diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'plugins/MirOTR/libotr/src/sm.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | plugins/MirOTR/libotr/src/sm.c | 929 |
1 files changed, 929 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/plugins/MirOTR/libotr/src/sm.c b/plugins/MirOTR/libotr/src/sm.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..535ae2243c --- /dev/null +++ b/plugins/MirOTR/libotr/src/sm.c @@ -0,0 +1,929 @@ +/* + * Off-the-Record Messaging library + * Copyright (C) 2004-2008 Ian Goldberg, Chris Alexander, Nikita Borisov + * <otr@cypherpunks.ca> + * + * This library is free software; you can redistribute it and/or + * modify it under the terms of version 2.1 of the GNU Lesser General + * Public License as published by the Free Software Foundation. + * + * This library is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, + * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of + * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU + * Lesser General Public License for more details. + * + * You should have received a copy of the GNU Lesser General Public + * License along with this library; if not, write to the Free Software + * Foundation, Inc., 59 Temple Place, Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307 USA + */ + +/* system headers */ +#include <stdlib.h> +#include <stdio.h> +#include <sys/types.h> + +/* libgcrypt headers */ +#include <gcrypt.h> + +/* libotr headers */ +#include "sm.h" +#include "serial.h" + +static const int SM_MSG1_LEN = 6; +static const int SM_MSG2_LEN = 11; +static const int SM_MSG3_LEN = 8; +static const int SM_MSG4_LEN = 3; + +/* The modulus p */ +static const char* SM_MODULUS_S = "0x" + "FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFC90FDAA22168C234C4C6628B80DC1CD1" + "29024E088A67CC74020BBEA63B139B22514A08798E3404DD" + "EF9519B3CD3A431B302B0A6DF25F14374FE1356D6D51C245" + "E485B576625E7EC6F44C42E9A637ED6B0BFF5CB6F406B7ED" + "EE386BFB5A899FA5AE9F24117C4B1FE649286651ECE45B3D" + "C2007CB8A163BF0598DA48361C55D39A69163FA8FD24CF5F" + "83655D23DCA3AD961C62F356208552BB9ED529077096966D" + "670C354E4ABC9804F1746C08CA237327FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF"; +/* The order of the group q = (p-1)/2 */ +static const char* SM_ORDER_S = "0x" + "7FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFE487ED5110B4611A62633145C06E0E68" + "948127044533E63A0105DF531D89CD9128A5043CC71A026E" + "F7CA8CD9E69D218D98158536F92F8A1BA7F09AB6B6A8E122" + "F242DABB312F3F637A262174D31BF6B585FFAE5B7A035BF6" + "F71C35FDAD44CFD2D74F9208BE258FF324943328F6722D9E" + "E1003E5C50B1DF82CC6D241B0E2AE9CD348B1FD47E9267AF" + "C1B2AE91EE51D6CB0E3179AB1042A95DCF6A9483B84B4B36" + "B3861AA7255E4C0278BA36046511B993FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF"; +static const char *SM_GENERATOR_S = "0x02"; +static const int SM_MOD_LEN_BITS = 1536; +static const int SM_MOD_LEN_BYTES = 192; + +static gcry_mpi_t SM_MODULUS = NULL; +static gcry_mpi_t SM_GENERATOR = NULL; +static gcry_mpi_t SM_ORDER = NULL; +static gcry_mpi_t SM_MODULUS_MINUS_2 = NULL; + +/* + * Call this once, at plugin load time. It sets up the modulus and + * generator MPIs. + */ +void otrl_sm_init(void) +{ + gcry_check_version(NULL); + gcry_mpi_scan(&SM_MODULUS, GCRYMPI_FMT_HEX, SM_MODULUS_S, 0, NULL); + gcry_mpi_scan(&SM_ORDER, GCRYMPI_FMT_HEX, SM_ORDER_S, 0, NULL); + gcry_mpi_scan(&SM_GENERATOR, GCRYMPI_FMT_HEX, SM_GENERATOR_S, + 0, NULL); + SM_MODULUS_MINUS_2 = gcry_mpi_new(SM_MOD_LEN_BITS); + gcry_mpi_sub_ui(SM_MODULUS_MINUS_2, SM_MODULUS, 2); +} + +/* + * Initialize the fields of a SM state. + */ +void otrl_sm_state_new(OtrlSMState *smst) +{ + smst->secret = NULL; + smst->x2 = NULL; + smst->x3 = NULL; + smst->g1 = NULL; + smst->g2 = NULL; + smst->g3 = NULL; + smst->g3o = NULL; + smst->p = NULL; + smst->q = NULL; + smst->pab = NULL; + smst->qab = NULL; + smst->nextExpected = OTRL_SMP_EXPECT1; + smst->received_question = 0; + smst->sm_prog_state = OTRL_SMP_PROG_OK; +} + +/* + * Initialize the fields of a SM state. Called the first time that + * a user begins an SMP session. + */ +void otrl_sm_state_init(OtrlSMState *smst) +{ + otrl_sm_state_free(smst); + smst->secret = gcry_mpi_new(SM_MOD_LEN_BITS); + smst->x2 = NULL; + smst->x3 = NULL; + smst->g1 = gcry_mpi_copy(SM_GENERATOR); + smst->g2 = gcry_mpi_new(SM_MOD_LEN_BITS); + smst->g3 = gcry_mpi_new(SM_MOD_LEN_BITS); + smst->g3o = gcry_mpi_new(SM_MOD_LEN_BITS); + smst->p = gcry_mpi_new(SM_MOD_LEN_BITS); + smst->q = gcry_mpi_new(SM_MOD_LEN_BITS); + smst->pab = gcry_mpi_new(SM_MOD_LEN_BITS); + smst->qab = gcry_mpi_new(SM_MOD_LEN_BITS); + smst->received_question = 0; + smst->sm_prog_state = OTRL_SMP_PROG_OK; +} + +/* + * Initialize the fields of a SM message1. + * [0] = g2a, [1] = c2, [2] = d2, [3] = g3a, [4] = c3, [5] = d3 + */ +void otrl_sm_msg1_init(gcry_mpi_t **msg1) +{ + gcry_mpi_t *msg = malloc(SM_MSG1_LEN * sizeof(gcry_mpi_t)); + msg[0] = gcry_mpi_new(SM_MOD_LEN_BITS); + msg[1] = NULL; + msg[2] = gcry_mpi_new(SM_MOD_LEN_BITS); + msg[3] = gcry_mpi_new(SM_MOD_LEN_BITS); + msg[4] = NULL; + msg[5] = gcry_mpi_new(SM_MOD_LEN_BITS); + + *msg1 = msg; +} + +/* + * Initialize the fields of a SM message2. + * [0] = g2b, [1] = c2, [2] = d2, [3] = g3b, [4] = c3, [5] = d3 + * [6] = pb, [7] = qb, [8] = cp, [9] = d5, [10] = d6 + */ +void otrl_sm_msg2_init(gcry_mpi_t **msg2) +{ + gcry_mpi_t *msg = malloc(SM_MSG2_LEN * sizeof(gcry_mpi_t)); + msg[0] = gcry_mpi_new(SM_MOD_LEN_BITS); + msg[1] = NULL; + msg[2] = gcry_mpi_new(SM_MOD_LEN_BITS); + msg[3] = gcry_mpi_new(SM_MOD_LEN_BITS); + msg[4] = NULL; + msg[5] = gcry_mpi_new(SM_MOD_LEN_BITS); + msg[6] = gcry_mpi_new(SM_MOD_LEN_BITS); + msg[7] = gcry_mpi_new(SM_MOD_LEN_BITS); + msg[8] = NULL; + msg[9] = gcry_mpi_new(SM_MOD_LEN_BITS); + msg[10] = gcry_mpi_new(SM_MOD_LEN_BITS); + + *msg2 = msg; +} + +/* + * Initialize the fields of a SM message3. + * [0] = pa, [1] = qa, [2] = cp, [3] = d5, [4] = d6, [5] = ra, + * [6] = cr, [7] = d7 + */ +void otrl_sm_msg3_init(gcry_mpi_t **msg3) +{ + gcry_mpi_t *msg = malloc(SM_MSG3_LEN * sizeof(gcry_mpi_t)); + msg[0] = gcry_mpi_new(SM_MOD_LEN_BITS); + msg[1] = gcry_mpi_new(SM_MOD_LEN_BITS); + msg[2] = NULL; + msg[3] = gcry_mpi_new(SM_MOD_LEN_BITS); + msg[4] = gcry_mpi_new(SM_MOD_LEN_BITS); + msg[5] = gcry_mpi_new(SM_MOD_LEN_BITS); + msg[6] = NULL; + msg[7] = gcry_mpi_new(SM_MOD_LEN_BITS); + + *msg3 = msg; +} + +/* + * Initialize the fields of a SM message4. + * [0] = rb, [1] = cr, [2] = d7 + */ +void otrl_sm_msg4_init(gcry_mpi_t **msg4) +{ + gcry_mpi_t *msg = malloc(SM_MSG4_LEN * sizeof(gcry_mpi_t)); + msg[0] = gcry_mpi_new(SM_MOD_LEN_BITS); + msg[1] = NULL; + msg[2] = gcry_mpi_new(SM_MOD_LEN_BITS); + + *msg4 = msg; +} + +/* + * Deallocate the contents of a OtrlSMState (but not the OtrlSMState + * itself) + */ +void otrl_sm_state_free(OtrlSMState *smst) +{ + gcry_mpi_release(smst->secret); + gcry_mpi_release(smst->x2); + gcry_mpi_release(smst->x3); + gcry_mpi_release(smst->g1); + gcry_mpi_release(smst->g2); + gcry_mpi_release(smst->g3); + gcry_mpi_release(smst->g3o); + gcry_mpi_release(smst->p); + gcry_mpi_release(smst->q); + gcry_mpi_release(smst->pab); + gcry_mpi_release(smst->qab); + otrl_sm_state_new(smst); +} + +/* + * Deallocate the contents of a message + */ +void otrl_sm_msg_free(gcry_mpi_t **message, int msglen) +{ + gcry_mpi_t *msg = *message; + int i; + for (i=0; i<msglen; i++) { + gcry_mpi_release(msg[i]); + } + free(msg); + *message = NULL; +} + +static gcry_mpi_t randomExponent(void) +{ + unsigned char *secbuf = NULL; + gcry_mpi_t randexpon = NULL; + + /* Generate a random exponent */ + secbuf = gcry_random_bytes_secure(SM_MOD_LEN_BYTES, GCRY_STRONG_RANDOM); + gcry_mpi_scan(&randexpon, GCRYMPI_FMT_USG, secbuf, SM_MOD_LEN_BYTES, NULL); + gcry_free(secbuf); + + return randexpon; +} + +/* + * Hash one or two mpis. To hash only one mpi, b may be set to NULL. + */ +static gcry_error_t otrl_sm_hash(gcry_mpi_t* hash, int version, + const gcry_mpi_t a, const gcry_mpi_t b) +{ + unsigned char* input; + unsigned char output[SM_DIGEST_SIZE]; + size_t sizea; + size_t sizeb; + size_t totalsize; + unsigned char* dataa; + unsigned char* datab; + + gcry_mpi_aprint(GCRYMPI_FMT_USG, &dataa, &sizea, a); + totalsize = 1 + 4 + sizea; + if (b) { + gcry_mpi_aprint(GCRYMPI_FMT_USG, &datab, &sizeb, b); + totalsize += 4 + sizeb; + } else { + sizeb = 0; + } + + input = malloc(totalsize); + input[0] = (unsigned char)version; + input[1] = (unsigned char)((sizea >> 24) & 0xFF); + input[2] = (unsigned char)((sizea >> 16) & 0xFF); + input[3] = (unsigned char)((sizea >> 8) & 0xFF); + input[4] = (unsigned char)(sizea & 0xFF); + memmove(input + 5, dataa, sizea); + if (b) { + input[5 + sizea] = (unsigned char)((sizeb >> 24) & 0xFF); + input[6 + sizea] = (unsigned char)((sizeb >> 16) & 0xFF); + input[7 + sizea] = (unsigned char)((sizeb >> 8) & 0xFF); + input[8 + sizea] = (unsigned char)(sizeb & 0xFF); + memmove(input + 9 + sizea, datab, sizeb); + } + + gcry_md_hash_buffer(SM_HASH_ALGORITHM, output, input, totalsize); + gcry_mpi_scan(hash, GCRYMPI_FMT_USG, output, SM_DIGEST_SIZE, NULL); + free(input); + input = NULL; + + /* free memory */ + gcry_free(dataa); + if (b) gcry_free(datab); + + return gcry_error(GPG_ERR_NO_ERROR); +} + +/* This method should be passed a pointer to an uninitialized buffer, + * and a list of mpis with a list length. When returns, the buffer will + * point to newly-allocated memory (using malloc) containing a + * reversible serialization. */ +static gcry_error_t serialize_mpi_array(unsigned char **buffer, int *buflen, + unsigned int count, gcry_mpi_t *mpis) +{ + size_t totalsize = 0, lenp, nextsize; + unsigned int i, j; + size_t *list_sizes = malloc(count * sizeof(size_t)); + unsigned char **tempbuffer = malloc(count * sizeof(unsigned char *)); + unsigned char *bufp; + + for (i=0; i<count; i++) { + gcry_mpi_aprint(GCRYMPI_FMT_USG, &(tempbuffer[i]), &(list_sizes[i]), + mpis[i]); + totalsize += list_sizes[i]; + } + + *buflen = (count+1)*4 + totalsize; + *buffer = malloc(*buflen * sizeof(char)); + + bufp = *buffer; + lenp = totalsize; + + write_int(count); + for(i=0; i<count; i++) + { + nextsize = list_sizes[i]; + write_int(nextsize); + + for(j=0; j<nextsize; j++) + bufp[j] = tempbuffer[i][j]; + + bufp += nextsize; + lenp -= nextsize; + gcry_free(tempbuffer[i]); + } + free(tempbuffer); + free(list_sizes); + + return gcry_error(GPG_ERR_NO_ERROR); +} + +/* Takes a buffer containing serialized and concatenated mpis + * and converts it to an array of gcry_mpi_t structs. + * The buffer is assumed to consist of a 4-byte int containing the + * number of mpis in the array, followed by {size, data} pairs for + * each mpi. If malformed, method returns GCRY_ERROR_INV_VALUE */ +static gcry_error_t unserialize_mpi_array(gcry_mpi_t **mpis, + unsigned int expcount, const unsigned char *buffer, const int buflen) +{ + int i; + int lenp = buflen; + unsigned int thecount = 0; + const unsigned char* bufp = buffer; + *mpis = NULL; + + read_int(thecount); + if (thecount != expcount) goto invval; + + *mpis = malloc(thecount * sizeof(gcry_mpi_t)); + + for (i=0; i<thecount; i++) { + (*mpis)[i] = NULL; + } + + for (i=0; i<thecount; i++) { + read_mpi((*mpis)[i]); + } + + return gcry_error(GPG_ERR_NO_ERROR); + +invval: + if (*mpis) { + for (i=0; i<thecount; i++) { + gcry_mpi_release((*mpis)[i]); + } + free(*mpis); + *mpis = NULL; + } + return gcry_error(GPG_ERR_INV_VALUE); +} + +/* Check that an MPI is in the right range to be a (non-unit) group + * element */ +static int check_group_elem(gcry_mpi_t g) +{ + if (gcry_mpi_cmp_ui(g, 2) < 0 || + gcry_mpi_cmp(g, SM_MODULUS_MINUS_2) > 0) { + return 1; + } + return 0; +} + +/* Check that an MPI is in the right range to be a (non-zero) exponent */ +static int check_expon(gcry_mpi_t x) +{ + if (gcry_mpi_cmp_ui(x, 1) < 0 || + gcry_mpi_cmp(x, SM_ORDER) >= 0) { + return 1; + } + return 0; +} + +/* + * Proof of knowledge of a discrete logarithm + */ +static gcry_error_t otrl_sm_proof_know_log(gcry_mpi_t *c, gcry_mpi_t *d, const gcry_mpi_t g, const gcry_mpi_t x, int version) +{ + gcry_mpi_t r = randomExponent(); + gcry_mpi_t temp = gcry_mpi_new(SM_MOD_LEN_BITS); + gcry_mpi_powm(temp, g, r, SM_MODULUS); + otrl_sm_hash(c, version, temp, NULL); + gcry_mpi_mulm(temp, x, *c, SM_ORDER); + gcry_mpi_subm(*d, r, temp, SM_ORDER); + gcry_mpi_release(temp); + gcry_mpi_release(r); + + return gcry_error(GPG_ERR_NO_ERROR); +} + +/* + * Verify a proof of knowledge of a discrete logarithm. Checks that c = h(g^d x^c) + */ +static int otrl_sm_check_know_log(const gcry_mpi_t c, const gcry_mpi_t d, const gcry_mpi_t g, const gcry_mpi_t x, int version) +{ + int comp; + + gcry_mpi_t gd = gcry_mpi_new(SM_MOD_LEN_BITS); /* g^d */ + gcry_mpi_t xc = gcry_mpi_new(SM_MOD_LEN_BITS); /* x^c */ + gcry_mpi_t gdxc = gcry_mpi_new(SM_MOD_LEN_BITS); /* (g^d x^c) */ + gcry_mpi_t hgdxc = NULL; /* h(g^d x^c) */ + + gcry_mpi_powm(gd, g, d, SM_MODULUS); + gcry_mpi_powm(xc, x, c, SM_MODULUS); + gcry_mpi_mulm(gdxc, gd, xc, SM_MODULUS); + otrl_sm_hash(&hgdxc, version, gdxc, NULL); + + comp = gcry_mpi_cmp(hgdxc, c); + gcry_mpi_release(gd); + gcry_mpi_release(xc); + gcry_mpi_release(gdxc); + gcry_mpi_release(hgdxc); + + return comp; +} + +/* + * Proof of knowledge of coordinates with first components being equal + */ +static gcry_error_t otrl_sm_proof_equal_coords(gcry_mpi_t *c, gcry_mpi_t *d1, gcry_mpi_t *d2, const OtrlSMState *state, const gcry_mpi_t r, int version) +{ + gcry_mpi_t r1 = randomExponent(); + gcry_mpi_t r2 = randomExponent(); + gcry_mpi_t temp1 = gcry_mpi_new(SM_MOD_LEN_BITS); + gcry_mpi_t temp2 = gcry_mpi_new(SM_MOD_LEN_BITS); + + /* Compute the value of c, as c = h(g3^r1, g1^r1 g2^r2) */ + gcry_mpi_powm(temp1, state->g1, r1, SM_MODULUS); + gcry_mpi_powm(temp2, state->g2, r2, SM_MODULUS); + gcry_mpi_mulm(temp2, temp1, temp2, SM_MODULUS); + gcry_mpi_powm(temp1, state->g3, r1, SM_MODULUS); + otrl_sm_hash(c, version, temp1, temp2); + + /* Compute the d values, as d1 = r1 - r c, d2 = r2 - secret c */ + gcry_mpi_mulm(temp1, r, *c, SM_ORDER); + gcry_mpi_subm(*d1, r1, temp1, SM_ORDER); + + gcry_mpi_mulm(temp1, state->secret, *c, SM_ORDER); + gcry_mpi_subm(*d2, r2, temp1, SM_ORDER); + + /* All clear */ + gcry_mpi_release(r1); + gcry_mpi_release(r2); + gcry_mpi_release(temp1); + gcry_mpi_release(temp2); + return gcry_error(GPG_ERR_NO_ERROR); +} + +/* + * Verify a proof of knowledge of coordinates with first components being equal + */ +static gcry_error_t otrl_sm_check_equal_coords(const gcry_mpi_t c, const gcry_mpi_t d1, const gcry_mpi_t d2, const gcry_mpi_t p, const gcry_mpi_t q, const OtrlSMState *state, int version) +{ + int comp; + + gcry_mpi_t temp1 = gcry_mpi_new(SM_MOD_LEN_BITS); + gcry_mpi_t temp2 = gcry_mpi_new(SM_MOD_LEN_BITS); + gcry_mpi_t temp3 = gcry_mpi_new(SM_MOD_LEN_BITS); + gcry_mpi_t cprime = NULL; + + /* To verify, we test that hash(g3^d1 * p^c, g1^d1 * g2^d2 * q^c) = c + * If indeed c = hash(g3^r1, g1^r1 g2^r2), d1 = r1 - r*c, + * d2 = r2 - secret*c. And if indeed p = g3^r, q = g1^r * g2^secret + * Then we should have that: + * hash(g3^d1 * p^c, g1^d1 * g2^d2 * q^c) + * = hash(g3^(r1 - r*c + r*c), g1^(r1 - r*c + q*c) * + * g2^(r2 - secret*c + secret*c)) + * = hash(g3^r1, g1^r1 g2^r2) + * = c + */ + gcry_mpi_powm(temp2, state->g3, d1, SM_MODULUS); + gcry_mpi_powm(temp3, p, c, SM_MODULUS); + gcry_mpi_mulm(temp1, temp2, temp3, SM_MODULUS); + + gcry_mpi_powm(temp2, state->g1, d1, SM_MODULUS); + gcry_mpi_powm(temp3, state->g2, d2, SM_MODULUS); + gcry_mpi_mulm(temp2, temp2, temp3, SM_MODULUS); + gcry_mpi_powm(temp3, q, c, SM_MODULUS); + gcry_mpi_mulm(temp2, temp3, temp2, SM_MODULUS); + + otrl_sm_hash(&cprime, version, temp1, temp2); + + comp = gcry_mpi_cmp(c, cprime); + gcry_mpi_release(temp1); + gcry_mpi_release(temp2); + gcry_mpi_release(temp3); + gcry_mpi_release(cprime); + + return comp; +} + +/* + * Proof of knowledge of logs with exponents being equal + */ +static gcry_error_t otrl_sm_proof_equal_logs(gcry_mpi_t *c, gcry_mpi_t *d, OtrlSMState *state, int version) +{ + gcry_mpi_t r = randomExponent(); + gcry_mpi_t temp1 = gcry_mpi_new(SM_MOD_LEN_BITS); + gcry_mpi_t temp2 = gcry_mpi_new(SM_MOD_LEN_BITS); + + /* Compute the value of c, as c = h(g1^r, (Qa/Qb)^r) */ + gcry_mpi_powm(temp1, state->g1, r, SM_MODULUS); + gcry_mpi_powm(temp2, state->qab, r, SM_MODULUS); + otrl_sm_hash(c, version, temp1, temp2); + + /* Compute the d values, as d = r - x3 c */ + gcry_mpi_mulm(temp1, state->x3, *c, SM_ORDER); + gcry_mpi_subm(*d, r, temp1, SM_ORDER); + + /* All clear */ + gcry_mpi_release(r); + gcry_mpi_release(temp1); + gcry_mpi_release(temp2); + return gcry_error(GPG_ERR_NO_ERROR); +} + +/* + * Verify a proof of knowledge of logs with exponents being equal + */ +static gcry_error_t otrl_sm_check_equal_logs(const gcry_mpi_t c, const gcry_mpi_t d, const gcry_mpi_t r, const OtrlSMState *state, int version) +{ + int comp; + + gcry_mpi_t temp1 = gcry_mpi_new(SM_MOD_LEN_BITS); + gcry_mpi_t temp2 = gcry_mpi_new(SM_MOD_LEN_BITS); + gcry_mpi_t temp3 = gcry_mpi_new(SM_MOD_LEN_BITS); + gcry_mpi_t cprime = NULL; + + /* Here, we recall the exponents used to create g3. + * If we have previously seen g3o = g1^x where x is unknown + * during the DH exchange to produce g3, then we may proceed with: + * + * To verify, we test that hash(g1^d * g3o^c, qab^d * r^c) = c + * If indeed c = hash(g1^r1, qab^r1), d = r1- x * c + * And if indeed r = qab^x + * Then we should have that: + * hash(g1^d * g3o^c, qab^d r^c) + * = hash(g1^(r1 - x*c + x*c), qab^(r1 - x*c + x*c)) + * = hash(g1^r1, qab^r1) + * = c + */ + gcry_mpi_powm(temp2, state->g1, d, SM_MODULUS); + gcry_mpi_powm(temp3, state->g3o, c, SM_MODULUS); + gcry_mpi_mulm(temp1, temp2, temp3, SM_MODULUS); + + gcry_mpi_powm(temp3, state->qab, d, SM_MODULUS); + gcry_mpi_powm(temp2, r, c, SM_MODULUS); + gcry_mpi_mulm(temp2, temp3, temp2, SM_MODULUS); + + otrl_sm_hash(&cprime, version, temp1, temp2); + + comp = gcry_mpi_cmp(c, cprime); + gcry_mpi_release(temp1); + gcry_mpi_release(temp2); + gcry_mpi_release(temp3); + gcry_mpi_release(cprime); + + return comp; +} + +/* Create first message in SMP exchange. Input is Alice's secret value + * which this protocol aims to compare to Bob's. Output is a serialized + * mpi array whose elements correspond to the following: + * [0] = g2a, Alice's half of DH exchange to determine g2 + * [1] = c2, [2] = d2, Alice's ZK proof of knowledge of g2a exponent + * [3] = g3a, Alice's half of DH exchange to determine g3 + * [4] = c3, [5] = d3, Alice's ZK proof of knowledge of g3a exponent */ +gcry_error_t otrl_sm_step1(OtrlSMAliceState *astate, + const unsigned char* secret, int secretlen, + unsigned char** output, int* outputlen) +{ + /* Initialize the sm state or update the secret */ + gcry_mpi_t secret_mpi = NULL; + gcry_mpi_t *msg1; + + *output = NULL; + *outputlen = 0; + + gcry_mpi_scan(&secret_mpi, GCRYMPI_FMT_USG, secret, secretlen, NULL); + + if (! astate->g1) { + otrl_sm_state_init(astate); + } + gcry_mpi_set(astate->secret, secret_mpi); + gcry_mpi_release(secret_mpi); + astate->received_question = 0; + + otrl_sm_msg1_init(&msg1); + + astate->x2 = randomExponent(); + astate->x3 = randomExponent(); + + gcry_mpi_powm(msg1[0], astate->g1, astate->x2, SM_MODULUS); + otrl_sm_proof_know_log(&(msg1[1]), &(msg1[2]), astate->g1, astate->x2, 1); + + gcry_mpi_powm(msg1[3], astate->g1, astate->x3, SM_MODULUS); + otrl_sm_proof_know_log(&(msg1[4]), &(msg1[5]), astate->g1, astate->x3, 2); + + serialize_mpi_array(output, outputlen, SM_MSG1_LEN, msg1); + otrl_sm_msg_free(&msg1, SM_MSG1_LEN); + astate->sm_prog_state = OTRL_SMP_PROG_OK; + return gcry_error(GPG_ERR_NO_ERROR); +} + +/* Receive the first message in SMP exchange, which was generated by + * otrl_sm_step1. Input is saved until the user inputs their secret + * information. No output. */ +gcry_error_t otrl_sm_step2a(OtrlSMBobState *bstate, const unsigned char* input, const int inputlen, int received_question) +{ + gcry_mpi_t *msg1; + gcry_error_t err; + + /* Initialize the sm state if needed */ + if (! bstate->g1) { + otrl_sm_state_init(bstate); + } + bstate->received_question = received_question; + bstate->sm_prog_state = OTRL_SMP_PROG_CHEATED; + + /* Read from input to find the mpis */ + err = unserialize_mpi_array(&msg1, SM_MSG1_LEN, input, inputlen); + + if (err != gcry_error(GPG_ERR_NO_ERROR)) return err; + + if (check_group_elem(msg1[0]) || check_expon(msg1[2]) || + check_group_elem(msg1[3]) || check_expon(msg1[5])) { + return gcry_error(GPG_ERR_INV_VALUE); + } + + /* Store Alice's g3a value for later in the protocol */ + gcry_mpi_set(bstate->g3o, msg1[3]); + + /* Verify Alice's proofs */ + if (otrl_sm_check_know_log(msg1[1], msg1[2], bstate->g1, msg1[0], 1) || + otrl_sm_check_know_log(msg1[4], msg1[5], bstate->g1, msg1[3], 2)) { + return gcry_error(GPG_ERR_INV_VALUE); + } + + /* Create Bob's half of the generators g2 and g3 */ + bstate->x2 = randomExponent(); + bstate->x3 = randomExponent(); + + /* Combine the two halves from Bob and Alice and determine g2 and g3 */ + gcry_mpi_powm(bstate->g2, msg1[0], bstate->x2, SM_MODULUS); + gcry_mpi_powm(bstate->g3, msg1[3], bstate->x3, SM_MODULUS); + + bstate->sm_prog_state = OTRL_SMP_PROG_OK; + return gcry_error(GPG_ERR_NO_ERROR); +} + +/* Create second message in SMP exchange. Input is Bob's secret value. + * Information from earlier steps in the exchange is taken from Bob's + * state. Output is a serialized mpi array whose elements correspond + * to the following: + * [0] = g2b, Bob's half of DH exchange to determine g2 + * [1] = c2, [2] = d2, Bob's ZK proof of knowledge of g2b exponent + * [3] = g3b, Bob's half of DH exchange to determine g3 + * [4] = c3, [5] = d3, Bob's ZK proof of knowledge of g3b exponent + * [6] = pb, [7] = qb, Bob's halves of the (Pa/Pb) and (Qa/Qb) values + * [8] = cp, [9] = d5, [10] = d6, Bob's ZK proof that pb, qb formed correctly */ +gcry_error_t otrl_sm_step2b(OtrlSMBobState *bstate, const unsigned char* secret, int secretlen, unsigned char **output, int* outputlen) +{ + /* Convert the given secret to the proper form and store it */ + gcry_mpi_t r, qb1, qb2; + gcry_mpi_t *msg2; + gcry_mpi_t secret_mpi = NULL; + + *output = NULL; + *outputlen = 0; + + gcry_mpi_scan(&secret_mpi, GCRYMPI_FMT_USG, secret, secretlen, NULL); + gcry_mpi_set(bstate->secret, secret_mpi); + gcry_mpi_release(secret_mpi); + + otrl_sm_msg2_init(&msg2); + + gcry_mpi_powm(msg2[0], bstate->g1, bstate->x2, SM_MODULUS); + otrl_sm_proof_know_log(&(msg2[1]), &(msg2[2]), bstate->g1, bstate->x2, 3); + + gcry_mpi_powm(msg2[3], bstate->g1, bstate->x3, SM_MODULUS); + otrl_sm_proof_know_log(&(msg2[4]), &(msg2[5]), bstate->g1, bstate->x3, 4); + + /* Calculate P and Q values for Bob */ + r = randomExponent(); + qb1 = gcry_mpi_new(SM_MOD_LEN_BITS); + qb2 = gcry_mpi_new(SM_MOD_LEN_BITS); + gcry_mpi_powm(bstate->p, bstate->g3, r, SM_MODULUS); + gcry_mpi_set(msg2[6], bstate->p); + gcry_mpi_powm(qb1, bstate->g1, r, SM_MODULUS); + gcry_mpi_powm(qb2, bstate->g2, bstate->secret, SM_MODULUS); + gcry_mpi_mulm(bstate->q, qb1, qb2, SM_MODULUS); + gcry_mpi_set(msg2[7], bstate->q); + + otrl_sm_proof_equal_coords(&(msg2[8]), &(msg2[9]), &(msg2[10]), bstate, r, 5); + + /* Convert to serialized form */ + serialize_mpi_array(output, outputlen, SM_MSG2_LEN, msg2); + + /* Free up memory for unserialized and intermediate values */ + gcry_mpi_release(r); + gcry_mpi_release(qb1); + gcry_mpi_release(qb2); + otrl_sm_msg_free(&msg2, SM_MSG2_LEN); + + return gcry_error(GPG_ERR_NO_ERROR); +} + +/* Create third message in SMP exchange. Input is a message generated + * by otrl_sm_step2b. Output is a serialized mpi array whose elements + * correspond to the following: + * [0] = pa, [1] = qa, Alice's halves of the (Pa/Pb) and (Qa/Qb) values + * [2] = cp, [3] = d5, [4] = d6, Alice's ZK proof that pa, qa formed correctly + * [5] = ra, calculated as (Qa/Qb)^x3 where x3 is the exponent used in g3a + * [6] = cr, [7] = d7, Alice's ZK proof that ra is formed correctly */ +gcry_error_t otrl_sm_step3(OtrlSMAliceState *astate, const unsigned char* input, const int inputlen, unsigned char **output, int* outputlen) +{ + /* Read from input to find the mpis */ + gcry_mpi_t r, qa1, qa2, inv; + gcry_mpi_t *msg2; + gcry_mpi_t *msg3; + gcry_error_t err; + + *output = NULL; + *outputlen = 0; + astate->sm_prog_state = OTRL_SMP_PROG_CHEATED; + + err = unserialize_mpi_array(&msg2, SM_MSG2_LEN, input, inputlen); + if (err != gcry_error(GPG_ERR_NO_ERROR)) return err; + + if (check_group_elem(msg2[0]) || check_group_elem(msg2[3]) || + check_group_elem(msg2[6]) || check_group_elem(msg2[7]) || + check_expon(msg2[2]) || check_expon(msg2[5]) || + check_expon(msg2[9]) || check_expon(msg2[10])) { + return gcry_error(GPG_ERR_INV_VALUE); + } + + otrl_sm_msg3_init(&msg3); + + /* Store Bob's g3a value for later in the protocol */ + gcry_mpi_set(astate->g3o, msg2[3]); + + /* Verify Bob's knowledge of discreet log proofs */ + if (otrl_sm_check_know_log(msg2[1], msg2[2], astate->g1, msg2[0], 3) || + otrl_sm_check_know_log(msg2[4], msg2[5], astate->g1, msg2[3], 4)) { + return gcry_error(GPG_ERR_INV_VALUE); + } + + /* Combine the two halves from Bob and Alice and determine g2 and g3 */ + gcry_mpi_powm(astate->g2, msg2[0], astate->x2, SM_MODULUS); + gcry_mpi_powm(astate->g3, msg2[3], astate->x3, SM_MODULUS); + + /* Verify Bob's coordinate equality proof */ + if (otrl_sm_check_equal_coords(msg2[8], msg2[9], msg2[10], msg2[6], msg2[7], astate, 5)) + return gcry_error(GPG_ERR_INV_VALUE); + + /* Calculate P and Q values for Alice */ + r = randomExponent(); + qa1 = gcry_mpi_new(SM_MOD_LEN_BITS); + qa2 = gcry_mpi_new(SM_MOD_LEN_BITS); + gcry_mpi_powm(astate->p, astate->g3, r, SM_MODULUS); + gcry_mpi_set(msg3[0], astate->p); + gcry_mpi_powm(qa1, astate->g1, r, SM_MODULUS); + gcry_mpi_powm(qa2, astate->g2, astate->secret, SM_MODULUS); + gcry_mpi_mulm(astate->q, qa1, qa2, SM_MODULUS); + gcry_mpi_set(msg3[1], astate->q); + + otrl_sm_proof_equal_coords(&(msg3[2]), &(msg3[3]), &(msg3[4]), astate, r, 6); + + /* Calculate Ra and proof */ + inv = gcry_mpi_new(SM_MOD_LEN_BITS); + gcry_mpi_invm(inv, msg2[6], SM_MODULUS); + gcry_mpi_mulm(astate->pab, astate->p, inv, SM_MODULUS); + gcry_mpi_invm(inv, msg2[7], SM_MODULUS); + gcry_mpi_mulm(astate->qab, astate->q, inv, SM_MODULUS); + gcry_mpi_powm(msg3[5], astate->qab, astate->x3, SM_MODULUS); + otrl_sm_proof_equal_logs(&(msg3[6]), &(msg3[7]), astate, 7); + + serialize_mpi_array(output, outputlen, SM_MSG3_LEN, msg3); + otrl_sm_msg_free(&msg2, SM_MSG2_LEN); + otrl_sm_msg_free(&msg3, SM_MSG3_LEN); + + gcry_mpi_release(r); + gcry_mpi_release(qa1); + gcry_mpi_release(qa2); + gcry_mpi_release(inv); + + astate->sm_prog_state = OTRL_SMP_PROG_OK; + return gcry_error(GPG_ERR_NO_ERROR); +} + +/* Create final message in SMP exchange. Input is a message generated + * by otrl_sm_step3. Output is a serialized mpi array whose elements + * correspond to the following: + * [0] = rb, calculated as (Qa/Qb)^x3 where x3 is the exponent used in g3b + * [1] = cr, [2] = d7, Bob's ZK proof that rb is formed correctly + * This method also checks if Alice and Bob's secrets were the same. If + * so, it returns NO_ERROR. If the secrets differ, an INV_VALUE error is + * returned instead. */ +gcry_error_t otrl_sm_step4(OtrlSMBobState *bstate, const unsigned char* input, const int inputlen, unsigned char **output, int* outputlen) +{ + /* Read from input to find the mpis */ + int comp; + gcry_mpi_t inv, rab; + gcry_mpi_t *msg3; + gcry_mpi_t *msg4; + gcry_error_t err; + err = unserialize_mpi_array(&msg3, SM_MSG3_LEN, input, inputlen); + + *output = NULL; + *outputlen = 0; + bstate->sm_prog_state = OTRL_SMP_PROG_CHEATED; + + if (err != gcry_error(GPG_ERR_NO_ERROR)) return err; + + otrl_sm_msg4_init(&msg4); + + if (check_group_elem(msg3[0]) || check_group_elem(msg3[1]) || + check_group_elem(msg3[5]) || check_expon(msg3[3]) || + check_expon(msg3[4]) || check_expon(msg3[7])) { + return gcry_error(GPG_ERR_INV_VALUE); + } + + /* Verify Alice's coordinate equality proof */ + if (otrl_sm_check_equal_coords(msg3[2], msg3[3], msg3[4], msg3[0], msg3[1], bstate, 6)) + return gcry_error(GPG_ERR_INV_VALUE); + + /* Find Pa/Pb and Qa/Qb */ + inv = gcry_mpi_new(SM_MOD_LEN_BITS); + gcry_mpi_invm(inv, bstate->p, SM_MODULUS); + gcry_mpi_mulm(bstate->pab, msg3[0], inv, SM_MODULUS); + gcry_mpi_invm(inv, bstate->q, SM_MODULUS); + gcry_mpi_mulm(bstate->qab, msg3[1], inv, SM_MODULUS); + + /* Verify Alice's log equality proof */ + if (otrl_sm_check_equal_logs(msg3[6], msg3[7], msg3[5], bstate, 7)) + return gcry_error(GPG_ERR_INV_VALUE); + + /* Calculate Rb and proof */ + gcry_mpi_powm(msg4[0], bstate->qab, bstate->x3, SM_MODULUS); + otrl_sm_proof_equal_logs(&(msg4[1]), &(msg4[2]), bstate, 8); + + serialize_mpi_array(output, outputlen, SM_MSG4_LEN, msg4); + + /* Calculate Rab and verify that secrets match */ + rab = gcry_mpi_new(SM_MOD_LEN_BITS); + gcry_mpi_powm(rab, msg3[5], bstate->x3, SM_MODULUS); + comp = gcry_mpi_cmp(rab, bstate->pab); + + /* Clean up everything allocated in this step */ + otrl_sm_msg_free(&msg3, SM_MSG3_LEN); + otrl_sm_msg_free(&msg4, SM_MSG4_LEN); + gcry_mpi_release(rab); + gcry_mpi_release(inv); + + bstate->sm_prog_state = comp ? OTRL_SMP_PROG_FAILED : + OTRL_SMP_PROG_SUCCEEDED; + + if (comp) + return gcry_error(GPG_ERR_INV_VALUE); + else + return gcry_error(GPG_ERR_NO_ERROR); +} + +/* Receives the final SMP message, which was generated in otrl_sm_step. + * This method checks if Alice and Bob's secrets were the same. If + * so, it returns NO_ERROR. If the secrets differ, an INV_VALUE error is + * returned instead. */ +gcry_error_t otrl_sm_step5(OtrlSMAliceState *astate, const unsigned char* input, const int inputlen) +{ + /* Read from input to find the mpis */ + int comp; + gcry_mpi_t rab; + gcry_mpi_t *msg4; + gcry_error_t err; + err = unserialize_mpi_array(&msg4, SM_MSG4_LEN, input, inputlen); + astate->sm_prog_state = OTRL_SMP_PROG_CHEATED; + + if (err != gcry_error(GPG_ERR_NO_ERROR)) return err; + + if (check_group_elem(msg4[0]) || check_expon(msg4[2])) { + return gcry_error(GPG_ERR_INV_VALUE); + } + + /* Verify Bob's log equality proof */ + if (otrl_sm_check_equal_logs(msg4[1], msg4[2], msg4[0], astate, 8)) + return gcry_error(GPG_ERR_INV_VALUE); + + /* Calculate Rab and verify that secrets match */ + rab = gcry_mpi_new(SM_MOD_LEN_BITS); + gcry_mpi_powm(rab, msg4[0], astate->x3, SM_MODULUS); + + comp = gcry_mpi_cmp(rab, astate->pab); + gcry_mpi_release(rab); + otrl_sm_msg_free(&msg4, SM_MSG4_LEN); + + astate->sm_prog_state = comp ? OTRL_SMP_PROG_FAILED : + OTRL_SMP_PROG_SUCCEEDED; + + if (comp) + return gcry_error(GPG_ERR_INV_VALUE); + else + return gcry_error(GPG_ERR_NO_ERROR); +} |