_fatal ("Slow entropy gathering module not yet initialized\n");
+
+  if ( slow_gather_fnc (add_randomness, orgin, length, level) < 0)
+	log_fatal ("No way to gather entropy for the RNG\n");
+}
+
+
+static int
+gather_faked (void (*add)(const void*, size_t, enum random_origins),
+			  enum random_origins origin, size_t length, int level )
+{
+  static int initialized=0;
+  size_t n;
+  char *buffer, *p;
+  
+  (void)add;
+  (void)level;
+  
+  if ( !initialized )
+	{
+	  log_info(_("WARNING: using insecure random number generator!!\n"));
+	  initialized=1;
+#ifdef HAVE_RAND
+	  srand( time(NULL)*getpid());
+#else
+	  srandom( time(NULL)*getpid());
+#endif
+	}
+
+  p = buffer = gcry_xmalloc( length );
+  n = length;
+#ifdef HAVE_RAND
+  while ( n-- )
+	*p++ = ((unsigned)(1 + (int) (256.0*rand()/(RAND_MAX+1.0)))-1);
+#else
+  while ( n-- )
+	*p++ = ((unsigned)(1 + (int) (256.0*random()/(RAND_MAX+1.0)))-1);
+#endif
+  add_randomness ( buffer, length, origin );
+  gcry_free (buffer);
+  return 0; /* okay */
+}
+
+
+/* Create an unpredicable nonce of LENGTH bytes in BUFFER. */
+void
+_gcry_rngcsprng_create_nonce (void *buffer, size_t length)
+{
+  static unsigned char nonce_buffer[20+8];
+  static int nonce_buffer_initialized = 0;
+  static volatile pid_t my_pid; /* The volatile is there to make sure the
+								   compiler does not optimize the code away
+								   in case the getpid function is badly
+								   attributed. */
+  volatile pid_t apid;
+  unsigned char *p;
+  size_t n;
+  int err;
+
+  /* Make sure we are initialized. */
+  initialize ();
+
+#ifdef USE_RANDOM_DAEMON
+  if (allow_daemon
+	  && !_gcry_daemon_create_nonce (daemon_socket_name, buffer, length))
+	return; /* The daemon succeeded. */
+  allow_daemon = 0; /* Daemon failed - switch off. */
+#endif /*USE_RANDOM_DAEMON*/
+
+  /* Acquire the nonce buffer lock. */
+  err = ath_mutex_lock (&nonce_buffer_lock);
+  if (err)
+	log_fatal ("failed to acquire the nonce buffer lock: %s\n",
+			   strerror (err));
+
+  apid = getpid ();
+  /* The first time intialize our buffer. */
+  if (!nonce_buffer_initialized)
+	{
+	  time_t atime = time (NULL);
+	  pid_t xpid = apid;
+
+	  my_pid = apid;
+
+	  if ((sizeof apid + sizeof atime) > sizeof nonce_buffer)
+		BUG ();
+
+	  /* Initialize the first 20 bytes with a reasonable value so that
+		 a failure of gcry_randomize won't affect us too much.  Don't
+		 care about the uninitialized remaining bytes. */
+	  p = nonce_buffer;
+	  memcpy (p, &xpid, sizeof xpid);
+	  p += sizeof xpid;
+	  memcpy (p, &atime, sizeof atime); 
+
+	  /* Initialize the never changing private part of 64 bits. */
+	  gcry_randomize (nonce_buffer+20, 8, GCRY_WEAK_RANDOM);
+
+	  nonce_buffer_initialized = 1;
+	}
+  else if ( my_pid != apid )
+	{
+	  /* We forked. Need to reseed the buffer - doing this for the
+		 private part should be sufficient. */
+	  gcry_randomize (nonce_buffer+20, 8, GCRY_WEAK_RANDOM);
+	  /* Update the pid so that we won't run into here again and
+		 again. */
+	  my_pid = apid;
+	}
+
+  /* Create the nonce by hashing the entire buffer, returning the hash
+	 and updating the first 20 bytes of the buffer with this hash. */
+  for (p = buffer; length > 0; length -= n, p += n)
+	{
+	  _gcry_sha1_hash_buffer (nonce_buffer,
+							  nonce_buffer, sizeof nonce_buffer);
+	  n = length > 20? 20 : length;
+	  memcpy (p, nonce_buffer, n);
+	}
+
+
+  /* Release the nonce buffer lock. */
+  err = ath_mutex_unlock (&nonce_buffer_lock);
+  if (err)
+	log_fatal ("failed to release the nonce buffer lock: %s\n",
+			   strerror (err));
+
+}
diff --git a/plugins/MirOTR/libgcrypt-1.4.6/random/random-daemon.c b/plugins/MirOTR/libgcrypt-1.4.6/random/random-daemon.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..2e03ba00e5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/plugins/MirOTR/libgcrypt-1.4.6/random/random-daemon.c
@@ -0,0 +1,360 @@
+/* random-daemon.c  - Access to the external random daemon
+ * Copyright (C) 2006  Free Software Foundation, Inc.
+ *
+ * This file is part of Libgcrypt.
+ *
+ * Libgcrypt is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ * it under the terms of the GNU Lesser General Public License as
+ * published by the Free Software Foundation; either version 2.1 of
+ * the License, or (at your option) any later version.
+ *
+ * Libgcrypt is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
+ * GNU Lesser General Public License for more details.
+ *
+ * You should have received a copy of the GNU Lesser General Public
+ * License along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
+ * Foundation, Inc., 59 Temple Place - Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307, USA
+ */
+
+/*
+   The functions here are used by random.c to divert calls to an
+   external random number daemon.  The actual daemon we use is
+   gcryptrnd.  Such a daemon is useful to keep a persistent pool in
+   memory over invocations of a single application and to allow
+   prioritizing access to the actual entropy sources.  The drawback is
+   that we need to use IPC (i.e. unix domain socket) to convey
+   sensitive data.
+ */
+
+
+#include <config.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <assert.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <sys/socket.h>
+#include <sys/un.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+
+#include "g10lib.h"
+#include "random.h"
+#include "ath.h"
+
+
+
+/* This is default socket name we use in case the provided socket name
+   is NULL.  */
+#define RANDOM_DAEMON_SOCKET "/var/run/libgcrypt/S.gcryptrnd"
+
+/* The lock serializing access to the daemon.  */
+static ath_mutex_t daemon_lock = ATH_MUTEX_INITIALIZER;
+
+/* The socket connected to the daemon.  */
+static int daemon_socket = -1; 
+
+/* Creates a socket connected to the daemon.  On success, store the
+   socket fd in *SOCK.  Returns error code.  */
+static gcry_error_t
+connect_to_socket (const char *socketname, int *sock)
+{
+  struct sockaddr_un *srvr_addr;
+  socklen_t addrlen;
+  gcry_error_t err;
+  int fd;
+  int rc;
+
+  srvr_addr = NULL;
+
+  /* Create a socket. */
+  fd = socket (AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0);
+  if (fd == -1)
+    {
+      log_error ("can't create socket: %s\n", strerror (errno));
+      err = gcry_error_from_errno (errno);
+      goto out;
+    }
+
+  /* Set up address.  */
+  srvr_addr = gcry_malloc (sizeof *srvr_addr); 
+  if (! srvr_addr)
+    {
+      log_error ("malloc failed: %s\n", strerror (errno));
+      err = gcry_error_from_errno (errno);
+      goto out;
+    }
+  memset (srvr_addr, 0, sizeof *srvr_addr);
+  srvr_addr->sun_family = AF_UNIX;
+  if (strlen (socketname) + 1 >= sizeof (srvr_addr->sun_path))
+    {
+      log_error ("socket name `%s' too long\n", socketname);
+      err = gcry_error (GPG_ERR_ENAMETOOLONG);
+      goto out;
+    }
+  strcpy (srvr_addr->sun_path, socketname);
+  addrlen = (offsetof (struct sockaddr_un, sun_path)
+             + strlen (srvr_addr->sun_path) + 1);
+
+  /* Connect socket.  */
+  rc = connect (fd, (struct sockaddr *) srvr_addr, addrlen);
+  if (rc == -1)
+    {
+      log_error ("error connecting socket `%s': %s\n",
+		 srvr_addr->sun_path, strerror (errno));
+      err = gcry_error_from_errno (errno);
+      goto out;
+    }
+
+  err = 0;
+
+ out:
+
+  gcry_free (srvr_addr);
+  if (err)
+    {
+      close (fd);
+      fd = -1;
+    }
+  *sock = fd;
+
+  return err;
+}
+
+
+/* Initialize basics of this module. This should be viewed as a
+   constructor to prepare locking. */
+void
+_gcry_daemon_initialize_basics (void)
+{
+  static int initialized;
+  int err;
+
+  if (!initialized)
+    {
+      initialized = 1;
+      err = ath_mutex_init (&daemon_lock);
+      if (err)
+        log_fatal ("failed to create the daemon lock: %s\n", strerror (err) );
+    }
+}
+
+
+
+/* Send LENGTH bytes of BUFFER to file descriptor FD.  Returns 0 on
+   success or another value on write error. */
+static int
+writen (int fd, const void *buffer, size_t length)
+{
+  ssize_t n;
+      
+  while (length)
+    {
+      do
+        n = ath_write (fd, buffer, length);
+      while (n < 0 && errno == EINTR);
+      if (n < 0)
+         {
+           log_error ("write error: %s\n", strerror (errno));
+           return -1; /* write error */
+         }
+      length -= n;
+      buffer = (const char*)buffer + n;
+    }
+  return 0;  /* Okay */
+}
+
+static int
+readn (int fd, void *buf, size_t buflen, size_t *ret_nread)
+{
+  size_t nleft = buflen;
+  int nread;
+  char *p;
+  
+  p = buf;
+  while (nleft > 0)
+    {
+      nread = ath_read (fd, buf, nleft);
+      if (nread < 0)
+        {
+          if (nread == EINTR)
+            nread = 0;
+          else 
+            return -1;
+        }
+      else if (!nread)
+        break; /* EOF */
+      nleft -= nread;
+      buf = (char*)buf + nread;
+    }
+  if (ret_nread)
+    *ret_nread = buflen - nleft;
+  return 0;
+}
+
+/* This functions requests REQ_NBYTES from the daemon.  If NONCE is
+   true, the data should be suited for a nonce.  If NONCE is FALSE,
+   data of random level LEVEL will be generated.  The retrieved random
+   data will be stored in BUFFER.  Returns error code.  */
+static gcry_error_t
+call_daemon (const char *socketname,
+             void *buffer, size_t req_nbytes, int nonce,
+	     enum gcry_random_level level)
+{
+  static int initialized;
+  unsigned char buf[255];
+  gcry_error_t err = 0;
+  size_t nbytes;
+  size_t nread;
+  int rc;
+
+  if (!req_nbytes)
+    return 0;
+
+  ath_mutex_lock (&daemon_lock);
+
+  /* Open the socket if that has not been done. */
+  if (!initialized)
+    {
+      initialized = 1;
+      err = connect_to_socket (socketname ? socketname : RANDOM_DAEMON_SOCKET,
+			       &daemon_socket);
+      if (err)
+        {
+          daemon_socket = -1;
+          log_info ("not using random daemon\n");
+          ath_mutex_unlock (&daemon_lock);
+          return err;
+        }
+    }
+
+  /* Check that we have a valid socket descriptor. */
+  if ( daemon_socket == -1 )
+    {
+      ath_mutex_unlock (&daemon_lock);
+      return gcry_error (GPG_ERR_INTERNAL);
+    }
+
+
+  /* Do the real work.  */
+
+  do
+    {
+      /* Process in chunks.  */
+      nbytes = req_nbytes > sizeof (buf) ? sizeof (buf) : req_nbytes;
+      req_nbytes -= nbytes;
+
+      /* Construct request.  */
+      buf[0] = 3;
+      if (nonce)
+	buf[1] = 10;
+      else if (level == GCRY_VERY_STRONG_RANDOM)
+	buf[1] = 12;
+      else if (level == GCRY_STRONG_RANDOM)
+	buf[1] = 11;
+      buf[2] = nbytes;
+
+      /* Send request.  */
+      rc = writen (daemon_socket, buf, 3);
+      if (rc == -1)
+	{
+	  err = gcry_error_from_errno (errno);
+	  break;
+	}
+	
+      /* Retrieve response.  */
+
+      rc = readn (daemon_socket, buf, 2, &nread);
+      if (rc == -1)
+	{
+	  err = gcry_error_from_errno (errno);
+	  log_error ("read error: %s\n", gcry_strerror (err));
+	  break;
+	}
+      if (nread && buf[0])
+	{
+	  log_error ("random daemon returned error code %d\n", buf[0]);
+	  err = gcry_error (GPG_ERR_INTERNAL); /* ? */
+	  break;
+	}
+      if (nread != 2)
+	{
+	  log_error ("response too small\n");
+	  err = gcry_error (GPG_ERR_PROTOCOL_VIOLATION); /* ? */
+	  break;
+	}
+
+      /*      if (1)*/			/* Do this in verbose mode? */
+      /*	log_info ("received response with %d bytes of data\n", buf[1]);*/
+
+      if (buf[1] < nbytes)
+	{
+	  log_error ("error: server returned less bytes than requested\n");
+	  err = gcry_error (GPG_ERR_PROTOCOL_VIOLATION); /* ? */
+	  break;
+	}
+      else if (buf[1] > nbytes)
+	{
+	  log_error ("warning: server returned more bytes than requested\n");
+	  err = gcry_error (GPG_ERR_PROTOCOL_VIOLATION); /* ? */
+	  break;
+	}
+
+      assert (nbytes <= sizeof (buf));
+
+      rc = readn (daemon_socket, buf, nbytes, &nread);
+      if (rc == -1)
+	{
+	  err = gcry_error_from_errno (errno);
+	  log_error ("read error: %s\n", gcry_strerror (err));
+	  break;
+	}
+      
+      if (nread != nbytes)
+	{
+	  log_error ("too little random data read\n");
+	  err = gcry_error (GPG_ERR_INTERNAL);
+	  break;
+	}
+
+      /* Successfuly read another chunk of data.  */
+      memcpy (buffer, buf, nbytes);
+      buffer = ((char *) buffer) + nbytes;
+    }
+  while (req_nbytes);
+
+  ath_mutex_unlock (&daemon_lock);
+
+  return err;
+}
+
+/* Internal function to fill BUFFER with LENGTH bytes of random.  We
+   support GCRY_STRONG_RANDOM and GCRY_VERY_STRONG_RANDOM here.
+   Return 0 on success. */
+int
+_gcry_daemon_randomize (const char *socketname, 
+                        void *buffer, size_t length,
+                        enum gcry_random_level level)
+{
+  gcry_error_t err;
+
+  err = call_daemon (socketname, buffer, length, 0, level);
+
+  return err ? -1 : 0;
+}
+
+
+/* Internal function to fill BUFFER with NBYTES of data usable for a
+   nonce.  Returns 0 on success. */
+int
+_gcry_daemon_create_nonce (const char *socketname, void *buffer, size_t length)
+{
+  gcry_error_t err;
+
+  err = call_daemon (socketname, buffer, length, 1, 0);
+
+  return err ? -1 : 0;
+}
+
+/* END */
diff --git a/plugins/MirOTR/libgcrypt-1.4.6/random/random-fips.c b/plugins/MirOTR/libgcrypt-1.4.6/random/random-fips.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..2667e71fd8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/plugins/MirOTR/libgcrypt-1.4.6/random/random-fips.c
@@ -0,0 +1,1118 @@
+/* random-fips.c - FIPS style random number generator
+ * Copyright (C) 2008  Free Software Foundation, Inc.
+ *
+ * This file is part of Libgcrypt.
+ *
+ * Libgcrypt is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ * it under the terms of the GNU Lesser General Public License as
+ * published by the Free Software Foundation; either version 2.1 of
+ * the License, or (at your option) any later version.
+ *
+ * Libgcrypt is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
+ * GNU Lesser General Public License for more details.
+ *
+ * You should have received a copy of the GNU Lesser General Public
+ * License along with this program; if not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
+ */
+
+/*
+   The core of this deterministic random number generator is
+   implemented according to the document "NIST-Recommended Random
+   Number Generator Based on ANSI X9.31 Appendix A.2.4 Using the 3-Key
+   Triple DES and AES Algorithms" (2005-01-31).  This implementation
+   uses the AES variant.
+
+   There are 3 random context which map to the different levels of
+   random quality:
+
+   Generator                Seed and Key        Kernel entropy (init/reseed)
+   ------------------------------------------------------------
+   GCRY_VERY_STRONG_RANDOM  /dev/random         256/128 bits
+   GCRY_STRONG_RANDOM       /dev/random         256/128 bits
+   gcry_create_nonce        GCRY_STRONG_RANDOM  n/a
+
+   All random generators return their data in 128 bit blocks.  If the
+   caller requested less bits, the extra bits are not used.  The key
+   for each generator is only set once at the first time a generator
+   is used.  The seed value is set with the key and again after 1000
+   (SEED_TTL) output blocks; the re-seeding is disabled in test mode.
+
+   The GCRY_VERY_STRONG_RANDOM and GCRY_STRONG_RANDOM generators are
+   keyed and seeded from the /dev/random device.  Thus these
+   generators may block until the kernel has collected enough entropy.
+
+   The gcry_create_nonce generator is keyed and seeded from the
+   GCRY_STRONG_RANDOM generator.  It may also block if the
+   GCRY_STRONG_RANDOM generator has not yet been used before and thus
+   gets initialized on the first use by gcry_create_nonce.  This
+   special treatment is justified by the weaker requirements for a
+   nonce generator and to save precious kernel entropy for use by the
+   real random generators.
+
+ */
+
+#include <config.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_GETTIMEOFDAY
+#include <sys/time.h>
+#endif
+
+#include "g10lib.h"
+#include "random.h"
+#include "rand-internal.h"
+#include "ath.h"
+
+/* This is the lock we use to serialize access to this RNG.  The extra
+   integer variable is only used to check the locking state; that is,
+   it is not meant to be thread-safe but merely as a failsafe feature
+   to assert proper locking.  */
+static ath_mutex_t fips_rng_lock = ATH_MUTEX_INITIALIZER;
+static int fips_rng_is_locked;
+
+
+/* The required size for the temporary buffer of the x931_aes_driver
+   function and the buffer itself which will be allocated in secure
+   memory.  This needs to be global variable for proper initialization
+   and to allow shutting down the RNG without leaking memory.  May
+   only be used while holding the FIPS_RNG_LOCK.
+
+   This variable is also used to avoid duplicate initialization.  */
+#define TEMPVALUE_FOR_X931_AES_DRIVER_SIZE 48
+static unsigned char *tempvalue_for_x931_aes_driver;
+
+
+/* After having retrieved this number of blocks from the RNG, we want
+   to do a reseeding.  */
+#define SEED_TTL 1000
+
+
+/* The length of the key we use:  16 bytes (128 bit) for AES128.  */
+#define X931_AES_KEYLEN  16
+/* A global buffer used to communicate between the x931_generate_key
+   and x931_generate_seed functions and the entropy_collect_cb
+   function.  It may only be used by these functions. */
+static unsigned char *entropy_collect_buffer;  /* Buffer.  */
+static size_t entropy_collect_buffer_len;      /* Used length.  */
+static size_t entropy_collect_buffer_size;     /* Allocated length.  */
+
+
+/* This random context type is used to track properties of one random
+   generator. Thee context are usually allocated in secure memory so
+   that the seed value is well protected.  There are a couble of guard
+   fields to help detecting applications accidently overwriting parts
+   of the memory. */
+struct rng_context
+{
+  unsigned char guard_0[1];
+
+  /* The handle of the cipher used by the RNG.  If this one is not
+     NULL a cipher handle along with a random key has been
+     established.  */
+  gcry_cipher_hd_t cipher_hd;
+
+  /* If this flag is true, the SEED_V buffer below carries a valid
+     seed.  */
+  int is_seeded:1;
+
+  /* The very first block generated is used to compare the result
+     against the last result.  This flag indicates that such a block
+     is available.  */
+  int compare_value_valid:1;
+
+  /* A counter used to trigger re-seeding.  */
+  unsigned int use_counter;
+
+  unsigned char guard_1[1];
+
+  /* The buffer containing the seed value V.  */
+  unsigned char seed_V[16];
+
+  unsigned char guard_2[1];
+
+  /* The last result from the x931_aes fucntion.  Only valid if
+     compare_value_valid is set.  */
+  unsigned char compare_value[16];
+
+  unsigned char guard_3[1];
+
+  /* The external test may want to suppress the duplicate bock check.
+     This is done if the this flag is set.  */
+  unsigned char test_no_dup_check;
+  /* To implement a KAT we need to provide a know DT value.  To
+     accomplish this the x931_get_dt function checks whether this
+     field is not NULL and then uses the 16 bytes at this address for
+     the DT value.  However the last 4 bytes are replaced by the
+     value of field TEST_DT_COUNTER which will be incremented after
+     each invocation of x931_get_dt. We use a pointer and not a buffer
+     because there is no need to put this value into secure memory.  */
+  const unsigned char *test_dt_ptr;
+  u32 test_dt_counter;
+
+  /* We need to keep track of the process which did the initialization
+     so that we can detect a fork.  The volatile modifier is required
+     so that the compiler does not optimize it away in case the getpid
+     function is badly attributed.  */ 
+  pid_t key_init_pid;
+  pid_t seed_init_pid;
+};
+typedef struct rng_context *rng_context_t;
+
+
+/* The random context used for the nonce generator.  May only be used
+   while holding the FIPS_RNG_LOCK.  */
+static rng_context_t nonce_context;
+/* The random context used for the standard random generator.  May
+   only be used while holding the FIPS_RNG_LOCK.  */
+static rng_context_t std_rng_context;
+/* The random context used for the very strong random generator.  May
+   only be used while holding the FIPS_RNG_LOCK.  */
+static rng_context_t strong_rng_context;
+
+
+/* --- Local prototypes ---  */
+static void x931_reseed (rng_context_t rng_ctx);
+static void get_random (void *buffer, size_t length, rng_context_t rng_ctx);
+
+
+
+
+/* --- Functions  --- */
+
+/* Basic initialization is required to initialize mutexes and
+   do a few checks on the implementation.  */
+static void
+basic_initialization (void)
+{
+  static int initialized;
+  int my_errno;
+
+  if (!initialized)
+    return;
+  initialized = 1;
+
+  my_errno = ath_mutex_init (&fips_rng_lock);
+  if (my_errno)
+    log_fatal ("failed to create the RNG lock: %s\n", strerror (my_errno));
+  fips_rng_is_locked = 0;
+      
+  /* Make sure that we are still using the values we have
+     traditionally used for the random levels.  */
+  gcry_assert (GCRY_WEAK_RANDOM == 0 
+               && GCRY_STRONG_RANDOM == 1
+               && GCRY_VERY_STRONG_RANDOM == 2);
+
+}
+
+
+/* Acquire the fips_rng_lock.  */
+static void
+lock_rng (void)
+{
+  int my_errno;
+
+  my_errno = ath_mutex_lock (&fips_rng_lock);
+  if (my_errno)
+    log_fatal ("failed to acquire the RNG lock: %s\n", strerror (my_errno));
+  fips_rng_is_locked = 1;
+}
+
+
+/* Release the fips_rng_lock.  */
+static void
+unlock_rng (void)
+{
+  int my_errno;
+
+  fips_rng_is_locked = 0;
+  my_errno = ath_mutex_unlock (&fips_rng_lock);
+  if (my_errno)
+    log_fatal ("failed to release the RNG lock: %s\n", strerror (my_errno));
+}
+
+static void
+setup_guards (rng_context_t rng_ctx)
+{
+  /* Set the guards to some arbitrary values.  */
+  rng_ctx->guard_0[0] = 17;
+  rng_ctx->guard_1[0] = 42;
+  rng_ctx->guard_2[0] = 137;
+  rng_ctx->guard_3[0] = 252;
+}
+
+static void
+check_guards (rng_context_t rng_ctx)
+{
+  if ( rng_ctx->guard_0[0] != 17
+       || rng_ctx->guard_1[0] != 42
+       || rng_ctx->guard_2[0] != 137
+       || rng_ctx->guard_3[0] != 252 )
+    log_fatal ("memory corruption detected in RNG context %p\n", rng_ctx);
+}
+
+
+/* Get the DT vector for use with the core PRNG function.  Buffer
+   needs to be provided by the caller with a size of at least LENGTH
+   bytes. RNG_CTX needs to be passed to allow for a KAT.  The 16 byte
+   timestamp we construct is made up the real time and three counters:
+
+   Buffer:       00112233445566778899AABBCCDDEEFF
+                 !--+---!!-+-!!+!!--+---!!--+---!     
+   seconds ---------/      |   |    |       |
+   microseconds -----------/   |    |       |
+   counter2 -------------------/    |       |
+   counter1 ------------------------/       |
+   counter0 --------------------------------/
+
+   Counter 2 is just 12 bits wide and used to track fractions of
+   milliseconds whereas counters 1 and 0 are combined to a free
+   running 64 bit counter.  */
+static void 
+x931_get_dt (unsigned char *buffer, size_t length, rng_context_t rng_ctx)
+{
+  gcry_assert (length == 16); /* This length is required for use with AES.  */
+  gcry_assert (fips_rng_is_locked);
+
+  /* If the random context indicates that a test DT should be used,
+     take the DT value from the context.  For safety reasons we do
+     this only if the context is not one of the regular contexts.  */
+  if (rng_ctx->test_dt_ptr 
+      && rng_ctx != nonce_context
+      && rng_ctx != std_rng_context
+      && rng_ctx != strong_rng_context)
+    {
+      memcpy (buffer, rng_ctx->test_dt_ptr, 16);
+      buffer[12] = (rng_ctx->test_dt_counter >> 24);
+      buffer[13] = (rng_ctx->test_dt_counter >> 16);
+      buffer[14] = (rng_ctx->test_dt_counter >> 8);
+      buffer[15] = rng_ctx->test_dt_counter;
+      rng_ctx->test_dt_counter++;
+      return;
+    }
+
+
+#if HAVE_GETTIMEOFDAY
+  {
+    static u32 last_sec, last_usec;
+    static u32 counter1, counter0;
+    static u16 counter2;
+    
+    unsigned int usec;
+    struct timeval tv;
+
+    if (!last_sec)
+      {
+        /* This is the very first time we are called: Set the counters
+           to an not so easy predictable value to avoid always
+           starting at 0.  Not really needed but it doesn't harm.  */
+        counter1 = (u32)getpid ();
+#ifndef HAVE_W32_SYSTEM
+        counter0 = (u32)getppid ();
+#endif
+      }
+
+
+    if (gettimeofday (&tv, NULL))
+      log_fatal ("gettimeofday() failed: %s\n", strerror (errno));
+
+    /* The microseconds part is always less than 1 millon (0x0f4240).
+       Thus we don't care about the MSB and in addition shift it to
+       the left by 4 bits.  */
+    usec = tv.tv_usec;
+    usec <<= 4;
+    /* If we got the same time as by the last invocation, bump up
+       counter2 and save the time for the next invocation.  */
+    if (tv.tv_sec == last_sec && usec == last_usec)
+      {
+        counter2++;
+        counter2 &= 0x0fff;
+      }
+    else
+      {
+        counter2 = 0;
+        last_sec = tv.tv_sec;
+        last_usec = usec;
+      }
+    /* Fill the buffer with the timestamp.  */
+    buffer[0] = ((tv.tv_sec >> 24) & 0xff);
+    buffer[1] = ((tv.tv_sec >> 16) & 0xff);
+    buffer[2] = ((tv.tv_sec >> 8) & 0xff);
+    buffer[3] = (tv.tv_sec & 0xff);
+    buffer[4] = ((usec >> 16) & 0xff);
+    buffer[5] = ((usec >> 8) & 0xff);
+    buffer[6] = ((usec & 0xf0) | ((counter2 >> 8) & 0x0f));
+    buffer[7] = (counter2 & 0xff);
+    /* Add the free running counter.  */
+    buffer[8]  = ((counter1 >> 24) & 0xff);
+    buffer[9]  = ((counter1 >> 16) & 0xff);
+    buffer[10] = ((counter1 >> 8) & 0xff); 
+    buffer[11] = ((counter1) & 0xff);
+    buffer[12] = ((counter0 >> 24) & 0xff);
+    buffer[13] = ((counter0 >> 16) & 0xff);
+    buffer[14] = ((counter0 >> 8) & 0xff); 
+    buffer[15] = ((counter0) & 0xff);
+    /* Bump up that counter.  */
+    if (!++counter0)
+      ++counter1;
+  }
+#else
+  log_fatal ("gettimeofday() not available on this system\n");
+#endif
+
+  /* log_printhex ("x931_get_dt: ", buffer, 16); */
+}
+
+
+/* XOR the buffers A and B which are each of LENGTH bytes and store
+   the result at R.  R needs to be provided by the caller with a size
+   of at least LENGTH bytes.  */
+static void
+xor_buffer (unsigned char *r, 
+            const unsigned char *a, const unsigned char *b, size_t length)
+{
+  for ( ; length; length--, a++, b++, r++)
+    *r = (*a ^ *b);
+}
+
+
+/* Encrypt LENGTH bytes of INPUT to OUTPUT using KEY.  LENGTH
+   needs to be 16. */
+static void
+encrypt_aes (gcry_cipher_hd_t key, 
+             unsigned char *output, const unsigned char *input, size_t length)
+{
+  gpg_error_t err;
+
+  gcry_assert (length == 16);
+
+  err = gcry_cipher_encrypt (key, output, length, input, length);
+  if (err)
+    log_fatal ("AES encryption in RNG failed: %s\n", gcry_strerror (err));
+}
+
+
+/* The core ANSI X9.31, Appendix A.2.4 function using AES.  The caller
+   needs to pass a 16 byte buffer for the result, the 16 byte
+   datetime_DT value and the 16 byte seed value V.  The caller also
+   needs to pass an appropriate KEY and make sure to pass a valid
+   seed_V.  The caller also needs to provide two 16 bytes buffer for
+   intermediate results, they may be reused by the caller later.
+
+   On return the result is stored at RESULT_R and the SEED_V is
+   updated.  May only be used while holding the lock.  */
+static void
+x931_aes (unsigned char result_R[16], 
+          unsigned char datetime_DT[16], unsigned char seed_V[16],
+          gcry_cipher_hd_t key,
+          unsigned char intermediate_I[16], unsigned char temp_xor[16])
+{
+  /* Let ede*X(Y) represent the AES encryption of Y under the key *X.
+
+     Let V be a 128-bit seed value which is also kept secret, and XOR
+     be the exclusive-or operator. Let DT be a date/time vector which
+     is updated on each iteration. I is a intermediate value. 
+
+     I = ede*K(DT)  */
+  encrypt_aes (key, intermediate_I, datetime_DT, 16);
+
+  /* R = ede*K(I XOR V) */
+  xor_buffer (temp_xor, intermediate_I, seed_V, 16);
+  encrypt_aes (key, result_R, temp_xor, 16);
+
+  /* V = ede*K(R XOR I).  */
+  xor_buffer (temp_xor, result_R, intermediate_I, 16);
+  encrypt_aes (key, seed_V, temp_xor, 16);
+
+  /* Zero out temporary values.  */
+  wipememory (intermediate_I, 16);
+  wipememory (temp_xor, 16);
+}
+
+
+/* The high level driver to x931_aes.  This one does the required
+   tests and calls the core function until the entire buffer has been
+   filled.  OUTPUT is a caller provided buffer of LENGTH bytes to
+   receive the random, RNG_CTX is the context of the RNG.  The context
+   must be properly initialized.  Returns 0 on success. */
+static int
+x931_aes_driver (unsigned char *output, size_t length, rng_context_t rng_ctx)
+{
+  unsigned char datetime_DT[16];
+  unsigned char *intermediate_I, *temp_buffer, *result_buffer;
+  size_t nbytes;
+
+  gcry_assert (fips_rng_is_locked);
+  gcry_assert (rng_ctx->cipher_hd);
+  gcry_assert (rng_ctx->is_seeded);
+
+  gcry_assert (tempvalue_for_x931_aes_driver);
+  gcry_assert (TEMPVALUE_FOR_X931_AES_DRIVER_SIZE == 48);
+  intermediate_I = tempvalue_for_x931_aes_driver;
+  temp_buffer    = tempvalue_for_x931_aes_driver + 16;
+  result_buffer  = tempvalue_for_x931_aes_driver + 32;
+
+  while (length)
+    {
+      /* Unless we are running with a test context, we require a new
+         seed after some time.  */
+      if (!rng_ctx->test_dt_ptr && rng_ctx->use_counter > SEED_TTL)
+        {
+          x931_reseed (rng_ctx);
+          rng_ctx->use_counter = 0;
+        }
+
+      /* Due to the design of the RNG, we always receive 16 bytes (128
+         bit) of random even if we require less.  The extra bytes
+         returned are not used.  Intheory we could save them for the
+         next invocation, but that would make the control flow harder
+         to read.  */
+      nbytes = length < 16? length : 16;
+
+      x931_get_dt (datetime_DT, 16, rng_ctx);
+      x931_aes (result_buffer,
+                datetime_DT, rng_ctx->seed_V, rng_ctx->cipher_hd,
+                intermediate_I, temp_buffer);
+      rng_ctx->use_counter++;
+
+      if (rng_ctx->test_no_dup_check
+          && rng_ctx->test_dt_ptr
+          && rng_ctx != nonce_context
+          && rng_ctx != std_rng_context
+          && rng_ctx != strong_rng_context)
+        {
+          /* This is a test context which does not want the duplicate
+             block check. */
+        }
+      else
+        {
+          /* Do a basic check on the output to avoid a stuck generator.  */
+          if (!rng_ctx->compare_value_valid)
+            {
+              /* First time used, only save the result.  */
+              memcpy (rng_ctx->compare_value, result_buffer, 16);
+              rng_ctx->compare_value_valid = 1;
+              continue;
+            }
+          if (!memcmp (rng_ctx->compare_value, result_buffer, 16))
+            {
+              /* Ooops, we received the same 128 bit block - that should
+                 in theory never happen.  The FIPS requirement says that
+                 we need to put ourself into the error state in such
+                 case.  */
+              fips_signal_error ("duplicate 128 bit block returned by RNG");
+              return -1;
+            }
+          memcpy (rng_ctx->compare_value, result_buffer, 16);
+        }
+      
+      /* Append to outbut.  */
+      memcpy (output, result_buffer, nbytes);
+      wipememory (result_buffer, 16);
+      output += nbytes;
+      length -= nbytes;
+    }
+
+  return 0;
+}
+
+
+/* Callback for x931_generate_key. Note that this callback uses the
+   global ENTROPY_COLLECT_BUFFER which has been setup by get_entropy.
+   ORIGIN is not used but required due to the design of entropy
+   gathering module. */
+static void
+entropy_collect_cb (const void *buffer, size_t length,
+                    enum random_origins origin)
+{
+  const unsigned char *p = buffer;
+
+  (void)origin;
+
+  gcry_assert (fips_rng_is_locked);
+  gcry_assert (entropy_collect_buffer);
+
+  /* Note that we need to protect against gatherers returning more
+     than the requested bytes (e.g. rndw32).  */
+  while (length-- && entropy_collect_buffer_len < entropy_collect_buffer_size)
+    {
+      entropy_collect_buffer[entropy_collect_buffer_len++] ^= *p++;
+    }
+}
+
+
+/* Get NBYTES of entropy from the kernel device.  The callers needs to
+   free the returned buffer.  The function either succeeds or
+   terminates the process in case of a fatal error. */
+static void *
+get_entropy (size_t nbytes)
+{
+  void *result;
+  int rc;
+
+  gcry_assert (!entropy_collect_buffer);
+  entropy_collect_buffer = gcry_xmalloc_secure (nbytes);
+  entropy_collect_buffer_size = nbytes;
+  entropy_collect_buffer_len = 0;
+
+#if USE_RNDLINUX
+  rc = _gcry_rndlinux_gather_random (entropy_collect_cb, 0,
+                                     X931_AES_KEYLEN,
+                                     GCRY_VERY_STRONG_RANDOM);
+#elif USE_RNDW32
+  do 
+    {
+      rc = _gcry_rndw32_gather_random (entropy_collect_cb, 0,
+                                       X931_AES_KEYLEN,
+                                       GCRY_VERY_STRONG_RANDOM);
+    }
+  while (rc >= 0 && entropy_collect_buffer_len < entropy_collect_buffer_size);
+#else
+  rc = -1;
+#endif
+
+  if (rc < 0 || entropy_collect_buffer_len != entropy_collect_buffer_size)
+    {
+      gcry_free (entropy_collect_buffer);
+      entropy_collect_buffer = NULL;
+      log_fatal ("error getting entropy data\n");
+    }
+  result = entropy_collect_buffer;
+  entropy_collect_buffer = NULL;
+  return result;
+}
+
+
+/* Generate a key for use with x931_aes.  The function returns a
+   handle to the cipher context readily prepared for ECB encryption.
+   If FOR_NONCE is true, the key is retrieved by readong random from
+   the standard generator.  On error NULL is returned.  */
+static gcry_cipher_hd_t
+x931_generate_key (int for_nonce)
+{
+  gcry_cipher_hd_t hd;
+  gpg_error_t err;
+  void *buffer;
+
+  gcry_assert (fips_rng_is_locked);
+
+  /* Allocate a cipher context.  */
+  err = gcry_cipher_open (&hd, GCRY_CIPHER_AES128, GCRY_CIPHER_MODE_ECB,
+                          GCRY_CIPHER_SECURE);
+  if (err)
+    {
+      log_error ("error creating cipher context for RNG: %s\n",
+                 gcry_strerror (err));
+      return NULL;
+    }
+
+  /* Get a key from the standard RNG or from the entropy source.  */
+  if (for_nonce)
+    {
+      buffer = gcry_xmalloc (X931_AES_KEYLEN);
+      get_random (buffer, X931_AES_KEYLEN, std_rng_context);
+    }
+  else
+    {
+      buffer = get_entropy (X931_AES_KEYLEN);
+    }
+
+  /* Set the key and delete the buffer because the key is now part of
+     the cipher context.  */
+  err = gcry_cipher_setkey (hd, buffer, X931_AES_KEYLEN);
+  wipememory (buffer, X931_AES_KEYLEN);
+  gcry_free (buffer);
+  if (err)
+    {
+      log_error ("error creating key for RNG: %s\n", gcry_strerror (err));
+      gcry_cipher_close (hd);
+      return NULL;
+    }
+
+  return hd;
+}
+
+
+/* Generate a key for use with x931_aes.  The function copies a seed
+   of LENGTH bytes into SEED_BUFFER. LENGTH needs to by given as 16.  */
+static void
+x931_generate_seed (unsigned char *seed_buffer, size_t length)
+{
+  void *buffer;
+
+  gcry_assert (fips_rng_is_locked);
+  gcry_assert (length == 16);
+
+  buffer = get_entropy (X931_AES_KEYLEN);
+
+  memcpy (seed_buffer, buffer, X931_AES_KEYLEN);
+  wipememory (buffer, X931_AES_KEYLEN);
+  gcry_free (buffer);
+}
+
+
+
+/* Reseed a generator.  This is also used for the initial seeding. */
+static void
+x931_reseed (rng_context_t rng_ctx)
+{
+  gcry_assert (fips_rng_is_locked);
+
+  if (rng_ctx == nonce_context)
+    {
+      /* The nonce context is special.  It will be seeded using the
+         standard random generator.  */
+      get_random (rng_ctx->seed_V, 16, std_rng_context);
+      rng_ctx->is_seeded = 1;
+      rng_ctx->seed_init_pid = getpid ();
+    }
+  else
+    {
+      /* The other two generators are seeded from /dev/random.  */
+      x931_generate_seed (rng_ctx->seed_V, 16);
+      rng_ctx->is_seeded = 1;
+      rng_ctx->seed_init_pid = getpid ();
+    }
+}
+
+
+/* Core random function.  This is used for both nonce and random
+   generator.  The actual RNG to be used depends on the random context
+   RNG_CTX passed.  Note that this function is called with the RNG not
+   yet locked.  */
+static void
+get_random (void *buffer, size_t length, rng_context_t rng_ctx)
+{
+  gcry_assert (buffer);
+  gcry_assert (rng_ctx);
+
+  check_guards (rng_ctx);
+
+  /* Initialize the cipher handle and thus setup the key if needed.  */
+  if (!rng_ctx->cipher_hd)
+    {
+      if (rng_ctx == nonce_context)
+        rng_ctx->cipher_hd = x931_generate_key (1);
+      else
+        rng_ctx->cipher_hd = x931_generate_key (0);
+      if (!rng_ctx->cipher_hd)
+        goto bailout;
+      rng_ctx->key_init_pid = getpid ();
+    }
+
+  /* Initialize the seed value if needed.  */
+  if (!rng_ctx->is_seeded)
+    x931_reseed (rng_ctx);
+
+  if (rng_ctx->key_init_pid != getpid ()
+      || rng_ctx->seed_init_pid != getpid ())
+    {
+      /* We are in a child of us.  Because we have no way yet to do
+         proper re-initialization (including self-checks etc), the
+         only chance we have is to bail out.  Obviusly a fork/exec
+         won't harm because the exec overwrites the old image. */
+      fips_signal_error ("fork without proper re-initialization "
+                         "detected in RNG");
+      goto bailout;
+    }
+
+  if (x931_aes_driver (buffer, length, rng_ctx))
+    goto bailout;
+
+  check_guards (rng_ctx);
+  return;
+
+ bailout:
+  log_fatal ("severe error getting random\n");
+  /*NOTREACHED*/
+}
+
+
+
+/* --- Public Functions --- */
+
+/* Initialize this random subsystem.  If FULL is false, this function
+   merely calls the basic initialization of the module and does not do
+   anything more.  Doing this is not really required but when running
+   in a threaded environment we might get a race condition
+   otherwise. */
+void
+_gcry_rngfips_initialize (int full)
+{
+  basic_initialization ();
+  if (!full)
+    return;
+
+  /* Allocate temporary buffers.  If that buffer already exists we
+     know that we are already initialized.  */
+  lock_rng ();
+  if (!tempvalue_for_x931_aes_driver)
+    {
+      tempvalue_for_x931_aes_driver
+        = gcry_xmalloc_secure (TEMPVALUE_FOR_X931_AES_DRIVER_SIZE);
+
+      /* Allocate the random contexts.  Note that we do not need to use
+         secure memory for the nonce context.  */
+      nonce_context = gcry_xcalloc (1, sizeof *nonce_context);
+      setup_guards (nonce_context);
+
+      std_rng_context = gcry_xcalloc_secure (1, sizeof *std_rng_context);
+      setup_guards (std_rng_context);
+      
+      strong_rng_context = gcry_xcalloc_secure (1, sizeof *strong_rng_context);
+      setup_guards (strong_rng_context);
+    }
+  else
+    {
+      /* Already initialized. Do some sanity checks.  */
+      gcry_assert (!nonce_context->test_dt_ptr);
+      gcry_assert (!std_rng_context->test_dt_ptr);
+      gcry_assert (!strong_rng_context->test_dt_ptr);
+      check_guards (nonce_context);
+      check_guards (std_rng_context);
+      check_guards (strong_rng_context);
+    }
+  unlock_rng ();
+}
+
+
+/* Print some statistics about the RNG.  */
+void
+_gcry_rngfips_dump_stats (void)
+{
+  /* Not yet implemented.  */
+}
+
+
+/* This function returns true if no real RNG is available or the
+   quality of the RNG has been degraded for test purposes.  */
+int
+_gcry_rngfips_is_faked (void)
+{
+  return 0;  /* Faked random is not allowed.  */
+}
+
+
+/* Add BUFLEN bytes from BUF to the internal random pool.  QUALITY
+   should be in the range of 0..100 to indicate the goodness of the
+   entropy added, or -1 for goodness not known. */
+gcry_error_t
+_gcry_rngfips_add_bytes (const void *buf, size_t buflen, int quality)
+{
+  (void)buf;
+  (void)buflen;
+  (void)quality;
+  return 0;  /* Not implemented. */
+}   
+
+    
+/* Public function to fill the buffer with LENGTH bytes of
+   cryptographically strong random bytes.  Level GCRY_WEAK_RANDOM is
+   here mapped to GCRY_STRONG_RANDOM, GCRY_STRONG_RANDOM is strong
+   enough for most usage, GCRY_VERY_STRONG_RANDOM is good for key
+   generation stuff but may be very slow.  */
+void
+_gcry_rngfips_randomize (void *buffer, size_t length,
+                         enum gcry_random_level level)
+{
+  _gcry_rngfips_initialize (1);  /* Auto-initialize if needed.  */
+  
+  lock_rng ();
+  if (level == GCRY_VERY_STRONG_RANDOM)
+    get_random (buffer, length, strong_rng_context);
+  else
+    get_random (buffer, length, std_rng_context);
+  unlock_rng ();
+}
+
+
+/* Create an unpredicable nonce of LENGTH bytes in BUFFER. */
+void
+_gcry_rngfips_create_nonce (void *buffer, size_t length)
+{
+  _gcry_rngfips_initialize (1);  /* Auto-initialize if needed.  */
+
+  lock_rng ();
+  get_random (buffer, length, nonce_context);
+  unlock_rng ();
+}
+
+
+/* Run a Know-Answer-Test using a dedicated test context.  Note that
+   we can't use the samples from the NISR RNGVS document because they
+   don't take the requirement to throw away the first block and use
+   that for duplicate check in account.  Thus we made up our own test
+   vectors. */
+static gcry_err_code_t
+selftest_kat (selftest_report_func_t report)
+{
+  static struct 
+  {
+    const unsigned char key[16];
+    const unsigned char dt[16];
+    const unsigned char v[16];
+    const unsigned char r[3][16];
+  } tv[] =
+    {
+      { { 0xb9, 0xca, 0x7f, 0xd6, 0xa0, 0xf5, 0xd3, 0x42,
+          0x19, 0x6d, 0x84, 0x91, 0x76, 0x1c, 0x3b, 0xbe },
+        { 0x48, 0xb2, 0x82, 0x98, 0x68, 0xc2, 0x80, 0x00,
+          0x00, 0x00, 0x28, 0x18, 0x00, 0x00, 0x25, 0x00 },
+        { 0x52, 0x17, 0x8d, 0x29, 0xa2, 0xd5, 0x84, 0x12,
+          0x9d, 0x89, 0x9a, 0x45, 0x82, 0x02, 0xf7, 0x77 },
+        { { 0x42, 0x9c, 0x08, 0x3d, 0x82, 0xf4, 0x8a, 0x40,
+            0x66, 0xb5, 0x49, 0x27, 0xab, 0x42, 0xc7, 0xc3 },
+          { 0x0e, 0xb7, 0x61, 0x3c, 0xfe, 0xb0, 0xbe, 0x73,
+            0xf7, 0x6e, 0x6d, 0x6f, 0x1d, 0xa3, 0x14, 0xfa },
+          { 0xbb, 0x4b, 0xc1, 0x0e, 0xc5, 0xfb, 0xcd, 0x46,
+            0xbe, 0x28, 0x61, 0xe7, 0x03, 0x2b, 0x37, 0x7d } } },
+      { { 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+          0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 },
+        { 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+          0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 },
+        { 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+          0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 },
+        { { 0xf7, 0x95, 0xbd, 0x4a, 0x52, 0xe2, 0x9e, 0xd7,
+            0x13, 0xd3, 0x13, 0xfa, 0x20, 0xe9, 0x8d, 0xbc },
+          { 0xc8, 0xd1, 0xe5, 0x11, 0x59, 0x52, 0xf7, 0xfa,
+            0x37, 0x38, 0xb4, 0xc5, 0xce, 0xb2, 0xb0, 0x9a },
+          { 0x0d, 0x9c, 0xc5, 0x0d, 0x16, 0xe1, 0xbc, 0xed, 
+            0xcf, 0x60, 0x62, 0x09, 0x9d, 0x20, 0x83, 0x7e } } },
+      { { 0x00, 0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 0x05, 0x06, 0x07,
+          0x08, 0x09, 0x0a, 0x0b, 0x0c, 0x0d, 0x0e, 0x0f },
+        { 0x80, 0x00, 0x81, 0x01, 0x82, 0x02, 0x83, 0x03,
+          0xa0, 0x20, 0xa1, 0x21, 0xa2, 0x22, 0xa3, 0x23 },
+        { 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff,
+          0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff },
+        { { 0x96, 0xed, 0xcc, 0xc3, 0xdd, 0x04, 0x7f, 0x75,
+            0x63, 0x19, 0x37, 0x6f, 0x15, 0x22, 0x57, 0x56 },
+          { 0x7a, 0x14, 0x76, 0x77, 0x95, 0x17, 0x7e, 0xc8,
+            0x92, 0xe8, 0xdd, 0x15, 0xcb, 0x1f, 0xbc, 0xb1 },
+          { 0x25, 0x3e, 0x2e, 0xa2, 0x41, 0x1b, 0xdd, 0xf5, 
+            0x21, 0x48, 0x41, 0x71, 0xb3, 0x8d, 0x2f, 0x4c } } }
+    };
+  int tvidx, ridx;
+  rng_context_t test_ctx;
+  gpg_error_t err;
+  const char *errtxt = NULL;
+  unsigned char result[16];
+
+  gcry_assert (tempvalue_for_x931_aes_driver);
+
+  test_ctx = gcry_xcalloc (1, sizeof *test_ctx);
+  setup_guards (test_ctx);
+  
+  lock_rng ();
+
+  for (tvidx=0; tvidx < DIM (tv); tvidx++)
+    {
+      /* Setup the key.  */
+      err = gcry_cipher_open (&test_ctx->cipher_hd,
+                              GCRY_CIPHER_AES128, GCRY_CIPHER_MODE_ECB,
+                              GCRY_CIPHER_SECURE);
+      if (err)
+        {
+          errtxt = "error creating cipher context for RNG";
+          goto leave;
+        }
+
+      err = gcry_cipher_setkey (test_ctx->cipher_hd, tv[tvidx].key, 16);
+      if (err)
+        {
+          errtxt = "error setting key for RNG";
+          goto leave;
+        }
+      test_ctx->key_init_pid = getpid ();
+      
+      /* Setup the seed.  */
+      memcpy (test_ctx->seed_V, tv[tvidx].v, 16);
+      test_ctx->is_seeded = 1;
+      test_ctx->seed_init_pid = getpid ();
+      
+      /* Setup a DT value.  */
+      test_ctx->test_dt_ptr = tv[tvidx].dt;
+      test_ctx->test_dt_counter = ( (tv[tvidx].dt[12] << 24) 
+                                   |(tv[tvidx].dt[13] << 16)
+                                   |(tv[tvidx].dt[14] << 8)
+                                   |(tv[tvidx].dt[15]) );
+
+      /* Get and compare the first three results.  */
+      for (ridx=0; ridx < 3; ridx++)
+        {
+          /* Compute the next value.  */
+          if (x931_aes_driver (result, 16, test_ctx))
+            {
+              errtxt = "X9.31 RNG core function failed";
+              goto leave;
+            }
+          
+          /* Compare it to the known value.  */
+          if (memcmp (result, tv[tvidx].r[ridx], 16))
+            {
+              /* log_printhex ("x931_aes got: ", result, 16); */
+              /* log_printhex ("x931_aes exp: ", tv[tvidx].r[ridx], 16); */
+              errtxt = "RNG output does not match known value";
+              goto leave;
+            }
+        }
+
+      /* This test is actual pretty pointless because we use a local test
+         context.  */
+      if (test_ctx->key_init_pid != getpid ()
+          || test_ctx->seed_init_pid != getpid ())
+        {
+          errtxt = "fork detection failed";
+          goto leave;
+        }
+
+      gcry_cipher_close (test_ctx->cipher_hd);
+      test_ctx->cipher_hd = NULL;
+      test_ctx->is_seeded = 0;
+      check_guards (test_ctx);
+    }
+
+ leave:
+  unlock_rng ();
+  gcry_cipher_close (test_ctx->cipher_hd);
+  check_guards (test_ctx);
+  gcry_free (test_ctx);
+  if (report && errtxt)
+    report ("random", 0, "KAT", errtxt);
+  return errtxt? GPG_ERR_SELFTEST_FAILED : 0;
+}
+
+
+/* Run the self-tests.  */
+gcry_error_t
+_gcry_rngfips_selftest (selftest_report_func_t report)
+{
+  gcry_err_code_t ec;
+
+#if defined(USE_RNDLINUX) || defined(USE_RNDW32)
+  {
+    char buffer[8];
+
+    /* Do a simple test using the public interface.  This will also
+       enforce full intialization of the RNG.  We need to be fully
+       initialized due to the global requirement of the
+       tempvalue_for_x931_aes_driver stuff. */
+    gcry_randomize (buffer, sizeof buffer, GCRY_STRONG_RANDOM);
+  }
+
+  ec = selftest_kat (report);
+
+#else /*!(USE_RNDLINUX||USE_RNDW32)*/
+  report ("random", 0, "setup", "no entropy gathering module");
+  ec = GPG_ERR_SELFTEST_FAILED;
+#endif
+  return gpg_error (ec);
+}
+
+
+/* Create a new test context for an external RNG test driver.  On
+   success the test context is stored at R_CONTEXT; on failure NULL is
+   stored at R_CONTEXT and an error code is returned.  */
+gcry_err_code_t
+_gcry_rngfips_init_external_test (void **r_context, unsigned int flags,
+                                  const void *key, size_t keylen,
+                                  const void *seed, size_t seedlen,
+                                  const void *dt, size_t dtlen)
+{
+  gpg_error_t err;
+  rng_context_t test_ctx;
+
+  _gcry_rngfips_initialize (1);  /* Auto-initialize if needed.  */
+  
+  if (!r_context
+      || !key  || keylen  != 16 
+      || !seed || seedlen != 16
+      || !dt   || dtlen   != 16 )
+    return GPG_ERR_INV_ARG;
+
+  test_ctx = gcry_calloc (1, sizeof *test_ctx + dtlen);
+  if (!test_ctx)
+    return gpg_err_code_from_syserror ();
+  setup_guards (test_ctx);
+  
+  /* Setup the key.  */
+  err = gcry_cipher_open (&test_ctx->cipher_hd,
+                          GCRY_CIPHER_AES128, GCRY_CIPHER_MODE_ECB,
+                          GCRY_CIPHER_SECURE);
+  if (err)
+    goto leave;
+
+  err = gcry_cipher_setkey (test_ctx->cipher_hd, key, keylen);
+  if (err)
+    goto leave;
+
+  test_ctx->key_init_pid = getpid ();
+      
+  /* Setup the seed.  */
+  memcpy (test_ctx->seed_V, seed, seedlen);
+  test_ctx->is_seeded = 1;
+  test_ctx->seed_init_pid = getpid ();
+  
+  /* Setup a DT value.  Because our context structure only stores a
+     pointer we copy the DT value to the extra space we allocated in
+     the test_ctx and set the pointer to that address.  */
+  memcpy ((unsigned char*)test_ctx + sizeof *test_ctx, dt, dtlen);
+  test_ctx->test_dt_ptr = (unsigned char*)test_ctx + sizeof *test_ctx; 
+  test_ctx->test_dt_counter = ( (test_ctx->test_dt_ptr[12] << 24) 
+                               |(test_ctx->test_dt_ptr[13] << 16)
+                               |(test_ctx->test_dt_ptr[14] << 8)
+                               |(test_ctx->test_dt_ptr[15]) );
+
+  if ( (flags & 1) )
+    test_ctx->test_no_dup_check = 1;
+
+  check_guards (test_ctx);
+  /* All fine.  */
+  err = 0;
+
+ leave:
+  if (err)
+    {
+      gcry_cipher_close (test_ctx->cipher_hd);
+      gcry_free (test_ctx);
+      *r_context = NULL;
+    }
+  else
+    *r_context = test_ctx;
+  return gcry_err_code (err);
+}
+
+
+/* Get BUFLEN bytes from the RNG using the test CONTEXT and store them
+   at BUFFER.  Return 0 on success or an error code.  */
+gcry_err_code_t
+_gcry_rngfips_run_external_test (void *context, char *buffer, size_t buflen)
+{
+  rng_context_t test_ctx = context;
+
+  if (!test_ctx || !buffer || buflen != 16)
+    return GPG_ERR_INV_ARG;
+
+  lock_rng ();
+  get_random (buffer, buflen, test_ctx);
+  unlock_rng ();
+  return 0;
+}
+
+/* Release the test CONTEXT.  */
+void
+_gcry_rngfips_deinit_external_test (void *context)
+{
+  rng_context_t test_ctx = context;
+
+  if (test_ctx)
+    {
+      gcry_cipher_close (test_ctx->cipher_hd);
+      gcry_free (test_ctx);
+    }
+}
+
+
diff --git a/plugins/MirOTR/libgcrypt-1.4.6/random/random.c b/plugins/MirOTR/libgcrypt-1.4.6/random/random.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..8df87e2dfa
--- /dev/null
+++ b/plugins/MirOTR/libgcrypt-1.4.6/random/random.c
@@ -0,0 +1,323 @@
+/* random.c - Random number switch
+ * Copyright (C) 2008  Free Software Foundation, Inc.
+ *
+ * This file is part of Libgcrypt.
+ *
+ * Libgcrypt is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ * it under the terms of the GNU Lesser General Public License as
+ * published by the Free Software Foundation; either version 2.1 of
+ * the License, or (at your option) any later version.
+ *
+ * Libgcrypt is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
+ * GNU Lesser General Public License for more details.
+ *
+ * You should have received a copy of the GNU Lesser General Public
+ * License along with this program; if not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
+ */
+
+/*
+  This module switches between different implementations of random
+  number generators and provides a few help functions.
+ */
+
+#include <config.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+
+#include "g10lib.h"
+#include "random.h"
+#include "rand-internal.h"
+#include "ath.h"
+
+
+/* If not NULL a progress function called from certain places and the
+   opaque value passed along.  Registred by
+   _gcry_register_random_progress (). */
+static void (*progress_cb) (void *,const char*,int,int, int );
+static void *progress_cb_data;
+
+
+
+
+/* ---  Functions  --- */
+
+
+/* Used to register a progress callback.  This needs to be called
+   before any threads are created. */
+void
+_gcry_register_random_progress (void (*cb)(void *,const char*,int,int,int),
+                                void *cb_data )
+{
+  progress_cb = cb;
+  progress_cb_data = cb_data;
+}
+
+
+/* This progress function is currently used by the random modules to
+   give hints on how much more entropy is required. */
+void
+_gcry_random_progress (const char *what, int printchar, int current, int total)
+{
+  if (progress_cb)
+    progress_cb (progress_cb_data, what, printchar, current, total);
+}
+
+
+
+/* Initialize this random subsystem.  If FULL is false, this function
+   merely calls the basic initialization of the module and does not do
+   anything more.  Doing this is not really required but when running
+   in a threaded environment we might get a race condition
+   otherwise. */
+void
+_gcry_random_initialize (int full)
+{
+  if (fips_mode ())
+    _gcry_rngfips_initialize (full);
+  else
+    _gcry_rngcsprng_initialize (full);
+}
+
+
+void
+_gcry_random_dump_stats (void)
+{
+  if (fips_mode ())
+    _gcry_rngfips_dump_stats ();
+  else
+    _gcry_rngcsprng_dump_stats ();
+}
+
+
+/* This function should be called during initialization and beore
+   intialization of this module to place the random pools into secure
+   memory.  */
+void
+_gcry_secure_random_alloc (void)
+{
+  if (fips_mode ())
+    ;  /* Not used; the fips rng is allows in secure mode.  */
+  else
+    _gcry_rngcsprng_secure_alloc ();
+}
+
+
+/* This may be called before full initialization to degrade the
+   quality of the RNG for the sake of a faster running test suite.  */
+void
+_gcry_enable_quick_random_gen (void)
+{
+  if (fips_mode ())
+    ;  /* Not used.  */
+  else
+    _gcry_rngcsprng_enable_quick_gen ();
+}
+
+
+void
+_gcry_set_random_daemon_socket (const char *socketname)
+{
+  if (fips_mode ())
+    ;  /* Not used.  */
+  else
+    _gcry_rngcsprng_set_daemon_socket (socketname);
+}
+
+/* With ONOFF set to 1, enable the use of the daemon.  With ONOFF set
+   to 0, disable the use of the daemon.  With ONOF set to -1, return
+   whether the daemon has been enabled. */
+int
+_gcry_use_random_daemon (int onoff)
+{
+  if (fips_mode ())
+    return 0; /* Never enabled in fips mode.  */
+  else
+    return _gcry_rngcsprng_use_daemon (onoff);
+}
+
+
+/* This function returns true if no real RNG is available or the
+   quality of the RNG has been degraded for test purposes.  */
+int
+_gcry_random_is_faked (void)
+{
+  if (fips_mode ())
+    return _gcry_rngfips_is_faked ();
+  else
+    return _gcry_rngcsprng_is_faked ();
+}
+
+
+/* Add BUFLEN bytes from BUF to the internal random pool.  QUALITY
+   should be in the range of 0..100 to indicate the goodness of the
+   entropy added, or -1 for goodness not known.  */
+gcry_error_t
+gcry_random_add_bytes (const void *buf, size_t buflen, int quality)
+{
+  if (fips_mode ())
+    return 0; /* No need for this in fips mode.  */
+  else
+    return _gcry_rngcsprng_add_bytes (buf, buflen, quality);
+}   
+
+  
+/* Helper function.  */ 
+static void
+do_randomize (void *buffer, size_t length, enum gcry_random_level level)
+{
+  if (fips_mode ())
+    _gcry_rngfips_randomize (buffer, length, level);
+  else
+    _gcry_rngcsprng_randomize (buffer, length, level);
+}
+
+/* The public function to return random data of the quality LEVEL.
+   Returns a pointer to a newly allocated and randomized buffer of
+   LEVEL and NBYTES length.  Caller must free the buffer.  */
+void *
+gcry_random_bytes (size_t nbytes, enum gcry_random_level level)
+{
+  void *buffer;
+
+  buffer = gcry_xmalloc (nbytes);
+  do_randomize (buffer, nbytes, level);
+  return buffer;
+}
+
+
+/* The public function to return random data of the quality LEVEL;
+   this version of the function returns the random in a buffer allocated
+   in secure memory.  Caller must free the buffer. */
+void *
+gcry_random_bytes_secure (size_t nbytes, enum gcry_random_level level)
+{
+  void *buffer;
+
+  /* Historical note (1.3.0--1.4.1): The buffer was only allocated
+     in secure memory if the pool in random-csprng.c was also set to
+     use secure memory.  */
+  buffer = gcry_xmalloc_secure (nbytes);
+  do_randomize (buffer, nbytes, level);
+  return buffer;
+}
+
+
+/* Public function to fill the buffer with LENGTH bytes of
+   cryptographically strong random bytes.  Level GCRY_WEAK_RANDOM is
+   not very strong, GCRY_STRONG_RANDOM is strong enough for most
+   usage, GCRY_VERY_STRONG_RANDOM is good for key generation stuff but
+   may be very slow.  */
+void
+gcry_randomize (void *buffer, size_t length, enum gcry_random_level level)
+{
+  do_randomize (buffer, length, level);
+}
+
+
+/* This function may be used to specify the file to be used as a seed
+   file for the PRNG.  This fucntion should be called prior to the
+   initialization of the random module.  NAME may not be NULL.  */
+void
+_gcry_set_random_seed_file (const char *name)
+{
+  if (fips_mode ())
+    ; /* No need for this in fips mode.  */
+  else
+    _gcry_rngcsprng_set_seed_file (name);
+}
+
+
+/* If a seed file has been setup, this function may be used to write
+   back the random numbers entropy pool.  */
+void
+_gcry_update_random_seed_file (void)
+{
+  if (fips_mode ())
+    ; /* No need for this in fips mode.  */
+  else
+    _gcry_rngcsprng_update_seed_file ();
+}
+
+
+
+/* The fast random pool function as called at some places in
+   libgcrypt.  This is merely a wrapper to make sure that this module
+   is initalized and to lock the pool.  Note, that this function is a
+   NOP unless a random function has been used or _gcry_initialize (1)
+   has been used.  We use this hack so that the internal use of this
+   function in cipher_open and md_open won't start filling up the
+   random pool, even if no random will be required by the process. */
+void
+_gcry_fast_random_poll (void)
+{
+  if (fips_mode ())
+    ; /* No need for this in fips mode.  */
+  else
+    _gcry_rngcsprng_fast_poll ();
+}
+
+
+
+/* Create an unpredicable nonce of LENGTH bytes in BUFFER. */
+void
+gcry_create_nonce (void *buffer, size_t length)
+{
+  if (fips_mode ())
+    _gcry_rngfips_create_nonce (buffer, length);
+  else
+    _gcry_rngcsprng_create_nonce (buffer, length);
+}
+
+
+/* Run the self-tests for the RNG.  This is currently only implemented
+   for the FIPS generator.  */
+gpg_error_t
+_gcry_random_selftest (selftest_report_func_t report)
+{
+  if (fips_mode ())
+    return _gcry_rngfips_selftest (report);
+  else
+    return 0; /* No selftests yet.  */
+}
+
+
+/* Create a new test context for an external RNG test driver.  On
+   success the test context is stored at R_CONTEXT; on failure NULL is
+   stored at R_CONTEXT and an error code is returned.  */
+gcry_err_code_t
+_gcry_random_init_external_test (void **r_context, 
+                                 unsigned int flags,
+                                 const void *key, size_t keylen,
+                                 const void *seed, size_t seedlen,
+                                 const void *dt, size_t dtlen)
+{
+  (void)flags;
+  if (fips_mode ())
+    return _gcry_rngfips_init_external_test (r_context, flags, key, keylen,
+                                             seed, seedlen,
+                                             dt, dtlen);
+  else
+    return GPG_ERR_NOT_SUPPORTED;
+}
+
+/* Get BUFLEN bytes from the RNG using the test CONTEXT and store them
+   at BUFFER.  Return 0 on success or an error code.  */
+gcry_err_code_t
+_gcry_random_run_external_test (void *context, char *buffer, size_t buflen)
+{
+  if (fips_mode ())
+    return _gcry_rngfips_run_external_test (context, buffer, buflen);
+  else
+    return GPG_ERR_NOT_SUPPORTED;
+}
+
+/* Release the test CONTEXT.  */
+void
+_gcry_random_deinit_external_test (void *context)
+{
+  if (fips_mode ())
+    _gcry_rngfips_deinit_external_test (context);
+}
diff --git a/plugins/MirOTR/libgcrypt-1.4.6/random/random.h b/plugins/MirOTR/libgcrypt-1.4.6/random/random.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..9075d9a3a7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/plugins/MirOTR/libgcrypt-1.4.6/random/random.h
@@ -0,0 +1,72 @@
+/* random.h - random functions
+ *	Copyright (C) 1998, 2002, 2006 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
+ *
+ * This file is part of Libgcrypt.
+ *
+ * Libgcrypt is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ * it under the terms of the GNU Lesser General Public License as
+ * published by the Free Software Foundation; either version 2.1 of
+ * the License, or (at your option) any later version.
+ *
+ * Libgcrypt is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
+ * GNU Lesser General Public License for more details.
+ *
+ * You should have received a copy of the GNU Lesser General Public
+ * License along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
+ * Foundation, Inc., 59 Temple Place - Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307, USA
+ */
+#ifndef G10_RANDOM_H
+#define G10_RANDOM_H
+
+#include "types.h"
+
+/*-- random.c --*/
+void _gcry_register_random_progress (void (*cb)(void *,const char*,int,int,int),
+                                     void *cb_data );
+
+void _gcry_random_initialize (int full);
+void _gcry_random_dump_stats(void);
+void _gcry_secure_random_alloc(void);
+void _gcry_enable_quick_random_gen (void);
+int  _gcry_random_is_faked(void);
+void _gcry_set_random_daemon_socket (const char *socketname);
+int  _gcry_use_random_daemon (int onoff);
+void _gcry_set_random_seed_file (const char *name);
+void _gcry_update_random_seed_file (void);
+
+byte *_gcry_get_random_bits( size_t nbits, int level, int secure );
+void _gcry_fast_random_poll( void );
+
+gcry_err_code_t _gcry_random_init_external_test (void **r_context, 
+                                                 unsigned int flags,
+                                                 const void *key,
+                                                 size_t keylen,
+                                                 const void *seed,
+                                                 size_t seedlen,
+                                                 const void *dt, 
+                                                 size_t dtlen);
+gcry_err_code_t _gcry_random_run_external_test (void *context,
+                                                char *buffer, size_t buflen);
+void            _gcry_random_deinit_external_test (void *context);
+
+
+/*-- rndegd.c --*/
+gpg_error_t _gcry_rndegd_set_socket_name (const char *name);
+
+/*-- random-daemon.c (only used from random.c) --*/
+#ifdef USE_RANDOM_DAEMON
+void _gcry_daemon_initialize_basics (void);
+int _gcry_daemon_randomize (const char *socketname,
+                            void *buffer, size_t length,
+                            enum gcry_random_level level);
+int _gcry_daemon_create_nonce (const char *socketname,
+                               void *buffer, size_t length);
+#endif /*USE_RANDOM_DAEMON*/
+
+#endif /*G10_RANDOM_H*/
+
+
+
+
diff --git a/plugins/MirOTR/libgcrypt-1.4.6/random/rndegd.c b/plugins/MirOTR/libgcrypt-1.4.6/random/rndegd.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..63a5e0f162
--- /dev/null
+++ b/plugins/MirOTR/libgcrypt-1.4.6/random/rndegd.c
@@ -0,0 +1,290 @@
+/* rndegd.c  -	interface to the EGD
+ *	Copyright (C) 1999, 2000, 2002, 2003 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
+ *
+ * This file is part of Libgcrypt.
+ *
+ * Libgcrypt is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ * it under the terms of the GNU Lesser General Public License as
+ * published by the Free Software Foundation; either version 2.1 of
+ * the License, or (at your option) any later version.
+ *
+ * Libgcrypt is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
+ * GNU Lesser General Public License for more details.
+ *
+ * You should have received a copy of the GNU Lesser General Public
+ * License along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
+ * Foundation, Inc., 59 Temple Place - Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307, USA
+ */
+
+#include <config.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <sys/time.h>
+#include <sys/stat.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/socket.h>
+#include <sys/un.h>
+#include "types.h"
+#include "g10lib.h"
+#include "cipher.h"
+#include "rand-internal.h"
+
+#ifndef offsetof
+#define offsetof(type, member) ((size_t) &((type *)0)->member)
+#endif
+
+static int egd_socket = -1;
+
+/* Allocated name of the socket if supplied at runtime.  */
+static char *user_socket_name;
+
+
+/* Allocate a new filename from FIRST_PART and SECOND_PART and to
+   tilde expansion for first_part.  SECOND_PART might be NULL.
+ */
+static char *
+my_make_filename (const char *first_part, const char *second_part)
+{
+  size_t n;
+  char *name, *home, *p;
+
+  n = strlen(first_part)+1;
+  if (second_part)
+    n += strlen (second_part) + 1;
+
+  home = NULL;
+  if( *first_part == '~' && first_part[1] == '/'
+      && (home = getenv("HOME")) && *home )
+    n += strlen(home);
+
+  name = gcry_xmalloc(n);
+  p = (home
+       ? stpcpy (stpcpy (name, home), first_part+1 )
+       : stpcpy (name, first_part) );
+
+  if (second_part)
+    strcpy (stpcpy(p,"/"), second_part);
+
+  return name;
+}
+
+
+static int
+do_write( int fd, void *buf, size_t nbytes )
+{
+  size_t nleft = nbytes;
+  int nwritten;
+  
+  while( nleft > 0 ) 
+    {
+      nwritten = write( fd, buf, nleft);
+      if( nwritten < 0 )
+        {
+          if( errno == EINTR )
+            continue;
+          return -1;
+	}
+      nleft -= nwritten;
+      buf = (char*)buf + nwritten;
+    }
+  return 0;
+}
+
+static int
+do_read( int fd, void *buf, size_t nbytes )
+{
+  int n, nread = 0;
+
+  do
+    {
+      do
+        {
+          n = read(fd, (char*)buf + nread, nbytes );
+        } 
+      while( n == -1 && errno == EINTR );
+      if( n == -1)
+        return nread? nread:-1;
+      if( n == 0)
+        return -1;
+      nread += n;
+      nbytes -= n;
+    } 
+  while( nread < nbytes );
+  return nread;
+}
+
+
+/* Note that his fucntion is not thread-safe.  */
+gpg_error_t
+_gcry_rndegd_set_socket_name (const char *name)
+{
+  char *newname;
+  struct sockaddr_un addr;
+
+  newname = my_make_filename (name, NULL);
+  if (strlen (newname)+1 >= sizeof addr.sun_path)
+    {
+      gcry_free (newname);
+      return gpg_error_from_syserror ();
+    }
+  gcry_free (user_socket_name);
+  user_socket_name = newname;
+  return 0;
+}
+
+
+/* Connect to the EGD and return the file descriptor.  Return -1 on
+   error.  With NOFAIL set to true, silently fail and return the
+   error, otherwise print an error message and die. */
+int
+_gcry_rndegd_connect_socket (int nofail)
+{
+  int fd;
+  const char *bname = NULL;
+  char *name;
+  struct sockaddr_un addr;
+  int addr_len;
+
+  if (egd_socket != -1)
+    {
+      close (egd_socket);
+      egd_socket = -1;
+    }
+
+#ifdef EGD_SOCKET_NAME
+  bname = EGD_SOCKET_NAME;
+#endif
+  if (user_socket_name)
+    {
+      name = gcry_strdup (user_socket_name);
+      if (!name)
+        {
+          if (!nofail)
+            log_fatal ("error allocating memory in rndegd: %s\n",
+                       strerror(errno) );
+          return -1;
+        }
+    }
+  else if ( !bname || !*bname )
+    name = my_make_filename ("~/.gnupg", "entropy");
+  else
+    name = my_make_filename (bname, NULL);
+
+  if (strlen(name)+1 >= sizeof addr.sun_path)
+    log_fatal ("EGD socketname is too long\n");
+  
+  memset( &addr, 0, sizeof addr );
+  addr.sun_family = AF_UNIX;
+  strcpy( addr.sun_path, name );	  
+  addr_len = (offsetof( struct sockaddr_un, sun_path )
+              + strlen( addr.sun_path ));
+  
+  fd = socket(AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0);
+  if (fd == -1 && !nofail)
+    log_fatal("can't create unix domain socket: %s\n", strerror(errno) );
+  else if (connect (fd, (struct sockaddr*)&addr, addr_len) == -1)
+    {
+      if (!nofail)
+        log_fatal("can't connect to EGD socket `%s': %s\n",
+		  name, strerror(errno) );
+      close (fd);
+      fd = -1;
+    }
+  gcry_free(name);
+  if (fd != -1)
+    egd_socket = fd;
+  return fd;
+}
+
+/****************
+ * Note: We always use the highest level.
+ * To boost the performance we may want to add some
+ * additional code for level 1
+ *
+ * Using a level of 0 should never block and better add nothing
+ * to the pool.  So this is just a dummy for EGD.
+ */
+int
+_gcry_rndegd_gather_random (void (*add)(const void*, size_t,
+                                        enum random_origins),
+                            enum random_origins origin,
+                            size_t length, int level )
+{
+  int fd = egd_socket;
+  int n;
+  byte buffer[256+2];
+  int nbytes;
+  int do_restart = 0;
+
+  if( !length )
+    return 0;
+  if( !level )
+    return 0;
+
+ restart:
+  if (fd == -1 || do_restart)
+    fd = _gcry_rndegd_connect_socket (0);
+
+  do_restart = 0;
+
+  nbytes = length < 255? length : 255;
+  /* First time we do it with a non blocking request */
+  buffer[0] = 1; /* non blocking */
+  buffer[1] = nbytes;
+  if( do_write( fd, buffer, 2 ) == -1 )
+    log_fatal("can't write to the EGD: %s\n", strerror(errno) );
+  n = do_read( fd, buffer, 1 );
+  if( n == -1 )
+    {
+      log_error("read error on EGD: %s\n", strerror(errno));
+      do_restart = 1;
+      goto restart;
+    }
+  n = buffer[0];
+  if( n )
+    {
+      n = do_read( fd, buffer, n );
+      if( n == -1 )
+        {
+          log_error("read error on EGD: %s\n", strerror(errno));
+          do_restart = 1;
+          goto restart;
+	}
+      (*add)( buffer, n, origin );
+      length -= n;
+    }
+
+  if( length )
+    {
+      log_info (
+      _("Please wait, entropy is being gathered. Do some work if it would\n"
+        "keep you from getting bored, because it will improve the quality\n"
+        "of the entropy.\n") );
+    }
+  while( length )
+    {
+      nbytes = length < 255? length : 255;
+
+      buffer[0] = 2; /* blocking */
+      buffer[1] = nbytes;
+      if( do_write( fd, buffer, 2 ) == -1 )
+        log_fatal("can't write to the EGD: %s\n", strerror(errno) );
+      n = do_read( fd, buffer, nbytes );
+      if( n == -1 )
+        {
+          log_error("read error on EGD: %s\n", strerror(errno));
+          do_restart = 1;
+          goto restart;
+	}
+      (*add)( buffer, n, origin );
+      length -= n;
+    }
+  memset(buffer, 0, sizeof(buffer) );
+
+  return 0; /* success */
+}
diff --git a/plugins/MirOTR/libgcrypt-1.4.6/random/rndhw.c b/plugins/MirOTR/libgcrypt-1.4.6/random/rndhw.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..0961d10601
--- /dev/null
+++ b/plugins/MirOTR/libgcrypt-1.4.6/random/rndhw.c
@@ -0,0 +1,138 @@
+/* rndhw.c  - Access to the external random daemon
+ * Copyright (C) 2007  Free Software Foundation, Inc.
+ *
+ * This file is part of Libgcrypt.
+ *
+ * Libgcrypt is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ * it under the terms of the GNU Lesser General Public License as
+ * published by the Free Software Foundation; either version 2.1 of
+ * the License, or (at your option) any later version.
+ *
+ * Libgcrypt is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
+ * GNU Lesser General Public License for more details.
+ *
+ * You should have received a copy of the GNU Lesser General Public
+ * License along with this program; if not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
+ */
+
+#include <config.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+
+#include "types.h"
+#include "g10lib.h"
+#include "rand-internal.h"
+
+#undef USE_PADLOCK
+#ifdef ENABLE_PADLOCK_SUPPORT
+# if defined (__i386__) && SIZEOF_UNSIGNED_LONG == 4 && defined (__GNUC__)
+# define USE_PADLOCK
+# endif
+#endif /*ENABLE_PADLOCK_SUPPORT*/
+
+/* Keep track on whether the RNG has problems.  */
+static volatile int rng_failed;
+
+
+#ifdef USE_PADLOCK
+static size_t
+poll_padlock (void (*add)(const void*, size_t, enum random_origins),
+              enum random_origins origin, int fast)
+{
+  volatile char buffer[64+8] __attribute__ ((aligned (8)));
+  volatile char *p;
+  unsigned int nbytes, status;
+  
+  /* Peter Gutmann's cryptlib tests again whether the RNG is enabled
+     but we don't do so.  We would have to do this also for our AES
+     implementaion and that is definitely too time consuming.  There
+     would be a race condition anyway.  Thus we assume that the OS
+     does not change the Padlock initialization while a user process
+     is running.  */
+  p = buffer;
+  nbytes = 0;
+  while (nbytes < 64)
+    {
+      asm volatile 
+        ("movl %1, %%edi\n\t"         /* Set buffer.  */
+         "xorl %%edx, %%edx\n\t"      /* Request up to 8 bytes.  */
+         ".byte 0x0f, 0xa7, 0xc0\n\t" /* XSTORE RNG. */
+         : "=a" (status)
+         : "g" (p)
+         : "%edx", "%edi", "cc"
+         );
+      if ((status & (1<<6))         /* RNG still enabled.  */
+          && !(status & (1<<13))    /* von Neumann corrector is enabled.  */
+          && !(status & (1<<14))    /* String filter is disabled.  */
+          && !(status & 0x1c00)     /* BIAS voltage at default.  */
+          && (!(status & 0x1f) || (status & 0x1f) == 8) /* Sanity check.  */
+          )
+        {
+          nbytes += (status & 0x1f);
+          if (fast)
+            break; /* Don't get into the loop with the fast flag set.  */
+          p += (status & 0x1f);
+        }
+      else 
+        {
+          /* If there was an error we need to break the loop and
+             record that there is something wrong with the padlock
+             RNG.  */
+          rng_failed = 1;
+          break; 
+        }
+    }
+
+  if (nbytes)
+    {
+      (*add) ((void*)buffer, nbytes, origin);
+      wipememory (buffer, nbytes);
+    }
+  return nbytes;
+}
+#endif /*USE_PADLOCK*/
+
+
+int
+_gcry_rndhw_failed_p (void)
+{
+  return rng_failed;
+}
+
+
+/* Try to read random from a hardware RNG if a fast one is
+   available.  */
+void
+_gcry_rndhw_poll_fast (void (*add)(const void*, size_t, enum random_origins),
+                       enum random_origins origin)
+{
+  (void)add;
+  (void)origin;
+
+#ifdef USE_PADLOCK
+  if ((_gcry_get_hw_features () & HWF_PADLOCK_RNG))
+    poll_padlock (add, origin, 1);
+#endif  
+}
+
+
+/* Read 64 bytes from a hardware RNG and return the number of bytes
+   actually read.  */
+size_t
+_gcry_rndhw_poll_slow (void (*add)(const void*, size_t, enum random_origins),
+                       enum random_origins origin)
+{
+  size_t nbytes = 0;
+
+  (void)add;
+  (void)origin;
+
+#ifdef USE_PADLOCK
+  if ((_gcry_get_hw_features () & HWF_PADLOCK_RNG))
+    nbytes += poll_padlock (add, origin, 0);
+#endif  
+
+  return nbytes;
+}
diff --git a/plugins/MirOTR/libgcrypt-1.4.6/random/rndlinux.c b/plugins/MirOTR/libgcrypt-1.4.6/random/rndlinux.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..574ef6dcc0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/plugins/MirOTR/libgcrypt-1.4.6/random/rndlinux.c
@@ -0,0 +1,167 @@
+/* rndlinux.c  -  raw random number for OSes with /dev/random
+ * Copyright (C) 1998, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2007  Free Software Foundation, Inc.
+ *
+ * This file is part of Libgcrypt.
+ *
+ * Libgcrypt is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ * it under the terms of the GNU Lesser General Public License as
+ * published by the Free Software Foundation; either version 2.1 of
+ * the License, or (at your option) any later version.
+ *
+ * Libgcrypt is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
+ * GNU Lesser General Public License for more details.
+ *
+ * You should have received a copy of the GNU Lesser General Public
+ * License along with this program; if not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
+ */
+
+
+#include <config.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <sys/time.h>
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/stat.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_GETTIMEOFDAY
+# include <sys/times.h>
+#endif
+#include <string.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include <fcntl.h>
+#include "types.h"
+#include "g10lib.h"
+#include "rand-internal.h"
+
+static int open_device ( const char *name );
+
+
+static int
+set_cloexec_flag (int fd)
+{
+  int oldflags;
+
+  oldflags= fcntl (fd, F_GETFD, 0);
+  if (oldflags < 0)
+    return oldflags;
+  oldflags |= FD_CLOEXEC;
+  return fcntl (fd, F_SETFD, oldflags);
+}
+
+
+
+/*
+ * Used to open the /dev/random devices (Linux, xBSD, Solaris (if it exists)).
+ */
+static int
+open_device ( const char *name )
+{
+  int fd;
+
+  fd = open ( name, O_RDONLY );
+  if ( fd == -1 )
+    log_fatal ("can't open %s: %s\n", name, strerror(errno) );
+
+  if (set_cloexec_flag (fd))
+    log_error ("error setting FD_CLOEXEC on fd %d: %s\n",
+               fd, strerror (errno));
+
+  /* We used to do the following check, however it turned out that this
+     is not portable since more OSes provide a random device which is
+     sometimes implemented as another device type. 
+     
+     struct stat sb;
+
+     if( fstat( fd, &sb ) )
+        log_fatal("stat() off %s failed: %s\n", name, strerror(errno) );
+     if( (!S_ISCHR(sb.st_mode)) && (!S_ISFIFO(sb.st_mode)) )
+        log_fatal("invalid random device!\n" );
+  */
+  return fd;
+}
+
+
+int
+_gcry_rndlinux_gather_random (void (*add)(const void*, size_t,
+                                          enum random_origins),
+                              enum random_origins origin,
+                              size_t length, int level )
+{
+  static int fd_urandom = -1;
+  static int fd_random = -1;
+  int fd;
+  int n;
+  int warn=0;
+  byte buffer[768];
+  size_t n_hw;
+
+  /* First read from a hardware source.  However let it account only
+     for up to 50% of the requested bytes.  */
+  n_hw = _gcry_rndhw_poll_slow (add, origin);
+  if (n_hw > length/2)
+    n_hw = length/2;
+  if (length > 1)
+    length -= n_hw;
+
+  /* Open the requested device.  */
+  if (level >= 2)
+    {
+      if( fd_random == -1 )
+        fd_random = open_device ( NAME_OF_DEV_RANDOM );
+      fd = fd_random;
+    }
+  else
+    {
+      if( fd_urandom == -1 )
+        fd_urandom = open_device ( NAME_OF_DEV_URANDOM );
+      fd = fd_urandom;
+    }
+
+  /* And enter the read loop.  */
+  while (length)
+    {
+      fd_set rfds;
+      struct timeval tv;
+      int rc;
+      
+      FD_ZERO(&rfds);
+      FD_SET(fd, &rfds);
+      tv.tv_sec = 3;
+      tv.tv_usec = 0;
+      if( !(rc=select(fd+1, &rfds, NULL, NULL, &tv)) )
+        {
+          if( !warn )
+            {
+              _gcry_random_progress ("need_entropy", 'X', 0, (int)length);
+	      warn = 1;
+	    }
+	  continue;
+	}
+	else if( rc == -1 )
+          {
+	    log_error ("select() error: %s\n", strerror(errno));
+	    continue;
+          }
+
+	do 
+          {
+	    int nbytes = length < sizeof(buffer)? length : sizeof(buffer);
+	    n = read(fd, buffer, nbytes );
+	    if( n >= 0 && n > nbytes ) 
+              {
+		log_error("bogus read from random device (n=%d)\n", n );
+		n = nbytes;
+              }
+          } 
+        while( n == -1 && errno == EINTR );
+	if( n == -1 )
+          log_fatal("read error on random device: %s\n", strerror(errno));
+	(*add)( buffer, n, origin );
+	length -= n;
+    }
+  memset(buffer, 0, sizeof(buffer) );
+
+  return 0; /* success */
+}
diff --git a/plugins/MirOTR/libgcrypt-1.4.6/random/rndunix.c b/plugins/MirOTR/libgcrypt-1.4.6/random/rndunix.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..1faf9abc0e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/plugins/MirOTR/libgcrypt-1.4.6/random/rndunix.c
@@ -0,0 +1,883 @@
+/****************************************************************************
+ *									    *
+ *									    *
+ *   Unix Randomness-Gathering Code					    *
+ *									    *
+ *   Copyright Peter Gutmann, Paul Kendall, and Chris Wedgwood 1996-1999.   *
+ *   Heavily modified for GnuPG by Werner Koch				    *
+ *									    *
+ *									    *
+ ****************************************************************************/
+
+/* This module is part of the cryptlib continuously seeded pseudorandom
+   number generator.  For usage conditions, see lib_rand.c
+
+   [Here is the notice from lib_rand.c:]
+
+   This module and the misc/rnd*.c modules represent the cryptlib
+   continuously seeded pseudorandom number generator (CSPRNG) as described in
+   my 1998 Usenix Security Symposium paper "The generation of random numbers
+   for cryptographic purposes".
+
+   The CSPRNG code is copyright Peter Gutmann (and various others) 1996,
+   1997, 1998, 1999, all rights reserved.  Redistribution of the CSPRNG
+   modules and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification,
+   are permitted provided that the following conditions are met:
+
+   1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice
+      and this permission notice in its entirety.
+
+   2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the copyright notice in
+      the documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+
+   3. A copy of any bugfixes or enhancements made must be provided to the
+      author, <pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz> to allow them to be added to the
+      baseline version of the code.
+
+  ALTERNATIVELY, the code may be distributed under the terms of the
+  GNU Lesser General Public License, version 2.1 or any later version
+  published by the Free Software Foundation, in which case the
+  provisions of the GNU LGPL are required INSTEAD OF the above
+  restrictions.
+
+  Although not required under the terms of the LGPL, it would still be
+  nice if you could make any changes available to the author to allow
+  a consistent code base to be maintained.  */
+/*************************************************************************
+ The above alternative was changed from GPL to LGPL on 2007-08-22 with
+ permission from Peter Gutmann:
+ ==========
+ From: pgut001 <pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz>
+ Subject: Re: LGPL for the windows entropy gatherer
+ To: wk@gnupg.org
+ Date: Wed, 22 Aug 2007 03:05:42 +1200
+ 
+ Hi,
+ 
+ >As of now libgcrypt is GPL under Windows due to that module and some people
+ >would really like to see it under LGPL too.  Can you do such a license change
+ >to LGPL version 2?  Note that LGPL give the user the option to relicense it
+ >under GPL, so the change would be pretty easy and backwar compatible.
+ 
+ Sure.  I assumed that since GPG was GPLd, you'd prefer the GPL for the entropy
+ code as well, but Ian asked for LGPL as an option so as of the next release
+ I'll have LGPL in there.  You can consider it to be retroactive, so your
+ current version will be LGPLd as well.
+ 
+ Peter.
+ ==========
+ From: pgut001 <pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz>
+ Subject: Re: LGPL for the windows entropy gatherer
+ To: wk@gnupg.org
+ Date: Wed, 22 Aug 2007 20:50:08 +1200
+ 
+ >Would you mind to extend this also to the Unix entropy gatherer which is
+ >still used on systems without /dev/random and when EGD is not installed? That
+ >would be the last GPLed piece in Libgcrypt.
+ 
+ Sure, it covers the entire entropy-gathering subsystem.
+ 
+ Peter.
+ =========
+*/
+
+/* General includes */
+
+#include <config.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+/* OS-specific includes */
+
+#ifdef __osf__
+  /* Somewhere in the morass of system-specific cruft which OSF/1 pulls in
+   * via the following includes are various endianness defines, so we
+   * undefine the cryptlib ones, which aren't really needed for this module
+   * anyway */
+#undef BIG_ENDIAN
+#undef LITTLE_ENDIAN
+#endif				/* __osf__ */
+
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include <fcntl.h>
+#include <pwd.h>
+#ifndef __QNX__
+#include <sys/errno.h>
+#include <sys/ipc.h>
+#endif				/* __QNX__ */
+#include <sys/time.h>		/* SCO and SunOS need this before resource.h */
+#ifndef __QNX__
+#include <sys/resource.h>
+#endif				/* __QNX__ */
+#if defined( _AIX ) || defined( __QNX__ )
+#include <sys/select.h>
+#endif				/* _AIX */
+#ifndef __QNX__
+#include <sys/shm.h>
+#include <signal.h>
+#include <sys/signal.h>
+#endif				/* __QNX__ */
+#include <sys/stat.h>
+#include <sys/types.h>		/* Verschiedene komische Typen */
+#if defined( __hpux ) && ( OS_VERSION == 9 )
+#include <vfork.h>
+#endif				/* __hpux 9.x, after that it's in unistd.h */
+#include <sys/wait.h>
+/* #include <kitchensink.h> */
+#ifdef __QNX__
+#include <signal.h>
+#include <process.h>
+#endif		      /* __QNX__ */
+#include <errno.h>
+
+#include "types.h"  /* for byte and u32 typedefs */
+#include "g10lib.h"
+#include "rand-internal.h"
+
+#ifndef EAGAIN
+#define EAGAIN	EWOULDBLOCK
+#endif
+#ifndef STDIN_FILENO
+#define STDIN_FILENO 0
+#endif
+#ifndef STDOUT_FILENO
+#define STDOUT_FILENO 1
+#endif
+
+#define GATHER_BUFSIZE		49152	/* Usually about 25K are filled */
+
+/* The structure containing information on random-data sources.  Each
+ * record contains the source and a relative estimate of its usefulness
+ * (weighting) which is used to scale the number of kB of output from the
+ * source (total = data_bytes / usefulness).  Usually the weighting is in the
+ * range 1-3 (or 0 for especially useless sources), resulting in a usefulness
+ * rating of 1...3 for each kB of source output (or 0 for the useless
+ * sources).
+ *
+ * If the source is constantly changing (certain types of network statistics
+ * have this characteristic) but the amount of output is small, the weighting
+ * is given as a negative value to indicate that the output should be treated
+ * as if a minimum of 1K of output had been obtained.  If the source produces
+ * a lot of output then the scale factor is fractional, resulting in a
+ * usefulness rating of < 1 for each kB of source output.
+ *
+ * In order to provide enough randomness to satisfy the requirements for a
+ * slow poll, we need to accumulate at least 20 points of usefulness (a
+ * typical system should get about 30 points).
+ *
+ * Some potential options are missed out because of special considerations.
+ * pstat -i and pstat -f can produce amazing amounts of output (the record
+ * is 600K on an Oracle server) which floods the buffer and doesn't yield
+ * anything useful (apart from perhaps increasing the entropy of the vmstat
+ * output a bit), so we don't bother with this.  pstat in general produces
+ * quite a bit of output, but it doesn't change much over time, so it gets
+ * very low weightings.  netstat -s produces constantly-changing output but
+ * also produces quite a bit of it, so it only gets a weighting of 2 rather
+ * than 3.  The same holds for netstat -in, which gets 1 rather than 2.
+ *
+ * Some binaries are stored in different locations on different systems so
+ * alternative paths are given for them.  The code sorts out which one to
+ * run by itself, once it finds an exectable somewhere it moves on to the
+ * next source.  The sources are arranged roughly in their order of
+ * usefulness, occasionally sources which provide a tiny amount of
+ * relatively useless data are placed ahead of ones which provide a large
+ * amount of possibly useful data because another 100 bytes can't hurt, and
+ * it means the buffer won't be swamped by one or two high-output sources.
+ * All the high-output sources are clustered towards the end of the list
+ * for this reason.  Some binaries are checked for in a certain order, for
+ * example under Slowaris /usr/ucb/ps understands aux as an arg, but the
+ * others don't.  Some systems have conditional defines enabling alternatives
+ * to commands which don't understand the usual options but will provide
+ * enough output (in the form of error messages) to look like they're the
+ * real thing, causing alternative options to be skipped (we can't check the
+ * return either because some commands return peculiar, non-zero status even
+ * when they're working correctly).
+ *
+ * In order to maximise use of the buffer, the code performs a form of run-
+ * length compression on its input where a repeated sequence of bytes is
+ * replaced by the occurrence count mod 256.  Some commands output an awful
+ * lot of whitespace, this measure greatly increases the amount of data we
+ * can fit in the buffer.
+ *
+ * When we scale the weighting using the SC() macro, some preprocessors may
+ * give a division by zero warning for the most obvious expression
+ * 'weight ? 1024 / weight : 0' (and gcc 2.7.2.2 dies with a division by zero
+ * trap), so we define a value SC_0 which evaluates to zero when fed to
+ * '1024 / SC_0' */
+
+#define SC( weight )	( 1024 / weight )	/* Scale factor */
+#define SC_0			16384	/* SC( SC_0 ) evalutes to 0 */
+
+static struct RI {
+    const char *path;		/* Path to check for existence of source */
+    const char *arg;		/* Args for source */
+    const int usefulness;	/* Usefulness of source */
+    FILE *pipe; 		/* Pipe to source as FILE * */
+    int pipeFD; 		/* Pipe to source as FD */
+    pid_t pid;			/* pid of child for waitpid() */
+    int length; 		/* Quantity of output produced */
+    const int hasAlternative;	    /* Whether source has alt.location */
+} dataSources[] = {
+
+    {	"/bin/vmstat", "-s", SC(-3), NULL, 0, 0, 0, 1    },
+    {	"/usr/bin/vmstat", "-s", SC(-3), NULL, 0, 0, 0, 0},
+    {	"/bin/vmstat", "-c", SC(-3), NULL, 0, 0, 0, 1     },
+    {	"/usr/bin/vmstat", "-c", SC(-3), NULL, 0, 0, 0, 0},
+    {	"/usr/bin/pfstat", NULL, SC(-2), NULL, 0, 0, 0, 0},
+    {	"/bin/vmstat", "-i", SC(-2), NULL, 0, 0, 0, 1     },
+    {	"/usr/bin/vmstat", "-i", SC(-2), NULL, 0, 0, 0, 0},
+    {	"/usr/ucb/netstat", "-s", SC(2), NULL, 0, 0, 0, 1 },
+    {	"/usr/bin/netstat", "-s", SC(2), NULL, 0, 0, 0, 1 },
+    {	"/usr/sbin/netstat", "-s", SC(2), NULL, 0, 0, 0, 1},
+    {	"/usr/etc/netstat", "-s", SC(2), NULL, 0, 0, 0, 0},
+    {	"/usr/bin/nfsstat", NULL, SC(2), NULL, 0, 0, 0, 0},
+    {	"/usr/ucb/netstat", "-m", SC(-1), NULL, 0, 0, 0, 1  },
+    {	"/usr/bin/netstat", "-m", SC(-1), NULL, 0, 0, 0, 1  },
+    {	"/usr/sbin/netstat", "-m", SC(-1), NULL, 0, 0, 0, 1 },
+    {	"/usr/etc/netstat", "-m", SC(-1), NULL, 0, 0, 0, 0 },
+    {	"/bin/netstat",     "-in", SC(-1), NULL, 0, 0, 0, 1 },
+    {	"/usr/ucb/netstat", "-in", SC(-1), NULL, 0, 0, 0, 1 },
+    {	"/usr/bin/netstat", "-in", SC(-1), NULL, 0, 0, 0, 1 },
+    {	"/usr/sbin/netstat", "-in", SC(-1), NULL, 0, 0, 0, 1},
+    {	"/usr/etc/netstat", "-in", SC(-1), NULL, 0, 0, 0, 0},
+    {	"/usr/sbin/snmp_request", "localhost public get 1.3.6.1.2.1.7.1.0",
+				    SC(-1), NULL, 0, 0, 0, 0 }, /* UDP in */
+    {	"/usr/sbin/snmp_request", "localhost public get 1.3.6.1.2.1.7.4.0",
+				    SC(-1), NULL, 0, 0, 0, 0 },  /* UDP out */
+    {	"/usr/sbin/snmp_request", "localhost public get 1.3.6.1.2.1.4.3.0",
+				    SC(-1), NULL, 0, 0, 0, 0 }, /* IP ? */
+    {	"/usr/sbin/snmp_request", "localhost public get 1.3.6.1.2.1.6.10.0",
+				    SC(-1), NULL, 0, 0, 0, 0 }, /* TCP ? */
+    {	"/usr/sbin/snmp_request", "localhost public get 1.3.6.1.2.1.6.11.0",
+				    SC(-1), NULL, 0, 0, 0, 0 }, /* TCP ? */
+    {	"/usr/sbin/snmp_request", "localhost public get 1.3.6.1.2.1.6.13.0",
+				    SC(-1), NULL, 0, 0, 0, 0 }, /* TCP ? */
+    {	"/usr/bin/mpstat", NULL, SC(1), NULL, 0, 0, 0, 0     },
+    {	"/usr/bin/w", NULL, SC(1), NULL, 0, 0, 0, 1           },
+    {	"/usr/bsd/w", NULL, SC(1), NULL, 0, 0, 0, 0          },
+    {	"/usr/bin/df", NULL, SC(1), NULL, 0, 0, 0, 1          },
+    {	"/bin/df", NULL, SC(1), NULL, 0, 0, 0, 0             },
+    {	"/usr/sbin/portstat", NULL, SC(1), NULL, 0, 0, 0, 0  },
+    {	"/usr/bin/iostat", NULL, SC(SC_0), NULL, 0, 0, 0, 0  },
+    {	"/usr/bin/uptime", NULL, SC(SC_0), NULL, 0, 0, 0, 1   },
+    {	"/usr/bsd/uptime", NULL, SC(SC_0), NULL, 0, 0, 0, 0  },
+    {	"/bin/vmstat", "-f", SC(SC_0), NULL, 0, 0, 0, 1       },
+    {	"/usr/bin/vmstat", "-f", SC(SC_0), NULL, 0, 0, 0, 0  },
+    {	"/bin/vmstat", NULL, SC(SC_0), NULL, 0, 0, 0, 1       },
+    {	"/usr/bin/vmstat", NULL, SC(SC_0), NULL, 0, 0, 0, 0  },
+    {	"/usr/ucb/netstat", "-n", SC(0.5), NULL, 0, 0, 0, 1   },
+    {	"/usr/bin/netstat", "-n", SC(0.5), NULL, 0, 0, 0, 1   },
+    {	"/usr/sbin/netstat", "-n", SC(0.5), NULL, 0, 0, 0, 1  },
+    {	"/usr/etc/netstat", "-n", SC(0.5), NULL, 0, 0, 0, 0  },
+#if defined( __sgi ) || defined( __hpux )
+    {	"/bin/ps", "-el", SC(0.3), NULL, 0, 0, 0, 1           },
+#endif				/* __sgi || __hpux */
+    {	"/usr/ucb/ps", "aux", SC(0.3), NULL, 0, 0, 0, 1       },
+    {	"/usr/bin/ps", "aux", SC(0.3), NULL, 0, 0, 0, 1       },
+    {	"/bin/ps", "aux", SC(0.3), NULL, 0, 0, 0, 0          },
+    {   "/bin/ps", "-A", SC(0.3), NULL, 0, 0, 0, 0           }, /*QNX*/
+    {	"/usr/bin/ipcs", "-a", SC(0.5), NULL, 0, 0, 0, 1      },
+    {	"/bin/ipcs", "-a", SC(0.5), NULL, 0, 0, 0, 0         },
+    /* Unreliable source, depends on system usage */
+    {	"/etc/pstat", "-p", SC(0.5), NULL, 0, 0, 0, 1         },
+    {	"/bin/pstat", "-p", SC(0.5), NULL, 0, 0, 0, 0        },
+    {	"/etc/pstat", "-S", SC(0.2), NULL, 0, 0, 0, 1         },
+    {	"/bin/pstat", "-S", SC(0.2), NULL, 0, 0, 0, 0        },
+    {	"/etc/pstat", "-v", SC(0.2), NULL, 0, 0, 0, 1         },
+    {	"/bin/pstat", "-v", SC(0.2), NULL, 0, 0, 0, 0        },
+    {	"/etc/pstat", "-x", SC(0.2), NULL, 0, 0, 0, 1         },
+    {	"/bin/pstat", "-x", SC(0.2), NULL, 0, 0, 0, 0        },
+    {	"/etc/pstat", "-t", SC(0.1), NULL, 0, 0, 0, 1         },
+    {	"/bin/pstat", "-t", SC(0.1), NULL, 0, 0, 0, 0        },
+    /* pstat is your friend */
+    {	"/usr/bin/last", "-n 50", SC(0.3), NULL, 0, 0, 0, 1   },
+#ifdef __sgi
+    {	"/usr/bsd/last", "-50", SC(0.3), NULL, 0, 0, 0, 0    },
+#endif				/* __sgi */
+#ifdef __hpux
+    {	"/etc/last", "-50", SC(0.3), NULL, 0, 0, 0, 0        },
+#endif				/* __hpux */
+    {	"/usr/bsd/last", "-n 50", SC(0.3), NULL, 0, 0, 0, 0  },
+    {	"/usr/sbin/snmp_request", "localhost public get 1.3.6.1.2.1.5.1.0",
+				SC(0.1), NULL, 0, 0, 0, 0 }, /* ICMP ? */
+    {	"/usr/sbin/snmp_request", "localhost public get 1.3.6.1.2.1.5.3.0",
+				SC(0.1), NULL, 0, 0, 0, 0 }, /* ICMP ? */
+    {	"/etc/arp", "-a", SC(0.1), NULL, 0, 0, 0, 1  },
+    {	"/usr/etc/arp", "-a", SC(0.1), NULL, 0, 0, 0, 1  },
+    {	"/usr/bin/arp", "-a", SC(0.1), NULL, 0, 0, 0, 1  },
+    {	"/usr/sbin/arp", "-a", SC(0.1), NULL, 0, 0, 0, 0 },
+    {	"/usr/sbin/ripquery", "-nw 1 127.0.0.1",
+				SC(0.1), NULL, 0, 0, 0, 0 },
+    {	"/bin/lpstat", "-t", SC(0.1), NULL, 0, 0, 0, 1     },
+    {	"/usr/bin/lpstat", "-t", SC(0.1), NULL, 0, 0, 0, 1 },
+    {	"/usr/ucb/lpstat", "-t", SC(0.1), NULL, 0, 0, 0, 0 },
+    {	"/usr/bin/tcpdump", "-c 5 -efvvx", SC(1), NULL, 0, 0, 0, 0 },
+    /* This is very environment-dependant.  If network traffic is low, it'll
+     * probably time out before delivering 5 packets, which is OK because
+     * it'll probably be fixed stuff like ARP anyway */
+    {	"/usr/sbin/advfsstat", "-b usr_domain",
+				SC(SC_0), NULL, 0, 0, 0, 0},
+    {	"/usr/sbin/advfsstat", "-l 2 usr_domain",
+				SC(0.5), NULL, 0, 0, 0, 0},
+    {	"/usr/sbin/advfsstat", "-p usr_domain",
+				SC(SC_0), NULL, 0, 0, 0, 0},
+    /* This is a complex and screwball program.  Some systems have things
+     * like rX_dmn, x = integer, for RAID systems, but the statistics are
+     * pretty dodgy */
+#ifdef __QNXNTO__                                                             
+    { "/bin/pidin", "-F%A%B%c%d%E%I%J%K%m%M%n%N%p%P%S%s%T", SC(0.3),
+             NULL, 0, 0, 0, 0       },
+#endif     
+#if 0
+    /* The following aren't enabled since they're somewhat slow and not very
+     * unpredictable, however they give an indication of the sort of sources
+     * you can use (for example the finger might be more useful on a
+     * firewalled internal network) */
+    {	"/usr/bin/finger", "@ml.media.mit.edu", SC(0.9), NULL, 0, 0, 0, 0 },
+    {	"/usr/local/bin/wget", "-O - http://lavarand.sgi.com/block.html",
+				SC(0.9), NULL, 0, 0, 0, 0 },
+    {	"/bin/cat", "/usr/spool/mqueue/syslog", SC(0.9), NULL, 0, 0, 0, 0 },
+#endif				/* 0 */
+    {	NULL, NULL, 0, NULL, 0, 0, 0, 0 }
+};
+
+static byte *gather_buffer;	    /* buffer for gathering random noise */
+static int gather_buffer_size;	    /* size of the memory buffer */
+static uid_t gatherer_uid;
+
+/* The message structure used to communicate with the parent */
+typedef struct {
+    int  usefulness;	/* usefulness of data */
+    int  ndata; 	/* valid bytes in data */
+    char data[500];	/* gathered data */
+} GATHER_MSG;
+
+#ifndef HAVE_WAITPID
+static pid_t
+waitpid(pid_t pid, int *statptr, int options)
+{
+#ifdef HAVE_WAIT4
+	return wait4(pid, statptr, options, NULL);
+#else
+	/* If wait4 is also not available, try wait3 for SVR3 variants */
+	/* Less ideal because can't actually request a specific pid */
+	/* For that reason, first check to see if pid is for an */
+	/*   existing process. */
+	int tmp_pid, dummystat;;
+	if (kill(pid, 0) == -1) {
+		errno = ECHILD;
+		return -1;
+	}
+	if (statptr == NULL)
+		statptr = &dummystat;
+	while (((tmp_pid = wait3(statptr, options, 0)) != pid) &&
+		    (tmp_pid != -1) && (tmp_pid != 0) && (pid != -1))
+	    ;
+	return tmp_pid;
+#endif
+}
+#endif
+
+/* Under SunOS popen() doesn't record the pid of the child process.  When
+ * pclose() is called, instead of calling waitpid() for the correct child, it
+ * calls wait() repeatedly until the right child is reaped.  The problem is
+ * that this reaps any other children that happen to have died at that
+ * moment, and when their pclose() comes along, the process hangs forever.
+ * The fix is to use a wrapper for popen()/pclose() which saves the pid in
+ * the dataSources structure (code adapted from GNU-libc's popen() call).
+ *
+ * Aut viam inveniam aut faciam */
+
+static FILE *
+my_popen(struct RI *entry)
+{
+    int pipedes[2];
+    FILE *stream;
+
+    /* Create the pipe */
+    if (pipe(pipedes) < 0)
+	return (NULL);
+
+    /* Fork off the child ("vfork() is like an OS orgasm.  All OS's want to
+     * do it, but most just end up faking it" - Chris Wedgwood).  If your OS
+     * supports it, you should try to use vfork() here because it's somewhat
+     * more efficient */
+#if defined( sun ) || defined( __ultrix__ ) || defined( __osf__ ) || \
+	defined(__hpux)
+    entry->pid = vfork();
+#else				/*  */
+    entry->pid = fork();
+#endif				/* Unixen which have vfork() */
+    if (entry->pid == (pid_t) - 1) {
+	/* The fork failed */
+	close(pipedes[0]);
+	close(pipedes[1]);
+	return (NULL);
+    }
+
+    if (entry->pid == (pid_t) 0) {
+	struct passwd *passwd;
+
+	/* We are the child.  Make the read side of the pipe be stdout */
+	if (dup2(pipedes[STDOUT_FILENO], STDOUT_FILENO) < 0)
+	    exit(127);
+
+	/* Now that everything is set up, give up our permissions to make
+	 * sure we don't read anything sensitive.  If the getpwnam() fails,
+	 * we default to -1, which is usually nobody */
+	if (gatherer_uid == (uid_t)-1 && \
+	    (passwd = getpwnam("nobody")) != NULL)
+	    gatherer_uid = passwd->pw_uid;
+
+	setuid(gatherer_uid);
+
+	/* Close the pipe descriptors */
+	close(pipedes[STDIN_FILENO]);
+	close(pipedes[STDOUT_FILENO]);
+
+	/* Try and exec the program */
+	execl(entry->path, entry->path, entry->arg, NULL);
+
+	/* Die if the exec failed */
+	exit(127);
+    }
+
+    /* We are the parent.  Close the irrelevant side of the pipe and open
+     * the relevant side as a new stream.  Mark our side of the pipe to
+     * close on exec, so new children won't see it */
+    close(pipedes[STDOUT_FILENO]);
+
+#ifdef FD_CLOEXEC
+    fcntl(pipedes[STDIN_FILENO], F_SETFD, FD_CLOEXEC);
+#endif
+
+    stream = fdopen(pipedes[STDIN_FILENO], "r");
+
+    if (stream == NULL) {
+	int savedErrno = errno;
+
+	/* The stream couldn't be opened or the child structure couldn't be
+	 * allocated.  Kill the child and close the other side of the pipe */
+	kill(entry->pid, SIGKILL);
+	if (stream == NULL)
+	    close(pipedes[STDOUT_FILENO]);
+	else
+	    fclose(stream);
+
+	waitpid(entry->pid, NULL, 0);
+
+	entry->pid = 0;
+	errno = savedErrno;
+	return (NULL);
+    }
+
+    return (stream);
+}
+
+static int
+my_pclose(struct RI *entry)
+{
+    int status = 0;
+
+    if (fclose(entry->pipe))
+	return (-1);
+
+    /* We ignore the return value from the process because some
+       programs return funny values which would result in the input
+       being discarded even if they executed successfully.  This isn't
+       a problem because the result data size threshold will filter
+       out any programs which exit with a usage message without
+       producing useful output.  */
+    if (waitpid(entry->pid, NULL, 0) != entry->pid)
+	status = -1;
+
+    entry->pipe = NULL;
+    entry->pid = 0;
+    return (status);
+}
+
+
+/* Unix slow poll (without special support for Linux)
+ *
+ * If a few of the randomness sources create a large amount of output then
+ * the slowPoll() stops once the buffer has been filled (but before all the
+ * randomness sources have been sucked dry) so that the 'usefulness' factor
+ * remains below the threshold.  For this reason the gatherer buffer has to
+ * be fairly sizeable on moderately loaded systems.  This is something of a
+ * bug since the usefulness should be influenced by the amount of output as
+ * well as the source type */
+
+
+static int
+slow_poll(FILE *dbgfp, int dbgall, size_t *nbytes )
+{
+    int moreSources;
+    struct timeval tv;
+    fd_set fds;
+#if defined( __hpux )
+    size_t maxFD = 0;
+#else
+    int maxFD = 0;
+#endif /* OS-specific brokenness */
+    int bufPos, i, usefulness = 0;
+
+
+    /* Fire up each randomness source */
+    FD_ZERO(&fds);
+    for (i = 0; dataSources[i].path != NULL; i++) {
+	/* Since popen() is a fairly heavy function, we check to see whether
+	 * the executable exists before we try to run it */
+	if (access(dataSources[i].path, X_OK)) {
+	    if( dbgfp && dbgall )
+		fprintf(dbgfp, "%s not present%s\n", dataSources[i].path,
+			       dataSources[i].hasAlternative ?
+					", has alternatives" : "");
+	    dataSources[i].pipe = NULL;
+	}
+	else
+	    dataSources[i].pipe = my_popen(&dataSources[i]);
+
+	if (dataSources[i].pipe != NULL) {
+	    dataSources[i].pipeFD = fileno(dataSources[i].pipe);
+	    if (dataSources[i].pipeFD > maxFD)
+		maxFD = dataSources[i].pipeFD;
+
+#ifdef O_NONBLOCK /* Ohhh what a hack (used for Atari) */
+	    fcntl(dataSources[i].pipeFD, F_SETFL, O_NONBLOCK);
+#else
+#error O_NONBLOCK is missing
+#endif
+
+	    FD_SET(dataSources[i].pipeFD, &fds);
+	    dataSources[i].length = 0;
+
+	    /* If there are alternatives for this command, don't try and
+	     * execute them */
+	    while (dataSources[i].hasAlternative) {
+		if( dbgfp && dbgall )
+		    fprintf(dbgfp, "Skipping %s\n", dataSources[i + 1].path);
+		i++;
+	    }
+	}
+    }
+
+
+    /* Suck all the data we can get from each of the sources */
+    bufPos = 0;
+    moreSources = 1;
+    while (moreSources && bufPos <= gather_buffer_size) {
+	/* Wait for data to become available from any of the sources, with a
+	 * timeout of 10 seconds.  This adds even more randomness since data
+	 * becomes available in a nondeterministic fashion.  Kudos to HP's QA
+	 * department for managing to ship a select() which breaks its own
+	 * prototype */
+	tv.tv_sec = 10;
+	tv.tv_usec = 0;
+
+#if defined( __hpux ) && ( OS_VERSION == 9 )
+	if (select(maxFD + 1, (int *)&fds, NULL, NULL, &tv) == -1)
+#else  /*  */
+	if (select(maxFD + 1, &fds, NULL, NULL, &tv) == -1)
+#endif /* __hpux */
+	    break;
+
+	/* One of the sources has data available, read it into the buffer */
+	for (i = 0; dataSources[i].path != NULL; i++) {
+	    if( dataSources[i].pipe && FD_ISSET(dataSources[i].pipeFD, &fds)) {
+		size_t noBytes;
+
+		if ((noBytes = fread(gather_buffer + bufPos, 1,
+				     gather_buffer_size - bufPos,
+				     dataSources[i].pipe)) == 0) {
+		    if (my_pclose(&dataSources[i]) == 0) {
+			int total = 0;
+
+			/* Try and estimate how much entropy we're getting
+			 * from a data source */
+			if (dataSources[i].usefulness) {
+			    if (dataSources[i].usefulness < 0)
+				total = (dataSources[i].length + 999)
+					/ -dataSources[i].usefulness;
+			    else
+				total = dataSources[i].length
+					/ dataSources[i].usefulness;
+			}
+			if( dbgfp )
+			    fprintf(dbgfp,
+			       "%s %s contributed %d bytes, "
+			       "usefulness = %d\n", dataSources[i].path,
+			       (dataSources[i].arg != NULL) ?
+				       dataSources[i].arg : "",
+				      dataSources[i].length, total);
+			if( dataSources[i].length )
+			    usefulness += total;
+		    }
+		    dataSources[i].pipe = NULL;
+		}
+		else {
+		    int currPos = bufPos;
+		    int endPos = bufPos + noBytes;
+
+		    /* Run-length compress the input byte sequence */
+		    while (currPos < endPos) {
+			int ch = gather_buffer[currPos];
+
+			/* If it's a single byte, just copy it over */
+			if (ch != gather_buffer[currPos + 1]) {
+			    gather_buffer[bufPos++] = ch;
+			    currPos++;
+			}
+			else {
+			    int count = 0;
+
+			    /* It's a run of repeated bytes, replace them
+			     * with the byte count mod 256 */
+			    while ((ch == gather_buffer[currPos])
+				    && currPos < endPos) {
+				count++;
+				currPos++;
+			    }
+			    gather_buffer[bufPos++] = count;
+			    noBytes -= count - 1;
+			}
+		    }
+
+		    /* Remember the number of (compressed) bytes of input we
+		     * obtained */
+		    dataSources[i].length += noBytes;
+		}
+	    }
+	}
+
+	/* Check if there is more input available on any of the sources */
+	moreSources = 0;
+	FD_ZERO(&fds);
+	for (i = 0; dataSources[i].path != NULL; i++) {
+	    if (dataSources[i].pipe != NULL) {
+		FD_SET(dataSources[i].pipeFD, &fds);
+		moreSources = 1;
+	    }
+	}
+    }
+
+    if( dbgfp ) {
+	fprintf(dbgfp, "Got %d bytes, usefulness = %d\n", bufPos, usefulness);
+	fflush(dbgfp);
+    }
+    *nbytes = bufPos;
+    return usefulness;
+}
+
+/****************
+ * Start the gatherer process which writes messages of
+ * type GATHERER_MSG to pipedes
+ */
+static void
+start_gatherer( int pipefd )
+{
+    FILE *dbgfp = NULL;
+    int dbgall;
+
+    {
+	const char *s = getenv("GNUPG_RNDUNIX_DBG");
+	if( s ) {
+	    dbgfp = (*s=='-' && !s[1])? stdout : fopen(s, "a");
+	    if( !dbgfp )
+		log_info("can't open debug file `%s': %s\n",
+			     s, strerror(errno) );
+	    else
+		fprintf(dbgfp,"\nSTART RNDUNIX DEBUG pid=%d\n", (int)getpid());
+	}
+	dbgall = !!getenv("GNUPG_RNDUNIX_DBGALL");
+    }
+    /* close all files but the ones we need */
+    {	int nmax, n1, n2, i;
+#ifdef _SC_OPEN_MAX
+	if( (nmax=sysconf( _SC_OPEN_MAX )) < 0 ) {
+#ifdef _POSIX_OPEN_MAX
+	    nmax = _POSIX_OPEN_MAX;
+#else
+	    nmax = 20; /* assume a reasonable value */
+#endif
+	}
+#else /*!_SC_OPEN_MAX*/
+	nmax = 20; /* assume a reasonable value */
+#endif /*!_SC_OPEN_MAX*/
+	n1 = fileno( stderr );
+	n2 = dbgfp? fileno( dbgfp ) : -1;
+	for(i=0; i < nmax; i++ ) {
+	    if( i != n1 && i != n2 && i != pipefd )
+		close(i);
+	}
+	errno = 0;
+    }
+
+
+    /* Set up the buffer.  Not ethat we use a plain standard malloc here. */
+    gather_buffer_size = GATHER_BUFSIZE;
+    gather_buffer = malloc( gather_buffer_size );
+    if( !gather_buffer ) {
+	log_error("out of core while allocating the gatherer buffer\n");
+	exit(2);
+    }
+
+    /* Reset the SIGC(H)LD handler to the system default.  This is necessary
+     * because if the program which cryptlib is a part of installs its own
+     * SIGC(H)LD handler, it will end up reaping the cryptlib children before
+     * cryptlib can.  As a result, my_pclose() will call waitpid() on a
+     * process which has already been reaped by the installed handler and
+     * return an error, so the read data won't be added to the randomness
+     * pool.  There are two types of SIGC(H)LD naming, the SysV SIGCLD and
+     * the BSD/Posix SIGCHLD, so we need to handle either possibility */
+#ifdef SIGCLD
+    signal(SIGCLD, SIG_DFL);
+#else
+    signal(SIGCHLD, SIG_DFL);
+#endif
+
+    fclose(stderr);		/* Arrghh!!  It's Stuart code!! */
+
+    for(;;) {
+	GATHER_MSG msg;
+	size_t nbytes;
+	const char *p;
+
+	msg.usefulness = slow_poll( dbgfp, dbgall, &nbytes );
+	p = gather_buffer;
+	while( nbytes ) {
+	    msg.ndata = nbytes > sizeof(msg.data)? sizeof(msg.data) : nbytes;
+	    memcpy( msg.data, p, msg.ndata );
+	    nbytes -= msg.ndata;
+	    p += msg.ndata;
+
+	    while( write( pipefd, &msg, sizeof(msg) ) != sizeof(msg) ) {
+		if( errno == EINTR )
+		    continue;
+		if( errno == EAGAIN ) {
+		    struct timeval tv;
+		    tv.tv_sec = 0;
+		    tv.tv_usec = 50000;
+		    select(0, NULL, NULL, NULL, &tv);
+		    continue;
+		}
+		if( errno == EPIPE ) /* parent has exited, so give up */
+		   exit(0);
+
+		/* we can't do very much here because stderr is closed */
+		if( dbgfp )
+		    fprintf(dbgfp, "gatherer can't write to pipe: %s\n",
+				    strerror(errno) );
+		/* we start a new poll to give the system some time */
+		nbytes = 0;
+		break;
+	    }
+	}
+    }
+    /* we are killed when the parent dies */
+}
+
+
+static int
+read_a_msg( int fd, GATHER_MSG *msg )
+{
+    char *buffer = (char*)msg;
+    size_t length = sizeof( *msg );
+    int n;
+
+    do {
+	do {
+	    n = read(fd, buffer, length );
+	} while( n == -1 && errno == EINTR );
+	if( n == -1 )
+	    return -1;
+	buffer += n;
+	length -= n;
+    } while( length );
+    return 0;
+}
+
+
+/****************
+ * Using a level of 0 should never block and better add nothing
+ * to the pool.  So this is just a dummy for this gatherer.
+ */
+int
+_gcry_rndunix_gather_random (void (*add)(const void*, size_t,
+                                         enum random_origins),
+                             enum random_origins origin,
+                             size_t length, int level )
+{
+    static pid_t gatherer_pid = 0;
+    static int pipedes[2];
+    GATHER_MSG msg;
+    size_t n;
+
+    if( !level )
+	return 0;
+
+    if( !gatherer_pid ) {
+	/* Make sure we are not setuid. */
+	if ( getuid() != geteuid() )
+	    BUG();
+	/* time to start the gatherer process */
+	if( pipe( pipedes ) ) {
+	    log_error("pipe() failed: %s\n", strerror(errno));
+	    return -1;
+	}
+	gatherer_pid = fork();
+	if( gatherer_pid == -1 ) {
+	    log_error("can't for gatherer process: %s\n", strerror(errno));
+	    return -1;
+	}
+	if( !gatherer_pid ) {
+	    start_gatherer( pipedes[1] );
+	    /* oops, can't happen */
+	    return -1;
+	}
+    }
+
+    /* now read from the gatherer */
+    while( length ) {
+	int goodness;
+	ulong subtract;
+
+	if( read_a_msg( pipedes[0], &msg ) ) {
+	    log_error("reading from gatherer pipe failed: %s\n",
+							    strerror(errno));
+	    return -1;
+	}
+
+
+	if( level > 1 ) {
+	    if( msg.usefulness > 30 )
+		goodness = 100;
+	    else if ( msg.usefulness )
+		goodness = msg.usefulness * 100 / 30;
+	    else
+		goodness = 0;
+	}
+	else if( level ) {
+	    if( msg.usefulness > 15 )
+		goodness = 100;
+	    else if ( msg.usefulness )
+		goodness = msg.usefulness * 100 / 15;
+	    else
+		goodness = 0;
+	}
+	else
+	    goodness = 100; /* goodness of level 0 is always 100 % */
+
+	n = msg.ndata;
+	if( n > length )
+	    n = length;
+	(*add)( msg.data, n, origin );
+
+	/* this is the trick how we cope with the goodness */
+	subtract = (ulong)n * goodness / 100;
+	/* subtract at least 1 byte to avoid infinite loops */
+	length -= subtract ? subtract : 1;
+    }
+
+    return 0;
+}
diff --git a/plugins/MirOTR/libgcrypt-1.4.6/random/rndw32.c b/plugins/MirOTR/libgcrypt-1.4.6/random/rndw32.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..55b7256aba
--- /dev/null
+++ b/plugins/MirOTR/libgcrypt-1.4.6/random/rndw32.c
@@ -0,0 +1,981 @@
+/* rndw32.c  -  W32 entropy gatherer
+ * Copyright (C) 1999, 2000, 2002, 2003, 2007 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
+ * Copyright Peter Gutmann, Matt Thomlinson and Blake Coverett 1996-2006
+ *
+ * This file is part of Libgcrypt.
+ *
+ *************************************************************************
+ * The code here is based on code from Cryptlib 3.0 beta by Peter Gutmann.
+ * Source file misc/rndwin32.c "Win32 Randomness-Gathering Code" with this
+ * copyright notice:
+ *
+ * This module is part of the cryptlib continuously seeded pseudorandom
+ * number generator.  For usage conditions, see lib_rand.c
+ *
+ * [Here is the notice from lib_rand.c, which is now called dev_sys.c]
+ *
+ * This module and the misc/rnd*.c modules represent the cryptlib
+ * continuously seeded pseudorandom number generator (CSPRNG) as described in
+ * my 1998 Usenix Security Symposium paper "The generation of random numbers
+ * for cryptographic purposes".
+ *
+ * The CSPRNG code is copyright Peter Gutmann (and various others) 1996,
+ * 1997, 1998, 1999, all rights reserved.  Redistribution of the CSPRNG
+ * modules and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification,
+ * are permitted provided that the following conditions are met:
+ *
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice
+ *    and this permission notice in its entirety.
+ *
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the copyright notice in
+ *    the documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * 3. A copy of any bugfixes or enhancements made must be provided to the
+ *    author, <pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz> to allow them to be added to the
+ *    baseline version of the code.
+ *
+ * ALTERNATIVELY, the code may be distributed under the terms of the
+ * GNU Lesser General Public License, version 2.1 or any later version
+ * published by the Free Software Foundation, in which case the
+ * provisions of the GNU LGPL are required INSTEAD OF the above
+ * restrictions.
+ *
+ * Although not required under the terms of the LGPL, it would still
+ * be nice if you could make any changes available to the author to
+ * allow a consistent code base to be maintained.
+ *************************************************************************
+ * The above alternative was changed from GPL to LGPL on 2007-08-22 with
+ * permission from Peter Gutmann:
+ *==========
+ From: pgut001 <pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz>
+ Subject: Re: LGPL for the windows entropy gatherer
+ To: wk@gnupg.org
+ Date: Wed, 22 Aug 2007 03:05:42 +1200
+
+ Hi,
+
+ >As of now libgcrypt is GPL under Windows due to that module and some people
+ >would really like to see it under LGPL too.  Can you do such a license change
+ >to LGPL version 2?  Note that LGPL give the user the option to relicense it
+ >under GPL, so the change would be pretty easy and backwar compatible.
+
+ Sure.  I assumed that since GPG was GPLd, you'd prefer the GPL for the entropy
+ code as well, but Ian asked for LGPL as an option so as of the next release
+ I'll have LGPL in there.  You can consider it to be retroactive, so your
+ current version will be LGPLd as well.
+
+ Peter.
+ *==========
+ */
+
+#include <config.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#ifdef __GNUC__  
+#include <stdint.h>
+#endif
+
+#include <winsock2.h>
+#include <windows.h>
+
+
+#include "types.h"
+#include "g10lib.h"
+#include "rand-internal.h"
+
+
+/* Definitions which are missing from the current GNU Windows32Api.  */
+#ifndef IOCTL_DISK_PERFORMANCE
+#define IOCTL_DISK_PERFORMANCE  0x00070020
+#endif
+
+/* This used to be (6*8+5*4+8*2), but Peter Gutmann figured a larger
+   value in a newer release. So we use a far larger value. */
+#define SIZEOF_DISK_PERFORMANCE_STRUCT 256
+
+/* We don't include wincrypt.h so define it here.  */
+#define HCRYPTPROV  HANDLE
+
+
+/* When we query the performance counters, we allocate an initial buffer and
+ * then reallocate it as required until RegQueryValueEx() stops returning
+ * ERROR_MORE_DATA.  The following values define the initial buffer size and
+ * step size by which the buffer is increased
+ */
+#define PERFORMANCE_BUFFER_SIZE         65536   /* Start at 64K */
+#define PERFORMANCE_BUFFER_STEP         16384   /* Step by 16K */
+
+
+/* The number of bytes to read from the system RNG on each slow poll.  */
+#define SYSTEMRNG_BYTES 64
+
+/* Intel Chipset CSP type and name */
+#define PROV_INTEL_SEC  22
+#define INTEL_DEF_PROV  "Intel Hardware Cryptographic Service Provider"
+
+
+
+
+/* Type definitions for function pointers to call NetAPI32 functions.  */
+typedef DWORD (WINAPI *NETSTATISTICSGET)(LPWSTR szServer, LPWSTR szService,
+                                         DWORD dwLevel, DWORD dwOptions,
+                                         LPBYTE *lpBuffer);
+typedef DWORD (WINAPI *NETAPIBUFFERSIZE)(LPVOID lpBuffer, LPDWORD cbBuffer);
+typedef DWORD (WINAPI *NETAPIBUFFERFREE)(LPVOID lpBuffer);
+
+/* Type definitions for function pointers to call native NT functions.  */
+typedef DWORD (WINAPI *NTQUERYSYSTEMINFORMATION)(DWORD systemInformationClass,
+                                                 PVOID systemInformation,
+                                                 ULONG systemInformationLength,
+                                                 PULONG returnLength);
+typedef DWORD (WINAPI *NTQUERYINFORMATIONPROCESS)
+     (HANDLE processHandle, DWORD processInformationClass,
+      PVOID processInformation, ULONG processInformationLength,
+      PULONG returnLength);
+typedef DWORD (WINAPI *NTPOWERINFORMATION)
+     (DWORD powerInformationClass, PVOID inputBuffer,
+      ULONG inputBufferLength, PVOID outputBuffer, ULONG outputBufferLength );
+
+/* Type definitions for function pointers to call CryptoAPI functions. */
+typedef BOOL (WINAPI *CRYPTACQUIRECONTEXT)(HCRYPTPROV *phProv,
+                                           LPCTSTR pszContainer,
+                                           LPCTSTR pszProvider, 
+                                           DWORD dwProvType,
+                                           DWORD dwFlags);
+typedef BOOL (WINAPI *CRYPTGENRANDOM)(HCRYPTPROV hProv, DWORD dwLen,
+                                      BYTE *pbBuffer);
+typedef BOOL (WINAPI *CRYPTRELEASECONTEXT)(HCRYPTPROV hProv, DWORD dwFlags);
+
+/* Somewhat alternative functionality available as a direct call, for 
+   Windows XP and newer.  This is the CryptoAPI RNG, which isn't anywhere
+   near as good as the HW RNG, but we use it if it's present on the basis
+   that at least it can't make things any worse.  This direct access version 
+   is only available under Windows XP, we don't go out of our way to access
+   the more general CryptoAPI one since the main purpose of using it is to 
+   take advantage of any possible future hardware RNGs that may be added, 
+   for example via TCPA devices.  */
+typedef BOOL (WINAPI *RTLGENRANDOM)(PVOID RandomBuffer, 
+                                    ULONG RandomBufferLength);
+
+
+
+/* MBM data structures, originally by Alexander van Kaam, converted to C by
+   Anders@Majland.org, finally updated by Chris Zahrt <techn0@iastate.edu> */
+#define BusType         char
+#define SMBType         char
+#define SensorType      char
+
+typedef struct 
+{
+  SensorType iType;               /* Type of sensor.  */
+  int Count;                      /* Number of sensor for that type.  */
+} SharedIndex;
+
+typedef struct 
+{
+  SensorType ssType;              /* Type of sensor */
+  unsigned char ssName[12];       /* Name of sensor */
+  char sspadding1[3];             /* Padding of 3 bytes */
+  double ssCurrent;               /* Current value */
+  double ssLow;                   /* Lowest readout */
+  double ssHigh;                  /* Highest readout */
+  long ssCount;                   /* Total number of readout */
+  char sspadding2[4];             /* Padding of 4 bytes */
+  long double ssTotal;            /* Total amout of all readouts */
+  char sspadding3[6];             /* Padding of 6 bytes */
+  double ssAlarm1;                /* Temp & fan: high alarm; voltage: % off */
+  double ssAlarm2;                /* Temp: low alarm */
+} SharedSensor;
+
+typedef struct
+{
+  short siSMB_Base;               /* SMBus base address */
+  BusType siSMB_Type;             /* SMBus/Isa bus used to access chip */
+  SMBType siSMB_Code;             /* SMBus sub type, Intel, AMD or ALi */
+  char siSMB_Addr;                /* Address of sensor chip on SMBus */
+  unsigned char siSMB_Name[41];   /* Nice name for SMBus */
+  short siISA_Base;               /* ISA base address of sensor chip on ISA */
+  int siChipType;                 /* Chip nr, connects with Chipinfo.ini */
+  char siVoltageSubType;          /* Subvoltage option selected */
+} SharedInfo;
+
+typedef struct
+{
+  double sdVersion;               /* Version number (example: 51090) */
+  SharedIndex sdIndex[10];        /* Sensor index */
+  SharedSensor sdSensor[100];     /* Sensor info */
+  SharedInfo sdInfo;              /* Misc.info */
+  unsigned char sdStart[41];      /* Start time */
+
+  /* We don't use the next two fields both because they're not random
+     and because it provides a nice safety margin in case of data size
+     mis- estimates (we always under-estimate the buffer size).  */
+#if 0
+  unsigned char sdCurrent[41];    /* Current time */
+  unsigned char sdPath[256];      /* MBM path */
+#endif /*0*/
+} SharedData;
+
+
+
+/* One time intialized handles and function pointers.  We use dynamic
+   loading of the DLLs to do without them in case libgcrypt does not
+   need any random.  */
+static HANDLE hNetAPI32;
+static NETSTATISTICSGET pNetStatisticsGet;
+static NETAPIBUFFERSIZE pNetApiBufferSize;
+static NETAPIBUFFERFREE pNetApiBufferFree;
+
+static HANDLE hNTAPI;
+static NTQUERYSYSTEMINFORMATION  pNtQuerySystemInformation;
+static NTQUERYINFORMATIONPROCESS pNtQueryInformationProcess;
+static NTPOWERINFORMATION        pNtPowerInformation;
+
+static HANDLE hAdvAPI32;
+static CRYPTACQUIRECONTEXT pCryptAcquireContext;
+static CRYPTGENRANDOM      pCryptGenRandom;
+static CRYPTRELEASECONTEXT pCryptReleaseContext;
+static RTLGENRANDOM        pRtlGenRandom;
+
+
+/* Other module global variables.  */
+static int system_rng_available; /* Whether a system RNG is available.  */
+static HCRYPTPROV hRNGProv;      /* Handle to Intel RNG CSP. */
+
+static int debug_me;  /* Debug flag.  */
+
+static int system_is_w2000;     /* True if running on W2000.  */
+
+
+
+
+/* Try and connect to the system RNG if there's one present. */
+static void 
+init_system_rng (void)
+{
+  system_rng_available = 0;
+  hRNGProv = NULL;
+
+  hAdvAPI32 = GetModuleHandle ("AdvAPI32.dll");
+  if (!hAdvAPI32)
+    return;
+
+  pCryptAcquireContext = (CRYPTACQUIRECONTEXT)
+    GetProcAddress (hAdvAPI32, "CryptAcquireContextA");
+  pCryptGenRandom = (CRYPTGENRANDOM)
+    GetProcAddress (hAdvAPI32, "CryptGenRandom");
+  pCryptReleaseContext = (CRYPTRELEASECONTEXT)
+    GetProcAddress (hAdvAPI32, "CryptReleaseContext");
+  
+  /* Get a pointer to the native randomness function if it's available.  
+     This isn't exported by name, so we have to get it by ordinal.  */
+  pRtlGenRandom = (RTLGENRANDOM)
+    GetProcAddress (hAdvAPI32, "SystemFunction036");
+
+  /* Try and connect to the PIII RNG CSP.  The AMD 768 southbridge (from 
+     the 760 MP chipset) also has a hardware RNG, but there doesn't appear 
+     to be any driver support for this as there is for the Intel RNG so we 
+     can't do much with it.  OTOH the Intel RNG is also effectively dead 
+     as well, mostly due to virtually nonexistant support/marketing by 
+     Intel, it's included here mostly for form's sake.  */
+  if ( (!pCryptAcquireContext || !pCryptGenRandom || !pCryptReleaseContext
+        || !pCryptAcquireContext (&hRNGProv, NULL, INTEL_DEF_PROV,
+                                  PROV_INTEL_SEC, 0) )
+       && !pRtlGenRandom)
+    {
+      hAdvAPI32 = NULL;
+    }
+  else
+    system_rng_available = 1;
+}
+
+
+/* Read data from the system RNG if availavle.  */
+static void 
+read_system_rng (void (*add)(const void*, size_t, enum random_origins),
+                 enum random_origins requester)
+{
+  BYTE buffer[ SYSTEMRNG_BYTES + 8 ];
+  int quality = 0;
+
+  if (!system_rng_available)
+    return;
+
+  /* Read SYSTEMRNG_BYTES bytes from the system RNG.  We don't rely on
+     this for all our randomness requirements (particularly the
+     software RNG) in case it's broken in some way.  */
+  if (hRNGProv)
+    {
+      if (pCryptGenRandom (hRNGProv, SYSTEMRNG_BYTES, buffer))
+        quality = 80;
+    }
+  else if (pRtlGenRandom)
+    {
+      if ( pRtlGenRandom (buffer, SYSTEMRNG_BYTES))
+        quality = 50;
+    }
+  if (quality > 0)
+    {
+      if (debug_me)
+        log_debug ("rndw32#read_system_rng: got %d bytes of quality %d\n",
+                   SYSTEMRNG_BYTES, quality);
+      (*add) (buffer, SYSTEMRNG_BYTES, requester);
+      wipememory (buffer, SYSTEMRNG_BYTES);
+    }
+}
+
+
+/* Read data from MBM.  This communicates via shared memory, so all we
+   need to do is map a file and read the data out.  */
+static void
+read_mbm_data (void (*add)(const void*, size_t, enum random_origins), 
+               enum random_origins requester)
+{
+  HANDLE hMBMData;
+  SharedData *mbmDataPtr;
+
+  hMBMData = OpenFileMapping (FILE_MAP_READ, FALSE, "$M$B$M$5$S$D$" );
+  if (hMBMData)
+    {
+      mbmDataPtr = (SharedData*)MapViewOfFile (hMBMData, FILE_MAP_READ,0,0,0);
+      if (mbmDataPtr)
+        {
+          if (debug_me)
+            log_debug ("rndw32#read_mbm_data: got %d bytes\n",
+                       (int)sizeof (SharedData));
+          (*add) (mbmDataPtr, sizeof (SharedData), requester);
+          UnmapViewOfFile (mbmDataPtr);
+        }
+      CloseHandle (hMBMData);
+    }
+}
+
+
+/* Fallback method using the registry to poll the statistics.  */
+static void
+registry_poll (void (*add)(const void*, size_t, enum random_origins), 
+               enum random_origins requester)
+{
+  static int cbPerfData = PERFORMANCE_BUFFER_SIZE;
+  int iterations;
+  DWORD dwSize, status;
+  PERF_DATA_BLOCK *pPerfData;
+
+  /* Get information from the system performance counters.  This can take a
+     few seconds to do.  In some environments the call to RegQueryValueEx()
+     can produce an access violation at some random time in the future, in
+     some cases adding a short delay after the following code block makes
+     the problem go away.  This problem is extremely difficult to
+     reproduce, I haven't been able to get it to occur despite running it
+     on a number of machines.  MS knowledge base article Q178887 covers
+     this type of problem, it's typically caused by an external driver or
+     other program that adds its own values under the
+     HKEY_PERFORMANCE_DATA key.  The NT kernel, via Advapi32.dll, calls the
+     required external module to map in the data inside an SEH try/except
+     block, so problems in the module's collect function don't pop up until
+     after it has finished, so the fault appears to occur in Advapi32.dll.
+     There may be problems in the NT kernel as well though, a low-level
+     memory checker indicated that ExpandEnvironmentStrings() in
+     Kernel32.dll, called an interminable number of calls down inside
+     RegQueryValueEx(), was overwriting memory (it wrote twice the
+     allocated size of a buffer to a buffer allocated by the NT kernel).
+     OTOH this could be coming from the external module calling back into
+     the kernel, which eventually causes the problem described above.
+
+     Possibly as an extension of the problem that the krnlWaitSemaphore()
+     call above works around, running two instances of cryptlib (e.g. two
+     applications that use it) under NT4 can result in one of them hanging
+     in the RegQueryValueEx() call.  This happens only under NT4 and is
+     hard to reproduce in any consistent manner.
+
+     One workaround that helps a bit is to read the registry as a remote
+     (rather than local) registry, it's possible that the use of a network
+     RPC call isolates the calling app from the problem in that whatever
+     service handles the RPC is taking the hit and not affecting the
+     calling app.  Since this would require another round of extensive
+     testing to verify and the NT native API call is working fine, we'll
+     stick with the native API call for now.
+
+     Some versions of NT4 had a problem where the amount of data returned
+     was mis-reported and would never settle down, because of this the code
+     below includes a safety-catch that bails out after 10 attempts have
+     been made, this results in no data being returned but at does ensure
+     that the thread will terminate.
+
+     In addition to these problems the code in RegQueryValueEx() that
+     estimates the amount of memory required to return the performance
+     counter information isn't very accurate (it's much worse than the
+     "slightly-inaccurate" level that the MS docs warn about, it's usually
+     wildly off) since it always returns a worst-case estimate which is
+     usually nowhere near the actual amount required.  For example it may
+     report that 128K of memory is required, but only return 64K of data.
+
+     Even worse than the registry-based performance counters is the
+     performance data helper (PDH) shim that tries to make the counters
+     look like the old Win16 API (which is also used by Win95).  Under NT
+     this can consume tens of MB of memory and huge amounts of CPU time
+     while it gathers its data, and even running once can still consume
+     about 1/2MB of memory */
+  pPerfData = gcry_xmalloc (cbPerfData);
+  for (iterations=0; iterations < 10; iterations++)
+    {
+      dwSize = cbPerfData;
+      if ( debug_me )
+        log_debug ("rndw32#slow_gatherer_nt: get perf data\n" );
+
+      status = RegQueryValueEx (HKEY_PERFORMANCE_DATA, "Global", NULL,
+                                NULL, (LPBYTE) pPerfData, &dwSize);
+      if (status == ERROR_SUCCESS)
+        {
+          if (!memcmp (pPerfData->Signature, L"PERF", 8))
+            (*add) ( pPerfData, dwSize, requester );
+          else
+            log_debug ("rndw32: no PERF signature\n");
+          break;
+        }
+      else if (status == ERROR_MORE_DATA)
+        {
+          cbPerfData += PERFORMANCE_BUFFER_STEP;
+          pPerfData = gcry_xrealloc (pPerfData, cbPerfData);
+        }
+      else
+        {
+          static int been_here;
+
+          /* Silence the error message.  In particular under Wine (as
+             of 2008) we would get swamped with such diagnotiscs.  One
+             such diagnotiscs should be enough.  */
+          if (been_here != status)
+            {
+              been_here = status;
+              log_debug ("rndw32: get performance data problem: ec=%ld\n",
+                         status);
+            }
+          break;
+        }
+    }
+  gcry_free (pPerfData);
+
+  /* Although this isn't documented in the Win32 API docs, it's necessary
+     to explicitly close the HKEY_PERFORMANCE_DATA key after use (it's
+     implicitly opened on the first call to RegQueryValueEx()).  If this
+     isn't done then any system components which provide performance data
+     can't be removed or changed while the handle remains active.  */
+  RegCloseKey (HKEY_PERFORMANCE_DATA);
+}
+
+
+static void
+slow_gatherer ( void (*add)(const void*, size_t, enum random_origins), 
+                enum random_origins requester )
+{
+  static int is_initialized = 0;
+  static int is_workstation = 1;
+  HANDLE hDevice;
+  DWORD dwType, dwSize, dwResult;
+  ULONG ulSize;
+  int drive_no, status;
+  int no_results = 0;
+  void *buffer;
+
+  if ( !is_initialized )
+    {
+      HKEY hKey;
+
+      if ( debug_me )
+        log_debug ("rndw32#slow_gatherer: init toolkit\n" );
+      /* Find out whether this is an NT server or workstation if necessary */
+      if (RegOpenKeyEx (HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE,
+                        "SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\ProductOptions",
+                        0, KEY_READ, &hKey) == ERROR_SUCCESS)
+        {
+          BYTE szValue[32 + 8];
+          dwSize = 32;
+
+          if ( debug_me )
+            log_debug ("rndw32#slow_gatherer: check product options\n" );
+
+          status = RegQueryValueEx (hKey, "ProductType", 0, NULL,
+                                    szValue, &dwSize);
+          if (status == ERROR_SUCCESS && stricmp (szValue, "WinNT"))
+            {
+              /* Note: There are (at least) three cases for ProductType:
+                 WinNT = NT Workstation, ServerNT = NT Server, LanmanNT =
+                 NT Server acting as a Domain Controller.  */
+              is_workstation = 0;
+              if ( debug_me )
+                log_debug ("rndw32: this is a NT server\n");
+            }
+          RegCloseKey (hKey);
+        }
+
+      /* The following are fixed for the lifetime of the process so we
+         only add them once */
+      /* readPnPData ();  - we have not implemented that.  */
+
+      /* Initialize the NetAPI32 function pointers if necessary */
+      hNetAPI32 = LoadLibrary ("NETAPI32.DLL");
+      if (hNetAPI32)
+        {
+          if (debug_me)
+            log_debug ("rndw32#slow_gatherer: netapi32 loaded\n" );
+          pNetStatisticsGet = (NETSTATISTICSGET)
+            GetProcAddress (hNetAPI32, "NetStatisticsGet");
+          pNetApiBufferSize = (NETAPIBUFFERSIZE)
+            GetProcAddress (hNetAPI32, "NetApiBufferSize");
+          pNetApiBufferFree = (NETAPIBUFFERFREE)
+            GetProcAddress (hNetAPI32, "NetApiBufferFree");
+
+          if (!pNetStatisticsGet || !pNetApiBufferSize || !pNetApiBufferFree)
+            {
+              FreeLibrary (hNetAPI32);
+              hNetAPI32 = NULL;
+              log_debug ("rndw32: No NETAPI found\n" );
+            }
+        }
+
+      /* Initialize the NT kernel native API function pointers if necessary */
+      hNTAPI = GetModuleHandle ("NTDll.dll");
+      if (hNTAPI)
+        {
+          /* Get a pointer to the NT native information query functions */
+          pNtQuerySystemInformation = (NTQUERYSYSTEMINFORMATION)
+            GetProcAddress (hNTAPI, "NtQuerySystemInformation");
+          pNtQueryInformationProcess = (NTQUERYINFORMATIONPROCESS)
+            GetProcAddress (hNTAPI, "NtQueryInformationProcess");
+          pNtPowerInformation = (NTPOWERINFORMATION)
+            GetProcAddress(hNTAPI, "NtPowerInformation");
+
+          if (!pNtQuerySystemInformation || !pNtQueryInformationProcess)
+            hNTAPI = NULL;
+        }
+
+
+      is_initialized = 1;
+    }
+  
+  read_system_rng ( add, requester );
+  read_mbm_data ( add, requester );
+  
+  /* Get network statistics.    Note: Both NT Workstation and NT Server by
+     default will be running both the workstation and server services.  The
+     heuristic below is probably useful though on the assumption that the
+     majority of the network traffic will be via the appropriate service.
+     In any case the network statistics return almost no randomness.  */
+  {
+    LPBYTE lpBuffer;
+    
+    if (hNetAPI32
+        && !pNetStatisticsGet (NULL,
+                               is_workstation ? L"LanmanWorkstation" :
+                               L"LanmanServer", 0, 0, &lpBuffer))
+      {
+        if ( debug_me )
+          log_debug ("rndw32#slow_gatherer: get netstats\n" );
+        pNetApiBufferSize (lpBuffer, &dwSize);
+        (*add) ( lpBuffer, dwSize, requester );
+        pNetApiBufferFree (lpBuffer);
+      }
+  }
+
+  /* Get disk I/O statistics for all the hard drives.  100 is an
+     arbitrary failsafe limit.  */
+  for (drive_no = 0; drive_no < 100 ; drive_no++)
+    {
+      char diskPerformance[SIZEOF_DISK_PERFORMANCE_STRUCT + 8];
+      char szDevice[50];
+      
+      /* Check whether we can access this device.  */
+      snprintf (szDevice, sizeof szDevice, "\\\\.\\PhysicalDrive%d",
+                drive_no);
+      hDevice = CreateFile (szDevice, 0, FILE_SHARE_READ | FILE_SHARE_WRITE,
+                            NULL, OPEN_EXISTING, 0, NULL);
+      if (hDevice == INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE)
+        break; /* No more drives.  */
+        
+      /* Note: This only works if you have turned on the disk performance
+         counters with 'diskperf -y'.  These counters are off by default. */
+      dwSize = sizeof diskPerformance;
+      if (DeviceIoControl (hDevice, IOCTL_DISK_PERFORMANCE, NULL, 0,
+                           diskPerformance, SIZEOF_DISK_PERFORMANCE_STRUCT,
+                           &dwSize, NULL))
+        {
+          if ( debug_me )
+            log_debug ("rndw32#slow_gatherer: iostat drive %d\n",
+                       drive_no);
+          (*add) (diskPerformance, dwSize, requester);
+        }
+      else
+        {
+          log_info ("NOTE: you should run 'diskperf -y' "
+                    "to enable the disk statistics\n");
+        }
+      CloseHandle (hDevice);
+    }
+
+  /* In theory we should be using the Win32 performance query API to obtain
+     unpredictable data from the system, however this is so unreliable (see
+     the multiple sets of comments in registryPoll()) that it's too risky
+     to rely on it except as a fallback in emergencies.  Instead, we rely
+     mostly on the NT native API function NtQuerySystemInformation(), which
+     has the dual advantages that it doesn't have as many (known) problems
+     as the Win32 equivalent and that it doesn't access the data indirectly
+     via pseudo-registry keys, which means that it's much faster.  Note
+     that the Win32 equivalent actually works almost all of the time, the
+     problem is that on one or two systems it can fail in strange ways that
+     are never the same and can't be reproduced on any other system, which
+     is why we use the native API here.  Microsoft officially documented
+     this function in early 2003, so it'll be fairly safe to use.  */
+  if ( !hNTAPI )
+    {
+      registry_poll (add, requester);
+      return;
+    }
+
+
+  /* Scan the first 64 possible information types (we don't bother with
+     increasing the buffer size as we do with the Win32 version of the
+     performance data read, we may miss a few classes but it's no big deal).
+     This scan typically yields around 20 pieces of data, there's nothing
+     in the range 65...128 so chances are there won't be anything above
+     there either.  */
+  buffer = gcry_xmalloc (PERFORMANCE_BUFFER_SIZE);
+  for (dwType = 0; dwType < 64; dwType++)
+    {
+      switch (dwType)
+        {
+          /* ID 17 = SystemObjectInformation hangs on some win2k systems.  */
+        case 17:
+          if (system_is_w2000)
+            continue;
+          break;
+
+          /* Some information types are write-only (the IDs are shared with
+             a set-information call), we skip these.  */
+        case 26: case 27: case 38: case 46: case 47: case 48: case 52:
+          continue;
+
+          /* ID 53 = SystemSessionProcessInformation reads input from the
+             output buffer, which has to contain a session ID and pointer
+             to the actual buffer in which to store the session information.
+             Because this isn't a standard query, we skip this.  */
+        case  53:
+          continue;
+        }
+
+      /* Query the info for this ID.  Some results (for example for
+         ID = 6, SystemCallCounts) are only available in checked builds
+         of the kernel.  A smaller subcless of results require that
+         certain system config flags be set, for example
+         SystemObjectInformation requires that the
+         FLG_MAINTAIN_OBJECT_TYPELIST be set in NtGlobalFlags.  To avoid
+         having to special-case all of these, we try reading each one and
+         only use those for which we get a success status.  */
+      dwResult = pNtQuerySystemInformation (dwType, buffer,
+                                            PERFORMANCE_BUFFER_SIZE - 2048,
+                                            &ulSize);
+      if (dwResult != ERROR_SUCCESS)
+        continue;
+
+      /* Some calls (e.g. ID = 23, SystemProcessorStatistics, and ID = 24,
+         SystemDpcInformation) incorrectly return a length of zero, so we
+         manually adjust the length to the correct value.  */
+      if ( !ulSize )
+        {
+          if (dwType == 23)
+            ulSize = 6 * sizeof (ULONG);
+          else if (dwType == 24)
+            ulSize = 5 * sizeof (ULONG);
+        }
+
+      /* If we got some data back, add it to the entropy pool.  */
+      if (ulSize > 0 && ulSize <= PERFORMANCE_BUFFER_SIZE - 2048)
+        {
+          if (debug_me)
+            log_debug ("rndw32#slow_gatherer: %lu bytes from sysinfo %ld\n",
+                       ulSize, dwType);
+          (*add) (buffer, ulSize, requester);
+          no_results++;
+        }
+    }
+
+  /* Now we would do the same for the process information.  This
+     call would rather ugly in that it requires an exact length
+     match for the data returned, failing with a
+     STATUS_INFO_LENGTH_MISMATCH error code (0xC0000004) if the
+     length isn't an exact match.  It requires a compiler to handle
+     complex nested structs, alignment issues, and so on, and
+     without the headers in which the entries are declared it's
+     almost impossible to do.  Thus we don't.  */
+
+
+  /* Finally, do the same for the system power status information.  There
+     are only a limited number of useful information types available so we
+     restrict ourselves to the useful types.  In addition since this
+     function doesn't return length information, we have to hardcode in
+     length data.  */
+  if (pNtPowerInformation)
+    {
+      static const struct { int type; int size; } powerInfo[] = {
+        { 0, 128 },     /* SystemPowerPolicyAc */
+        { 1, 128 },     /* SystemPowerPolicyDc */
+        { 4, 64 },      /* SystemPowerCapabilities */
+        { 5, 48 },      /* SystemBatteryState */
+        { 11, 48 },     /* ProcessorInformation */
+        { 12, 24 },     /* SystemPowerInformation */
+        { -1, -1 }
+      };
+      int i;
+
+      /* The 100 is a failsafe limit.  */
+      for (i = 0; powerInfo[i].type != -1 && i < 100; i++ )
+        {
+          /* Query the info for this ID */
+          dwResult = pNtPowerInformation (powerInfo[i].type, NULL, 0, buffer,
+                                          PERFORMANCE_BUFFER_SIZE - 2048);
+          if (dwResult != ERROR_SUCCESS)
+            continue;
+          if (debug_me)
+            log_debug ("rndw32#slow_gatherer: %u bytes from powerinfo %d\n",
+                       powerInfo[i].size, i);
+          (*add) (buffer, powerInfo[i].size, requester);
+          no_results++;
+        }
+      gcry_assert (i < 100);
+    }
+  gcry_free (buffer);
+
+  /* We couldn't get enough results from the kernel, fall back to the
+     somewhat troublesome registry poll.  */
+  if (no_results < 15)
+    registry_poll (add, requester);
+}
+
+
+int
+_gcry_rndw32_gather_random (void (*add)(const void*, size_t,
+                                        enum random_origins),
+                            enum random_origins origin,
+                            size_t length, int level )
+{
+  static int is_initialized;
+
+  if (!level)
+    return 0;
+
+  /* We don't differentiate between level 1 and 2 here because there
+     is no internal entropy pool as a scary resource.  It may all work
+     slower, but because our entropy source will never block but
+     deliver some not easy to measure entropy, we assume level 2.  */
+
+  if (!is_initialized)
+    {
+      OSVERSIONINFO osvi = { sizeof( osvi ) };
+
+      GetVersionEx( &osvi );
+      if ( osvi.dwPlatformId != VER_PLATFORM_WIN32_NT)
+        log_fatal ("can only run on a Windows NT platform\n" );
+      system_is_w2000 = (osvi.dwMajorVersion == 5 && osvi.dwMinorVersion == 0);
+      init_system_rng ();
+      is_initialized = 1;
+    }
+
+  if (debug_me)
+    log_debug ("rndw32#gather_random: ori=%d len=%u lvl=%d\n",
+               origin, (unsigned int)length, level );
+
+  slow_gatherer (add, origin);
+
+  return 0;
+}
+
+
+
+void
+_gcry_rndw32_gather_random_fast (void (*add)(const void*, size_t,
+                                             enum random_origins),
+                                 enum random_origins origin)
+{
+  static int addedFixedItems = 0;
+
+  if ( debug_me )
+    log_debug ("rndw32#gather_random_fast: ori=%d\n", origin );
+
+  /* Get various basic pieces of system information: Handle of active
+     window, handle of window with mouse capture, handle of clipboard
+     owner handle of start of clpboard viewer list, pseudohandle of
+     current process, current process ID, pseudohandle of current
+     thread, current thread ID, handle of desktop window, handle of
+     window with keyboard focus, whether system queue has any events,
+     cursor position for last message, 1 ms time for last message,
+     handle of window with clipboard open, handle of process heap,
+     handle of procs window station, types of events in input queue,
+     and milliseconds since Windows was started.  */
+
+  {
+    byte buffer[20*sizeof(ulong)], *bufptr;
+
+    bufptr = buffer;
+#define ADD(f)  do { ulong along = (ulong)(f);                  \
+                     memcpy (bufptr, &along, sizeof (along) );  \
+                     bufptr += sizeof (along);                  \
+                   } while (0)
+
+    ADD ( GetActiveWindow ());
+    ADD ( GetCapture ());
+    ADD ( GetClipboardOwner ());
+    ADD ( GetClipboardViewer ());
+    ADD ( GetCurrentProcess ());
+    ADD ( GetCurrentProcessId ());
+    ADD ( GetCurrentThread ());
+    ADD ( GetCurrentThreadId ());
+    ADD ( GetDesktopWindow ());
+    ADD ( GetFocus ());
+    ADD ( GetInputState ());
+    ADD ( GetMessagePos ());
+    ADD ( GetMessageTime ());
+    ADD ( GetOpenClipboardWindow ());
+    ADD ( GetProcessHeap ());
+    ADD ( GetProcessWindowStation ());
+    ADD ( GetQueueStatus (QS_ALLEVENTS));
+    ADD ( GetTickCount ());
+
+    gcry_assert ( bufptr-buffer < sizeof (buffer) );
+    (*add) ( buffer, bufptr-buffer, origin );
+#undef ADD
+  }
+
+  /* Get multiword system information: Current caret position, current
+     mouse cursor position.  */
+  {
+    POINT point;
+
+    GetCaretPos (&point);
+    (*add) ( &point, sizeof (point), origin );
+    GetCursorPos (&point);
+    (*add) ( &point, sizeof (point), origin );
+  }
+
+  /* Get percent of memory in use, bytes of physical memory, bytes of
+     free physical memory, bytes in paging file, free bytes in paging
+     file, user bytes of address space, and free user bytes.  */
+  {
+    MEMORYSTATUS memoryStatus;
+
+    memoryStatus.dwLength = sizeof (MEMORYSTATUS);
+    GlobalMemoryStatus (&memoryStatus);
+    (*add) ( &memoryStatus, sizeof (memoryStatus), origin );
+  }
+
+  /* Get thread and process creation time, exit time, time in kernel
+     mode, and time in user mode in 100ns intervals.  */
+  {
+    HANDLE handle;
+    FILETIME creationTime, exitTime, kernelTime, userTime;
+    SIZE_T minimumWorkingSetSize, maximumWorkingSetSize;
+
+    handle = GetCurrentThread ();
+    GetThreadTimes (handle, &creationTime, &exitTime,
+                    &kernelTime, &userTime);
+    (*add) ( &creationTime, sizeof (creationTime), origin );
+    (*add) ( &exitTime, sizeof (exitTime), origin );
+    (*add) ( &kernelTime, sizeof (kernelTime), origin );
+    (*add) ( &userTime, sizeof (userTime), origin );
+
+    handle = GetCurrentProcess ();
+    GetProcessTimes (handle, &creationTime, &exitTime,
+                     &kernelTime, &userTime);
+    (*add) ( &creationTime, sizeof (creationTime), origin );
+    (*add) ( &exitTime, sizeof (exitTime), origin );
+    (*add) ( &kernelTime, sizeof (kernelTime), origin );
+    (*add) ( &userTime, sizeof (userTime), origin );
+
+    /* Get the minimum and maximum working set size for the current
+       process.  */
+    GetProcessWorkingSetSize (handle, &minimumWorkingSetSize,
+                              &maximumWorkingSetSize);
+    (*add) ( &minimumWorkingSetSize,
+             sizeof (minimumWorkingSetSize), origin );
+    (*add) ( &maximumWorkingSetSize,
+             sizeof (maximumWorkingSetSize), origin );
+  }
+
+
+  /* The following are fixed for the lifetime of the process so we only
+   * add them once */
+  if (!addedFixedItems)
+    {
+      STARTUPINFO startupInfo;
+
+      /* Get name of desktop, console window title, new window
+         position and size, window flags, and handles for stdin,
+         stdout, and stderr.  */
+      startupInfo.cb = sizeof (STARTUPINFO);
+      GetStartupInfo (&startupInfo);
+      (*add) ( &startupInfo, sizeof (STARTUPINFO), origin );
+      addedFixedItems = 1;
+    }
+
+  /* The performance of QPC varies depending on the architecture it's
+     running on and on the OS, the MS documentation is vague about the
+     details because it varies so much.  Under Win9x/ME it reads the
+     1.193180 MHz PIC timer.  Under NT/Win2K/XP it may or may not read the
+     64-bit TSC depending on the HAL and assorted other circumstances,
+     generally on machines with a uniprocessor HAL
+     KeQueryPerformanceCounter() uses a 3.579545MHz timer and on machines
+     with a multiprocessor or APIC HAL it uses the TSC (the exact time
+     source is controlled by the HalpUse8254 flag in the kernel).  That
+     choice of time sources is somewhat peculiar because on a
+     multiprocessor machine it's theoretically possible to get completely
+     different TSC readings depending on which CPU you're currently
+     running on, while for uniprocessor machines it's not a problem.
+     However, the kernel appears to synchronise the TSCs across CPUs at
+     boot time (it resets the TSC as part of its system init), so this
+     shouldn't really be a problem.  Under WinCE it's completely platform-
+     dependant, if there's no hardware performance counter available, it
+     uses the 1ms system timer.
+     
+     Another feature of the TSC (although it doesn't really affect us here)
+     is that mobile CPUs will turn off the TSC when they idle, Pentiums
+     will change the rate of the counter when they clock-throttle (to
+     match the current CPU speed), and hyperthreading Pentiums will turn
+     it off when both threads are idle (this more or less makes sense,
+     since the CPU will be in the halted state and not executing any
+     instructions to count).
+     
+     To make things unambiguous, we detect a CPU new enough to call RDTSC
+     directly by checking for CPUID capabilities, and fall back to QPC if
+     this isn't present.  */
+#ifdef __GNUC__  
+/*   FIXME: We would need to implement the CPU feature tests first.  */
+/*   if (cpu_has_feature_rdtsc) */
+/*     { */
+/*       uint32_t lo, hi; */
+      /* We cannot use "=A", since this would use %rax on x86_64. */
+/*       __asm__ __volatile__ ("rdtsc" : "=a" (lo), "=d" (hi)); */
+      /* Ignore high 32 bits, hwich are >1s res.  */
+/*       (*add) (&lo, 4, origin ); */
+/*     } */
+/*   else */
+#endif /*!__GNUC__*/
+    {
+      LARGE_INTEGER performanceCount;
+      
+      if (QueryPerformanceCounter (&performanceCount))
+        {
+          if ( debug_me )
+          log_debug ("rndw32#gather_random_fast: perf data\n");
+          (*add) (&performanceCount, sizeof (performanceCount), origin);
+        }
+      else
+        {
+          /* Millisecond accuracy at best... */
+          DWORD aword = GetTickCount ();
+          (*add) (&aword, sizeof (aword), origin );
+        }
+    }
+
+
+}